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Abstract 
This thesis investigates Australia's experience in introducing agriculture for wood 
production. Australia now has a dual wood production system - one based on native 
forests, managed, it is argued, under multiple use principles, and the other based on an 
agricultural model (tree crops or plantations). I examine the proposition that because 
Australia's wood and wood products industry is dominated by commodity production, 
the multiple use approach to native forest management for wood production is 
fundamentally flawed and should be replaced by an approach that can explicitly 
recognise and reconcile ecological and industry goals. The sustainability framework 
developed by Costanza & Patten (1995) was used to develop a strategic land use 
approach for native forest conservation and wood production superimposed by a 
plantation processing industry policy. The approach enabled coherency in ecological 
and industry policy because the key strategies to maintain native forest ecological 
integrity and to enhance the competitiveness of a commodity wood and wood products 
industry were found to be complementary. 
Australia's maturing plantation estate offers significant ecological, industrial and socio-
economic benefits through substitution of native forest commodity wood and wood 
products. In 1999/00 Australia sourced slightly more than half its wood from 
plantations and, although plantation wood supply doubled over the 1990s, native forest 
wood supply remained unchanged. During the 1990s, the forest and wood industry 
policy of the Federal Government largely ignored the opportunity to facilitate increased 
investment to process Australia's maturing plantation resource. The thesis documents 
and examines institutional constraints to public policy that facilitates the substitution of 
plantation products for native forest products in commodity markets. This knowledge 
can be used in policy development where product substitution is identified as an 
integral part of the approach to reconcile ecological and industry goals. 
The 1960s was a fundamental turning point for Australian forestry. The legacy of its 
softwood plantation policy is now being realised in Australia's increased plantation 
wood · supply. The thesis presents a historical review of the 1960s softwood plantation 
policy, comprising a reconstruction of the events leading to the policy and an 
evaluation of its implementation. The review adds to Australia's forest history literature 
and deepens our understanding of Australia's current plantation wood supply potential. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
1 .1 Thesis context 
This thesis investigates Australia's experience in introducing agriculture for wood 
production. Until tree crops (plantations) were planted and matured, Australia relied on 
native forests for its domestic wood resource. In the early 1950s, plantations supplied 
only six per cent of Australia's wood - five decades later they supplied 54 per cent and 
the share continues to increase (Forestry and Timber Bureau 1969; Australian Bureau 
of Agricultural and Resource Economics 2001a). Today, Australia has a dual wood 
production system, one based on native forests managed, it is argued, under multiple 
use principles, and the other based on an agricultural model (National Forest Inventory 
1998). The wood from each is highly substitutable and technology, embodied in new 
products and processes, enhances substitutability in the markets for finished products. 
Growing wood as an agricultural crop or by managing native forests requires different 
approaches and has different implications for environmental management and industry 
structure. Furthermore, competition between the two parts of the industry can affect 
regional socio-economies. Since a significant proportion of the land base used in both 
systems is publicly owned, there is an extra legitimacy to public debate about how 
Australia's wood needs are met. 
During the 1990s, the forest and wood industry policy of the Federal Government 
largely ignored the opportunity to facilitate increased investment to process Australia's 
maturing plantation resource (Clark 1999c, 1999d). Instead, policy focussed on 
encouraging additional tree planting, and creating 'security' for native forest wood 
supply including the removal of certain Federal Government regulations on the 
industry. This policy preference was emphasised in the Federal and State Government 
regional forest (meaning native forests and plantations) agreement (RF A) process 
aimed at developing internationally competitive forest-based industries that maximise 
value-adding opportunities and efficient use of resources, as well as protecting forest 
biodiversity. The forest options presented for public consultation as part of the RF A 
process excluded the plantation resource. Why the plantation resource was ignored is 
unclear, yet, as will emerge below, would appear to be a vital omission from a process 
intended to set a new, sustainable future for the wood and wood products industry in 
Australia. 
On the basis of the research presented in this thesis, I argue that a fundamental aspect 
of the conflict over Australia's native forests is inter-industry competition. This 
competition is between an old industry using native forests and a relatively new 
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industry using plantations - that includes parts of the old. Product substitution in the 
market underpins this competition. Australia's transition from native forests to 
plantations is a tangible example of resource saving product and process substitution, as 
proposed by von Weizsacker et al. (1997) and Hawken et al. (1999), across a range of 
industry sectors and consumer items. They argue that increased resource productivity -
doing more and better with less - enhances company profitability and global living 
standards and reduces human environmental impacts. Like Hawken et al. ( 1999), my 
thesis extends past a narrow focus on product substitution as being solely for economic 
efficiency gains. Both pieces of work identify the fundamental ecological and industry 
goals, and product substitution has been identified as an integral part of the approach to 
reconcile them. 
I examine the proposition that, because Australia's wood and wood products industry is 
dominated by commodity production, the multiple use approach to native forest 
management for wood production is fundamentally flawed and should be replaced by 
an approach that can explicitly recognise and reconcile ecological and industry goals. 
This is essential where the goals are at odds and existing policy approaches seeking a 
'balanced' outcome require major trade-offs. The nature of commodities means that 
producers compete largely on price and therefore constantly seek cost reduction 
opportunities to maintain profits (H.A. Simons Ltd. & McLennan Magasanik 
Associates 1990; Humphreys 1992; Clark 2001 a). The price-cost squeeze of 
commodity production typically forces native forest managers to adopt intensification 
technologies, similar to those used in agriculture, that threaten the ecological integrity 
of native forests. Costanza & Patten (1995) developed an approach to sustainability 
whereby systems deemed in the public interest are identified for protection and 
strategies developed to enhance their capacity to persist. I used this approach to 
examine the proposition that Australia -should adopt a strategic land use approach 
superimposed by a plantation processing industry policy. On the basis that 95 per cent 
of the production of Australia's wood and wood products industry is directed to 
commodity markets, I propose that the principal land allocation task is largely one of 
matching the plantation resource to industry production and native forests to the 
maintenance of ecological integrity. The emphasis on plantation processing is argued 
on the grounds that a highly integrated domestic industry structure enhances the 
commercial viability of wood growing over the long-term ( and therefore its capacity to 
persist) and also enhances rural socio-economies through the employment and wealth 
that manufacturing generates. 
Product substitution - from native forest to processed plantation products - is a key 
element of the approach emerging from the research undertaken in this thesis. That 
Australia's 1990s native forest and wood industry policy failed to adopt such an 
approach, despite the then strong and continuing growth in plantation wood supply, 
warrants examination. Queensland and W estem Australia were the exceptions to 
Australia's 1990s policy in that, towards the end of that decade, they developed and 
implemented policies to facilitate the transition of their wood based industries to 
existing plantations. This break from mainstream forest and wood industry policy 
warrants investigation. 
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Projections of wood supply from Australia's plantation estate differ markedly 
(Cameron & Penna 1988; Australian Forestry Council 1989; Resource Assessment 
Commission 1992a; Clark 1995a; James et al. 1995; National Plantation Inventory 
1997; BIS Shrapnel Forestry Group Pty. Ltd. 2000). These differences remained 
unresolved over the 1990s despite the critical importance of this information for policy. 
Low wood supply projections relative to Australia's wood consumption support 
arguments for expansion of the plantation estate and continued use of native forests. 
This view aligns with Australia's 1990s forest and wood industry policy. Alternatively, 
projections indicating an adequate plantation resource to meet Australia's wood 
requirements support arguments for a more immediate industry transition from native 
forests to plantations. This view aligns with the policies of the Queensland and Western 
Australian Governments. The lack of clarity over Australia's plantation wood supply 
potential and the policy implications are investigated in this thesis. 
Forestry is characterised by the long lead times needed to grow wood. Most Australian 
softwood plantations have been managed over rotations of approximately 30 - 35 years 
(Clark 1995a; Turner & James 1997a). A historical examination of 1960s plantation 
policy and its implementation is important background to understanding the situation 
with Australia's plantation wood resource in the 1990s and early 2000s. The 1960s was 
a fundamental turning point in Australia's forest policy. The Federal Government 
embarked on a states rights challenge and, using financial arrangements, secured a 
significant acceleration in state based softwood planting. The significance of the policy 
is recognised from an array of perspectives (Rule 1967; Carron 1985; Routley & 
Routley 1974; Dargavel 1995; Frawley 1999), but how the policy was developed has 
been exposed to little investigation. Government files held in the National Archives of 
Australia were opened for this thesis under the 30-year rule to help recreate the events 
and circumstances resulting in 1960s policy. 
A key element of 1960s forest policy was the establishment of a national softwood 
plantation area target based on projections of Australia's wood consumption in 2000 
(i.e. when the first plantations established under the 1960s program would mature). The 
historical review undertaken in this thesis of the planting targets and wood consumption 
projections helps to clarify the wood supply potential of Australia's softwood 
plantations from the late 1990s. 
1 .2 Objectives 
The objectives of the thesis are to: 
• document and examine Australia's 1960s softwood plantation policy and its 
implementation to provide the background to Australia's 1990s plantation resource. 
• present a framework for sustainability in Australia's wood production system and 
native forest ecosystems. 
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• use this framework to evaluate Australia's performance over the 1990s and the 
Federal Government's 1990s forest and wood industry policy. 
• examine Australia's native forest and wood industry policy environment in the 
1990s and the information and advice provided by the Australian federal public 
service. 
• explore the nature of impediments to product substitution policies by documenting 
stakeholder responses to new information for policy and the processes generating 
such information. 
• report on what we can learn from Australia's 1990s native forest and wood industry 
policy experience. 
1.3 Contributions to knowledge 
This thesis is developed on the understanding that the nature of commodity production 
is fundamental to identifying the problem manifested in Australia's native forest 
conflict. Without this understanding it may not be possible to develop a policy 
framework to reconcile ecological and industry goals. Several analysts ( e.g. Sedjo & 
Lyon 1990; Humphreys 1992) have reported on the power of commodity production to 
drive change in the system of wood production and implementation of wood-saving 
technologies. The contribution my thesis attempts to make is in presenting a framework 
that enables coherency in ecological and industry policy. 
The thesis also attempts to contribute to forest and wood industry knowledge and 
understanding in its documentation and examination of institutional constraints to 
public policy that facilitates product substitution (i.e. plantation products for native 
forest products in commodity markets). · 
The recreation of the events and circumstances resulting in Australia's 1960s softwood 
plantation program, using Federal Government recently opened files under the 30-year 
rule, adds to Australia's forest history literature. 
1.4 Thesis outline 
The thesis covers a wide field commencing with a historical account of the challenges 
facing Australia's early foresters in the 19th century through to institutional behaviour at 
the tum of the 20th century. It combines history with industry economics, forestry, 
ecology, institutional analysis, and government policy analysis. All investigation needs 
boundaries and for this thesis they are as follows. The study focuses on the Australian 
experience. Although it refers to the New Zealand plantation program, its purpose is 
not to provide an inter-country comparison. The focus is on softwood plantations 
because they dominated Australia's plantation supply during the 1990s - eucalypt 
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plantations therefore receive less attention although the issues are similar. The policy 
analysis focusses on the 1990s, because this was when large areas of Australia's 
softwood plantations established in the 1960s matured, and focussses on Federal 
Government policy because this level of government overwhelmingly dominated 
Australian native forest and wood industry policy. 
The ecological issues surrounding Australia's plantations can be separated into those 
associated with the existing resource, including their potential for immediate native 
forest conservation gains, and future wood growing systems. This thesis focusses on 
issues surrounding Australia's existing plantation resource although the framework on 
which the analysis is based can accommodate future wood growing issues. 
This thesis considers the industrial sector, namely the use of wood for paper, sawn 
timber and wood panels, and in so doing focusses on the wood resource from 
plantations and native forests rather than woodlands. Such a separation is becoming 
less tenable for Australia with native forest wood used for charcoal production and 
proposals for new charcoal plants and biomass-fed power production using native 
forest and plantation wood. Incorporating fuel wood and charcoal extends the analysis 
to include Australia's woodlands because they supply most of Australia's firewood 
(Williams et al. in press). The focus on industrial wood and wood products, for time 
and space reasons, is consistent with the United Nations FAQ separation of the wood 
and wood products industry into its industrial and fuel wood components. Appendix F 
provides a brief discussion of the fuel wood component of the Australian industry. 
Chapter 2 presents the background to the study by documenting how and why 
agriculture for wood production was introduced into Australia in the late 19th century. 
The chapter describes the challenges facing Australia's foresters in securing a wood 
resource to meet the nation's needs and describes the forestry institution building that 
took place from the mid 19th century to the end of the 1950s. Chapter 3 uses Federal 
Government files, opened for this thesis by the National Archives of Australia under 
the 30-year rule, and published sources, to describe how the Federal Government 
decided in 1966 to finance a major acceleration in Australia's softwood planting. This 
policy aimed to secure Australia's self-sufficiency in wood by 2000 when the 
plantations matured after around 30-35 years of growing. Understanding 1960s policy 
illuminates Australia's current policy environment. 
Chapter 4 evaluates the implementation of the 1960s softwood plantation policy. It 
investigates whether the plantation area target was achieved and whether the 
consumption projections underpinning the area targets were realised. Through historical 
examination, this chapter presents an alternative approach to understanding Australia's 
softwood plantation resource, which avoids the conflict surrounding 1990s plantation 
wood supply projections. Chapter 5 presents a framework for sustainability in 
Australia's wood production system and native forest ecosystems. Indicators are 
derived and used to evaluate Australia's wood and wood products industry performance 
in the 1990s. Chapter 6 examines the Federal Government's forest and wood industry 
policy in the 1990s and the factors influencing the policy. It evaluates this policy 
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against the indicators developed in chapter 5 and describes alternative policy 
approaches recently adopted by the Queensland and Western Australian Governments. 
Chapter 7 explores the nature of constraints to product substitution policies by 
documenting stakeholder and public service responses to new information for policy 
and the processes generating such information. 
In synthesis, chapter 8 reports on what can be learnt from Australia's 1990s native 
forest and wood industry policy experience. The thesis incorporates appendices that 
present information and quantitative data to support the analysis. 
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Chapter 2 
The introduction of agriculture for wood production 
in Australia 
2.1 Introduction 
In the mid 1960s the Federal Government announced its decision to finance a 
significant acceleration in public softwood planting ( chapter 3). The planting target was 
largely achieved ( chapter 4) and by 2000 softwood plantations provided around 75 per 
cent of the wood processed into sawn timber, wood panels and paper in Australia. 
Native forests provided 25 per cent ( chapter 6). 
It is difficult to gain from Australia's forest histories a sense of the competition brought 
to the wood and wood products industry by local plantation wood-growing. The written 
histories in the 1960s (notably Rule 1967) were too close to the events to evaluate the 
competition. Time is needed for planted seedlings to grow into merchantable wood, and 
wood supply from the earlier plantings was relatively small. Plantations accounted for 
15 per cent of Australia's wood supply in the mid 1960s (Forestry and Timber Bureau 
1969, p. 11). Furthermore, in the 1960s, softwood plantations were not considered a 
threat to Australia's native forest based hardwood industry because the plantings were 
largely perceived and promoted as a replacement to imported softwoods (chapter 3). 
With time, however, it became clear that increasing wood supply from Australia's 
maturing softwood plantations was generating significant structural change in the 
Australian wood and wood products industry (Resource Assessment Commission 
1992a; Clark 1995a; Stafford et al. 2000). I discuss the proposition that forest histories 
written well after the events of the 1960s, whilst not ignoring plantations, may have 
presented an incomplete assessment of the competitive relationships between the 
plantation and native forest parts of the Australian wood and wood products industry. 
Understanding inter-industry competition - underpinned by substitutability between 
plantation and native forest wood in commodity markets ( appendix F) - is essential for 
coherent native forest and wood industry policy ( chapter 5). 
One reason for forest histories underplaying inter-industry competition is that as the 
plantation and native forest based parts of the industry united against the perceived 
common threat of the emerging environment movement, it had the effect of masking 
industry competition. Significant forest environmental activism was triggered in the 
late 1960s and early 1970s by the coinciding events of the softwood planting program, 
with its widespread clearing of native forests to provide tree cropping land, and the 
introduction of native forest export woodchipping. Australia's forest histories have 
emphasised the competition between environmentalists and industry over native forest 
land use rather than the competition between the plantation and native forests parts of 
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the industry for market share (see, for example, Carron 1985; Dargavel 1995; Watson 
1990). 
Another related explanation is that forest terminology makes it difficult to distinguish 
clearly the plantation/native forest industry divide. Australia inevitably adopted the 
European forestry words 'silviculture', 'forest' and 'afforestation'. These words applied 
irrespective of whether the system related to native forests or plantations. 
Australia's early foresters wanted native forests to be managed as a tree cropping 
system. As environmental consciousness has grown, ecologically based regulations 
developed for native forests as a wood production system have helped to clarify 
Australia's dual wood production system - one using native forests as a self-
regenerating ecosystem and the other using an agricultural cropping system ( chapter 5). 
The duality of Australia's wood production system may be concealed by the 
widespread use of the word 'forest' to describe the collection of trees in both systems. 
Forests are contemporarily defined as plant communities dominated by trees meeting 
specific height or canopy criteria ( for definitions see, for example, Resource 
Assessment Commission 1992a; National Forest Inventory 1998). 1 Today there is 
greater government sensitivity to the 'masking' problem embedded in the word 'forest'. 
Few meaningful advances have been made, however, in separately identifying the 
economic wealth and employment generated by the native forest and plantation parts of 
the 'forest' industries. A recent example was provided in the Federal Government's 
brochure Australia's Forests - the Path for Sustainability: 
'Our forests and plantations also provide the basis for Australia 's forest 
industries employing about 80 000 people. The annual turnover is more 
than $12.2 billion. Employment and wealth flow directly from the wood 
products derived from the forests.' (Commonwealth of Australia 2001, 
p. 5). 
The word 'afforestation' - the action or result of converting into a forest - has been 
inappropriately used in Australia. Australia broadened the meaning of 'afforestation' to 
include the clearing of native forest land and its replacement with plantations. Until the 
1980s, most of Australia's plantations were established like other agricultural crops by 
clearing native vegetation (Cadman 1990; Cadman et al. 1991). The practice was 
described as afforestation although it was not a conversion of land to forests. Rather, it 
was a replacement of one type of forest - native forests - with another type of forest -
plantations. Afforestation, in the true sense, has been a relatively recent development in 
Australia (see, for example, Wood et al. 2001, p. 146 for time series land use data for 
south east Queensland). 
In providing the background to Australia's 1960s softwood planting program, this 
chapter aims to answer questions about Australia's early plantation experience. When, 
1 The Oxford dictionary defines forest as the outside wood - i.e. that lying outside the walls of the park, 
not fenced in; extensive tract of land covered with trees and undergrowth usually belonging to the king, 
set aside for hunting; a wide uncultivated waste, a wilderness; also the trees collectively of a forest. 
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how and why was agriculture for wood production introduced to Australia? Why did 
exotic softwood plantations dominate the plantings? When did plantation processing 
begin and how did this industry develop? 
My investigation covers 170 years, from the experiences of the first fleeters until the 
eve of the 1960s softwood-planting decision. The events and challenges of this period 
shaped the forestry institutions in Australia, and they, in tum, shape future events and 
policy ( chapter 3). I describe Australia's first stage (1800s-1959) in forestry institution 
building and aim to clarify the relationship between these institutions and Australia' s 
plantation policies. What was the stimulus for establishing state forest agencies? What 
wood supply challenges did they inherit and what role did they map out for plantations 
in resolving them and why? How did the Federal Government establish its stake in the 
wood and wood products industry and how did it contribute to Australia's plantation 
development? 
Non-government organisations were also formed in the first half of the 20th century. 
These organisations addressed a plethora of issues concerning industry, foresters, 
workers, conservation and the environment in the wood and wood products industry. 
How did they promote Australia's plantation effort in the period leading up to the 
1960s plantation decision? 
The overview presented here of the challenges, events and institution building in 
Australia's wood and wood products industry provides background to the 1960s policy 
of accelerating Australia's softwood planting. With a focus on the plantation part of 
Australia's early forest history, the chapter also provides background to later 
discussions about the struggle to change the misperceptions underpinned by the notion 
of a single 'forest' industry to a fuller understanding of the duality in Australia's wood 
and wood products industries. 
2.2 Australia's first plantings for wood 
The pressure to settle and make Australia an agricultural economy meant that large 
areas of native forest were quickly cleared. Governor Phillip's land grants to 
emancipated convicts for cultivation began the process, which continued with the 
introduction of land sales in the 1820s followed by the 1860s Land Acts. Lands 
Departments were established in the state colonies to administer land privatisation and 
settlement ( Clark M. 199 5). 
Forest removal was considered a private necessity and a public good (Griffiths 1992, p. 
17). The axe, plough and fire used to clear Australia's forests were later joined by more 
efficient equipment in a process that continues today (National Forest Inventory 2001 ). 
It is difficult to determine accurately Australia' s native forest loss since 1788 because 
the area of native forest before European arrival can only be estimated. With this 
qualification, Australia's State of the Forests Report published in 1998 considers that 
about 45 per cent of Australia's pre-European open and closed forests were cleared for 
agriculture by 1980. Clearing rates vary, with Victoria (59 per cent loss), New South 
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Wales (58 per cent loss) and South Australia (51 per cent loss) recording the greatest 
percentage reductions (National Forest Inventory 1998, p. 69). 
Forest clearing was encouraged by the various governments, the gum tree was widely 
despised (Bonyhady 2000, p. 163), and wood was perceived as superabundant. The 
scale and intensity of Victoria's 1860s gold rush was the first brake on this perception. 
Wood used for building, mining timbers and firewood surged with Victoria's 
migration-boosted population (Carron 1985, p. 179). Dargavel describes the Victorian 
gold fields as places of: 
'The grossest assaults on the forests' ... 'where people cut almost every 
tree around them. What was not used was wasted or burnt.' (Dargavel 
1995, p. 60). 
The Colonial Government imposed little constraint. Its view was that wood should be 
available at virtually no cost to the thousands of people eking a living in the gold fields 
(Carron 1985, p. 179). 
A community increasingly concerned about unnecessary forest destruction and its 
effects on water supply challenged this laissez-faire policy. Their voice was the Argus 
and Australasian newspapers (Bonyhady 2000, pp. 163-4). The 1864 drought deepened 
community fears that forest clearing and timber getting would dry out the continent 
even more. The Argus argued for preserving native forests as an interim measure whilst 
exotic trees more suited for cropping were established - specifically, evergreens from 
countries with similar climates to Australia's, such as Italian stone pines. The weekly 
Australasian argued that tree felling reduced ground moisture and demanded that 
unnecessary felling by timber-getters be slopped so Victoria would not become another 
Sahara. Bonyhady (2000, p. 165) identified George Perkins Marsh's Man and Nature, 
which reached Victoria in 1865, as something that underscored the view that 
deforestation would result in wood shortages, erosion, . floods, climate change and loss 
of plants and animals. Marsh's influence was immediately apparent in the 1865 Report 
on the Advisableness of Establishing State Forests, by Victoria's Surveyor General, the 
Assistant Commissioner of Lands and Survey and the Secretary for Mines, warning of 
an imminent shortage of wood unless forests were reserved and waste reduced. The 
report recommended plantations of eucalypts and exotic species for wood supply and 
other services. They also suggested that 'overgrown' trees in native forests be replaced 
with deciduous trees and high quality wood-producing softwoods (Carron 1985, pp. 
179-80; Bonyhady 2000, p. 165). The report appears to be Australia's first official 
proposal to plant trees for wood. Whilst the Government quickly reserved more native 
forests (Bonyhady 2000, p. 165), commercial tree planting did not commence in 
Victoria until 1880 (Carron 1985, p. 198). 
Agriculture for wood production in Australia started tentatively in 1873. The South 
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Australian Government introduced subsidies for private farmers to plant trees because 
of a fear of wood shortages. Lewis2 (1975, p. 7) observed that the State's indigenous 
wood supply was constrained by its small forest and woodland cover and by only 1.1 
per cent of the state receiving over 635 mm of rain per year. By the 1860s, concerns 
about the rate of forest clearing were being expressed within the South Australian 
parliament and bureaucracy. 
In 1870 George Woodroffe Goyder, South Australia's Surveyor-General, alerted 
F.E.H.W. Krichauff, Member of the South Australian House of Assembly, to the 
possibility of a future wood supply problem. In September 1970, Krichauff advised the 
House of Assembly about the need for forest reservation, preserving native trees for 
wood and planting or replanting the reserves as permanent state forests with valuable 
indigenous or exotic trees for wood supply (Lewis 1975, p. 14). 
In response, Goyder and Dr Richard Schomburgk, Director of the Adelaide Botanic 
Gardens, prepared a report recommending the forest areas to be reserved (Jacobs 1972, 
p. 9). Krichauff presented the Forest Trees Planting Encouragement Bill that resulted in 
the South Australian Forest Trees Act No. 26 of 1873 (Jacobs 1972, p. 9). The Act 
encouraged tree planting through a financial bonus, by issuing a Land Order valued at 
£2 for planted areas exceeding five acres. The bonus could be used to buy crown land 
or pay interest on already purchased land (Lewis 1975, p. 14). Advice on what species 
to plant and where was provided by the Adelaide Botanic Gardens. Private landowner 
response was minimal. Only four applications were received and only one approved 
(Lewis 1975, p. 14). The scheme was superseded in 1881 by a free tree scheme that 
lasted to 1924. Over the four decades (1881 to 1924), 11 million trees were distributed 
to more than 63 000 landholders (Lewis 1975, p. 14). 
In this embryonic period, tree planting was perceived as the joint responsibility of 
private landowners and government. The role of private landowners diminished as 
South Australia began building its public forestry institutions. The Forest Board was 
established in 187 5 - the first government forest management organisation in the then 
British Empire (Institute of Foresters of Australia 2000). Goyder was appointed 
Chairman, a position he held from 1875 to 1882 (Jacobs 1972, p. 9). Before the arrival 
in 1878 of the first Conservator of Forests in South Australia, John Ednie Brown, 
Goyder drew up prescriptions for the establishment of plantations and implemented 
them. Nurseries were established at Bundaleer Springs, Wirrabara and Mt Gambier. 
The first public plantings - of pines and eucalypts - were undertaken at Bundaleer in 
1876 (Lewis 1975, p. 15). These plantings effectively began agriculture for wood 
production in Australia. Lewis described the event: 
'In February 18 7 6, Nurseryman Curnow and two men began the 
clearing of a thousand acres for what was to become Plantation A.' 
(Lewis 197 5, p. 15). 
2 Norman Benjamin Lewis entered the South Australian Woods and Forests Department as a cadet 
forester in 1938 and later headed the Forest Management Division, playing a pivotal role in advancing 
radiata pine plantations (Borschmann 1999, p. 183). 
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Under Goyder's command it took only a year for 132 756 trees to be propagated at the 
Bundaleer nursery. There was much trial and error in propagation and planting but by 
1881 regular annual plantings were being undertaken at Bundaleer, Wirrabara, Mount 
Burr, Mount Gambier and Mount Muirhead Flat (Lewis 1975, pp. 15-6). 
Plantation establishment in the other Australian states effectively commenced in the 
early 20th century. In northern New South Wales a nursery was established at Tuncurry 
in 1911, and 73 000 trees had been planted with prison labour by 1914 (Carron 1985, p. 
48). Planting over the next four decades in New South Wales was sporadic (Forestry 
and Timber Bureau 1969, p. 142). Planting rates and plantation productivity was 
affected by fire, poor tree growth due largely to the low quality of land used for 
planting, public concerns about clearing native forests for softwood plantations and 
World War II (Carron 1985, pp. 48-9). 
Softwood plantings in Tasmania commenced in the l 920s on the plains of the north 
west and west coast (Carron 1985, p. 89). The failure of these early plantings - due to 
soil nutrient deficiencies - encouraged the forest agency to purchase higher quality 
derelict agricultural land previously covered with eucalypt forests for planting (Carron 
1985, p. 89). Softwood planting was confined largely to abandoned agricultural land 
through to the 1960s. 
Queensland commenced experimental plantings of native and exotic tree species before 
World War I (Meyer 1985, p. 18; Carron 1985, p. 115). Queensland's first commercial 
plantations (80 per cent indigenous hoop pine (Araucaria cunninghamii) and bunya 
pine (Araucaria bidwillii)) were established in the early 1920s in the Mary Valley, 
Fraser Island and at Atherton (James, Young and Clark 1995, p. 181). Carron (1985, 
pp. 116-7) observed that the policy gradually developed to plant hoop pine on rainforest 
sites that had been cleared after the extraction of commercial wood for sawing, and 
faster growing exotic species, mainly slash pine (Pinus elliotti), on the coastal lowlands 
closer to the Brisbane market. 
Western Australia's trial plantings of radiata pine in the late 19th century on coastal 
sandy soils near Bunbury were a failure (Western Australian Forests Department 1969). 
Research over the next 40 years solved the silvicultural problems of the early planting 
experiences that ranged from mycorrhizal fungi to soil trace element and nutrient 
deficiencies (Morris and Clark 1995, p. 221 ). Radiata pine was planted on degraded 
agricultural land in the south west of the state (purchased because of the insufficiency 
of appropriate quality reserved native forest land) and Pinus pinaster (pinaster pine, 
maritime pine) was planted on the coastal sands closer to the Perth market (Carron 
1985, pp. 162-3). 
Section 2.10 discusses the planting performance of each of the states as the 1950s drew 
to a close. 
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2.3 Focus on softwood 
Australia's unfamiliar eucalypts did not appeal immediately to the first fleet sawyers 
and carpenters. The 18th century European technology they brought, in tools and 
practices, was shaped by centuries of using northern hemisphere conifers, oaks and 
beech. Governor Phillip wrote to Lord Sydney, Britain's Secretary of State for the 
Home Department, expressing the frustration: 
'The timber of the site is well described in Captain Cook's voyage but 
unfortunately it has one very bad quality which puts us to very great 
inconvenience: I mean the large gum-tree which splits and warps in 
such a manner when used green, to which necessity obliged us, that a 
storehouse boarded up with this wood is rendered useless.' ( quoted from 
Carron 1985, p. 1 ). 
After six weeks in Australia, Surgeon-General White wrote of Australia's wood: 
' .. . the timber of this country is very unfit for the purpose of building: 
nor do I know of any purpose for which it will answer except for 
firewood and for that it is excellent; but in other respects it is the worst 
wood that any country or climate ever produced.' ( quoted from Carron 
1985, p. 2). 
The colonists were not completely dependent on the unfamiliar eucalypts. Indigenous 
softwoods were soon discovered. Sydney, Hobart and Brisbane - the British colony's 
first main settlements - were all in close-proximity to coastal softwood species. Red 
cedar (Toona australis syn. Cedrela australis) was discovered on the Hawkesbury 
River in 1790 and Huon pine (Dacrydium franklinii) in the Macquarie Harbour 
catchment by 1815 (Dargavel 1995, p. 18). These logs float, a property that enabled 
relatively easy transport to Port Jackson and Hobart Town. Hoop pine was sighted by 
Surveyor General Oxley when he sailed up the Brisbane River in 1823. It was a 
valuable resource for the early settlement of Brisbane (Holzworth 1999, p. 15). 
Australia's relatively limited indigenous softwood forests were vulnerable and quickly 
over-exploited for building (Carron 1985, p. 99; Morrison 1999, p. 263 ; Holzworth 
1999, p. 20). Not all the colonists had access to cedar, huon and hoop pine and a trial 
and error process of sawing Australia's unfamiliar trees was necessary. She-oaks 
(Casuarina spp.) provided framing poles, roof shingles and weather boards, cabbage 
tree palms provided slab cladding and numerous species of eucalypts were also used for 
building (Dargavel 1988, pp. 3-5). 
As settlers became familiar with indigenous trees, detailed accounts of the uses for 
Australian wood were produced. In 1910, the Technological Museum of New South 
Wales published A Research of Pines of Australia, followed in 1919 with The 
Hardwoods of Australia and their Economics (Baker & Smith 191 O; Baker 1919). 
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Swain,3 the Chairman of the Queensland Forestry Board and early promoter of 
cropping indigenous hoop,4 produced a remarkably detailed work describing 200 
indigenous hardwood and softwood tree species in Queensland and their potential uses 
(Swain 1928a). Swain was keen to have the less-used tree species, particularly of the 
mixed subtropical forests, used more widely. This book was the culmination of decade-
long research by the Wood Technological Branch (Carron 1985, p. 105). 
Despite the species diversity, accessible information on their commercial application 
and processing innovation, Australian hardwoods have not been able to secure and 
maintain a position of importance in the Australian sawn timber market. Rather, the 
Australian sawn timber industry conformed to the softwood standard of northern 
hemisphere developed countries. Grenning5 wrote in the late 1920s that Australia had 
never seriously departed from the 'softwood standard' (Grenning 1928). H.R. Gray, a 
lecturer in Forest Management at the Australian Forestry School, writing after World 
War I observed: 
'The very rapid increase of softwood importations in the boom years 
following the war is an indication that consumers' preference for 
softwoods was not seriously weakened by their experience of the use of 
native hardwoods during the war.' (Gray 1935, p. 6). 
Exotic species - radiata pine 
Planting exotic trees for wood sits uneasily with today's ecological consciousness but 
was very much the practice under British Colonial Government. Improvement, not just 
of the land but of individuals and society, was on the agenda. Gillbank explained this 
dominant view: 
'In the mid-nineteenth century Nature was appreciated for its generous 
provision of a grand diversity of biological resources around the world. 
However, it was widely argued that the distribution of those resources 
could and should be improved. To enhance human survival and comfort, 
exotic plants should be introduced into regions not adequately blessed 
by Nature.' (Gillbank 1993, p. 4). 
Acclimatisation societies sprang up in Australia in the 1860s ( Griffiths 1992, p. 15) to 
introduce and disperse exotic plants and animals throughout the colony as well as 
promote the protection of native forests (Taylor 1994, p. 48). They were motivated by a 
desire to enrich the country and also to provide colonists with fond memories of home. 
Respected citizens supported acclimatisation societies, notably botanist Dr Ferdinand 
3 Edward Harold Fulcher Swain, born in Sydney in 1883 , was Director of Forests Queensland (1918-24), 
Chairman of the Queensland Forestry Board (1924-32), consultant to Australian Paper Manufacturers 
Ltd. (1933-34) , Commissioner for Forests in New South Wales (1935-48) and United Nations forestry 
consultant to Ethiopia (1951-55) (Meyer 1985, p. 26). 
4 Swain later moderated his view about exotic species and introduced Southern (USA) pines to 
Queensland. 
5 V.A. Grenning joined the Queensland Forest Service in 1922 becoming Director in 1932, a position he 
held until 1964 (Carron 1985 , pp. 102, 108). 
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Mueller (later Baron) who became Victoria's first Government Botanist in 1853. 
Noting that Victoria's 'forests are devoid of the larger coniferous trees', Mueller 
pressed for their enrichment with desirable exotic plants that nature had not managed to 
incorporate into them (Gillbank 1993, p. 7). Mueller was keen to introduce a wide 
range of pines to Victoria's alps, mentioning Norway spruce, silver fir, larch, 
Weymouth fir, Douglas pine and the pitch pines of North America, as evidenced in his 
highly circulated 1871 Industrial and Technology Museum Lecture 'Forest Culture in 
its Relation to Industrial Pursuits'. The lecture was illustrated with pictures of 
Californian and Himalayan pines and other species that he recommended for cultivation 
and samples of their timber presented (Gillbank 1993, p. 7). Mueller's focus on pines 
did not mean he saw no value in Australia's eucalypts. In his lecture, Mueller also 
called for careful management of native forests. He prolifically catalogued Victoria's 
indigenous plant species and their uses and expressed concern about forest loss and 
annihilation, arguing that forests supplied commodities and wider environmental 
values. Mueller's views were those of mainstream 19th century Australian society that 
was more familiar with exotic trees and regarded softwoods as traditionally appropriate 
for meeting their building needs. 
The exotic softwood species that rose to prominence was radiata pine (Pinus radiata D. 
Don). It is one of the 80 northern hemisphere species in the genus Pinus and one of the 
more than 300 species in the conifer family (Thomas 2000, p. 5; Scott 1960, p. 5). 
Radiata pine is native to three small areas on the Californian coast - Swanton, Cambria 
and Monterey. Native stands of radiata pine were estimated to cover less than 4 000 
hectares in those areas in 1931 (Scott 1960, p. 12). 6 Grown in its native habitat, radiata 
pine was considered insignificant as a tree and unimpressive for its wood (Lindsay 
1937, p. 5; Scott 1960, p. 1 & 26). 
South from Vancouver Island in lowland British Columbia, and particularly around 
other parts of California, radiata pine was planted as an ornamental tree more 
extensively than any other pine (Lindsay 1937, p. 44). Lindsay observed that radiata 
pine was planted in areas devoid of trees and it was radiata pine's rapid growth and 
'fresh foliage' that made it attractive as an ornamental (Lindsay 1937, p. 44). Its appeal 
was enhanced by the ease of collecting large volumes of seed that maintained their 
viability over long periods. Radiata pine belongs to a group of 16 species named the 
Insignes (Scott 1960, p. 5) 7 that are characterised by retention of the cones on the tree 
for a number of years with periodic opening and closing of the cone scales to release 
viable seed. Radiata pine seed is easy to propagate, plant and grow (Scott 1960, p. 83). 
Human selection initially for ornamental reasons shifted radiata pine from is position of 
relative obscurity in its natural environment to prominence. 
Radiata pine reached Australia in the mid 1850s. The first authenticated date of its 
arrival is 1857 with the recorded receipt by the Director of the Sydney Botanic Gardens 
in a 'List of Plants and Seeds received during 1857' of '1 pinus insignis per ship' 
6 This excludes the two-needled form (P. radiata var. binata) that occurs in Mexico on Guadalupe 
Island. 
7 Included in this group is Pinus pinaster - another species planted on a commercially viable scale in 
Australia. 
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(Fielding 1957, p. 15; Lewis 1975, p. 17). Fielding considers that von Mueller probably 
received a radiata pine tree at a similar time because his records list radiata growing in 
Victoria in his 'Report of the Government Botanist to Parliament, 1858'. It has been 
suggested that radiata pine seeds came in ballast dumped at Newcastle by ships 
carrying coal to California or with gold miners travelling from California in the 1850s 
(Rule 1967, p. 117; Entrican 1963, p. 4). If true, this would mean that radiata pine 
reached Australia a few years before 1857. 
von Mueller recognised his role in distributing radiata pine in Australia. In a copy of his 
1891 'Select Extra Tropical Plants Readily Eligible for Industrial Cultivation or 
Naturalization with Indications of their Native Country and some of their Uses', 
Mueller made his handwritten comment: 
'Most extensively distributed through the Colony of Victoria and also 
some other parts of Australia since 1859 by the author of this work.' 
(Fielding 1957, p.15. acknowledging J.H. Willis). 
von Mueller is acknowledged by Walter Gill, South Australia's Conservator of Forests 
(1890 to 1923), for introducing radiata pine to South Australia (Fielding 1957, p. 15). 
By around 1866, radiata pine was familiar to South Australian arboriculturalists with 
the pine growing in town environments and an avenue of radiata pine planted in the 
Botanic Gardens. Not surprisingly, radiata pine was included in South Australia's 
plantation trials. The recommendation to include radiata pine in the early planting trials 
came from a Scottish nurseryman, Edwin Smith, Goyder's brother in law (Lewis 1975, 
p. 17). 
It was initially hoped that South Australia, through tree cropping, could supply the 
better timbers of species grown interstate, namely eucalypts, and also its own sugar 
gum (Lewis 1957a, p. 15; Lewis 1975, p. 16).8 South Australia's early tree plantings 
were largely eucalypts (South Australian sugar gum was widely planted but also blue 
gum, red gum, and manna gum) as well as European hardwoods ( oak, elm, ash, 
sycamore, walnut, poplar and willow) and various European and North American pines 
(Lewis 1975, p. 16). About 30 softwood and 80 hardwood species were trialed in 
plantations in South Australia after 1876 (Lewis 1957b ). Lewis reported: 
' ... the planting of Eucalypts has not been very successful and the 
original hopes of providing a local supply of the better timbers of 
species grown interstate have not materialized.' (Lewis 1957 a, p. 15). 
The poor growth rates of eucalypt species potentially suitable for plantation growing 
meant that it was unlikely they could compete commercially with native forests of the 
other states or with preservative-treated softwood (Lewis 19 5 7 a, p. 15). Of the pines 
8 Lewis was writing in 1957, well before the environment controversy surrounding radiata pine 
plantations and therefore free of any desire to defend the decision to focus plantings on radiata pine. 
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trialed five showed 'major promise' - radiata, pinaster, Aleppo, Corsican pines and the 
Canary Island pine. Lewis enthusiastically wrote: 
'Of these, radiata pine was, and has remained, outstanding. It proved 
singularly adaptable to most soils and sites within the better rainfall 
areas of South Australia and soon showed itself destined to become the 
tree from which the State's man-made forest resource would be built. ' 
(Lewis 1975, p. 21) 
The decision to concentrate the state's plantings to radiata pine had been made by the 
late 1890s. Lewis wrote: 
'The unqualified adaptability of Pinus radiata to South Australian 
conditions was early evident, and afforestation with this species, 
particularly in the South East, has been primary policy for nearly 60 
years following the initial emphasis on Eucalypts.' (Lewis 1957b ). 
The decision to concentrate planting to predominantly radiata pine was made on its 
observed superior growth relative to numerous other species in trial plantings. No 
mention was made of any published quantitative assessment work. As for food crops, 
observation and · experience not scientifically framed and reported investigation 
determined the initial selection of radiata pine by South Australians. 
Scientific work on radiata pine's growth performance in Australia effectively 
commenced in the 1950s (Cromer et al. 1955; Cromer & Carron 1956; Cromer & 
Brown 1956; Lewis 1957a, 1957b; Cromer & Pawsey 1957; Cromer 1961). As 
plantations matured, foresters needed yield tables to know what volumes could be 
committed to processors. Research was further motivated at this time by the pulp and 
paper industry's interest in small, cheaper logs, which raised the then contentious 
management issue of thinning plantations. Because the aim of the research was to guide 
management decision making for an already established radiata pine crop, studies were 
generally not concerned with its growth performance relative to other species. 
Radiata pine's observed rapid growth in the South Australian planting trials was largely 
due to favourable moisture conditions and the absence of pests and diseases in its new 
environment. The climate for radiata pine in its natural habitat is characterised by mild 
winters and dry summers with humidity from sea fogs or mists enabling it to survive 
summer droughts (Lindsay 1937, pp. 12-21). Swain explained radiata pine's success in 
South Australia as a combination of the region's soil and moisture conditions: 
' ... the South East of South Australia was a homoclime of Monterey, save 
for its mean annual rainfall was more than double that of its native 
habitat, and the growth response to added moisture was enormous in the 
sandy hollows.' (Swain 1969, p. 6).9 
9 Swain was highly critical of radiata pine describing it as a 'gross and gawky tree' (Carron 1985, p. 
104). 
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The competitive and sometimes collaborative relationship between softwood plantation 
enthusiasts in Australia and New Zealand further encouraged radiata pine planting. 
Leon McIntosh Ellis was appointed Director of the New Zealand Forest Service in 
1919 and forcefully proposed a wide-ranging policy overhaul. Flush with the 
confidence of reinforced views after observing North American softwood forestry 
practices whilst attending the 1923 British Empire Forestry Conference in Canada, Ellis 
secured government support for the goal of increasing New Zealand's softwood 
plantation estate from 10 000 acres ( 4 000 hectares) to 300 000 acres ( 121 000 
hectares) by 1935. The goal was exceeded - partly because planting was used as an 
unemployment relief measure during the depression (Kirkland & Berg 1997, pp. 45-54; 
see also figure 3.1 for a historical comparison of New Zealand and Australian softwood 
planting). Swain wrote that New Zealand's 1920s radiata pine planting profoundly 
influenced South Australia's Conservator of Forests: 
'He had been thunderstruck at the sight of the New Zealand Radiata 
plantations extending in immense areas of plantations. He immediately 
multiplied the South Australian plantings in the South East and was the 
author of its present prosperity.' (Swain 1969, p. 6). 
New Zealand's 1960s planning for a second planting wave triggered alarm bells 
amongst Australian foresters and was instrumental in focussing State Governments on 
the 'imperative' to plant softwoods. 
Softwood plantation processing 
-The first recorded processing of radiata pine was in 1902 when a 20 year old tree from 
South Australia's Wirrabara plantation was sawn to make 28 apple cases for export 
(Lewis 1975, p. 23). This event marks the beginning of a new and more visible 
competition in the Australian wood products industry. Most sawn timber processing is 
undertaken by many private companies who compete in the marketplace for sales. 
Competition between suppliers of native forest and plantation wood has been less 
visible because State Governments own most of Australia's native forests used for 
wood production and, until recently, undertook most tree planting (chapter 3; Wood et 
al. 2001 ). This more visible, processing-based competition has helped to clarify and 
therefore distinguish Australia's dual wood production system. 
It is simplistic to view the relationship between wood grower and processor as a clear 
public and private sector separation. The South Australian Woods and Forests 
Department acted to ensure that its softwood planting program did not fail at a most 
vulnerable point - when mature wood came onto the market. Initially, radiata pine was 
poorly received by a building industry used to imports of high-grade mature Baltic pine 
and Oregon sawn timber from old-growth forests of the northern hemisphere (Lewis 
1999, p. 183). Walter Gill developed a two-pronged strategy to deal with radiata pine's 
poor market reception (Carron 1985; Lewis 1975). The first was marketing. He worked 
to convince a doubtful industry, elements within other state forest agencies and the 
public of the utility of plantation softwoods by displaying a wide range of products 
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made from radiata pine (Carron 1985, p. 219). The second strategy was to put 
processing under the direct control of the Department of Woods and Forests. The 
Department partly blamed private industry's poor processing standards for radiata 
pine's poor market reception, although it was inevitable that there would be teething 
problems in sawing and drying the unfamiliar and young trees. The larger South 
Australian plantation sawlogs that were coming on stream were failing to attract 
buyers, and unsatisfactory _ product standards among private sawmillers using the 
cheaper thinnings logs stimulated the Department to invest in processing. The first 
South Australian Government sawmill was built in 1903 to make sawn timber for apple 
cases and building. Further sawmills were built, purchased or up graded to produce 
sawn timber for building, flooring, weather boards, mouldings and cases (Lewis 197 5, 
p. 23-8). By the mid 1930s there was widespread acceptance of radiata pine for 
building and other applications (Lewis 1957b ). 
The wisdom of South Australia's early tree planting was proved by the late 1950s when 
the plantations were supplying wood of a sufficient volume to attract major private 
sector investment. Coreboard Ltd. ( a subsidiary of Softwood Holdings) began 
particleboard production at Mt Gambier in 1957, South Australia Perpetual Forests 
(SAPFOR) opened a large sawmill at Tarpeena in 1958, APCEL Ltd. (a joint venture 
between APM Ltd. and Cellulose Aust. Ltd.) began making tissue paper near Snuggery 
in 1960, Panelboard Pty. Ltd. began production of flakeboard in 1960 and a further 
particleboard plant was opened by Softwood Holdings in 1967 (Lewis 1975, p. 37). 
Max Jacobs, a key architect of Australia's 1960s softwood plantation program (chapter 
3), drew on South Australian achievements: 
'South Australia has been transformed between 1870 and 1970 from a 
Colony without a significant forest resource to the State having the 
largest sawmills in Australia.' (Jacobs 1972, p. 10). 
Because of South Australia's early planting history, the state played a crucial role in 
demonstrating the considerable processing-based employment and industry 
development benefits at a time when the Federal Government was considering a major 
financial stimulus for softwood planting Australia wide. Jacobs' use of the word 
'forest' masks the agricultural model underpinning this initiative. 
2.4 State forest agencies 
Other Australian states followed South Australia's lead in establishing their forest 
agencies in the first two decades of the 20th century (Carron 1985; table 2.1 ). Initially, 
most forest agencies were branches within land departments - a strategy the 
government used to clip their power and protect the settlement program. 10 Rivalry 
between foresters and lands department bureaucrats stimulated foresters to gain their 
10 The W estem Australian forest agency was responsible to the Minister for Mines and the Queensland 
forest agency remained in the Lands Department until 1960 (Carron 1985, p. 109, 144). 
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bureaucratic independence through legislation to become directly accountable to 
parliament via a minister for forests ( Carron 1985; Frawley 1999). 
Table 2.1 Establishment of major forestry institutions and events* in Australia (1857-1959). *Events of 
relevance to the plantation sector of the industry. Environment movement and worker union 
organisations are not included. Source: Fielding (1957); Jacobs (1972); Lewis (1975); Carron (1985) ; 
Dargavel (1995) ; Pine Australia (2001). 
c 1857 Radiata pine arrives in Australia 
1865 First official report recommending planting trees for wood -Victoria 
1873 First government encouragement of commercial tree planting - South Australia 
1875 Forest Act South Australia 
1876 First public tree planting for wood - South Australia 
1895 Timber Merchants and Mill Owners' Association established - Western Australia 
1902 
1905 
1908 
1910 
1911 
1912 
1913 
1916 
1917 
1919 
1920 
1921 
1922 
1924 
1927 
1928 
1935 
1938 
1943 
1945 
1946 
1947 
1949 
1951 
1957 
1959 
First recorded processing of plantation wood - South Australia 
Associated Country Sawmillers established - New South Wales 
Forest Act Victoria 
Creswick Forestry School (Victoria) commences operation (officially opened in 1913) 
First Interstate Forestry Conference - Sydney 
Australia's first professional (university based) forestry school - South Australia 
Second Interstate Forestry Conference - Melbourne 
Sawmillers' Association established - Western Australia 
Third Interstate Fores try Conference - Adelaide 
Forest Act New South Wales 
Fourth Interstate Forestry Conference - Perth 
Forest products laboratory established by the Federal Government in Perth (three year 
life) 
Forest Act Western Australia 
Fifth Interstate Forestry Conference - Hobart 
Forest Act Tasmania 
Sixth Interstate Forestry Conference - Brisbane 
Empire Forestry Association formed 
Seventh Interstate Forestry Conference - Sydney 
Forest Act Queensland 
Commonwealth Forestry Bureau established - Australian Forestry School established as 
a Division of the Bureau and located in Canberra 
Division of Forest Products established within the Council for Scientific and Industrial 
Research 
Tasmanian Timber Organisation established 
Institute of Foresters of Australia established 
Queensland Timber Industry Stabilisation Board established 
Eastern States Timber Industry Stabilisation (ESTIS) conference established 
Tasmanian Timber Association (from Tasmanian Timber Organisation) established 
Commonwealth Forestry and Timber Bureau - revamped Commonwealth Forestry 
Bureau with additional powers and responsibilities 
Country Sawmillers' Association established - Victoria 
Interstate forestry conferences recommenced after 25 years 
Associated Sawmillers' and Timber Merchants ' Association (from Sawmillers 
Association) established - Wes tern Australia 
Victorian Sawmillers Association (from Country Sawmillers' Association) established 
Radiata Pine Association of Australia established 
Australian Timber Industry Stabilisation (AUSTIS) conference established 
Frawley (1999, p. 38) argued that the massive changes taking place in sawmill 
technology with the advent of steam power also drove forest agency establishment. 
These technologies enabled larger sawmills and required a secure log supply to justify 
the investment. The tramways, which could cost as much as a sawmill, being used to 
open up the forests added to the desire for resource certainty (Dargavel 1995, p. 26). 
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Conflicts between sawmillers over the best patches of forest also contributed to 
resource uncertainty (Dargavel 1995, p. 26). To protect their investment, sawmillers 
directly lobbied State Governments to intervene and reserve forests against the steady 
march of land clearing and wood waste, to allocate resources to mills and make a start 
on regenerating forests (Frawley 1999, p. 38). 
State forest agencies saw their role as protecting and managing forests to meet the 
community's wood needs for housing and infrastructure. Their foresters faced a huge 
task securing the protection of Australia's forests from the land clearers and 
unregulated logging. They inherited a legacy of forest exploitation, cosy arrangements 
between government and industry and practically no administration of logging 
regulations by lands department bureaucrats (Frawley 1999, p. 37). Added to this was 
the vacuum of knowledge about Australia's forests and the growth characteristics of its 
tree species. 
The role of British Empire forestry in shaping the early Australian foresters' response 
to their challenges is a common theme in forest histories (Carron 1985; Griffiths 1992; 
Dargavel 1995; Frawley 1999). Visits by Empire forestry experts and British Empire 
Forestry Conferences provided policy directions to the colonies. Conferences were held 
in Australia and New Zealand in 1928 and 1957. Empire forestry was based on 
centuries of European forestry experience and more recent colonial forestry experience 
in India and Africa. Frawley (1999) argued that European forestry had crystalised over 
the centuries into what was considered a venerable profession concerned with the 
protection, cultivation and harvesting of trees. Australia's early foresters decided that 
the nation's indigenous forests should also be similarly managed to provide a crop of 
young, healthy, straight trees bearing hi~h quality timber to replace the 'over mature' , 
disorderly forests they had inherited. It is difficult to envisage how the early foresters 
could have acted differently. 
The foresters were well networked, overcoming the distances that separated them 
through interstate fores try conferences and shifting their employment around the for est 
agencies (see footnotes accompanying the introduction of each leading forester). 
Interstate fores try conferences commenced in 1911, and seven conferences were held 
up to 1924 (table 2.1). In 1924, the conferences ceased for 25 years, collapsing under 
the weight of intense interstate rivalry and personal antagonisms (Carron 1985, p. 303; 
Meyer 1985). 
The interstate forestry conference agenda comprised three main items - reserving native 
forests for wood production, planting trees and gaining administrative control over 
reserved forests. The prime recommendation of the first interstate forestry conference 
(Sydney 1911) was for 'special enactments in all states to provide for the conservation, 
maintenance and planting of forests, the creation of permanent and inalienable 
reserves, and the appointment of permanent authorities with statutory power for 
administrative control.' (Jacobs 1972, p. 13). Tree planting was incorporated into 
Australia's forestry agenda from the beginning. 
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During the 1920s, the forest agencies defined why and how 'forests ' would be 
managed. The first qualified (Oxford) Australian forester, Norman William Jolly, 11 
argued that: 
'Forest management aims above all at continuity of supplies and the 
permanence of the industries dependent on the forest ... ' (Jolly, as quoted 
in Lane Poole12 1928, p. 98). 
Foresters perceived a future sawlog deficit, no doubt emphasised by the then high 
economic growth. Readily accessible native forests were heavily over-cut because of 
inadequate government control over logging in the early years, and supply to mills 
could not be maintained (Lane Poole 1928, p. 98). Obviously the early forester's first 
priority was to protect forests for wood production. 
In a paper titled Forest reservations necessary for Australia, Jolly presented his 
national target for reservation - 24.5 million acres (9 .9 million hectares) - at the fourth 
Interstate Forestry Conference held in Perth in 1917. The conference decided against 
setting a target but recommended that 'all prime forest areas should be permanently 
reserved' and that the state agencies request the issue be considered at the next 
Premier's Conference (Jacobs 1972, p. 14-5). The national forest reserve issue was , 
deferred at the Premier's Conference held in Sydney in May 191 7, and was left in the 
hands of the Premier of New South Wales to confer with other Premiers. At the next 
(fifth) Interstate Forestry Conference, held in Hobart in 1920, Swain argued for a forest 
reserve of 37.5 million acres (15.2 million hectares). Swain's colleagues rejected the 
proposal, reluctant to move from Jolly's target, which had been used in briefings to 
their Premiers. The conference formally adopted lolly's 24.5 million acres (9.9 million 
hectares) as an 'indigenous forest' target and recommended that it be considered at the 
Premier's Conference in May 1920 (Jacobs 1972, p. 15). The Premiers endorsed the 
target. 
The proceedings of the fifth Interstate Forestry Conference also presented a specific 
plantation area target in a note that stated: 
'At the instance (sic) of the Premier of NS. W the importance of 
ultimately appropriating a national forest area of about 30,000,000 
acres for the whole Commonwealth, to comprise about 25,000,000 acres 
of indigenous forest country, and about 5,000,000 acres of coniferous 
plantations, is being urged for Commonwealth and the States' 
consideration. ' (as quoted in Jacobs 1972, p. 16). 
11 Norman William Jolly was Director of Forests Queensland (1911-18), Forestry Commissioner in New 
South Wales (1918-25) , Professor of Forestry at Adelaide University (1925-26) , Forestry Commissioner 
in New South Wales (1926-33) and forestry consultant (1933-54) (Meyer 1985, p. 16). 
12 Charles Edward Lane Poole was Conservator of Forests in Western Australia (1916-21) , Forest 
Advisor to the Federal Government (1925-27) , Acting Principal of the Australian Forestry School (1927-
44) and Inspector General of Forests, Commonwealth Forestry Bureau (1927-45) (Meyer 1985 , p . 2). 
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The note suggests that the plantation target was not a direct outcome of the conference. 
Jolly, the proponent of the 9.9 million hectare 'forest' target, was Forestry 
Commissioner in New South Wales and a softwood plantation enthusiast (Carron 
1985). Swain, with his higher target, was also a tree-cropping enthusiast. The solution 
to the problem of changing the target after already briefing the Premiers was to 
establish two targets - the original target specifically for native forests (9 .9 million 
hectares) and another target for the more productive plantations (2 million hectares). 
Jolly and Swain based their area targets on their expectations of future wood 
consumption. Jolly assumed a population of 25 million people by around 1980-1990, 
consuming 23.6 million m3 of wood for sawn timber per annum (Jacobs 1972, p. 14). 13 
Australia's 17.1 million people in 1990 consumed wood products (sawn timber, panels, 
paper and other products) requiring 17.9 million m3 of wood to make (Australian 
Bureau of Agricultural and Resource Economics 1999a, p. 127). Jolly over-estimated 
Australia's wood consumption in 1990 by 32 per cent. 14 Swain's 15 million hectare 
area target was based on an assumed 3 000 super feet (7 .08 m3) of wood consumed per 
person (Carron 1985, pp. 242-3) - nearly eight times the then per capita consumption. 
Australia's per capita consumption of wood in 1990 was 1.03 m3 per person (Australian 
Bureau of Agricultural and Resource Economics 1999a, p. 127). 
I draw three points from this discussion as important background for later chapters, 
namely: 
• the national plantation area target was established together with the native forest 
reserve target as one of the first priorities of the state forest agencies, 
• the targets were based on high consumption projections, and 
• defining an area target followed by government endorsement underpinned the 
approach to securing future wood supply. 
The state forest agencies met the 9.9 million hectare native forest target by the mid 
1960s (Dargavel 1995, p. 68). 15 
The early foresters faced the daunting task of aligning the sawlog cut to industry's 
requirements. The perception that over-logging was occurring was widely held in 
forestry circles. Lane Poole's preference was to close the inefficient mills (Lane Poole 
1928, pp. 98-100). Jolly argued _that forest agencies should avoid such intervention: 
13 Consumption projections converted to metrics: 100 super feet= 0.235973 m3. 
14 I have compared Jolly's projection of Australia's wood requirements with Australia's consumption of 
wood for all uses. lolly's projection was limited to Australian consumption of sawn timber and sleepers, 
leaving out paper and wood panels. In 1990, Australia's consumption of sawn timber and railway 
sleepers required 12.5 million m3 of logs to make - half the figure Jolly had expected. 
15 The target was not undermined by subsequent allocation of public native forest land to nature 
conservation reserves. Australia had 11.9 million hectares of publicly owned multiple use native forests 
available for wood production in June 2001 (National Forest Inventory 2001) - exceeding lolly's target 
by 20 per cent. 
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'It is an invidious and thankless task for the Forestry Commission to 
attempt the necessary discrimination in this matter, and it would be 
more satisfactory to all concerned if the members of the trade would 
undertake this unpleasant and difficult work.' (Jolly, as quoted in Lane 
Poole 1928, p. 100). 
Swain considered that the pioneering of forestry in Queensland was much the same as 
in other countries, stating that addressing over-cutting reduced to an issue of 
expediency (Swain 1928b, pp. 775, 785). Swain estimated that Queensland had lost 
almost three-quarters of its original 113 million m3 of hoop, bunya and kauri pine 
through clearing, and that, by 1925, there would be only ten years of supply left if 
logging continued at the then rate of 2.8 million m3 per annum. The state's softwood 
shortage up to 1955 was estimated to total 78 million m3, the import cost of which was 
£40 million (Swain 1928b, p. 774). 16 Queensland decided to run down its native forest 
resource, before supply from 'tree crops' came on stream, in such a way that there 
would be a continuous if declining industry. Similarly, the Victorian Forest 
Commission decided not to reduce the native forest cut, but rather to accommodate 
Victoria's booming sawmilling industry. The Commission argued for permanent 
reservation of all vacant crown land with good timber, management control to 
maximise productivity, strict controls on grazing in forests and softwood planting (Lane 
Poole 1928, p. 130). 
As the 1920s drew to a close, the state forest agencies had broadly settled on a strategy 
of continuing the unsustainable logging of native forests they had inherited and 
establishing relatively high productivity plantations to fill the perceived wood deficit. 
They chose not to use the pricing mechanism to address the over-cutting problem 
because of the negative effects for their _client industry. Jolly spoke of the persistent 
complaints from sawmillers about high stumpages (the price of the log still standing) 
and explained the sawmiller's exposure to competition from cheap imported softwoods, 
steel, concrete and various wall and partition compositions. He considered that native 
forest hardwoods were of lesser market value to softwood sawn timber: 
' .. . so long as Sydney remains the chief market for the hardwood 
scantlings produced by country mills, ordinary hardwood mill logs will 
always be of low value in the forest.' (Jolly, quoted by Lane Poole 1928, 
p. 101). 
H.R. Gray, one of the first lecturers appointed at the Australian Forestry School (Carron 
1985, p. 263-4), was emphatic that cheap wood was essential to keep the market share 
of sawn timber up against 'the common enemy', namely competing non-wood 
products. Gray argued that foresters and sawmillers had a common interest in the 
maximum use of sawn timber and that: 
16 Monetary units are reported as those at the time, i.e. £ until the introduction of decimal currency in 
1966, because it enables a more precise reporting of plantation establishment costs and wood prices in 
chapter 3. 
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' .. . speculations as to the monetary ''profits" to be derived from forestry 
are futile, and are born of incomplete understanding of the role of 
forests in the economy of a country. From time immemorial it has been 
pointed out that forests and forest products are essential to man's well 
being. A civilization without them, even if it could exist, is not of a kind 
that one would like to live in. So forests are desirable, and timber is a 
national necessity. Wise government should ensure that supplies are 
abundant and cheap, so that the country's development may not be 
hampered.' (Gray 1928a, p. 637). 
Gray's writing demonstrates a clarity about the market realities of commodity 
production: 
'Timber is a commodity which is likely to maintain its general use in 
human economy only if supplies are assured, abundant and cheap.' 
(Gray 1936, p. 47). 
In contrast to Jolly and Gray, Swain forcefully argued that forestry should be a 
commercial business in its own right. Unlike other early foresters with their European 
forestry training, Swain received his forestry training in the United States (Meyer 1985, 
p. 26) where presumably the business ethic rubbed off. Swain argued that: 
'Forestry was helpless before the early tide of timber cheapness.' 
(Swain 1928b, p. 774). 
The badly over-logged native forest areas bequeathed to them were loaded with an 
expensive regeneration liability in the form of unmarketable trees to be removed before 
the new crops could be established. Swain understood that ' [ t]orestry by itself stands at 
the mercy of its markets ' but, in contrast to other foresters, he argued that they 'must 
master the market-place in order to achieve its crowning triumph in the silvical arena.' 
(Swain 1928b, p. 773). 
To do this, Swain advocated forestry as a business, in opposition to the teachings of 
English born or influenced foresters that were: 
'based on mediaeval European silviculture on the estates of nobility 
unconcerned for profit and loss' (Swain 1969). 
The historical writings of the forester's debate emphasise the personal antagonisms and 
the 25-year cessation of the Interstate Forestry Conferences after 1924 (Carron 1985, p. 
303; Meyer 1985, p. 33). At its heart were the difficulties foresters, as managers of a 
public resource, faced in defining and controlling their relationship with a cost sensitive 
private sector commodity industry. 
The for est agencies, after ruling out the use of the price mechanism and resource 
withdrawal to align the native forest log cut to a 'sustainable level', had to decide how 
Australia's forests would be managed for perpetual wood supply. The issue was 
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worked through using the third British Empire Forestry Conference held in Australia 
and New Zealand in 1928. The outcome was a policy to regenerate large areas of 
Australia's native forests with relatively fast-growing softwoods. Foresters were 
primarily concerned with tree growth for sawlog supply and also satisfying the market 
preference for softwood sawn timber. 
Foresters reported negatively on the regeneration of Australia's eucalypt forests: 
'[The] inherent trouble in the genus Eucalyptus of which no species is 
entirely free [is that] the eucalypts grow fastest for the first twenty to 
thirty years, and the wood formed in this period is generally very poor 
quality and does not make duramen. By the time the tree has reached an 
age to make heartwood the inner core is usually attacked by fungus 
disease or insect pests. No eucalypts are free from this trouble though 
some show it to a worse degree than others.' (Lane Poole 1928, p. 102) 
Jolly spoke of the unfortunate characteristic of the eucalypts whose reproduction is 
frequently 'much denser in fact than a wheat crop.' (Jolly 1928a, p. 506). Jolly argued 
that the rapid growth caused by competition for light means: 
'the forest assumes the appearance of a dense array of inverted feather 
dusters, entirely lacking in vigour, the effect being so rapid that in the 
course of five years a healthy crop may change into an unhealthy and 
weedy crowd of spindles. What is perhaps more important still is that 
the stems so developed, having no rigidity, sway tremendously in the 
wind, the threshing of the crowns thus preventing one another's 
expansion - even if the stems were strong enough to carry larger heads. 
With planted forests, on the other hand, the wider spacing in early youth 
not only allows vigorous growth to be maintained for a much longer 
period, but results also in strong stems with robust crowns, capable of 
standing in denser stocking than swaying spindles with only a fraction of 
the head.' (Jolly 1928a, pp. 506-7). 
Jolly mused about putting greater effort into searching for markets for inferior wood 
from Australia's native forests to pay for the cost of thinning (Jolly 1928a, p. 512). As 
discussed below, Australian researchers made the technological breakthrough in 
pulping eucalypts in the early 1920s. However, the outlet for thinnings remained 
uncertain because a pulpmill investment was required, the market prospects for paper 
made from eucalypt pulp remained to be tested, and establishing pulpmills in every 
native forest wood supply region was unrealistic. 
It was sensible for foresters to remain focussed on sawlog production because this was 
the main product demanded by the industry. Sawn timber accounted for 73 per cent of 
the wood products ( expressed in round wood equivalent units) consumed in Australia in 
1935/36 (Forestry and Timber Bureau 1969, p. 4). 17 Consumers also preferred 
17 This is the earliest available national wood and wood products consumption data. 
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softwoods in most sawn timber applications (Grenning 1928; Gray 1935). Non-durable 
eucalypts (such as the stringybarks and mountain ash) were considered inferior to 
softwoods for general purpose uses. This contrasted with Australia's durable 
hardwoods ( e.g. jarrah) that were in high demand domestically and overseas, 
particularly for infrastructure development such as railway sleepers ( Gray 1928a). 
Jolly concluded that: 
'Australian silviculture should concentrate primarily upon the growth of 
durable hardwoods for special purposes and of the "bread and butter" 
softwoods which constitute the bulk of the world's requirements, and 
which cannot be replaced satisfactorily by the miscellaneous species 
characteristic of rainforests.' (Jolly 1928a, p. 516). 
Lane Poole concurred: 
'Mr Jolly, in his Handbook on Forestry in New South Wales, has voiced 
what many of us have held for sometime, viz., that the non durable fast-
growing hardwood forests should be converted to more valuable conifer 
plantations.' (Lane Poole 1928, p. 103). 
Gray advised delegates to the third British Forestry Conference of the broad agreement 
for the softwood conversion: 
'It is considered by the foremost forest authorities in Australia that a 
large proportion of the indigenous forests composed of the less durable 
and comparatively light timbers species, will ultimately be converted to 
conifers, that will produce heavier stands in shorter time, of timbers 
more suitable for general structural purposes. Regeneration of eucalypt 
forests will be directed rather to those producing slower-growing 
durable poles, piles, beams, girders, and sleeper timbers.' (Gray 1928a, 
p. 630). 
The London Forestry Commission's global softwood supply outlook added a sense of 
urgency to the softwood conversion. At the 1928 conference, they reported that the 
world's virgin softwood forests would be exhausted within 3 8 years given the then 
consumption growth (Story 1928). This meant that by the time it took to grow a 
softwood sawlog under a plantation regime in Australia the market would be supplied 
by inferior softwood timbers (not the high quality sawn timber from North America's 
virgin forests that Australian consumers were then enjoying) making the plantation 
option and preservative treatment relatively more attractive. Australia's recent wartime 
experience of softwood shortages provided further encouragement for the softwood 
conversion, as did expectations of sawn timber price increases as global demand for 
sawn timber increased and supply tightened. 
Some Australian foresters acknowledged that eucalypts could technically substitute for 
softwoods in many applications (Grenning 1928, p. 64), but their strategy had to 
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embrace wider issues, namely their expectations of future, higher levels of sawn timber 
consumption, the regenerative capacity of Australia's eucalypt dominant native forests 
and consumer preference for softwood sawn timber. Grenning summed up the view in 
Australian forestry circles: 
'There is only one solution - softwood plantations.' (Grenning 1928, p. 
66). 
The 1928 British Forestry Conference delegates inspected softwood plantations in 
South Australia. By this time, South Australia had half a century of experience in 
radiata pine plantations and nearly three decades of processing experience. The 
conference endorsed the strategy of softwood conversion, although there were 
apprehensions about radiata pine providing a complete solution to Australia's softwood 
requirements because of the tree's exacting requirements (especially with regard to 
soils) and the vulnerability of large areas of monoculture plantings to insect and fungal 
attacks (Carron 1985, p. 221). 
Funding was the key factor constra1n1ng plantation establishment. The issue was 
discussed as early as the first Interstate Forestry Conference in 1911. The Tasmanian 
delegate, L. Rod way, suggested that 100 000 acres ( 40 500 hectares) per annum needed 
to be planted to meet Australia's wood needs and that Federal Government assistance 
might be required. At the next interstate conference (1912), H.R. Mackay, the Victorian 
Conservator of Forests, expressed concerns about State Government neglect of 
planting, and by 1920 the conference was calling for the Federal Government to 
subsidise state forestry operations and in addition provide adequate loan funds. At the 
seventh interstate conference in 1924, L.G. Irby, the Tasmanian Conservator of Forests, 
argued for increased 'afforestation' and -suggested a cooperative scheme with State 
Governments leasing suitable areas to the Federal Government and supervising the 
necessary operations with the Federal Government providing the finance (Jacobs 1972, 
p. 16; Carron 1985, pp. 241-4). Federal Government funding remained elusive until the 
1960s ( chapter 3). 
2.5 The Federal Government 
Federation saw a split in government powers affecting the Australian wood and wood 
products industry. The states retained their colonial responsibility for stewardship of 
crown lands and therefore large tracts of native forest. The Federal Government was 
granted wide powers affecting industry. The wood and wood products industry 
complex was not considered in the conventions preceding Federation (Jacobs 1972). 
The Royal Commission on the Constitution held between 1927-1929 investigated the 
issue of Federal Government responsibility for wood supply. All witnesses giving 
evidence to the Commission on forestry sought greater Federal Government 
participation (Jacobs 1972, p. 3). 
The constitution was not amended, but the Commission clarified the relationship 
between the State and Federal Governments on wood and wood products industry 
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matters. It advised that the Federal Government had no power to make laws with 
respect to forestry for the whole of the Commonwealth but that it could influence state 
forest policy by making loans for forestry, providing assistance and advice and by 
establishing a school of forestry that could be attended by students from the states. It 
also noted that if a council was established to control forestry in Australia and the 
Federal Government was represented (having responsibility over forests in the 
territories) it was likely the states in developing their forest policy would give greater 
attention to the needs of Australia and that there would be less danger of forest lands 
being sacrificed for settlement. (Jacobs 1972, p. 2). These clarifications guided the 
Federal Government in its forestry institution building. This commenced with the 
establishment of the Commonwealth Forestry Bureau in 1927 and continued to the mid 
1960s with the formation of the Australian Forestry Council (table 2.1; chapter 3). 
Commonwealth Forestry Bureau (later Commonwealth Forestry and Timber 
Bureau) 
In his 1919 article A forest policy for Australia, Lane Poole argued that a national forest 
policy was required to address the problems of forest exploitation and limited State 
Government funds for silvicultural work. Lane Poole listed the issues the policy should 
cover: land classification and forest reservation, development of working plans by 
professional foresters, a single professional forestry school, training for professional 
staff, research institutes for wood and wood products, and an extensive publicity 
campaign (Carron 1985, p. 243). This was a direct blow to Victoria's Creswick 
Forestry School, and Lane Poole was regarded by Sam Wadham, Professor of 
Agriculture at the University of Melbourne, and others, as 'the enemy' of Melbourne 
forestry (J.S. Turner, in an interview with Robin as documented in Robin 1993, p. 381). 
As discussed in chapter 3, Victoria was unenthusiastic about a national forest policy 
and associated institutions. Swain extended the national forest policy concept, writing 
in 1920 of the need for a federal secretariat of forestry. Swain's proposal included the 
establishment of a federal forestry fund using the revenue from a tariff on timber 
imports, the transferring of the Interstate Forestry Conferences into a Commonwealth 
advisory board on forestry and the provision of loans from the Commonwealth to the 
states for forestry (Jacobs 1972). 
In 1924, the Federal Government appointed Lane Poole as its forest advisor to, amongst 
other things, report on the forest situation in Australia and propose a national forest 
policy (Carron 1985, pp. 244-5). Included in Lane Poole's recommendations were plans 
for a national forestry bureau and a national forestry school. The Federal Government 
announced its intention to establish the bureau in 1925, following on the heels of state 
forest agency establishment (table 2.1 ). The Bureau was formed in 1927 with Lane 
Poole appointed Inspector-General of Forests. The Bureau was to collect information 
and undertake research with the aim of Australia becoming self-sufficient in wood and 
to do so in co-operation with the states. Swain's proposals for Federal Government 
funding were conspicuously absent from any decisions. 
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Silvicultural research for plantations and native forests was the big challenge facing 
foresters in the 1920s (Carter18 1928, p. 163). The Bureau established ten experimental 
stations for the study of silviculture, forest management and forest protection - two 
stations covering rainforests, four on sclerophyll forests and one each on seed testing, 
water erosion, wind erosion and softwood plantations. The softwood plantation station 
was established at Mt Burr, South Australia, in collaboration with the state's Woods 
and Forests Department (Lane Poole 1937, p. 42). Its research program was co-
ordinated with the Australian Capital Territory softwood plantations, which enabled the 
Bureau and the Australian Forestry School in Canberra (see below) to reap the 
experience and knowledge of Australia's most advanced softwood plantation region. 
Bureau officers traveled overseas to investigate species and districts that were of 
interest to Australian foresters from the point of view of introducing softwoods. 
Research results and other information were made readily available through pamphlets 
and bulletins published by the Bureau. These were heavily focussed on softwood 
plantation issues. By 1946 (the year the Bureau was revamped, as discussed below), the 
Bureau had published 28 bulletins; 18 covered plantation issues ( overwhelmingly 
softwoods), five covered eucalypt tree issues, and five covered generic issues. 
Lane Poole retired as Director of the Bureau in 1944. A post-war review resulted in the 
Forestry and Timber Bureau Act 1946 with the Bureau's name changed to the 
Commonwealth Forestry and Timber Bureau and its powers and functions extended to 
collecting information, undertaking research, providing advice and planning the 
national production and consumption of wood in co-operation with the states (Carron 
1985, p. 254). G.J. Rodger, Conservator of the South Australian Wood and Forests 
Depart1nent, was appointed Director-General, ensuring that softwood plantations would 
remain a priority. The Bureau continued its research, publishing another eight bulletins 
by the end of the 1950s, exclusively focussed on softwood plantation issues, namely 
growing and managing radiata pine and calculating plantation wood yields. 
Australian Forestry School 
Forestry education and training was undertaken within forest agencies or, for Victorian 
foresters, at the Creswick Forestry School, which opened in 1910 (table 2.1 ). Dargavel 
(1995, p. 73) argued that the imperial model required that the forest agencies be 
managed by professional (university educated) foresters. Australia's first such forestry 
school was established at Adelaide University in 1911. South Australia was 
significantly more advanced than other states in its forestry institution building (table 
2.1 ), so a forestry school could be viewed as a continuation of this infrastructure. A 
related explanation for South Australia's early start was that professional forestry 
training comes with the realisation of inadequate areas of high-grade forest (Ovington19 
1965, pp. 1-2). 
18 C.E. Carter was recruited by Jolly as one of the first lecturers at the Australian Forestry School in 
Canberra (Carron 1985, p. 264). 
19 J. D. Ovington was Professor of Forestry at the Australian National University, Canberra, and had a 
distinguished later career in the federal public service managing National Parks and other environmental 
portfolios. 
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Jolly established the forestry course at Adelaide University, becoming Instructor in 
Forestry in 1910. Shortly after, at the first Interstate Forestry Conference, Jolly 
suggested that a federal school was necessary, but the proposal was not considered 
worthy of discussion (Jolly 1928b, p. 677). 
In his paper Forestry Education in Australia presented to the third British Empire 
Forestry Conference, Jolly argued that, to be self supporting in softwoods, Australia 
needed to establish two million acres (0.8 million hectares) of 'coniferous forest' 
during the next 50 years, which would cost £20 million without allowing for interest. 
Jolly argued that funding be conditional on professional forestry: 
'The expenditure of that sum should not rightly be undertaken unless it 
is definitely laid down that the work is to be controlled and carried out 
by men trained to their job, and until those in authority realize the 
blunders and waste of the past and the possibilities for still worse results 
in the future, it were far better indeed for a halt to be called. Without 
education in forestry in Australia, real prowess simply cannot be made.' 
(Jolly 1928b, p. 682). 
From its beginnings, forestry education in Australia appeared to be as much about 
establishing Australia's softwood plantation estate as it was about managing native 
forests for wood production. 
The 1917 Interstate Forestry Conference in Perth revived lolly's proposal for a national 
forestry school and agreement was reached to locate the school in a native forest area of 
New South Wales. Subsequent interstate rivalry about the location of the school meant 
that the proposal lapsed because the states would not guarantee student numbers 
sufficient to justify the building investment (Carron 1985, p. 262). The deadlock was 
broken by Lane Poole, who working previously as Western Australia's Conservator of 
Forests, had experienced the frustration of trying to obtain trained foresters and 
understood the importance of a national forestry school (Meyer 1985, p. 10). Lane 
Poole was now forest advisor to the Federal Government and persuaded it to fund 
construction of the school in Canberra. Lane Poole commented favourably on the 
school's location being in easy reach of a wide range of 'managed forests of both 
hardwoods and softwoods' (Lane Poole 193 7, p. 43). Jolly also supported the Canberra 
location because it focussed attention on 'one of Australia's big forestry problems, viz., 
that of conversion from unsuitable to suitable species.' (Jolly 1928b, p. 678). 
Because there was no university in Canberra at the time, the Australian Forestry School 
was established as a division of the Forestry Bureau from 1927 to 1965, with students 
undertaking two years of their four year course at an approved Australian university. 
Lane Poole, as Inspector-General of the Commonwealth Forestry Bureau, became 
Principal of the school. Funding constraints saw much of the Forestry Bureau' s 
research (with softwood plantations a priority) undertaken by Australian Forestry 
School staff (Carron 1985, p. 253). In 1965, the Australian Forestry School was shifted 
to the Australian National University (ANU) to become the Department of Forestry. 
These institutional arrangements meant that foresters with a solid grounding in 
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softwood plantation growing issues occupied most of the senior management positions 
in state forest agencies during the 1960s and 1970s. 
Division of Forest Products, Council for Scientific and Industrial Research 
(CSIR) 
The European and North American domination of world pulp and paper production, 
based on abundant supplies of spruce, fir and hemlock, appears to have stifled research 
into pulping other plant species. By the early twentieth century, industry concerns about 
the ongoing supply of these standard pulping species stimulated research into pulp and 
paper making technologies using other tree species, including Australian eucalypts and 
radiata pine (Ward 1928). Australia, with its eucalypt-dominated forests, had no wood 
pulp processing capacity. Desire for greater wealth and the fear of higher import prices 
encouraged Australia to participate in this research effort (Benjamin 1928, p. 431 ). 
Foresters were enthusiastic because a eucalypt pulp mill would provide a commercial 
market for non-sawlog material from neighbouring native forests. 
Tasmania, Victoria and New South Wales investigated the feasibility of pulping 
eucalypts from 1915 to 1917 without apparent success (Benjamin 1928). Meanwhile, in 
1916, the Federal Government, in view of the emergencies of the war, established the 
Advisory Council of Science and Industry to advise on the application of science to 
industry. Committees were set up in each state. W estem Australia decided to research 
the commercial potential of small logs from its native forests. Lane Poole, then Western 
Australia's Conservator for Forests, headed the forest products sub-committee of the 
Advisory Council. In 1918, it investigated the pulping of young karri and jarrah 
(thinnings) and sawmill residues (Benjamin 1928). The research findings differed from 
earlier studies and, showing promise, it w_as decided to extend the work to include the 
main eucalypt species of other states (Benjamin 1928). 
In 1919, the Federal Government established a forest products laboratory in Perth.20 
This effectively marks the commencement of Federal Government forestry institution 
building. During its short three-year existence, the laboratory demonstrated the 
technical feasibility of making many grades of paper, including newsprint, solely from 
eucalypts (Benjamin 1928, p. 431 ). Concurrent research was conducted to produce 
substitutes for imported softwood by preserving wood and seasoning sawn timber using 
kilns (Carron 1985, p. 276; Frawley 1999, p. 40). 
Australian research was boosted when the Bruce Government passed the Science and 
Industry Act establishing the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) in 
1926. A Forest Products Division was established in 1928, and I.A. Boas, a chemistry 
lecturer at Perth Technical School (Carron 1985, p. 278), was appointed to head the 
research team. Boas recognised the limitations on state based forestry research. No state 
was able to afford the necessary research work on silviculture and wood use, there was 
little co-ordination between the states on silvicultural research, and only one or two 
20 The Western Australian government provided the site within the State's university and a grant to assist 
construction of the laboratory (Carron 1985, p. 277). 
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states were undertaking research on wood use (Boas 1936, p. 22). The Federal 
Government now had two organisations engaged in wood and wood products research 
and it used the fallen tree as the line of demarcation. Research into wood growing was 
the responsibility of the Commonwealth Forestry Bureau who undertook forestry 
education and co-ordinated silvicultural research. The CSIR Division of Forest 
Products was responsible for research into processing the wood. The research effort 
was centralised to CSIR's Melbourne office and was assisted with a grant from the 
Federal Government for new laboratories, donations of wood and sawn timber from 
industry, and money from Russell Grimwade for equipment (Carron 1985, p. 279). 
The Division of Forest Products established the feasibility of kraft pulping using radiata 
pine (Benjamin 1928, p. 434). This meant that, in the short space of a decade, 
Australian research established the feasibility of pulping eucalypts and radiata pine. 
2.6 Institute of Foresters of Australia 
The Institute of Foresters of Australia (IPA) was formed in 1935 by forestry graduates 
of Australian universities and the Australian Forestry School. Stephen Kessell, the 
Institute's first president, wanted the Institute to facilitate a closer collaboration 
between the states and the Federal Government on forest policy. Kessell believed that 
forestry needed rescuing from state parochialism and the personal antipathies between 
state foresters (Kessell 1938, p. 89). The threat of permanent closure of the Australian 
Forestry School was also high on the Institute's agenda. The school was temporarily 
closed in 1936 because of poor enrolments caused by lack of state support and 
economic depression (Carron 1985, pp. 265-6). 
Frawley (1999, p. 42) and Dargavel (1995, p. 73) described the Institute as the core of 
the Empire model with trained fores try professionals running government forest 
agencies. The dangers for the independence of forestry were recognised at the earliest. 
Kessel in his 1938 retiring presidential address urged the Institute to keep a distance 
from government: 
' ... if the Institute is to continue its career of usefulness as a professional 
organisation divorced from State policies and State politics, it must steer 
clear of any close departmental associations in its Divisions or central 
organisation.' (Kessell 1938, p. 93). 
The separation was effectively impossible. Kessell was at the time Western Australia's 
Conservator of Forests and other founding members of the Institute's council occupied 
senior government positions (Institute of Foresters of Australia 1936, p. i). Strong 
networks between the Institute and government bureaucracy were inevitable. The 
Institute lobbied for university forestry education recognising that forestry graduates, 
its membership core, were highly successful in filling senior positions in forest 
agencies (for an understanding of the employment prospects see Anon. 1936a, p. 16). 
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In addition to the Institute linking, through personal networks, state and federal forest 
agencies and the Australian Forest School, it was also financially supported by 
industry. The Institute viewed this support as recognition of the value of professionally 
trained foresters to industry and hoped the bond in sympathy and understanding that 
was developing during the post-war years between industry and foresters would 
continue (Anon 1936b, p. 2). 
The Institute's journal, Australian Forestry, together with its newsletters and 
conferences, provided additional mechanisms for networking and communicating 
information and opinions. The first paper to be published in Australian Forestry was on 
plant nutrients and pine growth in Western Australia (Kessel & Stoate 1936). Of the 11 
papers published in volume 1, number 1, six dealt with plantations,21 with the other 
papers covering generic forestry issues ( education, fire protection, plant anatomy, water 
catchments, soil science). There were no papers specifically addressing native forest 
issues. 
The journal's early focus on softwood plantations contrasted with the Institute's 
emblem, the leaves of Eucalyptus rostrata. This species was selected because it was the 
most widely distributed of the commercial eucalypt species. The leaves circled the fruit 
vessels and buds of an important member of each state's forest flora (Institute of 
Foresters of Australia 1936, p. iii). South Australia was not represented by a radiata 
pine cone, although radiata pine accounted for 80 per cent of the state's sawn timber 
production in 1936 (Forestry and Timber Bureau 1969, p. 49). 
2.7 Private processing companies 
Paper had been made in Australia since 1868 using rags, recycled paper and imported 
pulp (Dargavel 1995, p. 40-1). A wood-fibre feedstock was dependent on the technical 
and commercial feasibility of pulping eucalypts and radiata pine, work that was 
undertaken in the early 1920s. 
The Australian paper industry was rationalised in the years between the two world wars 
with newsprint produced by Australian Newsprint Mills Ltd. (ANM); packaging paper 
by Australian Paper Manufacturers Ltd. (APM); and printing paper by Associated Pulp 
and Paper Mills Ltd. (APPM) (Dargavel 1995, p. 41). Newsprint and packaging papers, 
made principally from softwood fibres, were the dominant paper grades - consumption 
of printing papers was relatively minor. 
By the late 1940s, the outlook for the Australian pulp and paper industry was 
overwhelmingly optimistic. Australia's paper consumption grew by an average 6.6 per 
cent per annum between 1945/46 and 1949/50 (Forestry and Timber Bureau 1969, p. 
39). With half of Australia's paper consumption met by imports there was potential for 
significant import replacement. Imports of wood pulp also accounted for one-third of 
21 A paper on world softwood resources was included in this group because it provided market 
information for the softwood plantation program. 
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the pulp used for Australia's paper production (Forestry and Timber Bureau 1969, p. 
39). Softwood fibre supply was the main constraint to import replacement. 
ANM decided to secure its softwood pulp for newsprint manufacture by entering into 
an agreement with Canadian mills in 193 7 to share the Australian newsprint market -
then all met by imports - on the condition that ANM bought softwood pulp from 
Canada (Dargavel 1995, p. 41). This agreement meant that ANM had no interest in 
secunng an Australian wood resource either from softwood plantations or native 
forests. 
APM decided to grow its own softwood resource. In 1951, it established the subsidiary 
company APM Forests Pty. Ltd. to secure the necessary wood supply and appointed 
W.G. Chandler22 General Manager. APM embarked on a program to establish 10 000 
hectares of softwood plantations close to its Maryvale Victoria mill (Chandler 1957, 
1960a). Softwood planting was facilitated by the Victorian Government through the 
Land (Plantation Areas) Act 1959, which empowered the Victorian Forests 
Commission to identify suitable land to lease for planting. Although the core of APM's 
paper operation was located at Maryvale, state decentralisation policies in a 
protectionist industry policy framework encouraged APM to look at interstate 
opportunities. Softwood planting commenced in Queensland in 1956 to feed a future 
pulpmill; trial plantings began in northern NSW in 1957; and, in 1960, APM 
announced the construction of a paper mill at Spearwood, Western Australia, 
suggesting that a pulpmill was a future possibility (Chandler 1960b; Mann 1990, p. 
161). 
Chandler communicated the company's experiences in softwood plantation 
establishment through the IFA's journal, _newsletter and conferences (Chandler 1953, 
1957, 1960a, 1960b, 1963). These communications provided valuable information on 
radiata pine planting techniques, management and costings. 
In contrast to Australia's highly concentrated pulp and paper industry, sawn timber and 
plywood was produced in 2 730 mills processing less than 4 000 m3 on average in 1960 
(Forestry and Timber Bureau 1969, pp. 5 & 148). As discussed above, the increasing 
regionally concentrated softwood plantation supply in South Australia enabled 
investment in larger sawn timber and wood panel manufacturing establishments. 
Australia's sawn timber consumption soared during the post-World War II 
reconstruction but, in contrast to paper, high sawn timber consumption growth rates 
were not sustained past the early 1950s (figure 5.4). Australia's wood growing regimes 
would be more likely to become increasingly focussed on supplying raw material for 
paper production, with sawn timber playing a lesser role ( chapters 3 & 5). 
Industry associations 
The first sawmillers' association formed in Western Australia in 1895, with sawmillers 
in other states following over the next half century (table 2.1 ). Associations in 
22 Chandler was also an IF A Councilor and Editor of Australian Forestry. 
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Queensland, Western Australia and Tasmania comprised both sawmillers and timber 
merchants - who also dried and dressed the sawn timber when necessary (Hanson 
1958). Producers using native forests and plantations were represented in these state 
based associations, sometimes as specific groups. For example, the New South Wales 
radiata pine sawmillers were represented as the Monterey Pine Group and the Victorian 
Sawmillers' Association had a softwood division. 
The Queensland Timber Stabilisation Board, comprising the state's smaller sawmillers 
and merchants, formed in 1938 to promote stability in the production and marketing of 
sawn timber amongst its members. The Queensland Sawmillers' Association 
represented the larger businesses operating in the Brisbane region. The Eastern States 
Timber Industry (ESTIS) formed in 1943 with membership comprising the Queensland, 
New South Wales, Victorian and Tasmanian sawmillers' associations and government 
forest agencies (Hanson 1958, p. 5; Dargavel 1995, p. 194). Its aim was for a 
'permanently stabilized native timber industry in Australia' by promoting stability in 
the production and marketing of 'Australian-grown' sawn timber and harmonious 
relationships between the forest agencies and sawmillers. A council conducted ESTIS 
business with representatives from each of the constituent organisations (Hanson 1958, 
p. 5). 
The Conference went national with the formation of AUS TIS in 1959. In the same year, 
the Radiata Pine Association of Australia was also formed. Softwood plantation sawn 
timber (principally radiata pine) accounted for 14 per cent of Australia's production in 
1959 (figure 5.4) and the industry knew it would soon outgrow its market of low-grade 
products such as packing case material. The principal aim of the Radiata Pine 
Association of Australia was to transform the then poor image of radiata pine to a 
highly regarded structural and appearance_product (Pine Australia 2001). 
Early expressions of competition between the softwood plantation and native forest 
based industry can be observed in the organisations formed in 1959. These expressions 
were overwhelmed in the 1970s and 1980s, however, as both the plantation and native 
forest industries were attacked by a forceful environment movement, and others 
increasingly concerned about native forest logging and extensive clearing for plantation 
establishment (chapter 4 and 6). 
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2.8 Environment movement 
Australia's 19th century conservation effort was very much a part of mainstream society 
(Robin 1998; Hutton & Conners 1999; Bonyhady 2000). Acclimatisation societies and 
scientific societies (royal societies or natural history societies) urged wise resource use 
and nature protection respectively, and sat reasonably comfortably with the colonies ' 
emerging identity and development. The early foresters, as discussed previously, were 
part of Australia's first wave conservation movement that lobbied influential people in, 
or well connected with, government and promoted public education on the importance 
of wise use and nature protection. 
The social base for the first wave, utilitarian-focussed conservation movement started 
to erode in the 1930s, intensifying with post-World War II industry development. The 
scientists and professionally trained resource managers were now largely in the public 
service that, in tum, became captured by development interests (Hutton & Conners 
1999). Post-war economic growth and its embodied technology created new 
environmental problems that were challenged less in closed meetings with government 
but increasingly in the public arena. Campaigns over Barrier Reef oil exploration, the 
Little Desert, Myall Lakes, Colong caves and Lake Pedder were increasingly played out 
in the public arena, challenging contemporary notions of industry development (Hutton 
& Conners 1999; Robin 1998) and breaking the links between the movement and the 
'establishment'. 
Robin (1998) associated this post-war wave of environmentalism and its eschewal of 
co-operative tactics with a search for new ways of living and new cultural critiques. 
Social and political dimensions of conservation were elevated as the values 
underpinning science; economics and technology became increasingly challenged. 
Missing from the environment movement as the 1960s progressed, argued Robin, was a 
new cultural critique - a new factor to be added to the analysis of the issues of the day 
(Robin 1998, pp. 135-6). This observation remains relevant today as nations, not just 
Australia and not just the environment movement, continue to grapple with the tensions 
of industry development and its environmental and social consequences. 
A plethora of largely state based organisations (for a listing since federation, see 
Dargavel 1995, pp. 144-5) formed to tackle the perceived environmental problems that 
had emerged since the early 1960s. Forest campaigns became prominent as large areas 
of native forest were cleared for Australia's escalating softwood tree cropping and 
export woodchipping commenced ( chapter 4 and 6). The foresters found themselves 
recast from being wise-use conservationists to environmental destroyers, a portrayal 
many found difficult to comprehend (Robin 1998, pp. 145-6). 
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2.9 Unions 
Unions representing Australian wood products industry employee interests were 
established soon after Federation. Sawmill management and ownership started to 
separate with mechanisation and increasing scales of operation. Workers (usually on 
time wages) became more dissatisfied over wages, hours and conditions and gradually 
joined the labour movement (Dargavel 1995, p. 36). 
The Federated Sawmill, Timber-yard and Woodworkers' Employees Association of 
Australasia formed in 1907, changing its name to the Amalgamated Timber Workers' 
Union of Australia in 1913 and the Australian Timber Workers' Union in 1918 before 
merging with the Pulp and Paper Workers' Federation of Australia to become the 
Forest and Forest Products Division of the Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy 
Union (CFMEU) in the early 1990s. Through the 1920s, the union forcefully 
campaigned to reduce the 48-hour working week to 44 hours. It eventually won the 
case, but not without imprisonment of some leaders, lock-outs, violence and financial 
damage (Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union 2001a). 
Both the Australian Workers' Union (A WU), which facilitated the formation of timber 
unions that remain active today in Western Australia, Queensland and Tasmania, and 
the Australian Timber Workers' Union were affiliated with the Australian Council of 
Trades Unions (ACTU). Because unions affiliate a percentage of their members to the 
Australian Labor Party (ALP), union leaders were (and remain) important power 
brokers and shapers of public policy. Prior to the 1970s, it was the norm for unions to 
control up to 85 per cent of the delegates to the ALP state branch conventions and, 
through this, they controlled ALP federal conferences and the federal executive of the 
party (Warhurst & Parkin 2000, pp. 232-1 ). Up to 1960, the priority issues for wood 
products industry unions were workers' wages, hours, conditions and employment 
opportunities. The source of the mill's log supply was irrelevant - most union members 
worked in native forest sawmills and the small but growing softwood plantation 
industry was perceived as import replacement and therefore not a threat to existing 
Australian jobs. 
2.10 Plantation funding - the unfinished business 
Australia's early 20th century forestry institutions were largely formed from a public 
interest in securing a wood supply to meet housing needs. Technological breakthroughs 
in pulping radiata pine and eucalypt fibre elevated paper products to Australia's post-
war agenda of national self<7_sufficiency. Running alongside these industry and 
consumer developments was a consolidation in forest agency thinking about the 
growing of future wood resources. Its origins are found in 18th century European 
society and forestry practices. It was assumed that proper silvicultural treatment 
required a market for the large volume of non-saw log material in Australia's previously 
unlogged forests. It remained elusive until the technological and commercial 
breakthrough in eucalypt pulping. 
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Meanwhile, sawn timber continued to be the main wood use. By the late 1940s and 
early 1950s, foresters were envisaging an 'ultimate' Australian population of 20 million 
people requiring an estimated seven million m3 of sawn timber per annum. 23 This was 
about 60 per cent greater than the estimated sustainable supply that could be derived 
from native forests (Cromer 1951, p. 134). Softwood continued to meet half the 
consumption, and foresters had no doubt that much greater quantities of softwood 
would be consumed if available (Cromer 1951, p. 134). Softwood tree cropping, 
pioneered in wood-scarce South Australia, became a post-war priority for other 
Australian states, in addition to raising the use and productivity of existing native forest 
stands. Australia's softwood plantation estate increased by an average 6 per cent per 
annum from 1946 to 1959 (Forestry and Timber Bureau 1969, p. 143; figure 3.1). 
Despite this high planting rate, state agency plantation targets remained a long way 
from being realised as the 1950s drew to a close. Victoria entered the 1960s with a 
softwood plantation estate not quite meeting half the 80 000 hectare target set in the 
mid 1920s (Carron 1985, pp. 184-5). New South Wales' 200 000 hectare target, set by 
Jolly also in the 1920s (Carron 1985, p. 12), was only 18 per cent realised by 1959. By 
the end of the 1950s, Western Australia still had nearly 70 000 hectares of their 80 000 
hectare target set in 1949 (Carron 1985, p. 163) to plant. In 1939, Tasmania set a target 
of establishing 8 000 hectares within 80 kilometres of a major industrial centre or port 
(Carron 1985, p. 89). This area was nearly achieved by 1959 but not within the 
specified radius from the market. By 1959, Queensland was nearing the halfway mark 
for its 81 000 hectare target established in 1950 (Gair 1951). 
This planting underachievement was taken up by the Commonwealth Forestry Bureau, 
but not before an extension to its powers marked by its renaming as the Commonwealth 
Forestry and Timber Bureau in 1946 (table 2.1; chapter 3). 
The Bureau restored the Interstate Forestry Conferences, breaking their 25-year 
absence by hosting the eighth conference in Perth in December 1949. The conference 
concluded that Australia's future wood requirements could not be met without the 
establishment of large areas of softwood plantations, that the then rate of planting was 
inadequate, that growing 'utility' softwoods in plantations was economically proven 
and that exotic softwoods could grow better than native species on some lands. The 
conference recommended an investigation of suitable sites for economic softwood 
'afforestation' and the development of a coordinated plan for accelerated softwood 
planting (Forestry and Timber Bureau 1949).24 
In January 19 51, Arthur Fadden, Australia's Acting Prime Minster wrote to each of the 
State Premiers enclosing a copy of the resolutions from the 1949 Australian Forestry 
Conference. He informed the Premiers that the Federal Government would develop the 
23 The population expectation proved realistic for 2000 but the consumption projection exceeded 
Australia's actual consumption in 1999/2000 by 46 per cent. 
24 The conference also made recommendations regarding native forests : namely reserving more for wood 
production, increasing funds for their management, and enhancing fire control (Forestry and Timber 
Bureau 1949). 
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Forestry and Timber Bureau to enable it to undertake the information and research 
tasks required to implement the recommendations. Fadden also advised that the Federal 
Government was investigating additional resources for fire control, forestry education 
and future conferences. Before closing, he requested the Premiers to advise him 'as to 
the extent to which your Government would be prepared to implement the 
recommendations of the Conference' (Fadden 1951). Notably the Federal Government 
was not offering resources to assist in the softwood planting - the reason for the under-
planting. 
The State Premiers responded to what they perceived as a challenge to their 
commitment and states rights. Their 'keep out' message to the Prime Minister was 
clear. Individually, they advised the Prime Minister of their awareness of the softwood 
planting imperative. Some State Premiers boasted about their planting achievements. 
None expressed a desire for Federal Government funding. Premier Playford of South 
Australia understandably stated that the recommendation applied to other states and 
that the state provided adequate funds for softwood planting (Playford 1951 ). 
Tasmania's Premier advised that his Government agreed with accelerating softwood 
planting, that the planting rate had doubled in the previous three years and that funds 
were being made available as far as the State's financial resources would permit 
(Cosgrove 1951 ). The Western Australian Premier assured the Prime Minister that his 
Government was 'seized with the importance' of extending its softwood plantations and 
that loans had been provided to enable this (McLarty 1951 ). Vince Gair, Premier of 
Queensland, informed the Prime Minister that 'The softwood planting programme is the 
work of highest priority in Queensland and no other State has planted as great a 
softwood area since the war as this State.' He advised that labour shortage, not finance, 
was the constraint (Gair 1951). McDonald, Premier of Victoria, recognised that the 
softwood resources of the State were inadequate and advised that the planting program 
had not been implemented because of labour shortages (McDonald 1951 ). The Premier 
of New South Wales advised that extensive surveys of areas suitable for planting to 
softwoods had been undertaken and that planting will continue as 'facilities permit' 
(McGirr 1952). 
The Federal Government took heed of the Premiers' states' rights message and left 
them alone. Foresters and industry became increasingly dissatisfied about the states' 
softwood planting over the 1950s. They felt that funding was the main constraint. 
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Chapter 3 
Federal Government funding for softwood plantations 
3.1 Introduction 
In 1966, the Federal Government decided to finance a major acceleration in softwood 
planting in Australia. A year later, the policy received bipartisan support with the 
enabling legislation, the Softwood Forestry Agreements Act 1967, warmly welcomed by 
the parliamentary opposition party. The State Governments agreed to expand their 
softwood planting according to an agreed schedule, and the Federal Government agreed 
to finance the additional area planted over and above the status quo planting. The 
financial assistance took the form of 35-year loans with interest and repayment deferred 
for the first ten years. Interest, which for most states was not capitalised over this ten-
year period, was set at the rate the Federal Government paid on long-term loans raised 
through public subscription. 
This was a landmark policy for Australian forestry, and the factors leading up to it will 
be described in this chapter. The Federal Government had forcefully entered the 
Australian wood production arena - traditionally viewed as a state responsibility - to 
generate a substantial wood supply increase over the long term. Past Federal 
Government financial assistance to the states for forestry was short term and targeted 
primarily towards unemployment relief (Anon 1936b, pp. 2-3; Carron 1985). 
The historical dominance of the public sector in wood supply (chapter 2) was further 
entrenched by the decision. As the Federal Government's funding intent became clear, 
more players asked why the assistance could not be used to encourage the private sector 
to undertake the planting. The conservative Menzies Liberal-Country Party Coalition 
Government surprisingly did not take the opportunity to facilitate a greater role for the 
private sector in Australia's wood production. Instead, the increased role of the private 
sector in wood supply came about through the states variously leasing public land and 
providing funding assistance to private plantation growers, and the later privatisation by 
some states of the plantations established under the Softwood Forestry Agreements 
Acts. In more recent years, the Federal Government has played a greater facilitatory 
role in private plantation establishment ( chapters 4 and 6). 
The softwood plantation agreements generated a four-fold increase in Australia's 
softwood planting ( chapter 4). The planting, much of it undertaken by clearing native 
forested land, triggered an environmental backlash that, combined with the introduction 
of the exporting of native forest woodchips, launched Australia into three decades of 
forest conflict. During this time the softwood plantations were constantly building 
Australia's wood inventory, reaching maturity around 30-35 years after planting. The 
increased wood supply from plantation thinning and final harvesting of the first rotation 
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crop has generated major structural change in the industry (chapter 5) and presented 
new opportunities for industry development and native forest conservation in Australia 
( chapter 7). 
The policy embodied in the Softwood Forestry Agreements Acts was intertwined with 
the formation of the Australian Forestry Council (AFC). The Federal Government's 
announcement of the AFC triggered a lengthy states rights battle, which was ultimately 
resolved with the states' recognising the power of the Federal Government to affect 
industry development and expectation of financial assistance for softwood planting. 
The Federal Government's softwood plantation funding decision has received scant 
attention despite the wide policy implications it has for wood supply today. Jacobs, the 
most influential Federal Government fores try bureaucrat at the time, in his paper The 
establishment of the Australian Forestry Council, described the events leading to the 
establishment of the AFC. He considered the development to be an 'exchange of views' 
in the early 1960s between the Federal and State Governments on ways to improve 
consultation on wood and wood products industry policy (Jacobs 1965b, p. 92). Rule,25 
writing at the time of the negotiations and substantially about the softwood sector, 
provided no account of the background leading to the establishment of the AFC other 
than a reference to 'the persistent spadework beforehand by the Minister for National 
Development, the Hon. Gordon Freeth.' (Rule 1967, p. 81). Routley & Routley (1974), 
who argued against the softwood program, focussed on critiquing the information and 
arguments used to support the program and the foresters' wood production ethic - not 
on the policy process. Carron, a colleague of Jacobs, provided a brief description of the 
formation of the Australian Forestry Council and a slightly more detailed description of 
the process leading to the softwood forestry agreements as part of his wider history of 
forestry in Australia (Carron, 1985, pp. 394-9). Dargavel (1995) wrote of the increasing 
concerns about a wood shortage in Australia leading to the formation of the AFC, 
which 'advocated more pine plantations with a will' (Dargavel 1995, pp. 76-7). 
The confidentiality surrounding virtually all of the Federal Government documents 
relating to the policy (see Jacobs 1964e) only partly explains the dearth of historical 
writing. The foresters, as engaged proponents, held detailed knowledge of the policy 
process. Perhaps the absence of a detailed history of the events is connected to the 
observation I made in chapter 2 that plantations, as an agricultural wood production 
system, have been substantially written out of Australia's forest history. 
The aim of this chapter is to describe the policy process culminating in the crucial 
Softwood Forestry Agreements Act 1967. The absence of a detailed historical account 
of the funding decision diminishes our capacity to understand current Australian wood 
industry and forest issues. My reconstruction of the events draws substantially on 
Federal Government files from the Australian National Archives opened under the 30-
year rule just in time for this thesis. The files contain a detailed record of the 
information used in the policy process, the events and the debates. The players include 
25 A. Rule was one of the first lecturers at the Australian Forestry School when it opened in Canberra in 
1927 (Carron 1985, p. 264). 
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Prime Ministers, Premiers, State and Federal Ministers, Federal Government 
Departmental Secretaries, officers in the Forestry and Timber Bureau and the Federal 
Departments of Treasury and Trade, heads of the state forest agencies and those outside 
government such as the Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Organisation (CSIRO) 
and industry. 
In addition to the correspondence between these players, the files contain the cabinet 
submissions, briefings and decisions; the information used to analyse the economic 
viability of the softwood planting program; Hansard reporting of the first AFC meeting; 
and the background papers and minutes of the Standing Committee of the AFC. These 
documents, together with Hansard records of parliamentary debates and information 
from published sources, have been used to reconstruct the process leading to the 
Federal Government's decision to finance the acceleration of softwood planting in 
Australia. Despite the comprehensiveness of the documents, gaps from the non-
recording of events and communications are inevitable. 
3.2 Announcing the Australian Forestry Council 
A national forestry council was discussed in forestry circles soon after Federation 
(chapter 2), but the idea lay dormant until momentum for a national forest policy was 
regained in the late 1950s. The states were originally not particularly enthusiastic about 
the idea of a council and Victoria, with its forceful state and rural rights Premier, Henry 
Bolte, strongly objected to it. During Bolte's three-year resistance, the nature and 
membership of the council was changed to meet substantially Bolte's demands and 
softwood planting put on the top of the Council's agenda. This section describes the 
events leading to the first of what was to become three Federal Government 
announcements on the formation of the AFC. 
The seventh British Commonwealth Forestry Conference held in Australia and New 
Zealand in 1957 encouraged Australia to expand its forestry research effort, 
recommending a central research institute within the Forestry and Timber Bureau and a 
co-ordinating advisory committee with representatives from the federal and state forest 
agencies, the CSIRO and other scientists (Anon. 1957, p. 66). The advisory committee 
recommendation was the genesis of the AFC. The British Commonwealth Forestry 
Conference considered that for some issues, namely forestry finance and softwood 
planting programs, policy should be left to the individual country. 
The IF A addressed these policy issues at their 1958 national conference. Kessell, by 
then Managing Director of Australian Newsprint Mills, presented a paper based on an 
earlier one he delivered to the seventh British Commonwealth Forestry Conference 
(Kessell 1957) tackling the problem of fluctuating public funding for softwood 
plantation establishment. Kessell recommended a stabilisation fund to provide 
temporary assistance to State Governments funded by Federal Government revenue 
from tariffs on wood products (Kessell 1958). The IF A Council endorsed the proposal 
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that was later worked into a document by A.G. Hanson26 and A.J. Leslie, 27 members of 
the Institute's Victorian Division. The proposal was submitted to the Tariff Board 
inquiry into the timber industry held later that year but action on it was overtaken by 
events (Carron 1962). The Institute's position, established in 1958, was that Federal 
Government funding was required to increase softwood planting for national self-
sufficiency in wood products. 
Another of the Institute' s 1958 conference resolutions was to send a delegation of three 
IPA Council Members (S.G. Jennings, President of the Institute, W.G. Chandler and 
K.P. McGrath, Principal of the Australian Forestry School) to meet with the Prime 
Minister. For many years, foresters had spoken of the need for a greater national focus 
on forestry (chapter 2). The imperative increased because the Federal Government had 
retained its wartime power to impose income tax, fundamentally shifting the power for 
financing. 
The Prime Ministerial meeting took place on 4 August 1959 (Anon. 1959), well into 
Menzies' second decade as Prime Minister. His first decade was comparatively easy 
with a booming post-war economy further stimulated by post-war immigration. 
Economic policy was dominated by the loosening of wartime Government controls and 
extended to privatising Government equity in operations such as oil refining, radio 
broadcasting, manufacturing and whaling (Whitington & Chalmers 1971 , p. 192). By 
the mid 1950s, the Australian economy was faltering, with prices for primary products 
collapsing after the end of the Korean War and unemployment increasing. This was 
Menzies' time for projects of national development and employment generation. The 
Snowy Mountains scheme, an initiative of the Chifley Labor Government, symbolised 
this national development. Softwood planting for national self-sufficiency slotted easily 
into this 'big government' policy framework. 
The Institute's delegation pitched their message astutely, placing forestry as 
fundamental to the realisation of the Federal Government's national development plans. 
The softwood planting program was presented as the most practical way to meet 
Australia's future wood requirements. The delegation reported that Menzies accepted 
that there was a case for examination and that the matter would receive his active 
consideration. Menzies cautioned though, indicating something of the political and 
constitutional difficulties that confronted Federal Government action - even on the 
matter of the Institute's request for an inquiry into Australia's potential to meet its 
wood needs (Anon. 1959, p. 1 ). 
26 Hanson was Officer in Charge of the Division of Timber Supply Economics, Forestry and Timber 
Bureau. As discussed later, Hanson's projections of Australia' s wood consumption underpinned the three 
million acre softwood plantation target. Hanson was well qualified for the job, having a Bachelor of 
Science, Bachelor of Commerce and a Diploma of Forestry. 
27 Alf Leslie graduated from the School of Forestry, Creswick and University of Melbourne in 1941 , and 
worked for the Victorian Forests Commission and APM Forests before becoming a lecturer at the 
University of Melbourne in 1958 . He taught at the University of Ibadan in 1962-64, was a Reader at the 
School of Forestry University of Canterbury 1974-77, and worked for the United Nations Food and 
Agricultural Organisation, becoming Director of the Forest Industries Division of the FAO in 1981 
(Ferguson & Youl 1997). 
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The Federal Government proceeded cautiously, using the resolutions of the 1957 
British Commonwealth Forestry Conference to establish the institutional framework to 
co-ordinate policy between the Federal and State Governments and to involve industry. 
The measures were announced by Gordon Freeth, Minister for the Interior and 
responsible for the Forestry and Timber Bureau, in the House of Representatives on 18 
April 1961. The research functions of the Forestry and Timber Bureau were to be 
extended by establishing a Forest Research Institute as a division of the Bureau. The 
Minister also announced the AFC to serve as a national forest advisory body and 
mechanism to co-ordinate the Bureau's work with that of the state forest agencies, the 
CSIRO, universities and the industry. The Minister advised that the AFC membership 
would comprise representatives of the state and territory forest agencies, the CSIRO, 
the universities and, 'if considered desirable' , other appropriate organisations. The 
industry sectors to be represented were not specified. Carron (1985, p. 304) writes that 
the IF A and the private plantation growers were hopeful of being represented. A likely 
candidate was W.G. Chandler, Managing Director APM Forests, IFA Councilor and a 
member of the delegation to the Prime Minister. 
The key forestry task identified by Freeth was to bring Australia' s forest estate to a 
condition of maximum productivity by reducing the lost economic opportunities in 
native forests due to disease, fire and insect attack (Freeth 1961 ). There was no mention 
of expanding Australia's softwood plantation estate or of Federal Government funding. 
Freeth' s announcement triggered the states' rights battle that Menzies predicted. During 
the three years it took to resolve the dispute, the function of the AFC shifted from being 
a co-ordinating mechanism for forest research to advocating a major acceleration in 
softwood planting in Australia with Federal Government funding - the policy 
established by the Institute of Foresters in_ 1958. 
3.3 Establishing the Australian Forestry Council 
Max Jacobs 
In December 1959, M.R. (Max) Jacobs28 became Director-General of the Forestry and 
Timber Bureau and therefore the key Federal Government forestry bureaucrat involved 
in the negotiations over the formation of the Australian Forestry Council (AFC) and the 
framing of the Softwood Forestry Agreements Act 1967. Jacobs had a significant 
forestry research background covering both pines and eucalypts. He published papers 
on growth stresses in trees (particularly eucalypts ), the effects of wind on tree growth, 
(particularly pines), radiata pine propagation, and eucalypts in world forestry (Jacobs 
1935, 1936, 1937a, 193 To, 1938a, 1938b, 1939a, 1939b, 1939c, 1945, 1955). He was 
responsible for meeting the 1960 United Nations Food and Agricultural Organisation 
28 Jacobs, born in Adelaide in 1905, was trained in forestry with postgraduate studies at Oxford, Germany 
and the United States. He was previously Chief Forester of the Federal Capital Territory, Lecturer at the 
Australian Forestry School, Research Officer at the Commonwealth Forestry Bureau and Principal of the 
Australian Forestry School (Meyer 1985, p. 60). Jacobs became acting Director-General of the Forestry 
and Timber Bureau on 9 December 1959, and was permanently appointed in 1961. 
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request for help in establishing eucalypt plantations in other countries, organising the 
collection and despatch of seed (Meyer 1985, p. 69). Jacobs worked with Kessell and 
other foresters to establish the Institute of Foresters of Australia. He negotiated the 
Institute's initial constitution and early changes through the Attorney-General ' s 
Department (Jacobs 1960). Jacobs was an inaugural Councillor and member of the 
three person editorial committee responsible for the production of the Institute's journal 
Australian Forestry (Meyer 1985, p. 64). Jacobs remained a member of the Institute but 
held no official position whilst Director General of the Forestry and Timber Bureau. 
The Institute was pleased with Jacobs' appointment as Director-General, foreseeing the 
establishment of the AFC and hopeful of the Institute's representation on the Council 
(Anon. 1961). Meyer (1985, p . 61) observed that, in forestry circles, Jacobs is 
remembered 'with affection and respect by those he taught and those he worked with.' 
To others, Jacobs is remembered as a key architect of the softwood planting 
acceleration with its destruction of native forests (see for example Routley & Routley 
1974). Jacobs retired as Director-General in 1970, ending 44 years of Government 
employment in forestry education and as a public servant. He subsequently worked for 
the F AO and the World Bank and as an industry consultant in Australia, maintaining 
his long held view that there should be a closer association between foresters and 
companies using the public wood resource. Jacobs died on 9 October 1979. Carron 
recalled that it rained on his funeral: 
' ''Never mind," I could hear him say, "It's good radiata weather".' (as 
quoted in Meyer 1985, p. 70). 
Some writers present Jacobs as a forest hero, identifying his skills as crucial for the 
softwood planting policy (Meyer 1985; Carron 1985). Hasluck holds great reservations 
about the role of 'great men' in history. He argued that a complex of causes produces 
most situations facing government and a complex of forces shapes most of the 
decisions made and actions taken (Hasluck 1997, p. 51 ). Jacobs, by virtue of his 
position, skills, experience and commitment, played a crucial role in 1960s forest 
policy, but the policy was also the outcome of the larger causes and forces to which 
Hasluck refers. 
-States' rights 
Premier Bolte was in no hurry to respond to Freeth' s announcement. Seven months 
elapsed before he wrote to Menzies arguing that forestry was a state matter involving 
state land over which individual states held sovereign rights (Bolte 1961 ). Bolte was 
concerned that the composition of the Council would see the states 'completely 
overwhelmed ' by a large number of people unfamiliar with the problems of forest 
administration. His concern reflected, at least in part, the Victorian foresters ' 
centralisation fears displayed in the Creswick/ Australian Forestry School rivalry. Bolte 
did not reject the AFC outright but recommended an alternative membership modeled 
on the Australian Agricultural Council with a council of forestry ministers meeting 
annually and permanent heads of the State and Federal Government forest agencies 
meeting as a standing committee. The irony of Bolte' s proposal is clear for those 
46 
perceiving plantation 'forestry' as agriculture. The Australian Agricultural Council was 
established in 1934 and excluded forestry from its definition of primary production 
(Carron 1985, p. 305). Foresters at the time also supported such a separation. 
Menzies replied, not disagreeing with Bolte, but arguing that his proposal should not 
replace the AFC, which was intended as a consultative body between forest agencies, 
industry and related interests (Menzies 1962). Bolte countered, presenting additional 
arguments, namely the lack of clarification of the functions of the AFC and the 
existence of the Australian Timber Industries Stabilisation Conference, which acted as 
a consultative medium (Bolte 1962). Further written exchanges occurred. The Forestry 
. and Timber Bureau, through the Department of the Interior, maintained its advice to the 
Prime Minister's Department that the AFC should not be replaced by Bolte's proposal 
because it would exclude industry representation. McLaren, Secretary of the 
Department of the Interior, argued: 
'There is a fundamental difference between Australian agriculture and 
Australian forestry. Agriculture is essentially carried out by very large 
numbers of private individuals who form a group of considerable 
political significance. The industries based on agriculture are also 
mainly private concerns. On the other hand, in the case of the timber 
industry the State Forest Services are in complete control of log supplies 
from Crown forests, whereas the industries based on forest products are 
mainly privately owned. There tends to be a monopoly by the Crown on 
raw materials. The industries based on forest products complain that 
they do not have reasonable representation in the policy-making field 
connected with their raw materials. The proposed Fores try Council with 
the membership suggested by the .Minister has been warmly supported 
by all manufacturing sections of the timber industry - particularly 
Victorian industry.' (McLaren 1962). 
The Forestry and Timber Bureau chose not to present the option to ( a Liberal-Country 
Party) Government of facilitating a wood and wood products industry structure more in 
line with agriculture or advocating plantation establishment as a private sector 
responsibility. 
The Bureau lost the argument about industry representation on the AFC. In a letter 
prepared for Menzies' signature, but signed by the Acting Prime Minister, Bolte was 
advised on 21 December 1962 that the Federal Government accepted his proposal to 
establish the AFC along the lines of the Australian Agricultural Council with state and 
Federal Ministers supported by a Standing Committee. It was noted that the Standing 
Committee for Agriculture comprised the heads of the State Agricultural Departments, 
Federal Government representatives from the Departments of Primary Industry, 
Territories, Health, the Treasury and Trade and the CSIRO (Gorton 1962a). Bolte had 
successfully removed direct industry representation on the AFC29 but refused to sign 
29 The door was kept open to non-government interests through the Standing Committee to the AFC 
comprising the heads of the state forest agencies and the CSIRO. The Standing Committee could 
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Victoria onto the Council because of the dominance of Federal Government 
representation. 
The Prime Minister suggested a meeting of State and Federal Government Forestry 
Ministers early in the New Year (Gorton 1962a, 1962b). At this meeting, held in 
Melbourne on 13 February 1963, the Ministers approved . without amendment the 
functions of the AFC as proposed by Freeth. The broadly based functions were 
prepared by Jacobs and approved by Freeth on 31 January 1963 ( approval signed on 
Jacobs 1963a). The functions were subsequently adopted with minor amendment by the 
AFC at its first formal meeting in August 1964. 
The functions of the AFC were: 
• To promote the welfare and development of Australian forestry. 
• To arrange mutual exchange of information regarding the production and utilisation 
of forest products. 
• To ensure the maintenance and improvement of the quality of forest products and 
the maintenance of high-grade standards. 
• To formulate and recommend a national forestry policy for Australia directed in 
particular to the development of Australian forests to meet the national 
requirements for timber and forest products, both for domestic use and export. 
• To promote and co-ordinate research into problems affecting the establishment, 
development and management of forests and the utilisation of forest products. 
• To examine methods of obtaining adequate finance for the development of forests . 
• To consider matters submitted to the Council by the Standing Committee on 
Forestry (Freeth 1963a). 
Freeth' s second statement announcing the formation of the Council advised that, 
subject to State Government agreement, the AFC would comprise the three Federal 
Government Ministers - for the Interior (Chair), Territories and Trade - and the State 
Ministers responsible for forests (Freeth 1963a). This was a substantial reduction in 
Federal Government ministerial representation proposed by the Acting Prime Minister 
in December 1962. The Victorian Government remained antagonistic. Victoria's 
Minister for Forests, Lindsay Thompson, echoed his Premier's opposition to the 
Federal Government having three representatives on the Council (Anon. 1963). Premier 
Bolte did not sign Victoria onto the AFC until 16 months later. In the intervening 
period a series of events laid the groundwork for the AFC becoming the institution 
promoting an expansion in public softwood plantations with Federal Government 
funding. 
establish technical committees, thus enabling input from non-government interests. Jacobs had in mind 
here committees on trade and research (Jacobs 1963a). 
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Australia-New Zealand free trade proposal 
The State Governments initially appeared unconcerned about the slow progress in 
establishing the AFC. They were not the promoters of the institution and there was no 
talk of financial sweeteners for accelerating softwood planting from the Federal 
Government at this stage. Their lack of interest quickly dissipated with the announced 
negotiations between Australia and New Zealand for a free trade area in wood products. 
John McEwan and John Marshall, Trade Ministers for Australia and New Zealand 
respectively, met to discuss the issue in Wellington, New Zealand in April 1963. New 
Zealand was seeking increased economic and employment opportunities through 
exporting. John McEwan was sympathetic to the New Zealand situation, recognising 
that New Zealand would need considerable assistance if Britain abandoned it to gain 
membership to the European Economic Community (Whitington & Chalmers 1971, p. 
202). Trade liberalisation in either wood or dairy products was understood to have the 
potential to meet substantially New Zealand's concerns. McEwan, as Leader of the 
Country Party, opposed dairy product market liberalisation. This left the focus on wood 
and wood products - not then part of the primary industries club. New Zealand had 
targeted the wood and wood products industry for substantial export-oriented 
expansion. By 1961, Alex Entrican, the soon-to-retire Director of the New Zealand 
Forest Service, was promoting the concept of New Zealand being a net exporter of 
wood and wood products as an aim in its own right rather than as a convenient outlet 
for surplus wood (Kirkland & Berg 1997, p. 89). A few years earlier the New Zealand 
Government had signed an agreement with Tasman Pulp and Paper committing the 
Government to long-term wood supply under commercially favourable conditions, 
equity participation and substantial supporting infrastructure (Kirkland & Berg 1997, 
pp. 80-6). 
The Trade Ministers agreed to establish a Joint Standing Committee to investigate trade 
between the two countries. Because Australia was a signatory to the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ( GATT), a free trade agreement limited to wood 
products was not possible - GATT stipulates that when two countries enter into a free 
trade agreement, substantially all the trade should be free. The foresters, not apparently 
understanding this point, were concerned that the burden of an agreement would fall 
substantially on the Australian wood and wood products industry. The foresters were 
also unclear about which wood products were already traded duty free. 
The Australian and New Zealand Minister's joint statement issued on 11 April 1963 
announcing the decision to pursue negotiations triggered alarm bells in State and 
Federal Government forest agencies. Softwood planting by the Australian states was 
growing strongly in this post-war period (figure 3.1; table 3.1) and the heads of the 
state forest agencies were concerned that free trade would imperil the profitability of 
Australia's processing industry and flow back to undermine the softwood planting 
program. They prepared a statement advising their respective Governments to protect 
the Australian industry in the proposed free trade negotiations (Heads of Forest 
Services 1963). The statement stimulated the State Premiers to write to the Prime 
Minister regarding an early meeting of the AFC to consider the proposed Free Trade 
Agreement (Freeth 1963b ). 
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Table 3.1 Softwood plantations - Australia and New Zealand (000 hectares) for selected years. Source: 
Gray (1935); Forestry and Timber Bureau (1969); Forestry and Timber Bureau, Annual Reports for 
various years; Department of Primary Industries (1981); Australian Bureau of Agricultural and Resource 
Economics (1992); Wood et al. (2001); New Zealand Ministry of Forestry (1995); New Zealand Ministry 
of Agriculture and Fores try (2001 b). 
Planted NSW Vic Qld SA WA Tas ACT NT Aust NZa 
area as at 
1920 1 77 
1939 18 17 8 37 5 1 5 97 329c 
1946 12 15 12 42 5 1 5 94e 332 
1963 44 47 44 63 15 10 10 .1 233 372 
1970 81 89 80 82 28 23 12 1 396 465 
1980 174 162 157 95 60 52 14 4 718 846 
1990 252 210 190 98 85 72 15 4 926 1 261 
2000 270 215 179 114 98 76 15 5 972 1 769 
a. Includes hardwood plantations, which accounted for 3 per cent of the plantation estate in 2000. 
b. Estate area as at 1921. 
c. Estate area as at 1936. 
d. Includes private plantings of unspecified location. 
e. Includes private plantings unspecified for all states other than South Australia. 
At the same time that the Federal Government announced the trade negotiations, Jacobs 
addressed the fifth Australian Timber Congress in Adelaide and proposed that Australia 
establish a three million acre (1.2 million hectare) softwood plantation estate (Jacobs 
1963c). Proponents of this bold initiative, discussed in detail below, perceived the 
proposed Free Trade Agreement as a serious threat. If New Zealand could or wanted 
(by planting more softwood) to meet Australia's softwood needs, why should Australia 
embark on a major planting program? However, the announced negotiations worked to 
the advantage of proponents of an expanded softwood plantation estate, because they 
elevated softwood plantations and the goal of expanding the estate from relative 
obscurity to the attention of the highest --levels of government across Australia. New 
Zealand's desire to expand its softwood plantings to meet Australia's future needs, 
particularly for pulp and paper, supported the Australian foresters' case that the future 
domestic market demanded a larger softwood planting program. The free trade 
negotiations shone the spotlight on the manufacturing that would be lost if Australia 
were to let New Zealand undertake the planting. 
The free trade negotiations proceeded slowly, nearly breaking down and delayed by the 
December 1963 federal election. Post-election reshuffling saw the Forestry and Timber 
Bureau moved to William Spooner' s30 Department of National Development. The 
Department was under constant threat of being absorbed by the Trade Department with 
McEwan believing that National Development was incapable of dealing with tough 
international negotiations over resources. 31 These inter-departmental tensions 
30 Menzies appointed Spooner to Cabinet during World War II as part of an unsuccessful attempt to 
prevent his government disintegrating. Spooner was one of the most virulent party critics of Menzies 
(Whitington & Chalmers 1971, p. 49). 
31 McEwan was angered by the Australian contracts for supplying iron ore to Japan at bargain rates. He 
persuaded Cabinet to use export controls to prohibit exporting at low prices. McEwan blamed Spooner 
for allowing nearly all the major mineral contracts with Japan to be signed fob - that allowed the 
Japanese to monopolise iron ore shipments since the seller's price was only to get the ore to the ship. The 
cost of shipping ore to Japan was close to the cost of ore itself - i.e. Australia was missing out on the 
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contributed to the Department of Trade's reticence to share information with the 
Department of National Development and intensified Jacobs' suspicions about the 
intent of the free trade negotiations. 
Spooner met with the state Forestry Ministers on 12 April 1964. The states expressed 
their concerns about the free trade negotiations. Spooner thought that 'there was a good 
deal of loose talk' from the states but knew the issue had to be handled carefully. He 
asked his Department to prepare a letter to McEwan recording the state's request to be 
consulted before any agreement was completed (Spooner 1964). Spooner's letter 
initiated a meeting of the heads of the state forest agencies with representatives from 
the Prime Minister's Department and the Department of Trade. The Department of 
Trade originally proposed that each state meet separately with them and the Prime 
Minister's Department initially agreed. Jacobs was the most likely instigator of the 
changed arrangements (Jacobs 1964b). Jacobs understood the meeting's importance for 
the softwood planting program and wrote to each of the heads of the state forest 
agencies advising them of the points made in a letter from his Minister to the Prime 
Minister. Jacobs was aware that this might not be proper conduct for a Federal 
Government public servant, writing: 
'Please use this with discretion, but with the knowledge that any point 
used by my Minister which your state may wish to stress is now known to 
be a point which should be considered at senior level by the 
Commonwealth Government.' (Jacobs 1964b ). 
Jacobs knew from his discussions with the Prime Minister's Department which 
arguments would strike a sympathetic response. The consultative meeting, held in 
Canberra on 29 May 1964, did not satisfy the state forest agencies. They were unable to 
establish how a free trade agreement would affect the Australian wood products 
industry. The forest agency's dissatisfaction was conveyed back to the State Premiers 
who renewed their calls to the Prime Minister for an early meeting of the AFC. 
States' rights resolved 
The threat overhanging state based manufacturing from a possible Free Trade 
Agreement with New Zealand elevated the formation of the AFC to highest priority 
status. This meant meeting Bolte's outstanding objections. Menzies had earlier 
established that McEwan, as Minister for Trade, did not wish to be a member of the 
AFC (Jacobs 1964a). This paved the way for limiting the Federal Government's 
representation on the Council to two; namely the Minister for National Development 
and the Minister for the Interior representing forestry in the Territories. 
shipping business. McEwan tried to recoup some of this business, but failed because of the weakness of 
the mineral contract (Whitington & Chalmers 1971 , p 133). The experience was repeated in the early 
1970s when Australia commenced exporting woodchips to Japan. 
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Figure 3.1 Softwood plantation establishment in Australian States/Territories and 
New Zealand for selected years. New Zealand plantings include small areas of 
hardwood plantations. Source: Table 3.1. 
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Spooner' s meeting with the state forestry ministers on 12 April 1964 put further 
pressure on Victoria. By now a major softwood planting program with Federal 
Government funding was in the wind (Spooner 1964) with the AFC as the facilitating 
institution. Spooner reported after the meeting to his Departmental Secretary: 
'Victoria said it was averse to more than one Commonwealth Minister. 
This was unpopular with the other States who wanted to get on with the 
job. I just said that Victoria was not facing the facts of life if it thought 
that the Commonwealth would agree to any scheme which did not 
provide for representation of the Minister for the Territories and let it go 
at that. I fancy that my statement may cause Thompson to bring the 
matter to finality in Victoria.' (Spooner 1964). 
Spooner's reference to a 'scheme' appears to be the softwood plantation expansion 
program that, as discussed below, was spoken about at the meeting. Menzies wrote to 
Bolte three days after Spooner's meeting with the State Ministers advising him that the 
Minister for Trade would not be a member of the AFC thereby limiting the Federal 
Government's representation to two ministers. He trusted that the Premier may now be 
able to agree and that the Government could proceed with establishing the AFC 
(Menzies 1964a). A corresponding letter was sent to the other Premiers (Menzies 
1964b ), who quickly reconfirmed their agreement. Bolte replied on 5 June 1964, 
concurring with the Prime Minister's latest suggestion: 
' ... in order to enable the AFC to proceed', [but maintained his view 
that] 'it is not proper that the Commonwealth should have double the 
representation of any one state on a council dealing with a state 
responsibility.' (Bolte 1964). 
Bolte had effectively achieved his original desire to exclude industry and minimise 
Federal Government representation on the AFC so as to retain the maximum power for 
the states. McEwan, as Acting Prime Minister, advised the State Premiers that the AFC 
would be formed, leaving Menzies to make the third and final announcement to the 
press on 23 July 1964 (Australian Forestry Council 1964, p. 8). 
Differences in forestry policy may also have contributed to Victoria's intransigence. 
Lindsay Thompson, Victoria's Forest Minister, hinted this at the first AFC meeting in 
his response to the Chair's opening remarks saying: 
'As representative of the State that perhaps proved to be the hardwood 
stumbling block ... ' (Australian Forestry Council 1964, p. 6). 
A.O. Lawrence, the Chair of the Victorian Forest Commission, was particularly 
interested in the 'wise use' and development of the state's forest resources (Carron 
1985, p. 186) i.e. multiple use of native forests for wood and water. The Victorian 
Government had invested relatively little in softwood plantations, leaving the task to 
the private sector, notably APM Forests. Victoria had the largest softwood plantation 
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area of all the states in 1964, however in contrast to all other states, the private sector 
was the lead planter (table 3.2). 
The Victorian Government encouraged private sector planting through the Victorian 
Lands (Plantation Areas) Act 1959 that provided 60-year leases over Crown lands at 
low rental for tree planting and ultimate free holding. Additional land was leased to 
APM under the Forests (Wood Pulp) Agreement Act 1961 (Chandler 1963, p. 5). 
Victoria was also developing financial incentives for small landowners to establish 
plantations, providing loans with interest payments deferred until income started 
flowing from the planting. 
Table 3.2 Public and private softwood plantation area by Australian State and Territory in 1964. Source: 
Forestry and Timber Bureau (1969, p. 143). 
Public plantation area 
(hectares) 
NSW 98 759 
Vic 54 486 
Qld 106 119 
SA 122 608 
WA 38 918 
Tas 18 348 
ACT 26 368 
NT 376 
Aust 465 982 
3.4 The softwood planting target 
Private plantation area 
(hectares) 
18 099 
71 674 
9 800 
41104 
1 370 
7 108 
100 
50 
149 305 
Private plantation 
area as per cent of 
total softwood 
plantation area 
(%) 
15.5 
56.8 
8.5 
25.1 
3.4 
27.9 
0.4 
11.7 
24.3 
The first meeting of the AFC was held on 21 August 1964, only a month after the Prime 
Minister's announcement. The two main agenda items were a briefing on the proposed 
Free Trade Agreement by McEwan and the softwood planting program with Jacobs 
presenting the Standing Committee's proposal to increase the national planting rate to 
75 000 acres per annum (Australian Forestry Council 1964, p. 35). The meeting did not 
actually pass a resolution agreeing to this planting rate. The verbatim Hansard 
recording of the meeting indicates that poor chairing by David Fairbairn (Minister for 
National Development after Spooner's retirement on 14 July 1965) and inadequate 
preparatory briefmg of state forestry Ministers led to the lack of resolution over the 
planting target. The matter was rectified at the second AFC meeting with a national 
target for the softwood plantation estate set at three million acres to be achieved by 
planting 75 000 acres per annum for 35 years. 
The aim of this section is to establish how the three million acre target was derived. 
Self-sufficiency goal 
Self-sufficiency had been at the centre of Australia's forest policy since the early 20th 
century (Leslie 1963; Carron 1980; chapter 2). The rational for self-sufficiency has 
been debated (Carron 1980, Board of Inquiry into the Timber Industry in Victoria 
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1985) and loose definitions have enabled a pragmatic muddling through from a public 
policy perspective. Fielding (1962) argued that Australian foresters should maintain the 
ideal of virtual self-sufficiency in wood, noting that its achievement would increase the 
value and importance of their industry and the esteem of foresters. He considered that: 
[Foresters] 'could no longer be regarded as unique in being responsible 
for the production of a crop which can be grown successfully in 
Australia, but which nevertheless is imported on a large scale.' (Fielding 
1962, p. 123). 
For Australia, with its relative abundance of land and small population, self-sufficiency 
in wood is a readily achievable goal. When achieved, a policy of self-sufficiency means 
that future growth in the industry will be constrained mainly to population growth. 
Jacobs recognised the constraining nature of self-sufficiency and broadened the concept 
to meeting 'the national requirement for timber and forest products, both for domestic 
use and export.' (see earlier discussion on the functions of the AFC). 
Carron ( 1980) observed that in Australia self-sufficiency in wood has been largely 
about replacing imported softwood sawn timber with domestic production. This is a 
critical understanding. The softwood planting program was promoted as aiming for 
self-sufficiency through replacing softwood imports. This emphasis worked to smooth 
over fears that native forest hardwoods would play a diminished role in the market. I 
found no recorded discussion in forestry circles about the potential for a large softwood 
plantation program to also displace native forest hardwood sawn timber. It was widely 
understood that softwood and hardwood were substitutable in many sawn timber 
applications ( chapter 2). I will return to this point in later chapters. 
-
The first task in planning for self-sufficiency is to estimate the nation's future wood 
requirements. The wood deficit is then calculated as the difference between projected 
consumption and expected production from native forests and existing plantations. 
Planting targets can then be calculated making assumptions about plantation 
productivity, log grade yields and rotation time. 
Consumption projections 
The Interstate Forestry Conferences had urged the Forestry and Timber Bureau to 
produce periodical estimates of Australia's future wood requirements. The difficulty of 
the task was well recognised. Rodger reported in 1953 that the Bureau had not yet 
succeeded in producing reliable estimates (Leslie 1963, p. 3). Generating reliable 
consumption projections is not exclusively a wood and wood products industry 
problem. Nor is it a technical problem of modeling capability or a problem due to 
inadequate time series data. Global wood consumption projections prepared by the 
Food and Agricultural Organisation (F AO) of the United Nations are noted for their 
unreliability despite the use of relatively complex models, a detailed information base 
and long runs of time series data (Leslie 1997; Clark 2001a). Capturing the effects of 
technological development through new products and processes has always been 
challenging. The poor modelling ( or exclusion) of wood saving technologies, such as 
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increased paper recycling and substitution of wood based panels for sawn timber and 
plywood, has worked to generate higher consumption projections (Sedjo & Lyon 1990; 
Clark 2001 a). Perhaps some forestry organisations find it difficult to accept the 
implications of slowing population growth in high income countries combined with low 
income elasticities of demand for wood products used for housing (see Clark 2001a for 
long-term trends in wood and wood products consumption in high and low income 
countries). 
Uncertainty, the bane of all economic forecasting, is a particular problem for the wood 
industry because of the long investment lead times. It was generally considered that 40 
years was required for a softwood plantation to generate suitably sized sawlogs (Jacobs 
1963c; Lewis 1957a). Projecting consumption of any product over 40 years is difficult 
because many of the explanatory variables are unpredictable over that time scale and 
some even unknown. 
The 1950s and early 1960s saw increased effort in projecting Australia's future wood 
requirement. In most exercises, population and per capita consumption were the 
dominant explanatory variables. They were projected to 2000 to enable one softwood 
plantation rotation or crop cycle. There was debate about Australia's future population -
reflecting different views about migration, economic development and ecological 
carrying capacity. Future Australian population levels of up to 50 million and even 100 
million were spoken of (Jacobs 1964b ). Despite this exuberance, forecasters of 
Australia's future wood requirements were constrained and fairly accurate, assuming an 
Australian population in 2000 of between 20 and 22.4 million. Assuming a fixed time-
invariant relationship between population and consumption or, as discussed in chapter 
2, assuming that per capita consumption would increase, accounts for much of the 
inaccuracy in wood consumption projections. Simplistic assumptions about per capita 
consumption enabled more complex and demanding analysis of the effects of wood 
saving technologies, changing income elasticities of demand, changing demographics 
and competition from substitutes to be avoided. 
In April 1959, Rodger (nearing retirement) presented the paper Softwood planting 
program for Australia at the Eastern States Timber Industry Stabilisation Conference in 
Lome, Victoria. He calculated that by 2000 Australia, with an assumed doubling in 
population and constant per capita consumption, would consume 17.9 million m3 of 
sawlogs per annum. Rodger limited his consumption projection to the sawlog 
requirement because he considered that growing sawlogs would automatically generate 
the wood ( from thinnings and sawmill residues) for other wood products such as paper 
and wood based panels. The state forest agencies reported that native forests could 
supply 7. 7 m3 of saw logs per annum by 2000, and, after allowing for wood supply from 
existing softwood plantations, Rodger calculated that Australia's softwood planting 
needed to increase from the then rate of 19 840 acres per annum to 32 940 acres per 
annum to achieve self-sufficiency (Rodger 1959). Rodger's paper implied a national 
softwood plantation estate of around 1.8 million acres (0.7 million hectares). 
R.F. Turnbull, Senior Principal Research Officer-in-Charge of the Utilisation Section of 
CSIRO' s Division of Forest Products, presented similar volume projections. Turnbull' s 
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work was more detailed than Rodger's with projections disaggregated into the main 
products, which enabled varying trends in housing and the growth in pulp and paper 
consumption to be specified. Turnbull projected that by 2000 Australia would require 
1 0 to 11.3 million m3 of saw logs per annum with total wood requirements ( excluding 
fuel wood) of 17.2 to 21.6 million m3 per annum (Turnbull 1959). Turnbull's 
projections have proved to be remarkably accurate. Australia's consumption of wood 
products in the year ending 31 December 2000 required an estimated 18.6 m3 of wood 
(appendix A, table Al). 
In the same year, Hanson projected Australia's wood requirements to 1975 and 
suggested that by 2000 Australia's annual log requirements for sawn timber could be 
28 million m3. Hanson, like Rodger, considered that the requirements for other wood 
products could be achieved as a subsidiary of sawlog production (Hanson 1959). Three 
years later, Hanson prepared more detailed projections of Australia's wood requirement 
in 2000 using population and individual per capita consumption estimates across the 
range of wood products as explanatory variables. He projected that Australia would 
consume 32.6 million m3 of wood in 2000 ( excluding fuel wood) (Hanson 1962a). 
Hanson's 1962 projection was 51 per cent greater than the upper level projection 
prepared by Turnbull in 1958. 
Leslie, in a masters thesis written at the time of the wood projections, wrote: 
'It is apparent that some of the differences are of a very serious order. ' 
(Leslie 1963, p. 31 ). 
He was commenting particularly on the differences in the projections by Hanson and 
Turnbull. Leslie went on to criticise the forestry profession's failure to address the 
differences: -
'It seems rather surprising therefore that in Australian forestry neither 
the questions of the forecasts themselves, nor the problems associated 
with economic forecasting for forest products have aroused anything 
like the interest that has been shown in many problems of forestry 
production processes, whose relative importance actually depends on 
the future markets for these products.' (Leslie 1963, pp. 5-6). 
Hanson's 1962 projections prevailed and underpinned Australia 's three million acre 
softwood planting target. 
Australia's softwood planting target 
Addressing the Australian Timber Congress in 1963, Jacobs acknowledged the other 
projections and noted that Hanson 's projection was relatively high: 
'Mr. Hanson forecast a higher future demand than the other authors 
mentioned, and the comparison of the estimates of present growth with 
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his estimate of the log production required by the year 2000 is 
challenging.' (Jacobs 1963c, p. 2). 
Jacobs nonetheless defended his decision to use Hanson's projection, arguing that 
Hanson's per capita consumption assumptions for sawn timber had already been 
exceeded on different occasions in three Australian states and for pulp were lower than 
some countries with similar economies to Australia's. This simplistic explanation 
confirms Leslie's observation that there has been little questioning of the forecasts 
despite their major discrepancies. Jacobs also argued that the per capita consumption 
assumptions could be realised if Australia grew sufficient wood at a reasonable cost. 
Underlying this argument was the view that a wood surplus would dampen wood 
prices, which would enhance the competitiveness and therefore market share of wood 
products against non-wood substitutes. The attitude that wood growing could be 
immune from commercial rigour had its roots in Empire Forestry as articulated by 
Swain ( chapter 2). An alternative outcome that Jacobs did not present was that 
softwood plantation products could displace native forest hardwood sawn timber. 
An examination of the Forestry and Timber Bureau files failed to find any evidence that 
Jacobs briefed the Minister or Department Secretary before proposing the three million 
acre softwood plantation target to the Australian Timber Congress. Only two months 
before delivering his paper, Jacobs briefed his Minister for a meeting with State 
Forestry Ministers in Melbourne on 13 February 1963. Jacobs advised that Australia 
faced a wood deficit but that: 
'the area of wooded land ... is fully capable of growing the timber 
requirements of the likely population of Australia and that all 
Governments should cooperate in developing this vital resource.' 
(Jacobs 1963b ). 
Jacobs did not clarify that the Bureau's analysis supported a national softwood 
plantation target of three million acres and that he, as Director-General, would soon 
publicly announce this target to the industry. 
An examination of the files indicates that Spooner first became aware of the planting 
target at a meeting with State Forestry Ministers on 12 April 1964. Jacobs attended this 
meeting (Australian Forestry Council 1964, p. 42). Spooner wrote to his Department 
Secretary: 
'There was a strong demand to have the Forestry Council constituted. 
The idea is to evolve a national foresfly policy . Most obviously this 
means establishing a case to plant another 2 or 3 M acres of trees. I 
should imagine at Commonwealth expense. We need to go carefully 
otherwise it will be expensive. I think it would be as well to start 
thinking and talking early in the programme of ways and means under 
which private investment can be induced to do the job to some material 
extent.' (Spooner 1964). 
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If the Minister had been briefed on the planting target, why would he repeat it to his 
Departmental Secretary? The Bureau's files contain no evidence that the Minister was 
formally presented with the softwood planting target as a policy proposal for approval. 
The Minister was clearly concerned about the cost of increased softwood planting and 
requested his Department to elevate the role of the private sector in the program. These 
concerns went largely unheeded and were discarded after Spooner's retirement. 
A reference to the Federal Government's Committee of Economic Inquiry chaired by 
John V emon is required before closing this discussion on the planting target. The 
Committee was appointed in February 1963 to examine the future for Australian 
manufacturing. The Committee asked the Forestry and Timber Bureau for their views 
on the future demand and supply for wood and the possibility of import replacement 
(Homer 1963). The Bureau presented projections of Australia's wood needs in 2000 
ranging from 27 .2 to 32.6 million m3 assuming a population of 20 to 23 million and per 
capita wood consumption of 1.3 7 m3. This was calculated for wood as a whole, there 
being no disaggregation for each wood product. The Bureau calculated that after 
deducting projected supply from native forests and with current planting programs 
continuing, Australia needed to accelerate its annual softwood planting to between 60 
000 and 75 000 acres. Compared to Jacobs (1963c), the Bureau was advocating a 
higher planting rate using a lower wood consumption projection. The anomaly is 
explained by different assumptions about plantation productivity, the size of the 
existing plantation estate and native forest wood supply (table 3.3). The Bureau did not 
point out, and therefore did not explain, the anomaly in their submission to the 
Committee. 
APM wrote to the Committee advising that the Forestry and Timber Bureau data on 
softwood planting were incorrect. APM thought that, by September 1963, Australia had 
626 000 acres of softwood plantations (25 per cent private) and that the annual planting 
was about 36 000 acres (Wilson 1964). The Bureau reported in November 1963 that 
Australia then had 550 000 acres of softwood plantations and that this area was 
increasing by 25 000 acres per annum. Wilson's pointed remark to the Vernon 
Committee, 'In view of their importance and recent attention which has been given to 
softwood planting it is highly desirable that incorrect figures should not be bandied 
about.' (Wilson 1964), signaled an emerging rift between APM and the Forestry and 
Timber Bureau over the role of the private sector in the planting program. 
The Vernon Committee noted the Forestry and Timber Bureau' s softwood planting 
proposal but reported that: 
' .. . the lack of detailed statistics on a uniform basis about Australian 
timber resources ... makes it extremely difficult to pass judgement on this 
proposal.' (Commonwealth of Australia 1965, para. 8.167). 
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Table 3.3 Historical progression of the assumptions and information supporting the proposed three 
million acre softwood planting target for Australia. Source: Jacobs (1963c); Forestry and Timber Bureau 
(1963); Standing Committee to the Australian Forestry Council (1964b); Forestry and Timber Bureau 
(1969) ; Fairbairn (1966b ); Departments of National Development and Treasury (1965a & b ); Softwood 
Forestry Loans Act 1967; Fairbairn (1967). 
Jacobs Forestry Standing Department Department Softwood 
1963 and Timber Committee of National of National Forestry 
Bureau report to Development Development Loans Act 
submission AFC 1964 submission to and Treasury ]967h 
to Vernon Cabinet 1966 reports to 
Committee Cabinet 1965 
1963 
Projected 32.6 27.2 to 27.2 to n.r. over 28 over 32.6 
Australian 32.6 32.6 
consumption 
ofwooda by 
2000 (million 
m
3 per 
annum) 
Thenb annual 25 25 35 in 40 40 29 in 1965
1 
softwood 1962, 
planting rate 41.25 
(000 acres) planned for 
1964, 
46.8 
announced 
annual 
target by 
the states 
Thenb 500 550 n.r. n.r. nearly 700 n.r. 
plantation (520 public) 
area (000 
acres) 
Estimated 17.0 10.1 10.4 n.r. Not n.r. 
native forest quantified. 
wood supply 
- Half of 
by 2000 Australia' s 
(million m3 wood supply 
per annum) was expected 
to come from 
native forests 
in 2000. 
Plantation 14 n.r. n.r. n.r. 16g at least 14 
productiviti 20 to 21 13.2 to 
(MAI= a.c. d 16.9 a.c.r 
m3 /ha/year) 
Proposed 60 60 to 75 'at least' 75 75 (65 public 75 75 
annual and 10 
planting rate private) 
(000 acres per 
annum) 
Plantation 40 n.r. n.r. 35 35 35 
rotation 
(years) 
Total 3 000 2 650 to 3 n.r. 3 240 3 000 3 000 3 000 
plantation 175 a.c.e a.c. f 
area target 
(000 acres) 
a.c. means calculated by the author usmg informat10n in the report and limited assumptions as specified. 
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n.r. means not reported. The absence of a figure means that it could not be calculated using information 
in the report without having to make major assumptions. 
a. Excluding fuel wood. 
b. The absence of a year reference means the document did not specify it. 
c. Used to generate planting targets. 
d. The figure was calculated using a 35-year rotation with the 75 000 acre per annum planting proposal 
relating to the higher consumption projections. 
e. The figures were calculated assuming planting continues for 35 years. 
f. Assuming 35-year rotations and plantation area in 1964 of 615 287 acres (Forestry and Timber 
Bureau 1969). 
g. Average of mean annual increments (MAI) for each state as reported in Departments of National 
Development and Treasury 1965b, p. 8 weighted by the, recommended area to be planted by each 
state. 
h. Including information provided in the Ministerial Statement to the House of Representatives, 9 
March 1966, and second reading speech. 
1. The Minister's speech was unclear, Forestry and Timber Bureau data show that the figure was for 
public sector planting. 
The Committee expressed the hope that the AFC would help to improve the 
information base and emphasised the role of the private sector: 
' ... we hope the importance of the private sector will not be overlooked 
either in relation to current problems or to the future expansion. We 
suggest that close contact be established and maintained between the 
Standing Committee and owners of private forests.' (Commonwealth of 
Australia 1965, para 8.167). 
The Committee was favourable to additional plantation establishment, particularly on 
existing agricultural land where farmers could reap additional benefits ( e.g. wind 
protection, shade for cattle and aesthetic amenity) and suggested the distribution of free 
seedlings and additional information sen:ices. The Vernon Committee avoided making 
a judgement on the Bureau's softwood planting proposal. 
Jacobs reported to the first AFC meeting that the wood consumption projections 
presented in the Bureau's submission to the Vernon Committee were the basis for the 
proposed expansion in softwood planting (Australian Forestry Council 1964, p. 34). 
There are grounds to dispute this claim and argue that Hanson (1962a) is the original 
source. Since Jacobs first proposed the three million acre target in 1963, variations in 
projected consumption, different plantation productivity and rotation time assumptions 
and varying information about native forest wood supply and the size of the existing 
plantation estate have left the three million acre target unchanged (table 3.3). 
3.5 AFC decision to plant softwoods 
On the day the Prime Minister announced the formation of the AFC (23 July 1964), its 
Standing Committee met informally in Melbourne (Standing Committee to the 
Australian Forestry Council 1964a). Following the meeting, a three-page document 
'The Softwood Afforestation Programme' was prepared by the Forestry and Timber 
Bureau for the first AFC meeting. The forest agencies considered that Australia's 
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native forests could supply 10.4 million m3 of wood annually by 2000 and therefore 
could only partially meet projected consumption.32 The Standing Committee argued 
that increasing softwood planting was economically preferable to increasing the 
productivity of native forests: 
'There is little prospect of increasing production from native forests at a 
cost which would compare favourably with softwood planting. These 
softwoods in general grow faster than the native hardwoods, and have 
advantages over them for many purposes including some kinds of paper 
making and building construction, because of long fibre-lengths, 
lightness, ease of working and permeability by preservatives. Softwood 
plantations in Australia have already proved to be economic, and there 
are still large areas of land suitable for planting within economic range 
of markets.' (Standing Committee to the Australian Forestry Council 
1964b). 
The Standing Committee's document presented the case for increasing Australia 's 
softwood planting rate to 7 5 000 acres per annum. The document was deficient in 
quantified information - providing no data on the current area of softwood plantations, 
presenting insufficient information for the 7 5 000 acre figure to be recalculated ( and 
therefore verified), and making no mention of the three million acre area target (table 
3.3). 
The haste and brevity of the Standing Committee's work was challenged. J.D. Boyd, 
Acting Chief of the CSIRO's Division of Forest Products, attended the meeting and 
wrote to Jacobs, as Chair of the Standing Committee, concerned that the haste would 
mean that Ministers would not be adequately briefed on the important issues to be 
addressed at the first AFC meeting. Boyd was not arguing against the softwood 
plantation program. His concern was about the process of policy formulation and the 
Committee's responsibility to the Government: 
'I would like to make it clear that the documentation provided for the 
Standing Committee meeting in Melbourne was not, in my view, 
adequate ... ' (Boyd 1964). 
Boyd's impression was that: 
' ... under the present conditions, Council will assemble without proper 
briefing in the sense that individual conservators will have had to place 
their own interpretation of the significance of the two major items [ free 
trade agreement and softwood planting program], and the Ministers will 
have no clear idea of a national policy as supported by the Standing 
Committee.' (Boyd 1964). 
32 Australian hardwood native forests supplied 10.7 million m3 of wood in the year ending June 2000 
(Australian Bureau of Agricultural and Resource Economics 2001 b, p. 63) . 
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Boyd advised Jacobs that Allan Harris, Western Australia's Conservator of Forests, 
was 'similarly disturbed about the situation' and agreed with Boyd's suggestion that 
the Forestry and Timber Bureau prepare and circulate a draft document presenting the 
case for a softwood program for the Standing Committee and that the Standing 
Committee meet again for two days to consider it before the AFC meeting (Boyd 
1964). 
Jacobs (1964d) explained the haste by the desire of the State Forestry Ministers to meet 
before the Federal Minister for Trade discussed the Free Trade Agreement with New 
Zealand. He agreed with Boyd that the Bureau's paper on the softwood program 
required much more work and advised Boyd that his immediate aim was to make the 
Minister for Trade aware of the current softwood planting being undertaken by the 
states. Jacobs argued that the planting rate the Trade Department and the New Zealand 
Government had assumed was about half the actual. This meant that the cost of opening 
the Australian market to New Zealand's wood products industry would be much greater 
than the Department of Trade realised. The Forestry and Timber Bureau's files show 
that the planting rate used by the Department of Trade (35 00 acres per annum) was 
actually supplied by the Forestry and Timber Bureau (Department of Trade 1964). The 
official figures, also compiled by the Bureau, show an additional 36 000 acres 
established in 1963 and 40 000 acres in 1964 (Forestry and Timber Bureau 1969, p. 
143). Jacobs was wrong on two counts. First, the Department of Trade had made no 
assumption about the then planting rate - this information was provided by the Bureau. 
Secondly, the planting rate used by the Department of Trade was reasonably accurate 
anyway and also confirmed by APM. 
Jacobs concluded his letter to Boyd saying: 
'At the moment I do not hope to achieve anything further than this 
[ making McEwan aware of the implications for the current softwood 
planting program of a free trade with New Zealand in wood products], 
and will be very pleased if we get this far.' (Jacobs 1964d). 
If this was an accurate account of the agenda, Jacobs could have accommodated Boyd's 
concerns by delaying consideration of the softwood program until the second AFC 
meeting. This did not happen and a month later, on 21 August 1964, the first meeting of 
the AFC was held in Parliament House, Canberra, where Jacobs proposed an 
accelerated softwood planting · program. The meeting was recorded verbatim by the 
Hansard reporters (Australian Fores try Council 1964). 33 
McEwan attended the first part of the meeting to discuss the New Zealand-Australia 
free trade negotiations and whether any agreement would inhibit or threaten Australia's 
proposed softwood plantation expansion. McEwan advised that the negotiations were 
33 A subsequent meeting of the AFC Standing Committee considered a paper prepared by Jacobs, 'The 
need to treat Council and Standing Committee documents as confidential'. Jacobs considered that all 
members of the Council and Standing Committee would agree that all papers, reports and minutes should 
be treated as confidential (Jacobs 1964e). This secrecy worked to intensify concerns about the AFC on 
matters of public interest. 
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around New Zealand having the opportunity to sell duty free wood and wood products 
(including pulp and paper) with the exception of dressed sawn timber, building boards, 
plywood and veneers. 34 McEwan argued that the Australian wood and wood products 
industry had nothing to be concerned about. He presented tables (based on Anon 1964) 
showing the future Australian pulp market's capacity to accommodate all of the 
projected Australian and New Zealand production that was surplus to their domestic 
requirements. New Zealand's projected surplus was expected to supply slightly less 
than 1 0 per cent of the Australian market in 2000. McEwan argued that a problem for 
Australia would only arise if the population assumption and the planting rate were too 
high. McEwan made it clear that the figures were not his: 
'If we accept these figures - and it will not be I who will defend them, it 
will be the boffins who will defend them - there will be nothing to worry 
about then.' (Australian Forestry Council 1964, p. 21). 
The 'boffins' to whom McEwan was referring was mainly the Forestry and Timber 
Bureau, which provided the data on Australian demand and wood availability. McEwan 
presented the same analysis for sawn timber and came to the same conclusion: 
'This is what leads us on the face of it to believe, working from figures 
supplied by our own Forestry Bureau and the advice from New Zealand 
as to their plans, that this [a Free Trade Agreement] is not a proposition 
that holds any jeopardy for Australian timber interests.' (Australian 
Forestry Council 1964, p. 25). 
McEwan also reassured the Council that he would consult with them before adding 
additional wood products onto the free trade list. 35 
McEwan's argument meant that any concerns about a free trade agreement required the 
State Ministers to challenge either the Bureau's consumption projections or the size of 
New Zealand's surplus production. Victoria's Minister, Lindsay Thompson, argued that 
sawn timber consumption would be significantly less than projected because of 
declining per capita sawn timber consumption and quoted supporting figures from the 
34 The New Zealand-Australia Free Trade Agreement was signed on 31 August 1965 and required that 
both countries maintain existing duty free trade, which applied to a substantial part of the wood and 
wood products trade. On those products where duty applied, mainly dressed sawn timber, packaging 
materials and paper products, it required both countries to reduce these duties progressively. With respect 
to wood products, both countries would co-operate with a view to achieving a harmonious and mutually 
beneficial expansion of trade between them and to promoting the most efficient use of their combined 
resources with a joint consultative council of forest industries to be established (Parliament of Australia 
1965). 
35 Imports of softwood sawn timber from New Zealand accounted for 9 per cent of Australia 's sawn 
timber consumption in the year ending June 2000 , imports of wood panels from New Zealand accounted 
for 7 per cent, and imports of paper from New Zealand accounted for 5 per cent. These actual figures are 
reasonably in line with the projections quoted by McEwan. However, imports from other countries were 
not considered in the analysis. Over the year ending June 2000, net imports (imports less exports) of 
sawn timber accounted for 18 per cent of Australian consumption and net imports of paper accounted for 
26 per cent of Australian consumption. Australia was a net exporter of wood panels in 1999/00 
(Australian Bureau of Agricultural and Resource Economics 2001b). 
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Sawmillers Association. McEwan responded by repeating that the consumption figures 
came from the Forestry and Timber Bureau. After McEwan left the meeting, Thompson 
said that the consumption projections might be overestimates and asked the Standing 
Committee to recheck all the figures. Enticknap, the New South Wales Minister for 
Agriculture and Conservation, was concerned that non-wood substitutes could affect 
the industry greatly. Fairbairn, who was chairing the meeting, also commented on the 
use of concrete and steel over sawn timber (Australian Forestry Council 1964). 
The consumption projections were not re-examined by either the Standing Committee 
or the Forestry and Timber Bureau. Instead, McEwan's 'no worries' statement and 
reassurances were interpreted by Fairbairn as removing a few misapprehensions about 
accelerating Australia's softwood planting (Australian Forestry Council 1964, p. 29). 
With discussion on the proposed New Zealand-Australia Free Trade Agreement 
finished - the stimulus for the rushed meeting - the AFC moved to the next agenda 
item, namely the 'The softwood afforestation program'. 
Jacobs introduced the item and quickly explained that the Bureau's consumption 
projections were higher than others because the Bureau had taken into account the 
persistent underestimation made in previous forecasts (Australian Forestry Council 
1964, p. 34). No specific studies were quoted, but from the discussion above, Jacobs 
seems to be implying that Turnbull (CSIRO) and Rodger (the Bureau' s previous 
director) were also stuck in the mould of persistent underestimation. Jacobs did not use 
this opportunity to address the declining per capita sawn timber consumption and non-
wood substitute concerns specifically raised by Ministers Thompson and Enticknap. 
Jacobs explained the rationale for an accelerated softwood planting, namely constrained 
native forest wood supply relative to the projected requirement, the economic 
attractions of growing softwood due to its relatively high growth rates and the wide 
market applications for softwood. Jacobs advised that an annual planting rate of 7 5 000 
acres was required for reasonable self-sufficiency. This would require increasing the 
planting rate by 30 000 acres per annum on top of the existing state targets (table 3.3). 
This was the most conservative approach to 'ease' the State Ministers into the program. 
There was no mention of a three million acre target or possible Federal Government 
funding. Jacobs reported that there was ample (public) land for planting but, 
recognising Victoria's policy, noted that some states might choose to lease land to the 
private sector or encourage planting on private land. Also noted were the attractions of 
regional industry and employment growth based on import replacement. Jacobs 
concluded the presentation with the Standing Committee' s recommendation that the 
Committee investigate in more detail the land potential for the program (Australian 
Forestry Council 1964). 
The Ministers' response was cautious and confused. Enticknap led the response to the 
planting proposal saying: 
'This is a pretty big factor.' (Enticknap as reported in Australian Forestry 
Council 1964). 
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He wanted assurance that sufficient land with good wood yield potential was available 
for competitiveness. (Later in the discussion Jacobs referred to a meeting between 
Spooner and the state forestry Ministers where Enticknap indicated that New South 
Wales had three million acres of land available.) Enticknap suggested that the Council 
agree in principle to raising the annual planting to 7 5 000 acres with the Standing 
Committee researching the land availability issue. Thompson said: 
'I think that the consideration of certain factors before we finally agree 
on a target is essential.' (Thompson, as reported in Australian Forestry 
Council 1964). 
He was referring particularly to Victoria's lack of knowledge about the availability of 
suitable land. Richter, Queensland's Minister for Local Government and Conservation, 
spoke of taxation concessions to encourage private planting: 
'I think that could very well bridge the gap.' (Richter as reported in 
Australian Forestry Council 1964). 
Enticknap questioned the wisdom of the AFC 'getting down to recommending forms of 
assistance for private planters.' Shortly later Enticknap reported that the New South 
Wales Forestry Commission had set up a branch to encourage private planting. 
Thompson advised the Council of the Victorian Government's policies to encourage 
private sector planting. Jacobs and Fairbairn sought an in principle agreement to the 
7 5 000 figure. The discussion broadened and doubts were raised about New Zealand's 
intentions, the Standing Committee's figures and the cost of transporting sawn timber 
in Australia. Enticknap appeared frustrated that the 7 5 000 acre figure was not being 
supported in principle. Fairbairn thought that it had been. Jacobs sought clarification 
and Fairbairn sought verification that the meeting agreed in principle to aim for a 
7 5 000 acre per annum planting rate. Thompson, noting that New South Wales could 
cover the whole planting, asked whether the national planting figure was too low. 
Shortly after, Thompson agreed to setting the figure as a desirable target and 
investigating its practical feasibility. Lawrence, Chair of the Victorian Forests 
Commission, said that if the softwood resource were to be extended by the magnitude 
discussed, there would have to be high government appreciation for proper 
management and use of the resources: 
'Every forester will tell you that we do not want to repeat the New 
Zealand experience where virtually 1 million acres of timber were grown 
with no market, but with very great faith and hope. ' (Lawrence, as 
reported in Australian Forestry Council 1964). 
Lawrence knew that significant capital would be needed to process the resource and 
was concerned that government did not appreciate the potential threats to this 
investment being realised. The discussion then shifted to what products were already 
imported duty free from New Zealand and how any free trade agreement might affect 
competition. The discussion on the softwood program finished at this point with a 
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resolution put by Thompson that the Council welcomed the assurance from the Trade 
Minister that every precaution would be taken to safeguard the interests of processing 
industries. The first AFC meeting ended without a resolution on the softwood planting 
program. Boyd's concerns about the inadequate time for briefing Ministers were 
justified. Poor chairing was also evident. 
The first formal meeting of the Standing Committee to the AFC was held in Canberra 
on 2-3 December 1964. The meeting commenced with Hanson introducing the paper 
the Bureau had prepared with the assistance of the state forest agencies, 'Australian 
plantation potential' (Forestry and Timber Bureau 1964a). The paper detailed for each 
'forest' region in each state and territory the existing plantation area, planned planting, 
potential plantation area, plantation productivity and estimated annual wood yield. The 
paper concluded that there was enough suitable land to achieve the three million acre 
target. The exclusion of the private resource from the tables was argued on the grounds 
of insufficient knowledge about the private sector's future plans. However, a figure of 
10 000 acres per annum was suggested as a possible private planting rate, noting that 
this was consistent with recent past planting. The paper rationalised the small role given 
to the private sector, arguing that most private plantings were less productive because 
of 'inferior management and/or management aimed at maximising financial returns 
rather than volume returns.' Without industry representation on the AFC and its 
Standing Committee, these claims could go unchallenged. 
Jacobs, chairing the meeting, advised (incorrectly) that the AFC had agreed that raising 
the softwood planting to 75 000 acres was desirable and asked if the Committee would 
like to consider how the increased planting rate would be achieved. A confused 
discussion followed. Lawrence asked for the rationale behind the 7 5 000 acre figure; 
Harris (Western Australia) replied that it was what the AFC agreed to; Jacobs said the 
agreed program was to reach three million acres; Bednall (South Australia) pointed out 
that the three million target was not mentioned at the AFC meeting; Lawrence wanted a 
determination on the public sector proportion of the planting; Hanson suggested that the 
task was to decide how the planting should be distributed amongst the states; confusion 
continued about the 7 5 000 acre figure with a suggestion that this was a minimum; 
another suggested they were 'stuck with this figure'; concerns were raised about the 
state's capacity to nearly double the existing program. Lawrence advised that if the 
planting rate were to be increased to 7 5 000 acres per annum, 'money would have to be 
found' and it 'was a little too early to discuss allocation of acreages between 
Governments.' (Standing Committee to the Australian Forestry Council 1964c). 
At this point, the discussion became focussed with Hudson (New South Wales) 
speaking to a table showing what his state could do given financial aid. Jacobs advised 
that the Vernon Committee was likely to report to the Federal Government that the cost 
of the extra planting would be £2-3 million per annum and hoped that the Vernon 
Committee would make a recommendation for Federal Government funding. This 
recommendation was not forthcoming and, as discussed in chapter 2, the Committee 
was not impressed with the Bureau's documentation of the case for increased public 
sector softwood planting. A run-through of the states quickly established that, with 
financial assistance, a total of 60 000 acres per annum could be handled by the states. 
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Lawrence remained concerned about the private plantings, convinced that the private 
sector was on the edge of a planting boom. Jacobs, as Chair, let the issue pass 
unaddressed and asked for the i tern to be finalised. 
The key elements of the Committee's report to the AFC would be: 
• that adequate land was available. 
• that the public sector plant 65 000 acres per annum, with a state/territory allocation 
as specified, leaving 10 000 acres per annum to the private sector. 
• that the additional costs in each state ( over and above the costs of the current annual 
planting) would be detailed over the next five years (Standing Committee to the 
Australian Forestry Council 1964c). 
With industry having no voice on the AFC or its Standing Committee and with the 
expectation of Federal Government funding, the heads of the state forest agencies had 
divided amongst themselves the business of meeting the yet to be approved three 
million acre softwood plantation area target. 
A later agenda item, 'The encouragement of forestry on private land', brought 
contradictory comments, with Bednall noting that encouraging private forestry was one 
way of meeting the 75 000 acre target and Crane (Forestry and Timber Bureau) noting 
that the Government could save money if the private sector could grow wood more 
cheaply than the forest agencies. Jacobs saw 'great political advantages in having 1000 
forest owners backing the afforestation program.' He ignored the option of large 
private industrial plantation growers instead of large public sector forest &gencies 
meeting the planting target. The discussion fixed on using the taxation system to 
encourage private sector planting and no changes were made to the 10 000 acre per 
annum share notionally allocated to the private sector as part of the national program 
(Standing Committee to the Australian Forestry Council 1964c; Forestry and Timber 
Bureau 1964b). 
The AFC at its second meeting on 10 February 1965 accepted the assurances of the 
Standing Committee that there was adequate land and agreed to recommend to their 
Governments that the national softwood planting increase to 7 5 000 acres per annum. 
The Council envisaged that the private sector would establish 10 000 acres per annum 
and recommended that the government sector plant the difference. The Council 
requested Fairbairn approach the Federal Government to present the case for a specific 
allocation of funds for the additional softwood planting. 
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3.6 Preparing the case for Federal Government funding 
Federal Government funding required economic evaluation of the program by the 
Department of Treasury. The Forestry and . Timber Bureau viewed the Treasury 
examination as the toughest test for the program. Boswell, Fairbairn's Departmental 
Secretary, advised his Minister that Treasury would be treated carefully: 
'We are looking for a decision by the Commonwealth to assist the States 
in carrying out a continuing programme of expanded plantings 
extending at least over the next thirty-five years and involving in the 
aggregate hundreds of millions of pounds,' [ and cautiously warned his 
Minister:] 'The stakes are high and while we would like to reach finality 
on the matter as soon as possible we judge it better to proceed slowly 
and reach a favourable conclusion rather than trying to force things 
along with a strong possibility of an unfavourable reaction because of 
our insistence of early consideration.' (Boswell 1965). 
Fairbairn wrote to the Treasurer, Harold Holt, advising of the AFC's recommendations 
and suggested that the two Departments prepare a paper examining the case for Federal 
Government assistance for Cabinet consideration (Fairbairn 1965). Holt agreed (Holt 
1965). The officers responsible for the study were Hanson and R.W. Cole36 and they 
decided to undertake what they called a benefit-cost study. Benefit-cost analysis had 
become a prominent tool to analyse investment proposals, particularly those in the 
public sector, by including social benefits and costs not normally included in the price 
system (Leslie 1967). It was a favoured tool of agricultural economists such as Lloyd, 
Gruen and Davidson at the time. Th_e benefit-cost analysis undertaken by the 
Departments of Treasury and National Development was a simple discounted cash flow 
analysis of the direct costs and revenues of the plantation investment. The work was 
presented in a report to Cabinet (Departments of National Development and Treasury 
1965a). The findings were included in another report undertaken by the two . 
departments that considered the wider benefits (not costs) of the program, namely a 
reduced import bill, decentralisation and regional employment (Departments of 
National Development and Treasury 1965b ). 
The Departments of National Development and Treasury advised that a complete 
economic evaluation of the proposed planting program in each of the six states was not 
possible given the limited available data and time for analysis. The state forest agencies 
provided estimates of their planting and maintenance costs. These were not examined 
in detail, although they were likely to be overestimates given the expectation of Federal 
Government funding (Departments of National Development and Treasury 1965a, p. 
9). A comparison with private sector planting costs was not undertaken, possibly 
because Cole was not aware of published data on APM Forests' plantation 
establishment and maintenance costs. The state forest agency's data showed the cost of 
36 R.W. Cole was then in the Economic and Financial Survey Division, Department of the Treasury. 
Cole, later Sir William, became Secretary of the Public Service Board. 
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plantation establishment and maintenance ( excluding land and housing costs) ranged 
between £112 and £453 per acre (Departments of National Development and Treasury 
1965a, p. 8) with an area-based weighted average of £179 per acre. These costs were 
significantly greater than those reported for APM Forests' operations in 1957 of £22 
per acre (including land) for establishment and £1. 1 per acre per year for maintenance 
(Chandler 1957, p. 46). Chandler, in a paper presented at a conference on private 
forestry hosted by the NSW Division of the Institute of Foresters in 1963, presented 
data showing APM Forests' plantation establishment costs ( excluding land) at £30 per 
acre (Chandler 1963, p. II-4). Hanson was aware of these up-to-date private sector 
costings because he delivered the preceding paper (Hanson 1963) and asked Chandler a 
question on his. As discussed below, the public-private cost differential was only 
identified and challenged when the Softwood Forestry Agreements Bill 1967 was 
debated in the House of Representatives. 
The high public plantation establishment costs could be accommodated without 
generating a loss because the analysis used relatively high shadow prices for wood. 
Shadow prices for commodity sawlogs - the dominant plantation product in volume and 
revenue terms - were 120-300 per cent higher than the actual stumpage prices (table 
3.4). The planting program would have been unprofitable if actual stumpage prices 
were used in the analysis. The departments argued that it was inappropriate to use 
actual stumpage prices because of State Government policy to keep stumpages lower 
than market levels. They argued that, although such a policy came at a cost to the 
states, it delivered national benefits in manufacturing industry. 37 Shadow prices were 
derived as the residual price calculated by deducting the costs ( and allowing for a 
reasonable profit) of harvesting, transporting and processing from the price of imported 
products - douglas fir for sawn timber and New Zealand pulp. Treasury was particularly 
concerned that the shadow prices might not accurately reflect the free market prices for 
radiata pine. They were sensitive to the implication that higher shadow prices meant 
that higher costs could be absorbed knowing that someone else (i.e. the Federal 
Government) would fund the program. These qualifications were powerless against the 
report's main conclusion: 
'The balance of probabilities favours the proposed programmes in New 
South Wales, Victoria, South Australia and Tasmania. With respect to 
the proposed Queensland programme, the conclusion goes the other 
way: the probabilities, reasonably interpreted, do not favour the 
planting of Hoop pine as an economic proposition while the planting of 
37 Other justifications for low stumpage prices were the need to overcome prejudices against radiata pine 
as a newcomer to the market, to encourage investment in new pulping facilities, and the state government 
argument that stumpages should only be sufficient to pay for the cost of regeneration - to charge more is 
'tantamount to taxation' (Departments ofNational Development and Treasury 1965a, p. 17). These were 
not Hanson's personal views. Hanson argued that stumpage prices should be increased to recover the full 
market value of publicly owned assets. Forest agencies were tempted to set stumpages low to reduce the 
political pressures exerted by customers and consumers generally. It was less onerous for the agencies to 
persuade their state treasuries to make more funds available than to be consistently resisting pressures for 
lower stumpage charges. Higher stumpage rates would stimulate private forestry and dampen forest 
alienation to traditional agriculture (Hanson & Leslie 1965). Earlier, Hanson had argued for increased 
stumpages on pulpwood to stimulate supply (Hanson 1962b). 
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Exotic pine could be considered only marginal at best. The Western 
Australian programme, as proposed, has many uncertainties in its 
economic effects and it is not possible to put forward even a tentative 
conclusion. It is suggested that further work be done on the economics 
of the WA. programme.' (Departments of National Development and 
Treasury 1965b, p. 31 ). 
Table 3.4 Shadow prices used to evaluate the commercial viability of the softwood planting proposal. 
Source: Departments of National Development and Treasury 1965a, p. 16. 
Shadow price Stumpage rate 
(£ per cubic foot) (£ per cubic foot) 
Sawlogsa for commodity 
sawn timber 
NSW 0.20 0.05 
Vic 0.25 0.10 
Qld - hoop pine 0.22 0.10 
Q ld - exotic pine 0.21 0.07 
SA 0.30 0.10 
WA - radiata pine 0.21 0.06 
WA - pinaster pine 0.26 0.09 
Tas 0.17 0.05 
Sawlogsa for joinery 
NSW 0.40 0.10 
Vic 0.45 0.12 
Q ld - hoop pine 0.43 0.40 
WA 0.42 0.10 
Pulplogs and casewooda 
NSW 0.05 0.01 
Vic 0.08 0.04 
Q ld - hoop pine 0.06 0.02 
Qld- exotic pine 0.05 0.02 
SA 0.09 0.05 
WA - radiata pine 0.05 0.04 
WA - pinaster pine 0.08 0.03 
Tas 0.02 0.02 
a. Unless specified all logs are radiata pine. 
b. An average figure was taken when pulplogs and casewood were separately listed. 
Difference 
(%) 
300 
150 
120 
200 
200 
250 
189 
240 
300 
275 
7.5 
320 
400 
100 
200 
150 
80 
25 
167 
0 
Treasury worked on the assumption that there would be sufficient demand for the 
wood. Treasury had prepared their own estimates that were 'broadly consistent with the 
conclusion' that the planting program together with wood supplies from native forests 
would make Australia reasonably self-sufficient. With this separate examination, Cole 
and Hanson were able to write jointly: 
'Although such long-term projections are highly speculative it is 
considered reasonable to accept from the outset the proposition that a 
planting programme of the order envisaged would not be likely to create 
problems of excessive supply in Australia as a whole. ' (Departments of 
National Development and Treasury 1965a, p. 10). 
The agreement that the greater part of the softwood program was probably economic 
was a strategic breakthrough for the proponents of the softwood planting program. We 
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can only muse about the Treasury response had they been made aware of the apparent 
public-private sector planting cost differential. 
Treasury argued that there was no case for Government funding, particularly given that 
the program was shown to be largely an economic proposition (Departments of 
National Development and Treasury 1965b, pp. 13-5). The Department of National 
Development disagreed with the Treasury's view (Departments of National 
Development and Treasury 1965b, pp. 16-8). The two departments presented their 
respective arguments on Federal Government funding in separate submissions to 
Cabinet. 
3.5 Cabinet decision 
The Departments of Treasury and National Development's main report (Departments of 
National Development and Treasury 1965b ), which incorporated the economic analysis 
together with a consideration of wider issues, namely the import saving and 
decentralisation benefits, the proposed New Zealand-Australia Free Trade Agreement, 
private sector planting and Federal Government funding, was completed on 24 
December 1965. Fairbairn presented his Cabinet submission (No. 1205) before the 
year's end. The Prime Minister's Department presented their brief to the Prime 
Minister (Anon. 1966) on Fairbairn's submission on 18 January. They advised that 
Treasury and National Development disagreed on the financing issue and that the 
Minister for National Development was proposing a compromise - 50 per cent of the 
cost of the additional plantings to be funded by a Federal Government loan and 50 per 
cent by a grant. The Prime Minister was advised that neither the details of the proposed 
arrangements with the states, nor of any_ alternative arrangements had been discussed 
with Treasury. 
The recently appointed Treasurer,38 William McMahon, decided to make a separate 
Cabinet submission. On 15 February 1966, Cabinet considered two submissions on the 
softwood program - Number 8, submitted by Fairbairn (Fairbairn 1966a) on 28 January, 
and Number 13, submitted by McMahon on 31 January 1966 (McMahon 1966). 
Fairbairn's submission presented the background to, and arguments for, the softwood 
planting program. He saw no disagreement between the two departments about the 
overall desirability of the program with their work showing the greater part of the 
proposal to be economic. On the funding issue Fairbairn argued: 
'While I do not reject the possibility that the States could find at least 
some of the finance for the expansion programme, I do not feel that 
there are sufficiently compelling reasons at the State level to cause all 
the States to bring this about as quickly as we would wish. The State 's 
position in this regard can be easily appreciated. The main benefits tend 
38 Harold Holt, the previous Treasurer, became Prime Minister on Menzies' retirement on 26 January · 
1966. 
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to be largely national in character, in particular the substantial import 
savings (at economic costs) and the achievements of worthwhile 
decentralised development. 
In making their request the States have not asked for any specific form 
of financial assistance. Grants would of course be the most attractive to 
the States. However, since forestry is a revenue earning activity and the 
analysis has shown that softwood plantations can pay their way in the 
long term, I think it is reasonable for the Commonwealth to expect 
repayment of some of the funds advanced to the States for forestry. 
However if all the funds were to be made available by way of interest 
bearing repayable advances, this would raise financing problems for the 
States. They would be faced with a mounting commitment in interest and 
capital repayments during the lengthy initial period before any 
substantial revenue from the planting programme. For this reason I fear 
that the States would not regard an offer by the Commonwealth of an 
interest bearing repayable advance as a satisfactory solution to the 
financing problem in the initial stage.' (Fairbairn 1966a, para. 19, 20, 
21). 
Fairbairn recommended that the Federal Government finance the additional planting for 
the first five years, 50 per cent as a grant and 50 per cent as a loan. He also 
recommended that Cabinet indicate a preparedness to consider further support before 
the end of the initial five-year funding period. On the issue of the uneconomic planting 
in Queensland and Western Australia, Fairbairn sought Cabinet approval to approach 
Queensland about providing funding for exotic planting only (i.e. not for planting 
indigenous hoop pine) and recommended Western Australia's plantings remain as 
proposed but that future consideration be given to scaling it down to match the state's 
market. On the issue of private sector planting, Fairbairn argued that there was limited 
scope for increasing private plantings in the immediate future, presenting his view that 
any encouragement given to private planting would not significantly affect the initial 
five-year program. Government would always be a major provider of wood because of 
the long delay before the first harvest, and therefore income, from plantations 
(Fairbairn 1966a). 
The Treasurer argued that the benefit-cost analysis favoured increased planting of 
softwoods in south eastern Australia but not Queensland and Western Australia. He 
pointed out that: 
'In these circumstances, the Australian Forestry Council's programme 
could not be given a general blessing as it stands without ignoring the 
possibility that it involves directing resources into less economic areas.' 
(McMahon 1966). 
He advised that the AFC should be asked to look at the program again given the results 
of the benefit-cost analysis and data that were not available to the AFC when the 
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program was prepared. It was a long-term program (35 years) and haste was not 
necessary. The Treasurer noted that the AFC program was predominantly a 
Government planting program - private enterprise was to play only a minor role and 
little attention was given to how the states might encourage private planting. The 
Treasurer's submission specified the generous approach used to calculate the benefit-
cost ratios and argued that Federal Government funding would see 'payments to the 
states well beyond what would be necessary.' Whilst the Treasurer was opposed to 
funding by grants, he left the door open to financing by loans, advising that loan 
conditions could be varied, for example, by deferring repayment. But, before 
considering the form of assistance, it was necessary to decide whether or not any 
Federal Government assistance should be given to the states for softwood planting 
(McMahon 1966). 
Cabinet decided to provide financial assistance to the states. The record of the decision 
shows that Cabinet: 
• endorsed the AFC proposal to increase the softwood planting rate from the present 
40 000 acres per annum to 7 5 000 acres per annum for the next 3 5 years, 
• approved funding by the Federal Government for the initial five-year program as 
proposed by the AFC - subject to modification as the Minister may negotiate with 
Queensland, 
• indicated a preparedness to consider further support before the end of the initial 
five-year period, 
• agreed to the funding wholly by long-term loans free of interest and repayment of 
principal for the first ten years, after which interest and repayment would apply 
(Bunting 1966). 
The Treasurer's point, about Cabinet needing to decide first whether assistance should 
be provided, was made at the end of his submission when, in my opinion, it should 
have been the first consideration. An affirmative decision from Government would then 
trigger inquiry and debate over the form and amount of funding. Instead, the process 
started with Treasury becoming engaged in a rushed economic analysis using 
questionable data. 39 Consultation with APM Forests could have provided a quick check 
on the state forest agencies' plantation cost data and competitiveness in plantation 
wood growing. The interdepartmental reports provide no evidence that such an easy 
check was undertaken. The Forestry and Timber Bureau controlled the data collection 
process. On receiving the data, it undertook, independently of Treasury, its own 
analysis to satisfy itself that the information was adequate. As Jacobs advised his 
Departmental Secretary, 
' [ w ]e will also obtain in this way, an indication of the probable results of 
the independent studies the Treasury will carry out with our data. ' 
(Jacobs 1965a). 
39 The rush was initially motivated by the Bureau's desire to have a Cabinet submission agreed to by 
Treasury and the Department of National Development before the budget session. Jacobs became aware 
that this could not be achieved by July 1965 (Jacobs 1965a). 
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There was scope for considerable data adjustment in compiling the cost and shadow 
pricing information. For example, Hanson directed his staff to add to all New South 
Wales costs 52.5 per cent for overheads and £100 000 per annum for land purchases 
(Hanson 1965a). Data from other states were not filed, but presumably the same cost 
add-ons applied. No evidence was found of overt data manipulation by the Bureau. 
That W estem Australian and Queensland hoop plantations were reported as negative 
propositions lends support to the view that the data were not manipulated to generate a 
favourable economic result. Despite the clarity in the Cabinet submissions over the 
non-viability of the program in these two states, the benefit-cost analysis results were 
ambivalent. Western Australia's pinaster plantations and Queensland's hoop 
plantations were reported as the least economic, but were still (just) favourable under at 
least one of the three analyses used (Departments of National Development and 
Treasury 1965a, p. 7). 
3.6 Parliament votes on the softwood loans bill 
Fairbairn announced the Government's decision in a Ministerial Statement to the House 
of Representatives on 9 March 1966. He advised that about $20 million in long-term 
loans would be made available to the states over the following five years to help 
increase their softwood planting in order to enable Australia to meet its wood needs by 
2000 (Fairbairn 1966b ). The statement initiated the first major debate on 'forestry' in 
the Federal Parliament. There was unanimous support for the initiative, although some 
members argued that the funding was inadequate. The issue that received most 
discussion was the lack of support for private growers - four of the six speakers 
expressed this bipartisan concern. Davies-(Australian Labor Party) argued that if cheap 
money is provided for state planting it will encourage the private sector to curtail their 
already significant investment and rely on government for their wood supply. The 
private sector could now let the risk shift to the public sector and rest assured of 
cheaper wood supplies (Davies 1966). Nixon, a Country Party Member whose seat took 
in APM Ltd. was deeply concerned about the role for the private sector: 
'It is a pity that we cannot encourage private enterprise to grow these 
trees, particularly as this is a free enterprise government. '(Nixon 1966). 
As we shall see, this was not Nixon's last word on the matter, but his protests were 
ineffective. 
The Ministerial Statement enabled the states to plan for the expansion with reasonable 
confidence about Federal Government funding whilst the legislation was being 
prepared. The Softwood Fores try Agreements Bill 1967 was presented to the House of 
Representatives on 10 May 1967 and debated in the early hours of 19 May. The Labor 
opposition welcomed the legislation and hoped for its speedy passage through 
Parliament. Nixon, despite being in the Liberal-Country Party Government, led the 
main debate on the Bill. He again expressed his disappointment that the Government 
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was not able to assist private companies in the planting of softwoods, arguing that the 
private sector was more efficient in growing wood and that their enterprise earned 
taxable· income. Earlier, Jacobs had been called to a conference with Nixon and 
Fairbairn to discuss APM Forests' plantation costs (Jacobs 1967). Nixon was 
dissatisfied with the reason given to him for the Government's dismissal of the private 
sector, namely that the states could plant trees more cheaply. Using the Minister' s 
statements, he calculated that the public sector planted trees at an average cost of $131 
per acre compared with the private sector (APM Forests) cost of $60 to $70 per acre.40 
Nixon argued it would be best for the Government to allocate the funds to companies 
like APM Forests (Nixon 1967). His arguments were ineffective. Treasury officers at 
Parliament took notes on APM Forests' costs as quoted by Nixon (Jacobs 1967).41 
Fairbairn concluded the brief forty two-minute debate on the Bill: 
'I think everyone welcomes the Bill as one of the finest measures in 
conservation and in the development of our resources that has ever 
passed through the house.' (Fairbairn 1967). 
The Bill was passed through both Houses without amendment on 19 May 1967. A 
delighted Jacobs sent telegrams to the heads of the state forest agencies (Jacobs 1967). 
It was a great victory for the foresters who nine years earlier had sketched out a policy 
of increased softwood planting with Federal Government financial assistance. 
3.7 Summary 
The complexity of the linked nature _ of institution building and public policy 
development is clearly demonstrated in the establishment of the AFC and Federal 
Government policy to finance the softwood planting acceleration. The origins for both 
the AFC and softwood planting policy can be sourced to the problems perceived by the 
early Australian foresters, the political and social environment in which they operated, 
and the institutions and policy frameworks subsequently established in the first half of 
the 20th century ( chapter 2). The IF A was critical in clarifying the priorities -
establishing a large softwood plantation estate and securing Federal Government 
funding - and presenting the initiative in the wider national development agenda of the 
1960s. The absence of dissenting views in the IFA's newsletter and journal suggests 
that the policy was widely supported within the forestry profession at the time. 
The Forestry and Timber Bureau, and in particular its Director-General, Max Jacobs, 
played a crucial role in securing the AFC' s formation and shaping the softwood 
planting policy. The Bureau networked with the state forest agencies to put softwood 
planting on the Federal Government's agenda; used crisis opportunities (i.e. the 
40 Nixon's calculations slightly underestimated the actual cost of the program, which averaged $153/acre 
for the first five years (chapter 4). Note that this average cost was slightly more than half that reported by 
the forest agencies in Departments ofNational Development and Treasury (1965b). 
41 This information may explain the lowering of the planting cost from those first estimated by the forest 
agencies to that used in the actual funding allocation. 
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proposed New Zealand-Australia Free Trade Agreement) to focus State Premiers and 
Forestry Ministers on the need for an AFC; prevented a fundamental change in 
Australia's wood sourcing arrangements by virtually ignoring the advice provided by 
an array of sources that the private sector be put more firmly on the wood growing 
agenda; and controlled information at all levels. Despite the demonstrated capacity of 
the Forestry and Timber Bureau to influence the agenda, the 1960s policy outcome was 
clearly Government sanctioned. Federal Government funding was argued in Cabinet 
with the conflicting views of the Departments of Treasury and National Development 
presented in separate Cabinet submissions. The Government's funding policy (leaving 
aside the public-private debate) received bipartisan support in Parliament. This 
bipartisan political support has been lost in the later criticism of the forestry profession 
and the Bureau over the softwood planting pro gram. 
Three sleeping issues lay underneath this bipartisan support, however, namely the high 
consumption projections underpinning the softwood target, the role of the private sector 
and the clearing of native vegetation to establish the land base for planting. Checks and 
balances failed to identify or deal with these issues at the time the policy was 
developed. There was no mechanism for acknowledging and resolving the lack of 
consensus amongst the foresters about Australia's future wood requirements. This 
failing is of greater concern given that the information was used to support publicly 
funded investment decisions. Treasury's quick analysis of the market outlook also 
proved quite incorrect. The only serious challenge to the consumption projections 
underpinning the planting target arose from McEwan' s use of the projections to allay 
the State Forestry Ministers' fears about possible increased imports of wood products 
as a result of the proposed New Zealand-Australia Free Trade Agreement. However, as 
it became clear that the Federal Government would finance the planting acceleration, 
possibly through grants or soft loans, market-based checks and balances that might 
have worked to constrain State Government funding effectively disappeared. 
The planting policy presented the opportunity for the Federal (Liberal-Country Party) 
Government to restructure the Australian wood industry so that the private sector could 
take on a greater role in wood production. The Vernon Committee, the Treasury, 
elements within both sides of Parliament and industry advocated such an approach. 
Cabinet rejected Treasury's advice, although it could be argued that neither Treasury 
nor the Treasurer presented a forceful argument for a greater private sector role. The 
calls in Parliament for a greater private sector role in tree growing came too late. It is 
possible that the issue would have come under greater scrutiny if the Treasury and 
Cabinet had been aware of the private-public sector planting cost differential. 
Allocating a substantial implementation role to the private sector would seriously 
threaten the wood supply dominance of the state forest agencies, which were now 
closely networked with the Forestry and Timber Bureau. 
The third sleeping issue - native vegetation clearing for plantation establishment - was 
not identified as an issue at the time. Neither the Forestry and Timber Bureau nor 
Treasury identified it as a potential issue for Cabinet's attention. At the time, there was 
no Federal environment portfolio to alert Government of the imminent conservation 
backlash - something inconceivable by the end of the 20th century, but consistent with 
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the limited environmental agenda of conservation activists in the 1960s (Robin 1998). 
As discussed in chapter 4, checks were subsequently added to Cabinet submission 
procedures to ensure that environmental issues were not ignored. Neither the lengthy 
parliamentary debate generated by the Minister's 1966 Statement on forests in the 
House of Representatives nor the debate on the Softwood Forestry Loans Bill 1967 
drew any comment about native forest clearing for plantation establishment. 
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Chapter 4 
Evaluating the implementation of the 1960s 
plantation policy 
4.1 Introduction 
Slightly more than three decades have elapsed since the Federal softwood plantation 
loans scheme commenced. The planting target and underpinning consumption 
projections were set to the year 2000. Using recently released data, they can now be 
quantitatively evaluated. Was the 1.2 million hectare (three million acre) softwood 
plantation area target met? Have the plantations supplied the volume of wood suggested 
by Jacobs in his 1963 address to the Australian Timber Congress? We shall see that the 
consumption projections underpinning the plantation area target significantly overstated 
Australia's wood needs in 2000. What were the reasons? This chapter addresses these 
questions and evaluates the implementation of the Federal Government's 1960s policy 
of securing Australia's wood self-sufficiency by around 2000. 
The analysis is also of ~nterest from a historical and a natural resource policy 
perspective. This chapter discusses the political fate of the softwood funding 
arrangements and the rise of other government plantation assistance measures. Its main 
purpose is to present a quantitative background to Australia' s current wood supply 
situation. This contributes to the investigation in following chapters of resource driven 
industry structural change and the opening of new public policy options fo! native 
forests and the wood-based industries. 
4.2 Federal Government assistance for plantation establishment 
Softwood Forestry Agreements Acts 
The Federal Government's Softwood Forestry Agreements Acts 1967, 1972, 1976 and 
1978 provided for loans from the Federal Government to the states42 to enable them to 
meet their softwood planting obligations. The loans were for a 35-year duration with 
principal repayment and interest payment deferred for the first ten years. It was not 
required that interest over this period be capitalised. The interest rate was set at the 
long-term rate on Commonwealth securities. The Federal Government subsidy for 
softwood planting therefore comprised the lower interest due to the low financial risk 
of Federal Government credit, and the extent to which interest was not capitalised 
during the 'holiday' period. In his second reading speech, Fairbairn stated that the ten-
42 Funding for plantations in the Australian Capital Territory was provided directly through the Federal 
Government budgetary process. 
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year remission of interest was equivalent to a grant to the states of about 3 8 per cent of 
total plantation costs (Fairbairn 1967, p. 1931 ). 
Indicative or maximum financial commitments were made in the Acts or the Minister's 
reading speech. The states submitted funding requests to the Federal Government to 
cover the cost of planting, tending and replanting failures. Land . acquisition and 
execution of works including land clearing were included. Annual planting schedules 
were specified for each state with the Federal Government's funding component 
financing plantings above a specified base level. The 1967 Act specified annual 
planting rates for the period 1967 to 1971 inclusive; the 1972 Act for 1972 to 1976, the 
1976 Act for 1977 only, and the 1978 Act limited the funding to maintenance work. 
Federal Government funding assistance for plantation establishment lasted for only 
eleven years - not the 3 5 years envisaged by the Minister for National Development. 
The following section explains why and how the funding ceased. 
By the early 1970s the Federal Government was confronted by mounting public 
concerns about native forest clearing for softwood planting. Most of the softwood 
plantations established in Australia prior to the mid 1980s, as for other agriculture, 
were realised by the clearing of native vegetation. National data are not available on the 
extent of land clearing for plantation establishment. Cadman ( 1990) estimates that 
approximately 90 per cent of Australia's plantations were established by clearing native 
vegetated, mainly forested, land. The National Plantation Inventory presents historical 
data on the planting base for Queensland - such data for other states are substantially 
incomplete. Of the 185 799 hectares of plantations established in Queensland from the 
early 20th century to 2000, 73 per cent were planted on native forest land. The clearing 
of native forests for plantation establishment in Queensland started to decline in the 
early 1980s and had virtually ceased by 2000. The increasing area of mature softwood 
plantations means that second crop plantings - i.e. now on non-native forest land -
account for most of Queensland's planting today. This re-planting accounted for 78 per 
cent of Queensland's plantation establishment over the 1990s, and planting on other 
agricultural land accounted for 22 per cent of the planting (Wood et al. 2001 , pp. 146, 
154). State Government regulations on land clearing (Centre for International 
Economics 1997, p. 31) have significantly curtailed land clearing for plantation 
establishment in all states except Tasmania ( see Wood et al. 2001 for 2000 planting 
data in all states except Tasmania; Geoff Law pers. comm. 2000 for Tasmania). 
The late 1960s softwood planting acceleration and hence native forest clearing 
coincided with Australia's developing ecological consciousness (Robin 1998; Hutton & 
Conners 1999). The before and after images of large-scale native forest clearing for 
softwood plantation establishment (see, for example, Routley & Routley 1974) and 
public protests connected with a rising public concern about the development path 
Australia appeared to be pursuing. The Gorton Liberal Coalition Government 
established the House of Representatives Select Committee on Wildlife Conservation in 
1970, and the softwood program was incorporated in their inquiry. On this issue the 
Committee recommended that: 
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• uneconomic, previously-cleared farmland be used for softwood planting rather than 
clearing additional native forests, and 
• surveys to assess the wildlife values of areas to be cleared for softwood plantations 
be undertaken before clearing (House of Representatives Select Committee 1972). 
The environmental implications of native forest clearing for plantations were not 
considered at any stage in the softwood planting policy formulation process (chapter 2). 
However, within five years of the passing of the 1967 Act, a Parliamentary Select 
Committee was recommending measures to address the environmental concerns. This 
five-year period corresponded to one of the fastest-changing eras in Australian and 
international environmental consciousness, sometimes referred to as the 'environmental 
revolution' (Robin 1998). During this time there was a rapid rise in awareness of land 
'degraded' through poor agricultural practice. 
Federal Government funding for softwood planting was periodically exposed to 
parliamentary scrutiny because legislation was required to extend the funding for the 
next five-year planting schedule. The 1972 Bill was presented to Parliament in an 
election year. Whitlam, the leader of the opposition Australian Labor Party (ALP) had 
signalled a policy of safeguarding the environment. The opposition stated that it was 
not opposed to the 1972 Bill and expanding the plantation estate, but it was concerned 
about procedural and practical issues. It moved an amendment criticising the 
Government's failure to conserve existing hardwood native forests and associated flora 
and fauna in relation to softwood plantings (Patterson 1972). The speech by Tom Uren 
(ALP) in support of the amendment was the first parliamentary articulation of the 
environmental proble_ms of the softwood program. Uren considered that softwood 
plantations should be established on already cleared agricultural land thus solving the 
'degraded land' problem and meeting the. new need to retain native forests. He argued 
that the Bill was environmentally irresponsible and economically highly questionable: 
'It represents a classic case of national development designed and 
financed on the narrowest of economic considerations and based on 
very speculative future projections of Australia's population and per 
capita consumption of wood. The Bill contains not one word about the 
large environmental impact of the policies contained in it. Unlike the 
afforestation projects of most other countries, pine plantations in 
Australia in the main are being established on Crown lands already 
occupied by native hardwood forests.' (Uren 1972a). 
The ALP amendment was defeated and the Bill passed through to the Senate. In the 
Senate, an amendment moved by the Democratic Labor Party was successfully passed. 
The amendment comprised two parts: the first ensuring that native forests not be 
cleared for softwood planting without an environmental impact study, and the second 
requiring that planting conform to sound forestry, environmental and financial 
practices. The Minister for National Development (now Sir Reginald Swartz) in the 
House of Representatives proposed an alternative amendment 'ensuring that 
environmental factors relating to the planting have been considered.' (Swartz 1972). 
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Swaetz's amendment was successfully passed and the Senate agreed to the amendment 
in place of its. It was a historic occasion with Uren noting: 
'It is probably the first time - it will be only the first of many - that 
governments have been brought to task with regard to and reminded of 
the impact of certain legislation on the environment.' (Uren 1972b ). 
Only five years earlier, the Minister for National Development had described the same 
legislation as one of the finest conservation measures that had ever passed through the 
house. 
Neither the planting target nor the level of financial assistance was affected by the 
amendment. Under the 1972 Act, 22 128 hectares of softwood plantations would be 
established per annum, with the states financing 12 011 hectares per annum and Federal 
Government loans financing the difference. However, the parliamentary debate 
signalled the imminent cessation of Federal Government funding. 
Shortly after the 1972 parliamentary debate, the Government announced that any future 
Cabinet submission on any proposal relevant to the environment and any State 
Government project for which finance was sought from the Federal Government would 
have to be accompanied by a statement on the likely environmental impact of the 
proposal and supported by assurances that all the appropriate environmental factors had 
been considered and evaluated (Carron 1985, p. 311 ). 
The ALP, under Whitlam's leadership, won the December 1972 federal election. The 
Government transferred the Forestry and Timber Bureau to the Department of Primary 
Industries. The subsequent review of its functions and relations with other government 
organisations saw a boosting of the CSIRO's role in wood and wood products industry 
research, the Department of Primary Industries made responsible for 'forestry' up to the 
mill door, and the Department of Industry and Commerce made responsible for matters 
inside the mill door. The Department of Primary Industries would retain responsibility 
for the export woodchip industry, sleepers and whole logs (Carron 1985, pp. 256-7). 
These administrative arrangements, mirroring those in the states, remain in place today. 
In reality, the demarcation line is blurred and the primary industries/forest agency 
portfolios tend to dominate the development of wood and wood products industry 
policy. This is due to the public ownership of much of the wooded land and the focus of 
the political conflict at the wood supply level. This point is elaborated in chapters 6 and 
7. 
The scrutiny of the softwood planting program continued. The Task Force appointed in 
early 1973 to review the continuing expenditure policies of the previous Government, 
recommended further study into the economic viability of the softwood program before 
commencing negotiations over future funding (Carron 1985, p. 314). By this stage, 
controversy over softwood planting was joined by the controversy over the emerging 
native forest export woodchip industry. 
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Japanese companies were increasingly interested in purchasing Australia's native forest 
hardwood resource for papermaking. In November 1967, the Premier of New South 
Wales, Robert Askin, announced that a consortium, including the Daishowa Paper 
Manufacturing Company, had been awarded the right to purchase native forest eucalypt 
wood from the south east of the state for export as woodchips. Another project was 
being considered in the state's north. Other states were examining native forest 
woodchip export opportunities at the time. The Western Australian Government had 
invited applications for exporting woodchips from the Manjimup forest area; Victoria 
had numerous inquiries with the forest areas around Portland, Melbourne and East 
Gippsland being considered for export woodchip operations; the Queensland 
Government had held some discussions with Japanese interests; Australian and 
Japanese companies had shown interest in Tasmania and a number of inquiries were 
received by the State Government; eight companies had been given until the end of 
August 1968 to submit proposals for woodchip export projects in the Northern 
Territory (Fairbairn 1968). 
Securing a market to finance the culling of unwanted 'defective' trees to make room for 
a new and vigorous eucalypt forest crop had been the foresters' long-unrealised dream 
(chapter 2). The softwood plantation program added a new dimension. Much of the 
native forest cleared for softwood planting was burnt (Routley & Routley 197 4) and the 
Japanese pulp and paper industry's interest in Australia's native forest resource alerted 
foresters and government to the lost revenue. Developing a native forest woodchip 
export business was a 'cost-free or cheap way of clearing unwanted forest in 
preparation for softwood planting.' (Boswell 1967). The two developments, increased 
softwood planting - entailing native forest clearing - and native forest export 
woodchipping, combined in the late 1960s to launch Australia into four decades of 
forest conflict ( Quarmby 1986; Dargavel -1995; Frawley 1999). 
In May 1973, a Federal Government interdepartmental committee was established to 
investigate the softwood program and native forest woodchip operations. Pressure for a 
public inquiry saw the Government shift the softwood planting investigation in 197 4 to 
the House of Representatives Standing Committee on Environment and Conservation. 
The Committee was required to report on the operations of the 1967 and 1972 Acts 
with particular reference to their environmental, social and economic impact and to 
make recommendations on legislation for any future softwood plantation agreements. A 
year earlier, the Whitlam Government had set up the National Estate Committee of 
Inquiry to examine the national estate and find measures to preserve and enhance it. 
The National Estate Committee reported in 1974. On the issue of softwood plantations, 
it recommended more economic evaluation of the program and the cessation of clearing 
of native forests for plantation establishment (Committee of Inquiry into the National 
Estate 1974). The following year the House of Representatives Standing Committee on 
the Environment and Conservation reported and presented wide-ranging findings and 
recommendations. It found that there was a need for a softwood program, possibly on a 
lesser scale than planned, and recommended that the next Act cover a period of ten 
years. It also recommended greater exposure of the program to public scrutiny and an 
immediate study into the economic viability of the program. The Committee 
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recommended that Federal Government financing of plantation establishment on native 
forest land cease except where a thorough and stringently supervised independent 
research program had been conducted into the flora and fauna of the area, as well as its 
soil quality, and where the planting plan allowed for their protection (House of 
Representatives Standing Committee on the Environment and Conservation 1975). 
The Bureau of Agricultural Economics (BAE)43 undertook the economic study as 
suggested by the House of Representatives Standing Committee. Its primary objective 
was to determine the future level of demand for wood products in Australia and to 
determine if it was in the nation's interests to meet this demand through domestic 
production or through imports. The BAE concluded that, given projected native forest 
wood supply, softwood planting should be continued for the years 1976 to 1980, but at 
a lower rate than previously, in order to achieve self-sufficiency by 2020.44 It 
recommended an annual planting rate of between 16 700 and 18 200 hectares per 
annum (Bureau of Agricultural Economics 1977, p. 132). 
The AFC had decided to postpone recommending a softwood planting rate for the 197 6 
Act until after the FORWOOD conference.45 On the issue of the softwood program, the 
FORWOOD Conference proposed an annual planting (public and private) of 28 500 
hectares over the period 1975-2010. The plantation estate would not increase each year 
by this amount because some of the planting would be undertaken as second crops on 
existing plantation land (FORWOOD 1975, p. 53). 
With this body of work and competing interests, the Fraser Liberal-National Party 
Coalition Government presented the 197 6 Bill to provide $6 million of funding for an 
additional year of planting. On an annual basis, the area of plantations funded by the 
Federal Government would be halved to around 5 000 hectares. No commitments were 
made to continue the funding. The 197 6 Bill was enacted in December 197 6 - half way 
through the planting year. Federal Government funding to the states on such projects 
now required an environment impact statement. The states agreed that as much as 
possible of the remaining year's planting would be undertaken on already cleared 
agricultural land (Carron 1985, p. 315). The 1978 Act saw the cessation of Federal 
Government funding for plantation establishment. The $4.2 million funding 
commitment under the Act was to be spent on maintaining plantations established 
under the scheme for the five years commencing 1977 /78. Payments continued through 
43 The BAE was established in 1945 to service the Ministry of Post-War Reconstruction and the 
Department of Commerce and Agriculture. In 1989, it was amalgamated with the Bureau of Resource 
Economics (focussed mainly on energy issues) to form the Australian Bureau of Agricultural and 
Resource Economics (ABARE). ABARE undertakes economic research and provides information and 
analysis on a range of agricultural, minerals and energy industries (Australian Bureau of Agricultural and 
Resource Economics 1999b). 
44 The Bureau projected Australia's demand for wood in 2000 at 25 .2 million m3 per annum (Bureau of 
Agricultural Economics 1977, p. 117). This was 35 per cent greater than the actual requirement of 18.6 
million m3 (appendix A). 
45 The AFC authorised the Forestry and Wood-Based Industries Development Conference (FORWOOD) 
in 1969 and provided it with wide-ranging terms of reference to be considered by eight specialist panels 
with reports prepared for consideration at the FORWOOD Conference in April and November 1974 
(FORWOOD 1975). 
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to 1983/84 to cover claims outstanding when the 197 8 Act lapsed (Industries 
Assistance Commission 1989). 
The softwood plantation program came in on a wave of bipartisan support that was 
subsequently halted by bipartisan actions, commencing with the Gorton Liberal-
National Party Coalition Government, extended by the Whitlam ALP Government, and 
completed by the Fraser Liberal-National Party Coalition Government. 
Loan payments from the Federal Government to the states under the Softwood Forestry 
Agreements Acts totaled $373 million in 1999/00 dollars (table 4.1). According to the 
Acts, these funds were required to meet the costs of establishing and maintaining 
102 000 hectares of softwood plantations (table 4.1 ). The average cost of $3 670 per 
hectare (in 1999/00 dollars) is approximately double the softwood plantation 
establishment and management costs reported by ABARE in 1999 (Burns et al. 1999, 
pp. 217-8). Plantation costs in Queensland and Victoria show significant deviations 
above and below the Australian average respectively (table 4.1 ). However, these figures 
are not evidence of public sector inefficiency in plantation wood growing - as Nixon 
argued in 1967. Some of the funds may have been used to finance what should have 
been State Government funded plantations either at the time or after Federal 
Government funding ceased. 
Table 4.1 Commonwealth payments to the states for softwood plantation establishment and maintenance. 
Source: Softwood Forestry Agreements Acts 1967, 1972, 1976, 1978; Minister for Primary Industries and 
Energy (1997); Australian Bureau of Statistics (2001b). 
State Loan payments 
1967-1983 
($ million in 1999/00 
dollars) 
New South Wales 127.67 
Queensland 88.13 
Tasmania 46.83 
W estem Australia 45.87 
Victoria 44.80 
South Australia 19.21 
Total states 372.51 
Planting area financed 
by loan funds 
(hectares) 
39 200 
15 900 
10 600 
10 800 
19 400 
5 500 
101 400 
Implied plantation 
establishment and 
maintenance cost 
($/hectare) 
3 257 
5 543 
4 418 
4 247 
2 309 
3 493 
3 674 
The Acts require that principal and interest payments on each of the 35-year loans 
commence ten years after each loan is provided. The actual repayments vary 
considerably between states. South Australia and Tasmania have had their repayments 
of principal and payment of interest waived. New South Wales, Queensland and 
Western Australia have paid various amounts of principal and interest and Victoria has 
repaid all loans early and in full. Unlike other states, Queensland and Victoria 
capitalised the interest over the ten-year holiday period and included it in repayments 
(Minister for Primary Industries and Energy 1997; table 4.2). These arrangements have 
continued unchanged since 1997 (S. O'Loughlin pers. comm. October 2001). Tasmania 
and South Australia have therefore received outright grants for their softwood 
plantings. At the other extreme, Victoria - the state that frustrated the formation of the 
AFC - has repaid all its loans and the interest that was capitalised over the holiday 
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period. Victoria's clearing of outstanding debts was in preparation for the sale of the 
state's plantation resource in 1998. 
Table 4.2 Loan payments to the State Governments under the Softwood Forestry Agreements and 
principal and interest paid by each state to 30 June 1997 (million $ nominal). Source: Minister for 
Primary Industries and Energy (1997). 
State Loan Principal Interest 
payments repaid as paid as 
to state at 30 at 30 
June 
1997 
June 
1997 
NSW 27.23 10.95 30.45 
Qld 18.08 9.06a 13.74 
WA 10.08 8.93 11.70 
Tas 9.96 0 0 
Vic 9.06 17.24a 6.29 
Outstanding 
principal 
repayments 
as at 30 June 
1997 
16.28 
29.93 a 
1.15 
waived 
0 
Outstanding 
interest 
payments as 
at 30 June 
1997 
13.82 
32.80 
0.33 
waived 
0 
Total 
payments 
(principal 
and 
interest) 
paid and 
outstanding 
71.50 
85 .53 
22.11 
waived 
23.53 
SA 3.65 0 0 waived waived waived 
a. Interest over interest holiday period was capitalised and included in repayments. 
Other planting assistance 
Per cent of 
total 
payments 
(principal 
and 
interest) 
paid as at 
30 June 
1997 
(%) 
57.9 
26.7 
93.3 
waived 
100.0 
waived 
The rate of softwood planting declined by approximately a third following the cessation 
of Federal Government funding. However, annual planting continued during the 1980s 
at twice the rate of the post-war to mid 1960s period (table 4.3). The states were 
conscious of the need to establish the critical mass to enable scale economies in 
processing in their key plantation regions (see for example Victorian Government 1986, 
p. 56). 
Although APM Forests commenced planting eucalypts in the 1950s (Chandler 1963), it 
was not until the mid 1980s that investment in eucalypt plantations in Australia became 
a more widespread corporate strategy (Clark 1992a). The decision reflected a 
combination of the cost and quality attractions of growing wood as an agricultural crop 
( chapter 5), increasing interest globally in eucalypt fibre, particularly for printing and 
writing paper (Figueiredo 1987; Deslandes 1987), and risk reduction associated with 
government native forest land use decisions (Mann 1990, p. 160). 
Federal Government financial and non-financial assistance provided further incentives 
for plantation investment, but this time the assistance was indifferent as to whether the 
plantings were for hardwood or softwood. The National Afforestation Program 
commenced in 1987 /88 with the aim of stimulating eucalypt planting with grants to 
meet establishment costs and provide research and demonstration funding (Industries 
Assistance Commission 1989, p. 5). Additional Federal Government support for tree 
planting was provided through the Trees on Farms, One Billion Trees, Farm Forestry 
Programs and Regional Forest Agreement compensation funds. A plethora of other 
assistance measures - resource inventory compilation, research and development 
funding, conference sponsorship, land availability assessment, reviews of plantation 
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codes of practice and information collection - has provided additional industry support 
(Centre for International Economics 1997, p. 59). Federal Government assistance for 
plantation establishment in Australia since the softwood plantation loans scheme ceased 
has not been comprehensively documented, and the effectiveness of the programs has 
not been comprehensively researched. Assistance measures for commercial farm tree 
planting (provided mainly through share farming and joint venture arrangements) were 
documented and reviewed by Prinsely ( 1991 ). Farm tree planting accounted for 
approximately five per cent of Australia's plantation estate in 2000 (Wood et al. 2001 , 
p. 28). 
Table 4.3 Australia's plantation establishment phases, softwood and hardwood and private sector 
plantings. Source: Gray (1935); Forestry and Timber Bureau (1969); Australian Bureau of Agricultural 
and Resource Economics (2001 b) and earlier editions; Wood et al. (2001 ). 
Phase Year Increase in Increase in 
Pre WWII 
Post WWII to 
softwood loans 
agreement funding 
Softwood loans 
funding 
Post-softwood 
loans funding to 
1990 
1920-1939 
1946-1966 
1967-1983 
1984-1990 
softwood hardwood 
plantation 
area 
(hectares per 
annum) 
5 089 
9 406 
29 297 
19 098 
plantation area 
(hectares per 
annum) 
na 
1 250 
7 632 
Increase in 
total plantation 
area 
(hectares per 
annum) 
5 089 
10 067 
30 547 
26 730 
Eucalypt planting 1990-2000 4 576 - 40 615 46 187c 
priority 
a. Calculated from 194 7. 
b. Softwood plantations only. 
c. Total includes mixed hardwood and softwood species and unknown species. 
d. Excludes joint venture plantings and plantings of unknown ownership. 
Privately 
owned 
plantations 
as% of total 
at the end 
year of the 
phase 
(%) 
25 .2 
31.1 
29.5 
In 1997, the Federal Minister for Primary Industries and Energy launched Plantations 
for Australia - the 2020 Vision. The document presented an industry-proposed and 
government-endorsed target of trebling Australia's plantation estate by 2020 
(Ministerial Council on Forestry, Fisheries and Aquaculture et al. 1997). Like its 1960s 
softwood predecessor, the planting target (roughly three million hectares instead of 
three million acres) was not accompanied by a rigorous market analysis (see Clark 
2001 a for a global market analysis from the perspective of a plantation investor). 
Unlike its 1960s predecessor, however, the 2020 Vision was aimed at encouraging 
private sector investment. 
Mass marketed tax effective schemes were rampant in Australia during the second half 
of the 1990s (Senate Economics Reference Committee 2001 ), and the emerging 
plantation prospectus-based industry rode this wave. The prospectus-based industry had 
two powerful marketing tools to help distinguish it from other tax effective 
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investments. Firstly, Federal Government encouragement for plantation investment was 
clearly articulated though the 2020 Vision and the enthusiastic Minister for Forests and 
Conservation, Wilson Tuckey. Second, the widely-held perceptions of a global wood 
shortage (see for example Simons Consulting Group 1994; Apsey & Reed 1994; 
Cameron 1996, and, for an alternative view, Sedjo & Lyon 1990; Food and Agricultural 
Organisation of the United Nations 1999; Clark 2001 a) created a healthy price outlook 
for wood. Australia's hardwood planting increased by an average 41 000 hectares per 
annum over the 1990s - a planting rate exceeding softwood planting during the 1970s 
and 1980s (figure 4.3). As discussed in chapter 6, prospectus-based investment drove 
most of this planting. 
State Governments provided complementary assistance through joint venture planting 
programs; funding field days, publications, extension and advisory services and farm 
forestry networks; establishing private forestry units or groups as part of the state forest 
agency or as an independent statutory body; and development of strategies for private 
forestry ( Centre for International Economics 1997, pp. 60-1; National Plantations 
Advisory Committee 1991, appendix A). 
Offsetting these government assistance measures is the extent that the wood supply 
from publicly owned native forests - a competing product in the commodity wood 
market - is subsidised and therefore works to discourage private plantation investment 
(Industries Assistance Commission 1989; Marsden Jacob Associates 2001). This issue 
is discussed in chapter five. 
4.3 Was the 1960s planting target achieved? 
The 1.2 million hectare ( three million acre) softwood plantation area target aimed to 
secure Australia's wood self-sufficiency by 2000. With rotations of approximately 35 
years and the program commencing in 1967, the area target (1.2 million hectares) 
would be achieved by around 2000. By the early 1990s, Australia's softwood planting 
on new areas (first rotation planting) had plateaued, slowly reaching 0.97 million 
hectares by 2000 (figure 4.1; table 4.4). First rotation planting by the private and public 
sectors slowed as growers came to perceive future wood yields in reasonable alignment 
with market expectations and plantation areas were increasingly able to support scale 
economy processing plants in most major plantation regions. Over the 1990s, 
Australia's softwood plantation estate increased by an average 4 600 hectares per 
annum (table 4.3). Some plantation managers (e.g. APM Forests) converted softwood 
plantation areas after harvesting to hardwood plantations (Resource Assessment 
Commission 1992a, p. L9). The area of private softwood plantations in Queensland has 
steadily declined with housing estates established on much of the land after harvesting. 
Australia's softwood plantation estate is expected to stabilise at around one million 
hectares for the immediate future (Resource Assessment Commission 1992a, p. 258). 
The process of replanting harvested areas for the next crop is now dominating the 
softwood planting program ( see, for example, Department of Primary Industries 2001 , 
p. 80). 
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Figure 4.1 Softwood and eucalypt plantation establishment Australia 1920-2000, public 
and private. Non entries are due to the absence of area data or unreliable data. Source: 
Gray (1935); Forestry and Timber Bureau (1969) & Annual Reports; Department of 
Primary Industries (1981 ); Australian Bureau of Agricultural and Resource Economics 
(1992) ; Wood et al. (2001). 
1600 - 100 
r 90 
1400 
1960s three million acre (1.2 million f-- 80 
1200 hectare) softwood plantation area "'--
target for 2000 
f-- 70 
1000 -
r 60 
• ~ 
800 - f-- 50 
~ , 
. ~ 
! · 40 - r 600 - ~ ~ ~ 30 r p ~ ~ 
~ ... ~ 
400 - .. 
- -~ 20 f--
200 -
f-- 10 
0 - • I I I II I I I 0 I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I l I I I J f I I I I I I I I I I I 
0 "st' co C\J <.O 0 "st' co C\J <.O 0 "st' co C\J <.O 0 "st' co C\J <.O 0 
C\J C\J C\J C') C') "st' "st' "st' l!) l!) <.O <.O <.O t--- t--- co co co 0) 0) 0 
0) 0) 0) 0) 0) 0) 0) 0) 0) 0) 0) 0) 0) 0) 0) 0) 0) 0) 0) 0) 0 
,- ,- ,- ,- ,- ,- ,- ,- ,- ,- ,- ,- ,- ,- ,- ,- ,- ,- ,- ,- C\J 
Hardwood plantation area 
Softwood plantation area 
--Private total plantation area as % total plantation area 
--Private hardwood plantation area as % total hardwood plantation area 
--Private softwood plantation area as % total softwood plantation area 
89 
~ 0 
---
co 
+-' 
0 
+-' 
-0 
+-' 
C 
(I) 
u 
l,.... 
(I) 
0.. 
Cf) 
co 
Cf) 
0) 
C 
+-' 
C 
co 
0.. 
(I) 
+-' 
co 
> 
·;:: 
0.. 
The 0.97 million hectares of softwood plantations in Australia in 2000 represents 81 per 
cent of the softwood target set in the 1960s. 
During the 1990s, Australia's planting effort shifted to eucalypt species for use in 
printing and writing paper production. By September 2000, 0.50 million hectares of 
eucalypt plantations had been established in Australia. Together, softwood and 
hardwood plantations in Australia covered 1.5 million hectares in 2000 (table 4.4). The 
three million acre ( 1.2 million hectare) target proposed by Jacobs in 1963 has been 
achieved with two modifications; namely, the switch to hardwood planting and the 
increased role of the private sector (figure 4.1). 
Table 4.4 Plantation area Australia, by state, Seetember 2000 (hectares). Source: Wood et al. (2001). 
State/territory Softwood Hardwood Mixed seecies Unlmown Total 
New South Wales 270 672 44 626 2 676 923 318 897 
Victoria 215 110 101 453 2 035 35 318 633 
Western Australia 98 441 214 993 430 0 313 864 
Queensland 178 620 9 435 2 660 192 190 907 
Tasmania 75 630 109 567 0 0 185 197 
South Australia 113 871 20 703 718 261 135 553 
Australian Capital Territory 14 585 194 0 0 14 779 
Northern Territory 5 235 1 649 29 0 6 913 
· Australia 972 164 502 620 8 548 1 411 1484743 
Plantation wood supply - softwood 
The 1.2 million hectare plantation target was intended to supply half of Australia's 
projected wood needs ( excluding fuel wood) of 32.6 million m3 per annum by 2000 
( chapter 2). We cannot by directly examining published supply data determine if this 
wood supply objective was met because Australia's plantation resource is currently 
under-used ( chapter 6). This means that estimates of Australia's plantation supply 
potential are required to determine whether the wood supply target was met. The key 
pieces of information for this task are the softwood plantation age profile ( a snapshot of 
the plantation estate showing the area planted in specified time periods) and 
productivity (m3 of merchantable wood per hectare per annum). 
Figure 4.2 presents Australia's softwood plantation age profile at September 2000. 
Radiata pine and other exotic species plantings in Queensland and northern New South 
Wales make up 88 per cent of Australia's softwood plantations (Wood et al. 2001). 
They are generally managed over 30-year rotations (Clark 1995a). Plantations 
established in the planting years 1970-74 (the effect of the Federal Government's 
financial assistance is observable) should be coming on stream for clearfell harvesting 
around 2000-04.46 Western Australia's pinaster pine and Queensland's hoop pine 
plantations, make up 8 per cent of Australia's softwood plantations (Wood et al. 2001). 
These are managed over rotations of approximately 40 to 50 years (Morris & Clark 
1995; Turner & James 1997a). Figure 4.2 indicates that Australia's softwood plantation 
46 That the radiata pine plantations and exotic species plantations in Queensland and northern New South 
Wales established before 1970 are still standing (85 000 hectares - 10 per cent of those species 
plantations) suggests an under-use of the resource at September 2000. This issue is discussed in chapter 
five. 
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Figure 4.2 Softwood plantation age profile - Australia September 2000. Only one 
year of planting is recorded for 2000. Queensland and Northern New South 
Wales exotics comprise Pinus radiata, p. elliotti and p. caribaea . Source: Wood 
et al. (2001). 
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estate has reached a reasonably mature age profile status. This means that by around 
2000 the plantations were able to supply close to their maximum sustainable annual 
wood yield. Productivity improvements, particularly with the next crop (see for 
example Boardman & Simpson 1981; Boardman 1988; Flinn & Turner 1990), will 
increase sustainable supply over the longer term. 
Table 4.5 Australia's softwood plantation productivity. Source: Australian Forestry Council (1989); 
National Plantation Inventory (1997); Clark (1995a); Departments of National Development and 
Treasury (1965a); FORWOOD (1975); Jacobs (1963c); Resource Assessment Commission (1992a); 
Turner & James (1997a). 
Author and date 
Jacobs 1963 
Departments ofNational 
Development and Treasury 1965 
FORWOOD 1975 
Australian Forestry Council 1989 
Resource Assessment 
Commission 1992 
Clark 1995 
National Plantation Inventory 
1997 3 
Turner & James 19973 
Plantation MAI 
(m3 per hectare per annum) 
14.0 
16.0 
16.0 
18.0 
18.0 
16.4 
13.7 
17.8 
Comments 
An undocumented assumption. 
Weighted average of the data 
supplied by the state forest 
agencies for the benefit-cost 
analysis submitted to Cabinet. 
The weighted average for all 
commercial species planted on a 
significant scale. 
An undocumented assumption. 
Average productivity reported 
for sawlog/chiplog plantations in 
NSWNic/SA (appendix Pp. 7). 
Wood from the then 944 500 
hectare softwood plantation 
estate (p. 29) fully on stream by 
2005 supplying 15 .5 million m3 
per annum (p. xi) 
Projected average annual supply 
over 35 years (1995 to 2029) of 
12.15 million m3 (p. 79) from a 
883 980 hectare estate (p. 10). 
Calculated from indicative yield 
tables prepared for the National 
Plantation Inventory ( 1997). 
Regional wood volumes 
weighted by plantation area data 
reported in National Plantation 
Inventory ( 1997). 
a. The difference between National Plantation Inventory (1997) and Turner & James (1997) - work 
undertaken as part of the National Plantation Inventory 1997 - is discussed in chapter 7. 
The annual wood yield from Australia's softwood plantations by 2000 can be estimated 
by applying productivity assumptions to the area data. Wood yields from Australia's 
softwood plantation estate have been widely investigated, but most studies are difficult 
to evaluate because of inadequate documentation ( chapter 7). The productivity 
assumptions - either directly assumed or implied in the projections - of the main reports 
are presented in table 4.5. The productivity figures are averages for the Australian 
estate as a whole; they are not representative of the increased productivity generally 
achieved in more recent plantings. Productivity is measured by the mean annual 
increment (MAI) - the annual increase in the volume of merchantable wood per hectare 
over the rotation. From table 4.5, a MAI of 16 m3 per hectare per annum appears to be a 
reasonable, probably conservative, estimate of the overall productivity of Australia's 
current softwood plantation estate. This means that wood supply from Australia's 
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softwood plantations (972 165 hectares) could be expected to average approximately 
15.6 million m3 per annum by around 2000. Jacobs (1963c) proposed that softwood 
plantations would meet half of Australia's projected wood consumption in 2000 - 16.3 
million m3 to be supplied from softwood plantations and 16.3 million m3 from native 
forests. Jacobs' softwood plantation wood volume aim for 2000 appears to have been 
achieved - the slight difference being within the statistical discrepancy of such 
exercises. 
Plantation wood supply - hardwood 
As discussed above, and further in chapter 6, Australia's eucalypt plantation 
establishment is in a growth phase. Uncertainty about future planting rates for these 
generally short rotation plantations47 (i.e. 10 to 15 years) makes it difficult to generate 
reliable projections of wood supply past 2010. However, the purpose of this chapter is 
to examine the outcome of the 1960s plantation program focussing on plantation wood 
supply at 2000. It is projected that Australia's eucalypt plantations can supply 2.4 
million m3 of wood per annum in 2000-2004 (National Plantation Inventory 1997; 
Duggie 2000).48 
Summary 
Australia achieved the three million acre ( 1.2 million hectare) plantation area target set 
in the 1960s, allowing for some eucalypt plantation substitution. Australia's 1.5 million 
hectares of softwood and eucalypt plantations are estimated to have an annual wood 
supply potential of 18 million m3 in 2000. Wood self-sufficiency was the underlying 
aim of Australia's 1960s plantation policy, and it was considered that this would be 
achieved with native forests supplying h~lf the market and softwood plantations the 
other half. Hanson (1962a) estimated that Australia would require 32.6 million m3 of 
wood to meet Australia's projected consumption of wood products ( excluding for fuel) 
in 2000 - half (16.3 million m3 per annum) to be sourced from plantations. From a 
wood production perspective, the 1960s plantation policy was implemented. 
4.4 Were the consumption projections realised? 
Australia's consumption of wood products, domestically produced or imported, during 
the year ending 31 December 2000 required 18.6 million m3 of wood (appendix A, 
table Al). Australia's wood consumption in 2000 was therefore only slightly more than 
half the 32.6 million m3 of wood projected by Hanson in 1962. The main factors 
responsible for the over-estimation were: 
• the high per capita consumption assumption for sawn timber, 
47 As discussed in chapter 2, the South Australian experience indicated that fast growing softwood 
species were favoured over eucalypts in plantation regimes aimed at sawlog production. Most of 
Australia's eucalypt plantations have been established to supply chiplogs for pulp production and are 
managed using rotations considerably shorter than that required to grow a sawlog. 
48 The projections presented in Duggie (2000) were prepared by myself. 
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• not factoring in wood saving technology in the paper industry, namely recycling, 
and 
• a high population assumption (appendix A, figure 4.3). 
The consumption projections underpinning Australia's softwood planting program were 
intensely debated in the 1970s. Routley & Routley (1974) dominated this critique, 
presenting arguments and quantified evidence to contradict most assumptions made in 
Hanson (1962a). The Routleys estimated Australia's likely future wood requirements 
by examining each variable and preparing a range of likely per capita consumption 
estimates for a range of expected populations. They estimated that Australia's wood 
consumption in 2000 would most probably range between 19 and 21 million m3 
(Routley & Routley 1974, p. 57).49 This was a remarkably accurate projection, but, as 
discussed in chapter 3, other foresters working in the late 1950s and early 1960s had 
also accurately projected Australia's future wood requirement. It should be noted that, 
relative to the foresters, the Routleys had twelve years additional data to assist in their 
critique and projection work. 
The Routleys argued that the softwood plantation program was designed to simulate 
consumption with targets disguised as projections - what foresters hoped would be 
consumed if cheap wood was available. They explained: 
'That overestimation is the favoured method is not however hard to 
explain; it is an outcome of the fact that in forestry planning prediction 
has been biased by promotion, and promotion of wood products along 
big business lines with the aim of maximizing their consumption. The 
overestimation method, applied in a developmental 'pioneering ' ethos, 
helps, in its turn, to account for the environmentally irresponsible 
attitude of much standard forestry planning.' (Routley & Routley 197 4, 
p. 49). 
The Routleys charged the foresters with an exclusive focus on wood production. 
Declining per capita sawn timber consumption, the trend extensively researched by the 
Routleys, was well known in forestry circles - including Hanson and Jacobs. By the late 
1950s, the erosion of the sawn timber market by non-wood substitutes and wood saving 
technologies was well-documented (Hanson & Wilson 1958; Hanson 1959; Clarke 
1959, Turnbull 1959). The industry was also expressing its concern about declining 
market share. The Chair of the Australian Timber Producers' Panel ( of state sawmilling 
associations) wrote to Jacobs congratulating the Government on the establishment of 
the AFC and expressing the hope that it would thoroughly address the problem of 
declining demand for traditional sawn timber products (Cotton 1964). 
Some foresters argued that the competitiveness of the sawn timber industry could be 
enhanced by ensuring sufficient wood to keep log costs down and also enable scale 
economies in processing (Rodger 1959; Fielding 1962). Leslie argued that this view 
was not valid because sawn timber was price inelastic. Leslie also noted that sawn 
49 Figures reported in cubic feet converted to cubic metres. 
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Figure 4.3 Error source in Hanson (1962a) projected Australian wood requirements in 
2000. Source: Appendix A. 
Wood consumption in 2000 
Hanson 1962 wood consumption projection 
for 2000 
Hanson 1962 overestimation of Australia's 
wood requirements in 2000 
Source of error* 
High assumed per capita consumption of 
sawn timber, plywood and sleepers 
High assumed Australian population 
Not allowing for wood saving technology in 
the paper industry (mainly recycling) 
Understating consumption of wood-base , 
panels 
Low assumed per capita paper 
consumption 
Overstating consumption of poles, piles and 
posts 
-5 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 
Million m3 per annum of roundwood 
* Error source calculated by substituting 2000 data for each of Hanson's assumptions whilst 
holding all else constant. The total overestimation cannot be derived by aggregating the 
error sources because the error with the population assumption would be double counted. 
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timber had a low income elasticity of demand and that these price and income 
elasticities explained much of the declining per capita consumption of sawn timber 
(Leslie 1963, p. 116). Supplying cheap wood would not by itself reverse declining per 
capita consumption. 
Hanson and Jacobs were aware that the wood consumption projection presented in 
Hanson (1962a) was high. As discussed in chapter 3, Jacobs described the projection as 
'challenging' but presented arguments to support the per capita consumption 
assumptions. The consumption outcome, argued Jacobs, would depend on log supply 
and its suitability for wood products in favour at the time (Jacobs 1963c, p. 3). These 
arguments were repeated in the Forestry and Timber Bureau's submission to the 
Vernon Committee: 
' ... there is no justification for anticipating a fall in the per capita log 
equivalent of forest products used in Australia, provided the material is 
available for purchase at a reasonable price.' (Forestry and Timber 
Bureau 1963, p. 9). 
Jacobs wrote to the Vernon Committee providing additional points justifying the per 
capita assumptions. In addition, he argued that if Australia's wood consumption was 
over-projected, there was a latitude of at least twenty years before 'there is the 
embarrassment of material going to waste', although the commercial cost was 
appreciated (Jacobs 1964c). To summarise, it was widely understood that Australia's 
per capita consumption of sawn timber was declining and widely hoped, in forestry 
circles, that creating a large softwood supply would reverse the trend. 
I suggest an additional explanation for the high consumption projections. Whilst the 
substitutability between sawn timber and non-wood products was widely discussed, a 
silence appears to have swept over the issue of substitutability between native forest 
hardwood and plantation softwood. This was not always the case. Turnbull from the 
CSIRO's forest products utilisation section wrote: 
'A great deal of discussion has taken place from time to time concerning 
the respective merits of hardwood and softwood. In utilization the 
difference in merits of these two classes of wood is not as distinct at it 
appears to be in the minds of some foresters. I believe that softwoods 
and hardwoods are interchangeable in use to a far greater degree than 
is generally recognized.' (Turnbull 1959, p. 36). 
Gray (1957) and Harris & Nunn (1957) had also written papers on hardwood/softwood 
substitutability for the British Commonwealth Forestry Conference held in Australia 
and New Zealand in 1957. The conference discussed the desirable balance between 
softwood and hardwood production, and each country was left to decide whether to 
favour hardwoods or softwoods (British Commonwealth Forestry Conference 1957, p. 
19). 
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There was no reference to substitution between native forest hardwoods and plantation 
softwoods in any of the papers prepared for the AFC's softwood program, in the 
records of the AFC meetings, the reports by the Departments of National Development 
and Treasury for Cabinet or the Parliamentary debates on the Softwood Forestry 
Agreements Bill 1967. 
The softwood program was viewed as Australia becoming self-sufficient in softwoods 
through import replacement (chapter 3). The softwood planting target was presented as 
the gap filler - the unmet projected consumption after using the native forest wood 
supply and wood from the then relatively small area of existing plantations. This 
understanding sidestepped the sensitive issue of plantation softwoods (largely a future 
industry) competing against native forest hardwoods (an existing industry). 
The rationale for the native forest market share in the new wood supply regime was 
simplistically prescriptive. When the three million acre (1.2 million hectare) plantation 
target was first proposed, Jacobs allocated half of the market in 2000 to be supplied by 
native forest wood leaving the other half to softwoods (Jacobs 1963c, p. 3). Hanson 
later explained the rationale for this mix in a meeting with his local division of the 
Institute of Foresters: 
'A purely subjective judgement was made that half of our total 
requirement should come from plantations and half from native forests.' 
(Hanson 1965b, p. 2). 
This critical assumption sits uneasily with Hanson's Bachelor of Commerce and his 
obvious understanding of market competition (Hanson 1959, 1963; Hanson & Wilson 
1958). 
Perhaps the architects of the softwood program understood the sensitivity of the 
substitution issue and its potential to undermine the plantation program. They could 
avoid the issue and conflict in the 1960s because, at that time, the task was to establish 
the plantations. Competition would not fully emerge until around 2000, when large 
volumes of softwood sawlogs would come on stream for processing. The challenge for 
the 1960s architects was to establish a plantation resource to match future consumption 
without arousing anxiety among the native forest hardwood sawmillers. One way of 
achieving this could be to generate optimistic consumption projections, thereby 
supposedly creating a wood supply role for native forest sawn timber. 
Having examined the competitiveness/substitutability issue, Hanson came down 1n 
favour of softwood: 
'The way to counter these trends [ declining per capita sawn timber 
consumption] is to give to the consumers the type of timber they need as cheaply 
as possible. In the author 's opinion we are not doing this if we continue to grow 
hardwood in the same proportion as at present.' (Hanson 1959, pp. 39-40). 
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After presenting both sides of the hardwood versus softwood argument, Hanson 
concluded: 
'From the point of view of cost of sawn product, the advantage appears to be 
with softwood.' (Hanson 1959, pp. 39-40). 
He drew a similar conclusion for the paper pulp industry: 
'The advantages of the yield of long-fibred pulp makes softwood 
preferable for most production lines. Those items for which hardwood 
pulp are preferred represent a small proportion of the total 
consumption.' (Hanson 1959, pp. 39-40). 
For the other uses of wood - posts, piles and poles - Hanson commented: 
'Technically, hardwood is more suitable than softwood for most of these 
items but the advantage is reduced by the greater ease with which 
softwood is treated with preservative.' (Hanson 1959, pp. 39-40). 
Jacobs, using more technical arguments, also saw the wider industry advantages of a 
higher dependence on softwoods rather than native forest hardwoods. Writing well after 
the planting decision and with his knowledge on tree growth stresses, he based his 
explanation of Australia's need for a large softwood plantation resource on the growth 
properties of hardwoods: 
'The inner parts of hardwoods contain an in circle which develops 
millions of microscopic compression failures which relieve the stress, 
but permit fungal attack and rotten hearts. Hardwood trunks must grow 
to an appreciable diameter, and therefore age, before they are really 
suitable for the sawmilling industry. Conifers behave differently ... 
Largely because of this simple difference in growth habits, three 
quarters of the sawnwood used in the world is coniferous. So many 
machines are designed for it. We need an adequate resource of this 
material.' (Jacobs 1973, p. 47). 
As Australia exhausted its sawlog stocks in previously unlogged native forests, the 
problems to which Jacobs was referring would intensify because, without relatively 
fast-growing softwoods, the sawmilling industry would become increasingly dependent 
on the younger native forest regrowth resource. 
Perhaps the desire to avoid unsettling the existing native forest hardwood sawmillers 
played no role in Hanson's wood consumption projections and, unlike other projections 
at the time, he simply got them wrong. The most we can say is that Hanson's and 
Jacobs' collective understanding of sawn timber intra-industry competition and 
technical and economic issues of wood growing were strong motivations for defending 
the high consumption projections. 
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4.5 Sawlog demand, consumption and plantation supply 
Sawn timber consumption, and hence sawlog supply, has dominated much of the 
analysis and debate surrounding Australia's wood and wood products industry. This 
can be explained by the historical importance of sawn timber in the wood product mix, 
the labour intensiveness (hence political sensitiveness) of the many small native forest 
based sawmills still in operation and the environmental arguments supporting the 
management of native forests over longer, therefore less environmentally damaging, 
rotations to produce sawlogs for building rather than smaller logs over shorter rotations 
for paper. Implicit in this view is the contestable point that house building is a more 
legitimate use of wood than paper. The widespread importance placed on sawlogs/sawn 
timber calls for a separate examination of the plantation targets and wood consumption 
projections for this sector of the industry. 
Continuing high growth in sawn timber consumption dominated the consumption 
projections underpinning the plantation area target. Projected demand for saw and 
veneer logs50 accounted for nearly 70 per cent (22.1 million m3 per annum) of 
Australia's projected wood requirements in 2000 (Hanson 1962a). Australia's actual 
sawn timber and plywood consumption in the year ending 31 December 2000 required 
12.4 million m3 to make (appendix A table Al; figure 4.4). As discussed above, the 
high per capita sawn timber assumption explains most of the very large over-projection. 
The rapid post-war growth in Australia's sawn timber consumption did not continue. 
Consumption started to level out in the 1950s and after the 1970s oil shock. Australia's 
sawn timber consumption is characterised by housing-cycle induced oscillations around 
a low, long-term growth trend (figure 5.4). The high end-point of the actual 
consumption data presented in figure 4.4 (year ending 31 December 2000) shows the 
effects of the pre-goods and services tax building boom. The inevitable decline will see 
sawn timber consumption falling as part of the normal oscillation. I expect Australia's 
average annual consumption of sawn timber and plywood over the 1996-2002 housing 
cycle to be around 11.5 million m3.51 Hanson's 1962 projection is nearly double this 
figure. 
Actual softwood plantation sawlog production in 2000 does not accurately reflect the 
plantation supply potential because of the under-use problem raised earlier and in more 
detail in chapter 5. The simple but reliable approach used earlier to estimate total 
plantation wood supply (i.e. all log grades) is not appropriate for estimating output 
disaggregated into log grades. This is because growers in different plantation regions 
have different management objectives - some aim to maximise sawlog production 
whilst others focuss more on chiplog supply for paper production. The approach taken 
here is to present the various projections of Australia's softwood plantation saw and 
50 Veneer logs for plywood are included in the discussion to be consistent with most projections that 
include veneer logs in their sawlog projections. Plywood accounted for 5 per cent of Australia's saw and 
veneer log consumption in 2000 (appendix A, table Al). 
51 Consumption in 2001 and 2002 calculated by continuing the long-term trend growth of 0.3 per cent per 
annum from the trough of 1996. 
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veneer log supply undertaken since the late 1980s and compare them with consumption 
(figure 4.4). 
Projections of softwood plantation saw and veneer log supply vary significantly (see 
appendix E for a description of the projections). The reasons why are incorporated in 
the analysis presented in chapters 6 and 7. Projections by Cameron & Penna (1998), 
Clark (1995a) and BIS Shrapnel Forestry Group Pty. Ltd. (2000) indicate that softwood 
plantations can meet, or almost meet, Australia's requirements by around 2005 (figure 
4.3).52 The other projections indicate significantly lower supply in 2005. 
Self-sufficiency based on plantation wood only was not the purported aim of the 1960s 
plantation policy. Native forest hardwood sawn timber was notionally allocated half the 
projected market. Because actual consumption in 2000 was half that projected by 
Hanson and the planting targets were largely met, the option exists for Australia to 
meet virtually all its sawn timber needs from domestically produced plantation sawn 
timber (together with wood-based panels). To a large degree, the inevitable supply 
driven competition has been generating such an outcome with plantation sawn timber 
increasing its market share ( chapter 5). 
The projections presented in Clark (1995a) and BIS Shrapnel Forestry Group Pty. Ltd. 
(2000) support the view that Australia can be virtually self-sufficient in sawn timber 
using plantation wood alone, thereby creating new public policy options for Australia's 
native forests and wood based industries. These policy options are less valid if the 
projections presented in the Resource Assessment Commission (1992a, RAC 2) and the 
Australian Forestry Council (1989), and to a lesser extent the National Plantation 
Inventory (1997) and James et al. (1995), are more realistic. The wood supply potential 
of Australia's plantations is a key piece of information for policy. Before examining the 
vexed issue of Australia's plantation wood supply potential (chapter 7), we must 
analyse the efficiency of growing wood as an agricultural crop ( chapter 5). 
52 Wood based panels ( e.g. medium density fibreboard, particleboard, oriented strand board) made from 
small particles of wood have been excluded from this saw and veneer log/sawn timber and plywood 
discussion. They are used largely as substitutes for sawn timber and plywood in many applications 
(Nelson & Kelly 1998; von Weizsacker et al. 1997). From a self-sufficiency perspective, these products, 
together with traditional sawn timber and plywood, have enabled Australia to meet its entire commodity 
building needs since around 2000 (Clark 1995a). 
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Figure 4.4 Hanson (1962a) projected Australian consumption of saw and veneer logs in 2000 
relative to actual consumption and projected Australian softwood plantation saw and veneer log 
supply. Actual consumption figures to 1991 are for year ending 30 June. All other figures are for 
year ending 31 December. Source: Appendix E; ABARE Forest Products Statistics & Commodity 
Statistical Bulletin various years; Hanson (1962a). 
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Chapter 5 
Is it sensible to grow wood as an agricultural crop? 
5.1 Introduction 
A fundamental question for forest policy formulation is whether wood should be 
produced in an agricultural system. Debate over the question arouses strong views, and 
the arguments used by both supporters and opponents have often been based more on 
prejudice than on a balanced consideration of the information and issues (Poore & Fries 
1985). 
A core attraction of tree cropping is its productive use of land. For example, wood 
yields per hectare are generally higher than extensive use of native forests. The 
environmental impacts of sourcing wood from native forests can be reduced by shifting 
wood supply to a smaller land base using a cropping regime (Elliott 1992; Hawken et 
al. 1999). Against this benefit are the negative environmental impacts of intensive land 
management if native vegetation is cleared, native gene pools are contaminated by the 
introduction of other species, soils are disturbed during site preparation and their 
productivity deteriorates owing to repeated short rotation cropping, water quality and 
quantity in catchments containing large plantation areas deteriorates, and the use of 
herbicides, fertilisers and pesticides increases (Elliott 1992). Cadman et al. (1991) 
examined the potential negative environmental consequences of plantation expansion 
and weigh them up against the potential for tree planting to address land degradation 
problems flowing from earlier extensive forest clearing for other agricultural pursuits. 
Provided that environmental safeguards are implemented, they conclude that an 
increased plantation estate on cleared agricultural land can generate net environmental 
benefits compared to most other agricultural land uses. Research to underpin the 
necessary environmental safeguards is advancing, particularly in the areas of 
biodiversity conservation (see for example Lindenmayer at al. 1999; Lindenmayer & 
Pope 1999) and hydrology (see for example Vertessy & Bessard 1999; Petheram et al. 
2000; Zhang et al. 2001). 
Humphreys (1992) argued that the strong connection between land care programs and 
tree growing (see for example Prinsley 1992; Reid & Stewart 1994) may be the genesis 
of a merging of silviculture and agriculture to provide benefits to many land users in 
Australia. Conscious of the price-cost pressures of commodity production, Humphreys 
notes that synergies in plantation wood growing, land care and effluent management 
enable the sharing of fixed costs ( e.g. land, fencing, rates, research and development, 
infrastructure) across multiple businesses. Where such synergies exist, multiple 
commercial use of agricultural land can relieve some of the price-cost pressure of 
commodity production and concurrently address environmental problems. 
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Church & Richards (1998) argue that shifting wood supply to plantations is negative 
from the perspective of ecological sustainability because plantations require the use of 
non-renewable resources whereas native forest wood is a potentially renewable 
resource. Whilst Church & Richards provide no comment on whether the wood in 
Australia's 1.5 million hectares of existing plantations should be used, they encourage 
research effort to establish the requirements for ecologically sustainable management of 
native forests for wood production. Significant resources have already been focussed on 
this task (see, for example, Robinson 1988, Ferguson 1996), but the implementation 
question remains poorly addressed. 
In this chapter, I examine the commodity nature of the Australian wood and wood 
products industry and its implications for managing native forests for wood production. 
Can · state (native) forest agencies maintain environmentally effective regulations for a 
cost-conscious commodity industry over the long term? 
Social issues arise in growing wood as an agricultural crop. Plantation establishment 
raises local community concerns about population decline leading to reduced 
community services and increases in community servicing costs for the remaining 
population. The displacement of farming families and traditional agriculture is the core 
concern (Centre for Farm Planning and Land Management 1989; Courtney 2000; 
Schirmer 2000). Some rural communities have enjoyed significant manufacturing 
employment from processing plantation wood (Dwyer Leslie Pty. Ltd. & Powell 1995; 
Margules Groome Poyry et al. 1995) whilst others have benefited less with the 
exporting of wood for processing outside the region. 
Environmental, social and economic pressures are now introducing a greater 
complexity to plantation wood growing. Kanowski (1995) identified the major 
challenge for plantation wood growing, namely the design and management of 
production systems that acknowledge and address the economic and social dimensions 
of sustainability criteria as well as those that relate to the environment. The first aim of 
this chapter is to propose a framework to assist in meeting this challenge. Within this 
framework, two key strategies are identified as being critical for maintaining the 
sustainability of native forest ecosystems, wood production as an economic activity and 
rural socio-economic well being. These strategies are transformed into measurable 
indicators, which are used to complete the assessment of 1960s plantation policy before 
providing a detailed evaluation of the performance of Australia's wood and wood 
products industry over the 1990s. 
5.2 Defining sustainability 
The meaning of sustainability and sustainable development has received considerable 
discussion (Pezzey 1989; Costanza & Patten 1995; Common 1995; Sutton 2000). At its 
core, sustainability is the ability to maintain something over-time (Sutton 2001 ). 
103 
Costanza & Patten (1995) similarly argued that a sustainable system 1s one that 
survives or persists. 
The concept of sustainability can be widely applied, for example to the environment, 
the economy, an organisation, a culture and a species. Selection of systems for 
protection over their life-time or over a specified life is obviously contestable. 
Democratic processes that can identify the public interest and also assist in developing 
a public consensus become important ( see Dahl ( 1998) for a grounding in democratic 
theory, and Fish.kin (1995) and Dryzek (2000) for an examination of processes for 
bringing deliberation to democracy). 
Processes that threaten to cut short the expected life span of a system undermine 
sustainability. Identifying threatening processes, and strategies for their amelioration, is 
a core element of policies aimed at achieving sustainability. Sutton (2001) argues that, 
as the pursuit of sustainability has progressed, its meaning has shifted to one of 
integration of social, economic and environmental issues - even when these are traded-
off against each other. The idea of maintenance as the core meaning of sustainability is 
displaced by the idea of integration despite maintenance and major trade-off being 
· mutually exclusive. Sutton (2001) observes that this changed meaning is due to 
confusion about means and ends. The objective of sustainability is maintenance whilst 
the means to this end might be ( amongst many other things) an integrated grappling 
with issues in the social, economic and environmental arenas, but without any major 
trade-offs. 
The approach of Costanza & Patten ( 1995) and Sutton (2001 ), which focusses on 
system identification and developing strategies to enhance their capacity to persist 
(without major trade-off), underpins the framework for forest and wood industry policy 
developed below. 
Identifying systems for sustaining 
In this thesis, three systems associated with wood production have been selected for 
investigation of strategies to enhance their capacity to persist for their full-expected life 
span. They are: 
• native forests as self-regenerating ecosystems, 
• wood production systems to meet human needs for shelter, communication, 
packaging etc., and 
• rural socio-economic systems. 
Their selection is based on a subjective assessment of the main factors that historically 
have shaped native forest and wood industry policy in Australia. The analysis could be 
broadened to include ecosystem services such as carbon systems. The sustainability 
discussion for the wood production system is largely focussed on economic 
considerations. The framework can readily accommodate an extension to include 
environmental aspects ( e.g. biodiversity, water and soil) of wood production in an 
agricultural regime. 
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Native forests are ecosystems dominated by tree species predominantly native to the 
locality and where natural regenerative processes operate to recover canopy structure 
following natural or artificial disturbance. Clearing native forests for large-scale 
infrastructure and to create an agricultural land base for growing food, fibre and wood 
obviously destroys these systems at a regional scale. Maintaining these ecosystems 
requires a cessation of processes that threaten their self-regenerating capacity. 
The second group of systems are wood production systems to meet human needs for 
shelter, communication, packaging etc. These functions can also be met from non-wood 
products (Maddern & French 1989; Sedjo & Lyon 1990; Wood 1992; Lippke 1994; 
Clark 1995a). Alternatives to wood based production systems include by-products of 
other agricultural production systems (e.g. wheat straw, bagasse, and cotton linters); 
developing technologies using enzymes in non-wood pulping; and recycled wood-
plastic composites. New products and processes (technological development) mean that 
the life span of any production system should be indeterminate - superseded by others 
having a positive social consensus that is also consistent with enhancing the capacity of 
the ecosystem to persist. Here I shall concentrate on wood production systems. 
Rural Australia socio-economic systems make up the third group of systems in this 
inquiry. Population, communication, economic wealth, employment, culture, 
infrastructure and education contribute to rural community well being. The framework 
developed in this chapter focusses on employment and economic wealth because of 
their fundamental importance for rural communities (Commonwealth of Australia 
1994). 
5.3 Strategies to enhance system capacity to persist 
Actions aimed at enhancing a system's capacity to persist are contestable and call for 
debate and on-going investigation. This thesis proposes two key actions aimed at 
enhancing the persistence capacity of the three selected systems, namely: 
• shifting commodity wood production from native forests to an agricultural 
system, and 
• adding value by domestic processing. 
Shifting commodity wood production from native forests to agriculture 
I argue that shifting commodity wood production from self-regenerating native forest 
ecosystems to agricultural systems can enhance the persistence capacity of native forest 
ecosystems as well as enhance the economic viability of wood and wood products 
production systems and therefore their capacity to persist. The significance and nature 
of commodity production is fundamental to the argument. 
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Commodity production 
Commodity comes from the Latin word commoditas meaning benefit. Schaniel & 
Neale (1999) observed that five centuries ago commodities referred to imports from 
newly discovered lands ( e.g. spices, cottons, silks, furs) and to the traditional 
commercial products of farms. They argue that Marx gave 'commodity' a new 
meaning, namely, products made in factories to sell at a profit in a market. Marx did 
not rule out unprocessed items, referring specifically to Australia being a colonial 
'nursery' for the production of wool for Britain to process (Marx 1934, p. 485). His 
focus was on goods for sale to generate profits. Financial writers today ( e.g. Wyatt 
1999) use the word commodity in referring to market traded products like oil, coal, 
gold, wool and sugar that undergo varying degrees of processing. 
These loose understandings call for a definition that draws out the distinguishing nature 
of a commodity in contemporary socio-economic systems. Both commodity products 
and, their opposite, specialty products are sold in the market. Commodities are different 
to specialties in that they are homogeneous products that usually meet established 
standards. Quality (and its consistency in production) is important for commodity 
producers, but the products' characteristics tend to be defined in terms of broadly 
accepted international standards (Industry Commission 1993, p. 74). Examples of these 
standards are the moisture content and strength of graded sawn timber, the thickness, 
tear strength and brightness of paper and the size and colour range of woodchips. 
Homogeneity in commodities means that commodity producers compete largely on 
price because that is how buyers usually distinguish one company's product from 
others. It is this price-dominated competition that characterises commodity production. 
To capture more sales, commodity producers focus on selling their products at 
attractive prices, thereby putting constant downward pressure on commodity prices. 
Wyatt (1999), using the USA Commodity Research Bureau's price index of 17 
commodities, reported that commodities lost 75 per cent of their real (inflation 
adjusted) value over the last 200 years. Ruthven (1995) reported that the real price of 
commodities in the 1990s global market place was a mere fraction of what they were in 
the industrial age and the agrarian age before that. 
To maintain profit levels in an environment of long-term declining real prices, 
commodity producers adopt an on-going strategy of cost reduction. Technological 
change is the means by which profits can be maintained in an environment of long-term 
price decline. Clark (2001 a) used the technology classifications of Sedjo & Lyon 
(1990) and a simple supply and demand price model to capture the price effect of 
technological change in the wood and wood products industry. An examination of the 
empirical evidence showed long-term downward trends in the real price for wood in 
three of the four major markets examined. The exception was the very high-growth 
Asian countries, where average real import prices for woodchips during the 1990s 
remained at their 1960s levels (Clark 2001 a). Declining real prices for wood is an 
understood reality in the industry (Humphreys 1992; H.A. Simons & McLennan 
Magasanik Associates 1990), although some analysts ( e.g. Food and Agricultural 
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Organisation of the United Nations 1997; Sedjo & Lyon 1990) more cautiously report 
finding no evidence of increasing real prices for wood. 
The wood and wood products industry is highly exposed to the price-cost squeeze 
because of its highly commodified nature. Globally, commodities make up around 80 
per cent of the output volume of the wood products industry (A.J. Leslie pers. comm. 
1992) and an estimated 95 per cent of Australia's production (appendix B). Most sawn 
timber, structural beams and wood-based panels; much of veneer and plywood; pulp 
and most paper are commodities. The wood used in their manufacture is highly 
commodified. Most sawlogs and all chiplogs are commodities, as are woodchips. 
A familiar cost reduction strategy is to configure plant size to capture scale economies 
and maximise plant operating time to spread fixed costs over a larger revenue base. 
Attention can then be given to developing strategies for on-going reduction of operating 
costs, namely wood, energy, labour, and other material inputs. Wood is a significant 
cost item and therefore target for cost reduction strategies. Wood costs comprise the 
price paid for standing logs (stumpage) and the cost of logging and cartage to the mill. 
For Australian-based commodity producers supplying the home market, wood accounts 
for slightly more than half the operating costs of a plantation saw mill; around one-third 
of the costs of a plywood mill and slightly less than one-quarter of the costs of a wood 
based panels plant (Industry Commission 1993). Wood costs account for around one-
quarter of the operating costs of a bleached kraft pulp mill exporting its product to 
Japan (H.A. Simons & McLennan Magasanik Associates 1990). 
Wood growing regimes and the cost reduction imperative 
Old-growth native forests have provided the wood products industry with an in situ 
resource. The cost reduction effort has therefore concentrated on lobbying for lower 
stumpages and developing technologies to reduce logging and transport costs. Sedjo 
(1983) argued that, as the old-growth native forest resource diminishes, the cost 
reduction effort has shifted to the economics of growing wood and in particular 
growing wood in an agricultural regime. Australia's early foresters pre-empted this 
when they decided to shift the nation's wood supply to the global softwood standard 
( chapters 2 & 3). 
Growing wood in an agricultural regime offers cost reductions through economising on 
time, land, logging and transport as well as scale economies and processing efficiencies 
(Sedjo 1983, 1990; Clark 1995a; Bums et al. 1999). Plantations are usually established 
with relatively fast growing species, generally on favourable sites, and usually with the 
intention of intensive management. This agricultural growing regime enables earlier 
income returns to growers; scale economies to harvesters, haulers and processors; 
processing and handling efficiencies through log uniformity; and processing 
efficiencies through tree breeding and selection. The potential for on-going cost 
reduction through research and development (for examples, see Boomsma & Boardman 
1988; Robert Flynn and Associates & Economic Forestry Associates 1999) sustains 
industry interest in agricultural wood growing regimes. Alternatively, industry will 
remain focussed on Australia's native forest resource if low native forest stumpages can 
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compensate for their higher cost operations (for recent examples of low native forest 
stumpages, see Miller 1999; Paine 2001). Over time, however, as Sedjo (1990) argued, 
the economics of an agricultural regime relative to a hunter gatherer regime will widen. 
The price-cost squeeze of commodity production means that a native forest based 
industry is likely to lobby for intensification of native forest management to enjoy the 
same commercial advantages as their competitors using an agricultural regime (for a 
frank discussion, see Cross 2001). Opportunities for applying intensification 
technologies are greatest when old-growth forests are clear-felled and shift into a 
regrowth phase. Intensification practices include reducing rotation lengths, increasing 
wood yields using agricultural technology, and selecting non-indigenous tree species 
for replanting. Such intensification practices threaten biodiversity in native forest 
ecosystems (Ehrlich 1996; Lindenmayer 1996; Norton 1996). 
Ironically, plantation wood, with its potential to relieve the ecological pressures of 
commodity wood production on native forests (if this does not entail clearing native 
forests), also contributes to the pressure for intensification technologies in native 
forests. With high substitutability between plantation and native forest commodity 
wood products ( chapter 7, appendix F), the pressure to intensify native forest 
management will increase as more plantation wood comes on stream for processing. 
Shifting commodity wood production to an agricultural regime will remove a process 
threatening to native forest ecosystems and therefore enhance their persistence cap_acity 
(figure 5.1). 
Although intuitively obvious to many, rarely is the nature of commodity production and 
its implications for native forest ecosystems acknowledged in policy ( chapter 6). The 
changing structure of the wood and wood products industry suggests that the capacity 
of public forest agencies to resist adopting intensification technologies has diminished 
over the past three decades. Most of the many small, family owned sawmills are now 
concentrated into larger corporate structures and log sales to a small number of chip 
exporters has taken an increasing share of Australia's native forest wood (Dargavel 
1995; Resource Assessment Commission 1992a). 
State native forest agencies understandably have an interest in the commercial viability 
of their customers - mainly producers of commodity wood products. They are 
inevitably attracted to managing native forests to replicate the commercial benefits of 
growing wood as an agricultural crop. Government-imposed requirements on state 
(native) forest agencies to produce financial performance results more in line with the 
private sector adds to the intensification pressure. Revenue is most easily increased by 
selling more wood. Growing wood with similar attributes to a plantation resource 
reduces buyer pressure for lower wood stumpages to compensate for lower quality 
wood. The alternative is a run-down strategy of cost minimisation over an extensive 
native forest estate. 
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Figure 5.1 System framework for native forest and wood industry policy 
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For the above reasons, I argue that sourcing wood from native forests cannot jointly 
meet the interests of native forest ecosystems and producers of commodity wood 
products. A separation of function and land base is required ( figure 5 .1 ). 
Adding value by processing 
Value added is a measure of the economic value generated by the activities of a firm or 
industry in using its factors of production (i.e. land, labour, capital and knowledge). 
Broadly, it is the difference between the total value of a firm's production and the costs 
of all the material inputs and purchased services that it uses (Industry Commission 
1993, p. 25). 
Income ( as measured by value added) per unit of raw material usually increases with 
further processing. Processing sawlogs into sawn timber rather than exporting them 
unprocessed is estimated to boost income per m
3 of wood used sevenfold (figure 5.2 
and Appendix C for data and methodology). Income per unit of wood used is even 
greater if the processing of sawmill residues into wood-based panels is included in the 
calculation.53 The income returns per m3 of wood used by the Australian paper industry 
are even greater (figure 5.2). This is because, as discussed below, recycling has 
significantly increased resource productivity in the paper industry. Significantly higher 
levels of income per m3 of wood input are realised when commodity sawn timber, 
panels and paper are further processed into wooden components, roof trusses, door 
frames, paper containers, as so forth. Estimated income per m
3 of wood used (figure 5.2 
and appendix C) should be treated as indicative given the data deficiencies. 
An industry that undertakes a high level of domestic processing (i.e. wood growing and 
processing is highly integrated domestically) generates more national income per unit 
of wood grown than an industry that exports most of its wood unprocessed as logs or 
chips. This means that, from the perspective of Australian industry policy (leaving the 
issue of comparative advantage temporarily to one side), a highly integrated domestic 
industry has more scope and more items to factor into its cost reducing strategies 
relative to an industry that exports most of its wood unprocessed. Moving along the 
further processing path - shifting into semi-commodity and specialty products - also 
reduces the intensity of price competition and therefore the cost reduction imperative. 
Integration raises the perennial issue of cost and revenue sharing arrangements between 
growers and processors. The tensions are readily observable in the agricultural sector 
generally and, as discussed in chapter 2, the intense debates amongst Australia's early 
foresters were largely caused by their differing views on the relationship between 
themselves as 'growers' and industry as processors. Perhaps it is time for this debate to 
be revisited as part of Australia's wood and wood products industry policy process. 
53 This calculation was not presented because the sawmill residues from a world scale sawmill need 
supplementation with small logs to provide sufficient wood for a competitive wood-based panels plant. 
110 
Figure 5.2 Value added and employment per unit of wood used in the Australian 
wood and wood products industry. Value added is revenue less costs. Employment 
is that generated inside mill gate and excludes employment that is general to all 
sectors of the industry, namely wood growing, logging and haulage. Roundwood 
equivalent is the volume of wood in log form required to produce the wood product. 
Source: Appendix C. 
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Industry structure has significant socio-economic effects, particularly for those rural 
communities in close proximity to plantations. Processing wood into sawn timber, 
panels and paper generates around fifteen times more jobs than exporting the equivalent 
log volume unprocessed (figure 5.2), enhancing rural Australian socio-economies 
through higher employment levels and increased economic wealth. 
A wood and wood products industry policy aimed at securing a highly integrated 
industry structure is anathema to those advocating free market policies based on some 
notion of comparative advantage. Markets should be allowed to operate freely so 
resources will be allocated to areas where Australia enjoys a comparative advantage. I 
argue in chapters 6 and 7 that government policy has distorted the structure of 
Australia's wood products industry by discouraging investment in plantation 
processing. Removing these government-induced distortions - by ceasing commodity 
wood production in native forests - is likely to facilitate a more integrated plantation 
industry structure and therefore a commercially stronger wood growing industry over 
the long-term. 
5.4 Comparison with native forest multiple use 
Multiple use of native forests 
The framework presented figure 5 .1 is an alternative to the multiple use approach to 
wood production using native forests. Multiple use of native forests has gained 
increasing recognition in Australia since the 1930s (Frawley 1999, p. 43). From a 
forestry viewpoint, it was vital that the 'water-sensitive' Australian public accept 
multiple use of forested water catchments because Australia's more productive native 
forests were located in water catchments (Lawrence & Moulds 1960, p. 1697). 
By the 1950s, foresters globally were becoming increasingly concerned about public 
pressure for the alienation of native forests from wood production. This was evidenced 
by the Fifth World Forestry Congress held in Seattle in 1960 adopting the theme 
· Multiple Use of Forested Land. Richard McArdle, Chief of the USA Forest Service, in 
his Congress keynote address, spoke of forested land being excised for non-wood 
purposes, namely urban development, infrastructure, food and defence. Of great 
concern was the increasing pressure to set aside additional forested land exclusively for 
recreational use - no reference was made to wilderness. McArdle emphasised the need 
to apply multiple use management widely and intensively 'to lessen the pressures to 
divert forest lands' (McArdle 1960, p. 144). It was hoped that a multiple use approach 
could reduce or resolve conflict by establishing a balance in the competing uses for 
native fores ts. 
Multiple use is a loosely defined concept that has never sat comfortably with the 
primary initial function of public foresters to provide wood. Dargavel explained: 
'They [ the foresters] gathered the various other forest functions under a 
vague concept of 'multiple use', which acknowledged that plans for 
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managing the forest to produce wood had to be adjusted sometimes for 
water production, grazing, recreation, scenic and other values. In theory 
'sustained yield, multiple use' sought to maximise the net benefits to 
society from the combined uses.' (Dargavel 1995, p. 76). 
An attempt was made to ground multiple use of native forests in the theory of joint 
production developed by Carlson (1956). Joint production theory assists in addressing 
the distribution issues when a resource ( e.g. forested land) can generate more than one 
service or product ( e.g. wood production, water catchment protection, spiritual 
enhancement, biodiversity conservation). Ferguson (1996) used joint production theory 
to develop decision-making tools for the multiple use of native forests at a regional 
level. Implementation, as Ferguson acknowledges, was constrained by the cost and 
availability of data for modeling (Ferguson 1996, p. 97). He proposed another process 
and set of guiding criteria for decision making, identifying public participation, 
economic viability, environmental sensitivity and sustainability as key elements 
(Ferguson 1996, pp. 98-101). These elements do not constitute a forest or wood 
industry policy framework, rather they are largely a mixture of policy process attributes 
to deal with conflicting objectives for native forests. 
Comparing multiple use of native forests with a systems approach 
The multiple use of native forests and the systems approach presented in figure 5 .1 
have fundamental° differences and fundamentally different policy implications. The 
systems approach specifically includes an agricultural wood-growing regime that 
jointly accommodates the interests of commodity producers and native forest ecological 
integrity. The discussion above found that key strategies to enhance the persistence 
capacity of native forest ecosystems, wood production systems and rural socio-
economic systems are not in conflict. The policy framework enables a high degree of 
policy coherence because each strategy enhances the persistence capacity of more than 
one system (figure 5.1 ). 
In contrast, the multiple use of native forests appears to be unable to meet the needs of 
commodity producers without threatening the ecological integrity of native forests. 
Trade-off is required and conflict inevitable as long as government maintains a multiple 
use approach. The multiple use of native forests, by definition, excludes plantations (an 
agricultural system) and therefore the means to achieving policy coherence. 
Under the approach presented in figure 5 .1, the task is to align native forest and wood 
industry objectives to the appropriate land base - strategic choice land use decision 
making (figure 5.3). The task is made easier for Australia because commodity 
production accounts for 9 5 per cent of the nation's wood and wood products industry 
( appendix B). Virtually all wood production and rural employment should therefore be 
aligned to the plantation land base and superimposed by an industry policy encouraging 
investment in processing. This then would free native forests from commodity wood 
production, thereby removing a threat to their ecological integrity. 
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Figure 5.3 Strategic land use decision making 
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5.5 Australia's performance in enhancing system persistence 
capacity 
The foregoing discussion presented two key strategies to enhance the persistence 
capacity of the three identified systems. The strategies can be readily formed into 
indicators measuring the probability of the systems successfully contending with the 
price-cost squeeze of commodity production. The two indicators are: 
• the shift in commodity wood production from native forests to plantations, and 
• the domestic integration in plantation wood growing and processing. 
Using these indicators to evaluate Australia's 1960s plantation policy, I conclude that 
the policy was moving in the right direction if it had not entailed the clearing of native 
forests to establish the planting land base. Industry integration was effectively ensured 
because self-sufficiency in wood products dominated the political, bureaucratic and 
industry agenda and most of the plantation resource was publicly owned. I argue for 
integration on industry policy grounds not simply for nationalistic self-sufficiency 
reasons. The 1960s shift in commodity wood production to plantations had 
contradictory implications for native forest ecological integrity. It resulted in native 
forests being destroyed to create a planting base, but the large volumes of wood that 
plantations can supply, relative to native forests, mean that commodity wood 
production can now be shifted out of native forests ( chapter 7). The remainder of this 
chapter evaluates Australia's 1990s performance against the two criteria. 
Neither the ABS nor ABARE provides data that enable the indicators to be measured 
directly. This is because wood supply is reported as either softwood or hardwood, not 
by growing regime, 54 and wood products are classified using an industrial classification 
that is also not related to the growing regime. Estimates of Australia's production of 
wood and wood products disaggregated by wood source for 1999/00 and 1989/90 are 
presented in table 5 .1. The methodology, assumptions and data sources are presented in 
appendix D. 
Shift in commodity wood production from native forests to plantations 
Over the decade ending 2000, Australia' s wood products industry has substantially 
increased its dependence on plantation wood. Plantations accounted for approximately 
75 per cent of Australia's production of wood products in 1999/00 - native forests for 
only 25 per cent (table 5.1). Of significance was the 20 percentage point increase in the 
plantation share of Australia's sawn timber and wood panels production over the 
decade ending June 2000 (table 5.1). 
54 Australian Bureau of Agricultural and Resource Economics (200 la) provides, for the first time, 
Australian wood production data that disaggregates hardwood removals into native forest and plantation 
sources. The disaggregation applies to 1999/00 and will be useful as a performance indicator over time. 
Softwood removals were not similarly disaggregated. 
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Despite the displacement of native forest wood in domestic processing, there has been 
no decline in native forest wood production over the decade ending June 2000. Native 
forest wood production has remained constant at approximately 11 million m
3 per 
annum despite the near doubling in plantation production (table 5.1). Native forest 
wood production has been maintained by increased exports of unprocessed woodchips 
(table 5.1 ). 
The fact that native forest wood production remains unchanged even though plantation 
supplies have increased significantly means that Australia is dismissing opportunities to 
reduce the commodity wood production threat to native forest ecological integrity. 
Table 5.1 Australian production of plantation and native forest wood and wood products and exports of 
unprocessed wood 1989/90 and 1999/00. Figures in bold are percentages. All other figures are million 
m3. Sawn timber and wood panels production is reported as the finished product volume. All other 
production is reported as the roundwood equivalent volume. Source: Appendix D. 
Wood 
production 
Sawn timber 
and wood 
panels 
production 
Wood used 
for Australian 
pulp 
production 
Other wood 
products 
production 
(poles, posts, 
etc) 
Unprocessed 
wood exports 
(chips and 
logs) -
Plantation Native forest 
1989/90 1999/00 1989/90 1999/00 
6.7 13.0 10.9 11.0 
2.3 4.3 1.9 1.4 
2.1 2.0 1.1 0.7 
0.3 0.5 0.5 0.2 
0.3 4.3 4.5 6.1 
% plantation 
1989/90 1999/00 
38 54 
55 75 
65 73 
42 69 
6 41 
Integration in plantation wood growing and domestic processing 
The Australian plantation sector has become less domestically integrated over the 
decade ending 2000. At the start of the 1990s, virtually all the plantation resource was 
processed domestically. At the end of the decade, one-third was exported unprocessed 
as chips or whole logs (table 5.2). The increased use of plantation wood for domestic 
processing (into sawn timber and wood panels) was outstripped by strong growth in 
exports of unprocessed plantation chips and logs. Increased exports of unprocessed 
wood accounted for three-quarters of the per annum plantation wood production 
increase over the 1990s (table 5.2). 
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Table 5.2 Australian production of plantation wood and wood products and exports of unprocessed 
plantation wood 1989/90 and 1999/00. Sawn timber and wood panels production is reported as 000 m
3 
of 
finished product. All other production is reported as 000 m
3 
roundwood equivalent. Source: Appendix D. 
Wood production 
Sawn timber and wood 
panels 
Sawn timber 
Plywood 
Wood-based panels 
Wood used in 
Australian pulp 
production 
Other wood products 
(poles, posts, etc) 
Log exports 
Chip exports 
% wood exported 
unprocessed 
1989/90 1999/00 % change 
6 700 13 000 94.0 
2 304 4 307 86.9 
1 274 
107 
923 
2 080 
334 
3 
280 
4 
2 544 
163 
1 600 
1 976 
484 
1 032 
3 247 
33 
99 .7 
52.3 
73.3 
-5.0 
44 .9 
34 300 
1 060 
The softwood sector, which overwhelmingly dominated plantation wood production 
during the 1990s, accounts for most of the deteriorating domestic integration. Softwood 
woodchip exports increased significantly during the first half of the 1990s (table 5.3). 
The second half of the 1990s saw a levelling out in chip exporting and a rapid increase 
in softwood plantation sawlog exports (table 5.3). 
Table 5.3 Australian softwood plantation wood production and exports of unprocessed wood 1990-2000. 
Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics, International Trade Statistics; Australian Bureau of Agricultura
l 
and Resource Economics (2001 b) and earlier editions with adjustments as detailed in the notes. 
Financial Wood Woodchip Sawlog Chiplog Total log Per cent of 
year production exports exports exports exports plantation 
ending wood 
June exported 
(million m3t (million m3)b (million m3l (million m3l 
unprocessed 
(million m 3) (%) 
1990 6.70 0.31 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.6 
1991 6.26 0.35 0.01 0.04 0.05 6.4 
1992 6.86 0.91 0.00 0.10 0.10 14.7 
1993 7.58 1.11 0.05 0.18 0.23 17.7 
1994 8.66 1.44 0.15 0.25 0.40 21.3 
1995 8.40 2.47 0.09 0.16 0.25 32.4 
1996 9.03 2.36 0.10 0.24 0.34 29.9 
1997 10.29 2.45 0.48 0.12 0.60 29.6 
1998 10.78 2.76 0.33 0.05 0.38 29.1 
1999 10.71 2.73 0.63 0.05 0.68 31.8 
2000 12.20 2.76 1.02 0.01 1.02 31.1 
a. Calculated, using ABARE data, by deducting production of native forest softwood sawn timber 
( converted to round wood equivalent by multiplying by 2.5) from softwood log removals. 
b. Softwood figures reported in bone dry units converted to m
3 by multiplying by 2.69 and in bone dry 
tonnes by multiplying by 2.47 (Neilson & Flynn 1998, p . xiv) and allowing 6.5 per cent for chip 
losses and fines (Australian Forest Growers 1996). 
c. Assuming all softwood logs are sourced from plantations. Data are presented by log grade as 
reported to the ABS. Industry advises that some logs are too poor for sawmilling but that the leakage 
of good quality sawlogs is considerable and increasing. 
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Plantation woodchips and small logs 
Increased domestic processing of pulp and paper and wood based panels ( e.g. 
particleboard and medium density fibreboard) is currently the main alternative to 
exporting unprocessed plantation chips and small logs. Australia's production of wood-
based panels increased strongly over the 1990s (table 5.2), and Australia is now a net 
exporter of these products. Market prospects are favourable over the long term with 
developing country consumption of wood-based panels being the fastest growing sector 
of the global wood products industry (Clark 2001a). 
Australia's production of pulp declined over the 1990s, and so, therefore, did wood 
used for pulp and paper production. This is in spite of strong growth in Australian paper 
production (table 5.4). Paper producers, seeking to avoid the high costs of wood 
pulping, have increased their use of recycled paper, now the most important material 
input for Australian paper production (table 5.4). More efficient pulping is also 
dampening the demand for wood by an average 0.6 per annum over the 1990s 
( calculated using the data in table 5.4). In combination, increased paper recycling, 
pulping efficiencies and increased use of fillers means that Australia's paper industry 
has significantly reduced its dependence on wood. In 1991/92 the Australian paper 
industry, on average, required 1. 76 tonnes of wood to make a tonne of paper. By 
1999/00 the industry required 1.17 tonnes of wood to make a tonne of paper ( calculated 
using data in table 5 .4 and deducting the volume of pulp imported from the volume of 
paper produced in both years). The Australian paper industry' s wood resource 
productivity increased by an average 6.2 per cent per annum over 1991/92 to 1999/00. 
Significant resource productivity improvements are also observed in the global paper 
industry (Clark 2001a). 
These trends work to dampen the demand for new pulping capacity, but extra capacity 
is still required as paper consumption grows and to replenish the paper stock as it 
deteriorates with continuous recycling. Australia's pulp production has declined over 
the 1990s, leaving imports to meet the requirement (table 5.4). Most of Australia's 
declining pulp production is due to pulp mill rationalisation following PaperlinX's 
(previously Amcor) 1993 acquisition of APPM Ltd. 's Tasmanian pulp, paper and 
distribution assets. 
Table 5.4 Australian production of paper and material inputs 1991/92 and 1999/00 (000 tonnes) . Data on 
recycled fibre content were not published until 199 1/92. Source: Pulp and Paper Manufacturers 
Federation of Australia (2001 ). 
1991/92 1999/00 % change 
Paper production 2 072 2 649 27.8 
Australian pulp 981 884 -9.9 
production less exports 
Australian exports of pulp 3 4 
Imported pulp 221 275 24.4 
Australian recycled fibre 841 1 379 64.0 
Australian wood input 3 251 2 789 -14.2 
Fillers and additives na na 
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The commissioning of the Visy Industries pulp and paper mill in Tumut, New South 
Wales, which will process 0.8 million tonnes of softwood plantation wood per annum 
(Visy Industries 2000) will reverse the downward trend in Australia's pulp production. 
In the absence of significant additional investment in plantation processing capacity 
( e.g. pulp mills, wood panels plants and new product development), however, much of 
Australia's increasing plantation wood supply will be exported unprocessed and 
industry integration will continue to deteriorate (table 5.5). 
Table 5.5 Softwood and eucalypt plantation chip and small log supply 2000-10 and domestic processing 
using plantation wood in 1999/00 - Australia. The notes present the methodology, assumptions and 
sources used in the calculations. 
Projected plantation chip and 
small log supply 
• Softwood plantation supply 
• · hardwood plantation supply 
Domestic processing of chips 
and small logs from 
plantations and native forests 
in 1999/00 
• 
• 
• 
• 
for pulp 
for wood-based panels 
for other products ( e.g. 
poles and posts) 
Commissioning ofVisy 
ul mill 
Softwood plantation sawlogs 
Million m wood per annum 
10.6 in 2000 increasing to 18.3 
in 2010 
Notes 
8.5 average over 2000-10 Applying a MAI of 16 m
3 per 
hectare per annum to 
Australia's 972 165 hectares 
of softwood plantations and 
assuming that over the 
rotation 65% of the yield is 
used for saw and veneer logs 
and sawmill residues are 30% 
of saw log volume. 
2.1 in 2000 increasing to 9.8 
in 2010 
6.8 
2.7 
2.6 
0.7 
0.8 
Duggie (2000). 
Appendix D, table D2. 
Appendix D, table D 1 
converted to round wood 
equivalent assuming a 65% 
recovery factor. 
Appendix D, table D3. 
Visy Industries (2000). 
From an integration perspective, the softwood plantation sawlog/sawn timber sector has 
performed relatively well. Annual sawn timber production nearly doubled over the 
decade ending June 2000 (table 5.2). Virtually all of the production has been sold in the 
slow-growing Australian market, displacing imports and domestically produced native 
forest sawn timber. Displacement of native forest sawn timber by Australian plantation 
sawn timber has been evident since the mid 1950s (figure 5.4). A native forest sawlog 
short-fall created by past over-logging or conservation reserves could explain the 
declining market share of native forest sawn timber. The evidence suggests that such 
supply constraints account for less of the displacement than plantation based market 
competition. Native forest sawn timber production tends to fall more deeply in a 
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housing downturn relative to plantation sawn timber (figure 5.4). The existence of 
unutilised native forest sawlog allocations lends further weight to the competitive 
displacement view ( see, for example, Board of Inquiry into the Timber Industry in 
Victoria 1985, p. 137). 
Australia's plantations could support a higher level of sawn timber production than is 
currently occurring. Increasing volumes of plantation sawlogs are being exported 
unprocessed (table 5.3) and a significant sawlog stockpile (standing sawlogs in 
plantations past their commercial clearfell harvest age) exists in many plantation 
regions (see Clark (1995b) for Australia wide estimates, Cox (2000) for Western 
Australian estimates). There is debate about whether the exported saw logs ( as classified 
by the ABS) are of sawlog quality. Australia's largest softwood plantation log exporter 
( accounting for well over half the saw log exports) sells half its log volume as saw and 
veneer logs with the other half as chip logs (Ian Sedger pers. comm. 2001 ). The 
softwood plantation sawmillers are not concerned about the exporting of low quality 
logs, but they do perceive a large and increasing leakage of good quality sawlogs 
(Geoff Bankes, pers. comm. 2001). 
Australia's softwood plantation estate has entered its mature phase, yet the area of 
radiata pine plantations (now managed over rotations of approximately 30 years) 
established before 1970 and still standing is significant (figure 4.2) . The standing 
sawlogs in these plantations are a stockpile - a warning that processing capacity or 
market demand is slipping behind supply. Australia's softwood plantation sawlog 
stockpile is the combined result of insufficient investment in processing and cautious 
public plantation management (Clark 1995b). Corporatisation and privatisation are now 
exposing these older plantations to the pressures of cash flow. In times of low domestic 
demand for sawlogs - either structurally because of insufficient processing capacity or 
cyclically because of a housing downturn - export markets for 'surplus' sawlogs are 
increasingly being sought. This raises policy issues about trading-off short-term 
financial gains for wood growers against securing increased domestic processing 
capacity for longer-term gains. Chapter 6 extends the discussion. 
There is no consensus about the production potential of Australia' s plantation sawn 
timber industry because debate about projected plantation sawlog supply remains 
unresolved ( chapter 7). A sustainable softwood plantation saw log supply of around 10 
million m3 per annum is a reasonable approximation (applying a MAI of 16 m3 per 
hectare per annum to Australia's 972 000 hectares of softwood plantations and 
assuming that over the rotation 65 per cent of the yield is used for saw and veneer logs). 
Australia produced 2.6 million m3 of softwood plantation sawn timber and plywood in 
1999/00 (appendix D) requiring an estimated 6.6 million m3 of logs. Significant 
additional investment in plantation saw and veneer log processing is required from an 
industry integration perspective. 
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Figure 5.4 Australian production, imports and consumption of sawn timber 1936 to 
2000. Exports are not charted because of their insignificance. Source: ABARE 
Australian Forest Products Statistics and earlier versions; Forestry and Timber 
Bureau (1969) & Timber Supply Review various issues. 
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Summary 
Shifting commodity wood production from native forests to plantations and achieving 
high domestic integration in plantation wood growing and processing are key strategies 
to enhance concurrently the persistence capacity of native forest ecosystems, wood 
production systems and rural socio-economic systems. The strategies can be readily 
transformed into measurable indicators to evaluate policy and assist develop policy. 
In my opinion, Australia's 1960s plantation policy would have been a move in the right 
direction if it had not entailed the clearing of native forests to establish the planting 
land base. The legacy was a significantly increased plantation supply that enables 
Australia, from a wood supply perspective, to meet its consumption of commodity 
wood products from its plantation estate alone. 
However, an evaluation of the Australian wood and wood products industry's 
performance over the 1990s identified significant unrealised opportunities to enhance 
the persistence capacity of native forests, plantation wood production and rural socio-
economies. While the wood products industry is well advanced in shifting from a native 
forest to a plantation base, native forest wood production has not declined. Instead, 
new, lower-value markets have been found for the native forest resource, namely 
woodchips for export, and opportunities for removing the threatening process of 
commodity wood production on Australia's native forest ecosystems have been lost. 
Australia's plantation industry has become significantly less integrated over the 1990s. 
Processing capacity in all sectors, particularly pulp and paper, has not kept up with 
Australia's rapidly increasing plantation wood supply. Plantation growers have become 
more exposed to the highly competitive global wood market and, with most of the 
increased plantation supply exported unprocessed, rural regions are realising 
considerably less economic wealth and employment than they otherwise could enjoy. 
Securing the benefits of Australia's plantation resource requires a policy of strategic 
choice land use decision making and high domestic industry integration. The following 
chapter investigates Australia's 1990s forest and wood industry policy from this 
perspective. 
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Chapter 6 
Australian wood and wood products industry policy 
in the 1990s 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter evaluates the Federal Government's 1990s forest and wood industry 
policy. It commences by placing Australia's wood and wood products industry policy 
in the wider context of Australia's changing approach to manufacturing industry policy. 
When tree planting under the 1960s softwood plantation program commenced 
Australia's manufacturing industry policy was well regarded. By the time these trees 
matured, approximately three decades later, protectionism had been dismantled and 
manufacturing industry policy was in limbo {Brain 1999). Disengagement also 
characterises the Federal Government's 1990s native forest policy. The Federal 
Government had to establish its constitutional legitimacy to act in the environment 
policy arena. By the mid 1990s, however, it appeared to be retreating from native forest 
environment policy. The background to, and the reasons for, the exit are examined 
here. 
The Federal Government's 1990s native forest and wood industry policy was 
manifested in two actions - the Regional Forest Agreement (RF A) process and the 2020 
Vision for plantations. The RF A was focussed primarily on native forest land use 
decision making and the 2020 Vision on a significant increase in plantation 
establishment. This means that 1990s policy represents a decision to not facilitate major 
investment in plantation processing. After describing the key elements of the RF A 
process and 2020 Vision, this chapter uses the indicators developed in chapter 5 to 
evaluate 1990s policy. The indicators are examined for correlation with 1990s native 
forest and wood industry policy, and causal relationships between the trends in the 
indicators and the RF A process and 2020 Vision are investigated. 
Queensland and Western Australia are distinguished from the rest of Australia in that 
their native forest and wood industry policies fit more within the strategic choice land 
use decision-making framework developed in chapter 5. Queensland does not have a 
signed RF A for its south east native forests. Instead, it has a plantation transition 
policy. The policy - implemented as a stakeholder agreement signed in 1999 - is too 
recent to evaluate, so the discussion presents the context for the decision and its core 
components. Western Australia is also an exception in that, shortly after signing its 
RF A with the Federal Government, it discarded major elements of the agreement and 
also pursued a partial transition to plantations. The context for, and nature of, the 
decision are discussed. 
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6.2 Manufacturing industry policy 
The 1960s softwood planting program was conceived at the pinnacle of Austra
lia's 
manufacturing protection era. Four decades later, with softwood plantation w
ood 
coming fully on stream, import protection has been substantially dismantled 
and 
manufacturing industry policy is in tatters (Brain 1999; Sheehan et al. 1994 ). 
Australia's wood and wood products industry policy was cast in this w
ider 
manufacturing industry policy vacuum in the 1990s. In the wood-based indust
ries, 
resource issues dominated the policy agenda with the direct commercial relation
ship 
between private industry and state forest agencies having clipped the involveme
nt of 
manufacturing industry departments in wood and wood products industry poli
cy. I 
argue that the timing and nature of Australia's changed approach to industry po
licy, 
discussed below, made it even more difficult for manufacturing issues to gain a he
aring 
in the wood and wood products industry policy agenda. 
Federation linked Australia's emerging national identity and fledgling manufact
uring 
industry. Customs barriers between the states were dismantled to widen the marke
t for 
Australian manufacturers, and a combination of tariffs, quotas and subsidies 
was 
introduced to reduce the risk involved in investing in Australian manufacturing. 
This 
infant industry model brought together a market strategy based on import substitu
tion, 
an investment strategy based on attracting overseas direct investment, technolo
gies 
transferred usually from the United States of America (USA), and new skills through 
training and immigration, to provide profitable investment opportunities and gen
erate 
economic growth (Brain 1999, p. 75). Protectionism reached its heyday in the mid 20
th 
century, championed at that time by John McEwan, Leader of the Country Party
 and 
Deputy Prime Minister - although, as discussed in chapter 3, McEwan also force
fully 
advocated a New Zealand-Australia Free Trade Agreement. Despite opposition 
from 
his own party, many of whom saw tariffs as benefiting cities at the expens
e of 
agriculture, McEwan argued that Australia had no future if it continued solely o
n an 
agricultural base (Whitington & Chalmers 1971, p. 184). 
The infant industry model successfully increased investment in manufacturing bu
t at a 
scale suited, at best, to the size of the Australian market. State Govern
ment 
decentralisation policies and interstate rivalry for manufacturing investment work
ed to 
fragment industries with companies establishing less than optimal-sized plan
ts in 
different states to reap the State Government assistance. This can be observed in
 the 
textiles, clothing and footwear industries and also contributed to APM's nation-
wide 
scattering of investment in plantations and processing ( chapter 3). 
Brain (1999, pp. 75-6) argued that the infant industry model crumbled under the global 
economic pressures of the 1970s. Australian manufacturers needed export market
s to 
reach optimal plant-use levels to remain competitive against imports. Further
more, 
tariff policy had become counterproductive. By protecting all products of an indust
ry, it 
discouraged Australian manufacturers from specialising in niche markets that o
ften 
require export to gain scale economies. Blanket tariff protection was adding to the
 cost 
of inputs of these industries and undermining their competitiveness. 
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Australia's central policy agencies were keen to eliminate protectionism that, over 
seventy years, had built up a network of powerful industry groups cemented into a 
closed policy community that turned industry assistance into a political art form 
(Wanna & Withers 2000, pp. 70-2). Pressure politics determined which industry sectors 
and regions received assistance and the nature of the assistance. Protectionism was 
replaced by economic rationalism55 which, up to a point, was simply a reflection of 
mainstream economic thinking and therefore easily established in the central policy 
agencies (Argy 1998, p. 233). Dismantling of industry protection's institutional 
framework commenced in the 1970s with the reform of the Tariff Board into the 
Industry Assistance Commission (now Productivity Commission) and extended to the 
establishment of the National Competition Council in 1995 - a federal statutory body 
advising all governments on the implementation of national competition policy 
reforms. 
Brain ( 1999, pp. 214-5) described Australia's economic rationalism as the child of the 
USA parent first arriving in academic form to dismantle the fortress and open Australia 
to growth through exporting. Pastoralists and the mining industry were enthusiastic 
advocates of economic rationalism because it provided an economic regime suited to 
their commercial interests as sellers of mining and agricultural commodities in global 
markets. For economies such as Australia's, where the exchange rate tracks movements 
in commodity prices (Sicklen 1998, p. 34), a freely floating exchange rate - a core 
component of economic rationalism - protects the income of established mining and 
agricultural industries against declining commodity prices. In addition, the mining and 
agricultural industries were attracted to the cost reduction implications of economic 
rationalism, including the elimination of tariff-induced costs. The mining industry 
argued that, with economic rationalist policies, it could underpin Australia's continuing 
economic prosperity. The industry at the time was riding on a surge in the prices of 
goal and coal following the 1970s oil price shock (Brain 1999). 
The alternative argument put by manufacturing industry advocates was that Australia' s 
economy would under-perform with a high reliance on agricultural and mineral 
commodity exports. As the Australian economy develops, net imports (increasingly 
favouring highly income elastic,56 high value, elaborately transformed products) 
increase whilst our exports of primary products remain constrained by relatively slow 
growth in global consumption and declining commodity prices over the long term. 
Australia's current account will remain in deficit, and Australia's freely floating 
exchange rate will be locked into long-term decline. A low exchange rate increases the 
costs and risks for new high value-adding industries that require imports of skills, 
capital, components and technology, as well as the retention of skills in Australia, the 
development of marketing funds to be spent overseas and the protection of the 
55 Economic rationalism has been variously referred to as hard economic liberalism, neo-liberalism, 
economic fundamentalism, free-market economics, economic libertarianism, dry economics and 
monetarism. Argy (1998 , p. 54) argued that it is economic liberalism taken to extreme and is more a 
social philosophy than an economic doctrine. 
56 Income elasticity of demand measures the responsiveness of demand for a good or service to changes 
in income. Income elasticity is positive if demand increases with income. 
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industry's capital base from takeover and elimination (Brain 2001). Brain argues that a 
policy favouring mining and agricultural interests is directly undermining investment in 
new, high value-added industries. A voiding this outcome requires a policy framework 
supportive of a larger manufacturing sector and, in particular, one producing 
elaborately transformed products for export (Pappas Carter Evans & Koop/Telesis 
1989; Sheehan et al. 1994; Sheehan 1998; Gehler 1998; Sicklen 1998; Brain 1999). 
Australia's manufacturing industry policy currently remains in limbo although a stream 
of national reports on industry policy since 1997 has maintained the policy debate 
(Sheehan 1998, p. 236). Brain forcefully argued that: 
'The process of de-industrialisation will continue until the government 
develops enough political courage to face up to the dilemma embedded in 
current economic policy, and initiates the necessary battles which, for the 
national interest to be protected, have to be won.' (Brain 1999, p. 221). 
This means establishing priorities for industry policy where the interests of status quo 
raw material exporters do not come at the expense of new industries seeking to move 
up the value adding chain to elaborately transformed products for export. 
Australia's wood and wood products industry policy in the 1990s favoured the growing 
arm of the industry at the expense of manufacturing - replicating Australia's industry 
policy generally. From the perspective of the grower/processor integration argument 
presented in chapter 5, it was unfortunate that Australia's industry policy agenda 
appears to have been captured by the short-term, narrowly perceived interests of the 
agriculture and mining industries as increasing volumes of plantation wood were 
coming on stream for processing in the 1990s. 
6.3 Federal Government native forest environment policy 
Introduction 
During the 1970s and 1980s, the Federal Government established its constitutional 
legitimacy over land use and management issues. However, its actions to protect high 
conservation and heritage value areas from economic development disenfranchised the 
mining and native forest industries, and, by the late 1980s, the Federal Government was 
manoeuvering to address the political ramifications (F enna & Economou 1998, pp. 
345-9). The result was diminished Federal Government engagement in native forest 
environment policy in the 1990s. This section aims to reconstruct the events generating 
this outcome. 
Building Federal Government environmental legislation 
The Australian constitution did not grant the Parliament of Australia powers to make 
laws with respect to the environment. If the Federal Government wanted to respond to 
rising public expression of environmental values, it needed to establish its legitimacy to 
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act using other constitutional powers, namely its responsibility for trade and commerce 
with other countries and external affairs. This required testing of the legislative powers 
of the two levels of government. Stimulated by the Lake Pedder dispute, 57 the Whitlam 
Labor Government commenced the testing process in the early 1970s by establishing an 
inquiry into the National Estate. The Government acted on the inquiry' s key 
recommendation and, used its external affairs power to ensure Australia became a 
signatory to the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation 
(UNESCO). The Australian Heritage Commission Act 197 5 established the Australian 
Heritage Commission (AHC) as the statutory authority responsible for identifying and 
registering national heritage sites. It requires the responsible Minister to avoid any 
action that adversely affects the National Estate unless satisfied there is no feasible and 
prudent alternative and all reasonable measures to minimise adverse effects are 
undertaken. The legislation was later used as one of the three environmental obligations 
imposed on the Minister for Primary Industries and Energy in considering the issuing 
of licences to export woodchips. 
Federal Cabinet decided in 1968 to use its external affairs power under the Constitution 
to regulate, through the issuing of licences, the export of native forest woodchips. 
National economic interests motivated the policy with the Government concerned by 
the potential loss of domestic pulp and paper opportunities and under-pricing of wood 
(Fairbairn 1968). The states generally welcomed the Federal Government ' s regulatory 
involvement and did not challenge the Australian Parliament's constitutional power to 
veto state located resource projects by licencing exports under its external affairs 
power. Confirmation of the Australian Parliament's power came in the mid 1970s with 
a dispute over issuing export licences for sand mining. The High Court ruled as valid 
the Fraser Liberal Government's refusal to issue an export licence, thereby blocking the 
Murphyores Fraser Island sand mining proposal (Fenna & Economou 1998, pp. 345-6). 
The World Heritage Properties Conservation Act (1983) provided the legislative 
backing for the Federal Government's obligations under the World Heritage 
Convention to identify and protect its natural and cultural heritage. The legislation 
challenged State Government authority over land use and land management and was 
used by the Hawke Labor Government in the year it was enacted to prevent the Gordon 
below Franklin River dam. The legislation was tested in the High Court, which ruled 
that it was a valid use of the Australian Parliament's external affairs powers (Hawke 
1989; Fenna & Economou 1998, pp. 345-7). 
Earlier legislation, namely The Environment Protection (Impact of Proposals) Act 
197 4, applied to actions by the Federal Government that might significantly affect the 
environment. It enabled the Minister for the Environment to request the preparation of 
an environmental impact statement, initiate a public inquiry or provide advice and 
recommendations to the relevant Minister on the environmental aspects of proposed 
actions. The Act was used to make approval of the Wesley Vale, Tasmania, native 
57 The Lake Pedder dispute was triggered by the Tasmanian Hydro-Electricity Commission' s proposal in 
1967 to construct a power scheme on the Gordon River that would flood Lake Pedder. The unsuccessful 
campaign to prevent Lake Pedder's inundation resulted in a more forceful environment movement with 
less patience for government consultation (Hutton & Connors 1999, pp. 118-24). 
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forest pulpmill proposal (for background see Hutton & Conners 1999, pp. 204-7 and 
Penna & Economou 1998, pp. 348-9) conditional on satisfactory completion of further 
environmental studies and agreement on appropriate operating guidelines (Hawke 
1989). 
The Federal Government continued through to the early 1990s to build on this 
legislative framework to protect environmental values. The Endangered Species 
Protection Act 1992 aimed to protect nationally endangered or vulnerable species and 
ecological communities and prevent other species from becoming endangered. The Act 
enables a scientifically based listing process of species, communities and threatening 
processes; the use of recovery and threat abatement plans; and prevents actions by 
Federal Government agencies that contravene an approved plan. The Environment 
Protection (Impact of Proposals) Act 1974 was amended to include in the definition of 
'environmentally significant' any project that could threaten with extinction a species 
or community listed under the Endangered Species Protection Act 199 2. These two 
pieces of legislation, together with the National Heritage Commission Act 1975, 
became the triumvirate imposed on the Minister for Primary Industries and Energy in 
considering the issuing of licences to export native forest woodchips. The dismantling 
of this legislative framework dominated Australia's native forest policy agenda in the 
second half of the 1990s. 
Federal ALP woos the environment vote 
With demonstrated power to affect land use and land management in the states, Graham 
Richardson, Labor's Federal Minister for the Environment, adopted an active 
environmental protection agenda in the late 1980s. Richardson was the party's key 
numbers man, a member of the right and close to Prime Minister Hawke (Richardson 
[G] 1994). He identified the importance of a strong environment policy to maximise 
preference flows from the minor parties in the forthcoming federal election. 
Richardson's interventions were environmentally bold, highly publicised and 
challenging, particularly to his right wing ALP colleagues. Environment protection 
initiatives, dominated by native forests, crossed the nation. The East Gippsland native 
forest conflict was temporarily halted in 1990 by a moratorium on logging national 
estate forests; the process commenced to list Tasmania's Southern and Lemonthyme 
forests as World Heritage; Queensland's Daintree forest was listed as World Heritage 
( a visit in 1987 to Ravenshoe, Queensland saw Richardson swamped by angry native 
forest timber workers and secured widespread media coverage); proposals for uranium 
mining neighbouring the Kakadu National Park Conservation Zone were delayed; and 
proposals for a native forest based pulpmill at Wesley Vale, Tasmania, were frustrated. 
Labor won the 1990 federal election and Richardson's strategy appeared to be justified 
(Economou 2000, pp. 286-9). 
Richardson's highly confrontational, and therefore high-risk, political strategy ran 
counter to Prime Minister Hawke's consensus style and the interests of 'pro-
development' Ministers. As Richardson engaged directly with the public securing the 
green preference flows, the Federal Government developed an alternative approach to 
environment policy and a shift in the mix of issues on the environment agenda. New 
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processes and institutional arrangements were introduced that enabled unions, industry 
and environment interests to participate formally in policy development (Economou 
2000). 
The Resource Assessment Commission and ecologically sustainable 
development 
The Resource Assessment Commission (RAC) was established in 1989 with a broad 
mandate to investigate both the environmental and economic dimensions of resource 
industries referred to it by the Federal Government (Hawke 1989). The Government's 
first reference to the Commission was to investigate options for Australia's native 
forests and wood-based industries. The Government, by creating a barrier between 
itself, the public and interested players, had reduced the pressure for ad hoc policy 
making. Justice Stewart, the Chair of the RAC, spoke of natural resource based 
conflicts as characterised by: 
' .. . incomplete communication between the parties, by lack of agreement 
over basic facts, over-simplification of the . issues, irrational argument and 
distortion of information on both sides, and have sometimes resulted in 
unnecessary violent confrontation.' (Stewart 1989, p. 4). 
By directing the forest issue into the well resourced and multi-disciplinary RAC, the 
Hawke Government hoped for fresh advice on the then unsolvable forest conflict. The 
RAC reported on forests and the wood based industries in 1992. The Keating Labor 
Government wound up the Commission in 1993 with pro-development Ministers 
angered by its recommendation that mining be disallowed at Coronation Hill because of 
its violation of Aboriginal spiritual values (Economou 2000, p. 293). 
The RAC was the research and policy arm of the Hawke Labor Government's wider 
ecologically sustainable development (ESD) framework for addressing the tensions 
between ecological and economic development. The task of developing a national ESD 
strategy commenced in 1989 with the Government writing to industry, union and 
environment movement representatives proposing the establishment of a forum to 
discuss environment/development concerns (Hawke 1989, p. 13). The summit led to the 
establishment in 1990 of ESD working groups, including a forest working group - the 
only working group that the environment movement refused to participate in. The 
Government was seeking strategies from the working groups for the sustainable 
development of Australia's major industry sectors with measures to encourage the 
integration of environmental considerations into decision making (Hawke 1990). The 
establishment of an ESD Sub-committee of Cabinet chaired by the Prime Minister 
indicates the priority the Hawke Labor Government put on ESD and the process. 
Accompanying these new institutional arrangements and processes, was a strategic 
change in the environment agenda with tree planting and land care forming high 
environmental priorities. The ACF under the leadership of Philip Toyne, who enjoyed a 
close working relationship with Hawke and Richardson (Richardson [G] 1994, p. 214), 
played an important agenda-setting role. Through its reports, The Wood and the Trees 
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and Recovering Ground, the ACF had signalled its interest in additional plantation 
establishment and agricultural land regeneration. These issues generated less conflict 
between developers and environmentalists (Economou 2000, p. 288) than native forests 
and wilderness, which appeared to be intractable and therefore politically undesirable. 
The Government's new approach - embracing new processes, new institutions and new 
agendas - was announced in Prime Minister Hawke's July 1989 statement on the 
environment, Our Country our Future (Hawke 1989). It signalled a new era of dialogue 
between government and interested players, increasingly referred to as stakeholders, 
and a diminution in policy driven by the public interest. 
Native forest conflict remains intractable 
The Hawke Government's strategy of referring the forest issue to the RAC for 
investigation, establishing an ESD Forest Working Group and broadening the 
environment agenda failed to diffuse the conflict. Conflict was reignited when Hawke 
introduced the Forest Conservation and Development Bill 1991 to provide resource 
security with compensation for loss of native forest land or wood. Environment 
interests have consistently and vigorously opposed native forest resource security. 
Hawke's surprising move was rationalised by Economou (2000, p. 293) as the Prime 
Minister taking on the development agenda in response to Treasurer Keating's push for 
him to implement an agreed mid-term leadership change. 
Keating, who became Prime Minister on 20 December 1991, extended and formalised 
an approach of intergovernmental cooperation. By negotiating agreements with State 
Governments, the Federal Government hoped it would become less vulnerable on 
difficult environment issues. The Australian Heritage Commission (AHC) and Western 
Australia's Department of Conservation and Land Management (CALM) had 
previously investigated and reached agreement over the state's national estate forests. 
Their model was formalised in the 1992 Intergovernmental Agreement on the 
Environment. The objective was to reduce uncertainty about land use decisions by 
adopting a co-operative decision-making approach that took into account the interests 
of both levels of government (Commonwealth Interdepartmental Committee on 
Regional Forest Agreements 1994, p. 1). 
In December 1992, the Government released the National Forest Policy Statement 
(Commonwealth of Australia 1992) developed within the framework of the 
Intergovernmental Agreement on the Environment. The Statement was endorsed by the 
Federal and all State and Territory Governments except Tasmania. Tasmania resolved 
to manage its forests as set out in the Tasmanian Forests and Forest Industry Strategy, 
thereby avoiding the Statement's moratorium clause on logging old-growth forests and 
wilderness. The Tasmanian Government eventually signed the agreement in 1995. 
The National Forest Policy Statement was primarily about establishing processes for 
regional land use allocation enabling the Federal and State Governments to reach a 
single agreement on their obligations for native forests in each region (Commonwealth 
of Australia 1992, p. 24). With the pressure of unfolding events, the Federal 
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Government's policy was clarified to mean that regions with an agreement (RF A) 
would be freed from the environmental legislation built up by the Federal Government 
over the previous three decades and, in particular, the regulations requiring a licence to 
export native forest woodchips. 
In July 1994, forest activists met in Canberra and decided to promote the native forest 
issue in the public arena and pressure the Keating Government to implement the 
National Forest Policy Statement. This required state forest agencies to avoid activities 
that could significantly affect those areas of old-growth forests or wilderness that were 
likely to have high conservation value. In September, a forest embassy was set up on 
the lawns of Parliament House coinciding with a national day of action with rallies and 
native forest blockades around Australia (Hutton & Conners 1999, p. 255). The 
activities were a preliminary to the end-of-year Federal Government consideration of 
licences to companies to export woodchips during the following year. 
Ros Kelly's resignation as Minister for the Environment saw John Faulkner, from the 
socialist left, appointed to the position in March 1994. 58 Faulkner decided to implement 
the National Forest Policy Statement's moratorium clause on old-growth and 
wilderness fores ts and provided financial assistance to the environment movement to 
identify forest areas they considered of high conservation value. The Department for 
the Environment's subsequent evaluation of the nominated areas identified 1 311 forest 
areas of high conservation value to be excluded under the moratorium clause of the 
National Forest Policy Statement (Hutton & Conners 1999, p. 256). Faulkner presented 
these areas as ones that should be excluded as sources of export woodchip supply for 
the forthcoming 1995 licence period to the Resources Minister, David Beddall. 
Faulkner's request was largely dismissed and, on 19 December 1994, export licences 
were issued for most of the areas. All previous licences were renewed and three new 
licences issued. The public responded negatively to the decision; a December 1994 
Newspoll showed that 80.3 per cent of Australians supported an end to native forest 
woodchipping (N ewspoll results released by conservation groups in Parlane et al. 
1994). On 22 December, Prime Minister Keating announced the phase-out by the year 
2000 of native forest woodchip exports not covered by a RF A or where significant 
progress towards one had not been made (Commonwealth of Australia 1995a, p. 6). 
Some interpreted the statement as a blanket phase-out (Hutton & Conners 1999, p. 
256). 
The native forest industry was in cns1s with the Prime Minister threatening its 
lifeblood, namely the large and highly profitable export woodchip industry ( chapter 5 
and discussed below). Even if the Government reneged on the woodchip phase-out, the 
industry remained vulnerable as long as the annual export licence renewal process 
remained. Another perceived threat also faced the native forest industry. In late 1994, 
Faulkner approved funding to the State Conservation Councils to investigate the 
plantation processing industry' s production and employment growth potential. The 
58 Ros Kelly became Minister in April 1990, taking over from Graham Richardson, who returned as 
Minister for the Environment in a caretaker capacity for approximately three weeks until Faulkner 's 
appointment. 
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Australian Council of Trade Unions (ACTU) and the Construction, Forestry, Mining 
and Energy Union (CFMEU) were unhappy about the funding decision but were 
unsuccessful in preventing it ( chapter 7). They were concerned that the study would 
argue that Australia's wood and wood products industry should shift out of native 
forests and into plantations (Richardson B. 1994, p. 3). This and other reactions to the 
study are investigated in chapter 7. The threat of further restrictions on the native forest 
industry was clear by the end of 1994. 
Just as the National Forest Policy Statement contained an initiative favourable to the 
environmental movement, it also contained the beginnings of a way through the crisis 
for the native forest industry and unions. The Statement indicated that regional forest 
assessments provided the basis for the Federal and State Governments to reach a single 
agreement relating to their obligations for forests in a region (Commonwealth of 
Australia 1992, p. 24). This phrase was sufficiently general to include the abolition of 
the export woodchip regulations, thereby significantly reducing the industry's 
vulnerability to public opposition. The National Forest Policy Statement required the 
states to first invite the Federal Government to participate in a comprehensive regional 
assessment. The Regional Forest Agreement (RFA) process had languished for two 
years and initiating it was now a priority. 
Abolishing the export woodchip regulations required the Keating Labor Government to 
provide more incentives for the states to participate in the RF A process and to clarify 
that a 'single agreement relating to their obligations for forests in a region' included 
the removal of the export woodchip regulations. The catalyst was the log truck 
blockade of Parliament House, Canberra, in January 1995. 59 The blockade, organised 
by the Forest Protection Society (FPS)60 and the CFMEU, unsettled Prime Minister 
Keating (Economou 2000, p. 294), and his meeting with the demonstrators and the 
damage to Parliament House guaranteed high media coverage. Collins, the Minister for 
Primary Industries, was handed the task of solving the problem, and the Department of 
the Prime Minister and Cabinet took responsibility for forest policy and overseeing the 
RF A process. In the immediate term the Keating Government provided interim 
protection for 509 (later reduced to 452) of Faulkner's I 311 proposed high 
conservation areas (Hutton & Conners 1999, p. 256). 
Over the year, the Federal Government developed incentives to engage the states and 
processes for identifying native forest areas for long-term conservation. Areas outside 
conservation reserves were to be managed under ecologically sustainable forest 
management (ESFM) principles. A wood and paper industry strategy was developed, as 
was a new policy on woodchip export licences. Prime Minister Keating announced the 
package in The Future of Our Forests statement on 30 November 1995. Keating' s 
assessment was that there was no politically palatable solution to the native forest 
59 I thank Linda Par lane, then Director Environment Victoria, for her view that the blockade was a 
defining moment for Australia's native forest environment policy. 
60 The FPS was formed in Victoria in 1987 as a grassroots organisation involving people in the wood and 
wood products industry threatened by the loss of native forests to conservation uses. It was closely 
associated with the National Association of Forest Industries (NAFI) (Dargavel 1995, p. 192). 
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conflict and that the problem should be passed back to the states. He expressed this not 
as a Federal Government failure, but a failure of the environment movement: 
'The [public's] recourse to the Commonwealth Government [to take more 
responsibility for Australia's native forests] underlies the failure of interest 
groups to secure the appropriate undertakings from those who do manage 
forests in Australia and that, of course, is the State governments.' (Keating 
1995). 
The Federal Government's strategy was to use the RFA process to become free of its 
self-generated legislative commitments and hopefully to redirect public pressure for 
native forest protection onto the states. The woodchip export regulations were used to 
'encourage' state participation. A ceiling was placed on native forest woodchip exports 
preventing an increase in the volume exported without a signed RF A. The licenced 
export volume would be reduced by 20 per cent per annum unless there was significant 
progress towards an RF A and would cease in regions without an RF A by the end of 
December 2000 (Forest Taskforce 1995a). The Federal Government remained silent on 
the politically sensitive issue of removing the export regulations on native forest 
woodchips when a RFA was in place. 61 
The RF A policy signaled the Federal Government's intention to extract itself as much 
as possible from the native forest policy arena - a conclusion also made by Dargavel et 
al. (2000) and Hutton & Conners (1999, p. 257). Prime Minister Keating in his 
parliamentary statement couched the exit strategy positively: 
'Mr Speaker, no Australian government has ever made such a conscientious 
attempt to resolve this huge and vexed issue. Most governments would run a 
million miles from it.' (Keating 1995). 
The RF A process, continued under the Howard Liberal Coalition Government when it 
won office in March 1996,62 is estimated to have cost the Australian public $0.5 billion 
(Mobbs 2000). An evaluation of the public benefit from this expenditure is yet to be 
undertaken. The Federal Government's use of the RFA as the means for exiting the 
native forest environment policy arena meant that other policy approaches, such as that 
proposed in chapter 5, had little chance of being put on the agenda. Alternative uses for 
the $0.5 billion expenditure that arguably could deliver superior outcomes for industry, 
rural communities and the environment also had little chance of being considered. 
61 A Commonwealth Position paper dated February 1995 interpreted the National Forest Policy 
Statement to mean that, where a Regional Forest Agreement (RF A) was in operation, the Federal 
Government would consider extending export approvals for unprocessed wood ( chips and logs) beyond 
the current annual renewal cycle (Commonwealth of Australia 1995a, p . 7). 
62 Relations between the environment movement and the Federal Labor Government deteriorated with 
the Government' s desire to avoid any conservation action that might trigger another union backlash prior 
to the election. The Wilderness Society chose to support the Liberal Party in the March 1996 federal 
election, arguing that the environment movement's power was diminished if it continued to rubber stamp 
the ALP when little separated the two main parties on environment policy (V. Young pers. comm. 2001). 
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· On 8 October 1996 the Liberal National Party Coalition Government began the formal 
process to abolish the export controls on native forest woodchip exports by presenting 
to the House of Representatives the Export Control (Hardwood Wood Chips) (1996) 
Regulations and the Export Control (Unprocessed Wood) Regulations (Amendment) 
contained in Statutory Rules 1996 No's 206 and 207. Senator Brown's (Australian 
Greens Party) move to disallow the changes was voted down by both major parties. 
6.4 Multiple use policy framework 
Fenna & Economou (1998, pp. 338-47) argue that the Federal Government's attempts 
to reconcile contentious environmental issues (like native forests) by establishing 
mechanisms ( such as the RAC and the ESD process) to remove them from the 
immediate political sphere and subject them to neutral scientific analysis has been a 
failure. This view is based on an understanding that the objectives of wood production 
and native forest ecological integrity are competing and probably irreconcilable, and 
therefore native forest land use allocation requires a political rather than technical 
process. 
An examination of the major forest reports to the Federal Government during the 1990s 
found an unquestioning acceptance of the multiple use (later ESD) framework for 
native forests and a lack of attention to intensification technologies that threaten native 
forest ecological integrity (table 6.1 ). For the reasons argued in chapter 5, this meant 
that the advice the Federal Government received from its public service on native 
forests and the wood-based industries during the 1990s, if adopted, would continue to 
lock it into conflict. The failure identified by Fenna & Economou (1998) may be in the 
capacity of the public service to critically analyse and present policy options to 
government. 
The approach, findings and recommendations on multiple use and intensification 
technologies presented in each of the 1990s reports to the Federal Government is 
examined below and summarised in table 6.1. For completeness, the major policy 
documents generated by the Federal Government (e.g. the National Forest Policy 
Statement and the Wood and Paper Industry Strategy) are included in the discussion 
and table 6.1. The discussion below uses the common title to the documents and their 
reference is presented in table 6.1. 
ESD Forest Use Working Group Report - 1991 
The Working Group used an ESD framework viewing ecologically sustainable forest63 
use as the maintenance of ecological processes and biodiversity within forests , with the 
benefits to the community from forest use optimised within these ecological constraints 
(Ecologically Sustainable Development Forest Use Working Group 1991, p. 35, box 
63 The Working Group did not separate forests into their native forest and plantation components, but it is 
probably correct to assume that in most cases their use of the word ' forest' means 'native forest ' . 
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4.1 ). Other parts of the report contradict this view. In discussing the management of 
conflict, the Working Group states: 
'The maximisation of community benefits from forests necessarily involves 
an assessment of the competing values of a range of forest uses, and the 
allocation of property rights to the highest value mix of uses. That may 
mean to conservation for biodiversity in some cases, and in other cases, to 
multiple use, including integrated wood production operations producing 
sawlogs and woodchips.' (Ecologically Sustainable Development Forest 
Use Working Group 1991, p. 33). 
The Working Group saw multiple use as a valid management approach, finding support 
in the extensive areas used for wood production over undefined 'long periods' that have 
retained their high conservation value, water quality and recreation values 
(Ecologically Sustainable Development Forest Use Working Group 1991 , p. 43). As to 
whether the ecological integrity of native forests is threatened by intensification 
technologies, divergent messages are provided in the body of the report, its executive 
summary and its funding recommendations. The body of the report recognises the 
reality of intensification and argued a precautionary approach: 
'The effects of intensive management of native forests, through thinning, 
improved genetic stocking, and fertiliser application, on the ecological 
processes are not fully understood, although there are likely to be changes 
in the energy and nutrient flows. The extent to which intensive management 
affects forest processes and productivity is open to conjecture, and should 
be studied further before intensive management in native forests is 
undertaken on a broad scale. 
The use of chemical fertilisers, pesticides and weedicides in forest 
management has the potential to affect soil microbiology and water quality. 
Due care is needed to ensure that adverse effects are avoided. It is still 
unknown what the long-term effects on ecological processes in forests may 
be from regular and frequent application of chemical fertilisers, weedicides 
and pesticides. In such circumstances, a cautious approach to their 
application is appropriate.' (Ecologically Sustainable Development Forest 
Use Working Group 1991, p. 59). 
Further cautionary remarks are made in the body of the report: 
'A potential risk to the biodiversity of native forests, albeit difficult to gauge, 
may arise from intense management ... ' and 'In line with the principle of 
dealing cautiously with risk and irreversibility, such intensive management 
approaches need to be thoroughly tested and monitored before being widely 
adopted.' (Ecologically Sustainable Development Forest Use Working 
Group 1991, p. 89). 
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The scientific work required to ascertain the ecological risk of intensification was not 
included in the 41 recommendations ( costing $54.5 million in Federal Government 
funding) made by the Working Group (Ecologically Sustainable Development Forest 
Use Working Group 1991, pp. 199-206). 
In its executive summary, the Working Group contradicts the main report on the issue 
of intensification. It makes no reference to the need for intensive management systems 
to be 'thoroughly tested and monitored before being widely adopted,' rather it 
considers that: 
'Plantations and intensively managed regrowth forests hold prospects for 
greatly improved productivity in comparison with the more extensive 
harvesting operations in native forests. However, they will be substantially 
different in structure and floristics from natural forest, and will not provide 
the same levels of biological diversity and fauna habitat as is the case in 
natural forests.' (Ecologically Sustainable Development Forest Use 
Working Group 1991, p. xxxiii). 
The Working Group's executive summary viewed logged native forests as a resource 
that could be managed as an agricultural regime. 
The Working Group saw the native forest issue as forcing a polarisation of views on 
conservation and development, which inevitably resulted in conflict because, they 
argued, positions on these issues are ultimately based on personal values and 
judgements (Ecologically Sustainable Development Forest Use Working Group 1991, 
p. 171). The Working Group's accounts of ESD, multiple use and intensification 
technologies meant that it could not present a coherent policy framework to 
government. Although it claimed that the ESD approach would resolve much of the 
conflict over competing forest uses (Ecologically Sustainable Development Forest Use 
Working Group 1991, p. 37), none of the initiatives presented by the Working Group to 
minimise the conflict (Ecologically Sustainable Development Forest Use Working 
Group 1991, p. 172) dealt with the heart of the problem - the multiple use framework 
and intensification pressures on native forests. 
National Plantations Advisory Committee Report - 1991 
The National Plantations Advisory Committee was established in December 1990 by 
the Federal Minister for Resources, Alan Griffiths, in consultation with the Minister for 
the Environment, Ros Kelly, to consider the prospects for commercial wood production 
on cleared agricultural land. The Government viewed plantations as providing another 
source of wood for the industry, thereby reducing its reliance on native forests whilst 
also addressing the problem of degraded agricultural land (National Plantations 
Advisory Committee 1991, p. 1 ). Investigating the prospects for using the significant 
existing plantation resource ( chapter 5) was not in the Committee's brief. 
Competition between plantation and native forest wood means that the tendency to 
intensify native forest management to increase wood yields should have been of direct 
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interest to the Committee. However, it was silent on this issue in its recommendations 
concerning financial disincentives and incentives and other impediments to plantation 
establishment and the need for environmental protection (National Plantations 
Advisory Committee 1991, pp. ix-xiv). 
Resource Assessment Commission Forest and Timber Inquiry - 1992 
The RAC argued that ecologically sustainable forest use requires the maintenance of 
basic ecological processes and biological diversity of forested systems (Resource 
Assessment Commission 1992a, p. 105). Their literature surveys identified five key 
claims about the effects of wood production on native forest ecosystems, and these 
were exposed to examination. These claims were that: 
• logging does/does not increase the risk of species extinction and does/does not 
decrease forest biodiversity, 
• clear-felling is/is not equivalent to the natural fire regime and therefore is/is not an 
acceptable disturbance regime, 
• converting old-growth forest to regrowth forest will/will not favour a net decrease 
in atmospheric carbon dioxide, 
• current practices designed to reduce the impacts of wood production activities are 
adequate/inadequate, and 
• the use of fuel reduction burning is/is not a significant threat to the environmental 
value of forests (Resource Assessment Commission 1992a, p. 161 ). 
The trend to intensification of native forest management for wood production was not 
included. Intensification issues could be partially examined through the concern listed 
as 'Current practices designed to reduce the impacts of wood-production activities are 
adequate/inadequate.' On this, however, the RAC undertook a temporally static 
analysis focussing mainly on logging impacts. The trend to intensification technologies 
(i.e. managing forests for wood production) was not examined (Resource Assessment 
Commission 1992a, pp. 161-70). 
The RAC concluded that there was insufficient factual information to support general 
claims about whether impacts of wood production are benign or deleterious to 
environmental values in Australia (Resource Assessment Commission 1992a, p. 177). 
It argued, on the grounds of inter-generational equity, against applying the 
precautionary principle to cease logging of native forests until the impacts were 
determined. 64 It nevertheless strongly emphasised the importance of the precautionary 
principle and adaptive management, noting that: 
'This is particularly important given the current trends towards 
increases in the intensity of harvesting and silviculture. ' (Resource 
Assessment Commission 1992a, p. 178). 
64 Presumably the RAC considered that there was little processing growth potential using Australia 's 
existing plantation resource. The RAC 's plantation resource projections supporting this view are 
examined in chapter 7. 
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However, the RAC excluded intensification technologies in native forests from its list 
of key concerns for critical examination. 
It could be argued that the RAC did investigate the environmental effects of 
intensification technologies in its scenario analysis using the Integrated Forest Model 
(INFORM). 65 The high industry investment scenario dedicated a proportion of public 
native forest to intensive management for wood production (Resource Assessment 
Commission 1992a, p. 378). Intensification was defined using the CSIRO's young 
eucalypt program (Kerruish & Rawlins 1991), which researched changes in wood yield 
using different native forest thinning regimes. 66 This approach provides an inadequate 
assessment of the environmental effects of intensification because of its limited 
interpretation of intensification technologies, crude modeling of the environmental 
effects and poorly specified environmental indicators. The RAC acknowledged the 
limitations (Resource Assessment Commission 1992a, S 15 and S33). 
The RAC were aware of the commercial benefits of intensification technologies. It 
observed that, if, after a native forest area is logged, standing trees of lesser commercial 
value are removed and the area subsequently thinned, the forest may come to resemble 
a plantation with relatively high growth rates. Fertilisers could generate an additional 
substantial growth response as occurs in eucalypt plantations (Resource Assessment 
Commission 1992a, Appendix N, p. 18). The RAC also understood that financial 
pressures on public native forest agencies could lead to them adopting intensification 
practices: 
' ... the Inquiry has concluded that there will be strong pressures, arzszng 
from the economics of forestry operations, for agencies to adopt more 
intensive management practices, involving predominantly pulplog 
production on short rotation pulplog-sawlog regimes in public forest areas.' 
(Resource Assessment Commission 1992a, p. 20). 
The RAC supported the ecologically sustainable native forest management approach 
but failed to identify, and therefore research, intensification as a threat to native forest 
ecosystem health. Such an omission makes it difficult to present a policy framework to 
government that addresses a major component of the native forest conflict. 
65 INFORM was developed principally to assess log yields under different forest management regimes 
and the effects on downstream processing. The model's evaluation of the environmental effects of 
different scenarios was limited to stating the percentage of different forest types in conservation reserve 
tenure, percentage of forests unavailable for logging, area of old growth forest remaining, a regrowth 
indicator showing the standard deviation in the distribution of age and size classes of all forest groups in 
each land tenure and relative changes in soil and water quality (Resource Assessment Commission 
1992a, p. 399 and Appendix S, p. 15). 
66 The program researched the potential to enhance native forest wood yields through thinning. The 
researchers considered that adding treatments such as pest control and fertilising could significantly 
increase the potential for wood production from some regrowth forests , but supporting data are limited 
(Kerruish & Rawlins 1991, p. 9) and these intensification practices were excluded from the study. 
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National Forest Policy Statement - 1992 
In this Statement the Federal and State Governments shared a vision of ecologically 
sustainable management of Australia's 'forests'. 67 They adopted the ESD Forest Use 
Working Group's definition of sustainable forest use (see above). To implement this 
vision, the Governments agreed that the AFC' s set of national principles for native 
forest management for wood production (reproduced in Commonwealth of Australia 
1992, Attachment A) should be applied to all public and private native forests in 
Australia. The principles provide a reasonable introductory statement. Their general 
and limited nature, however, means that implementation runs the risk of ignoring the 
need to maintain natural processes that sustain native forest ecosystems, particularly the 
competitive and correlated behaviours of species, and water and carbon functions (B. 
Mackey pers. comm. 2001). 
The AFC's principles allow for the intensification of native forest management. 
Designated native forests can be reforested with selected species, provenances or 
populations to increase the productivity or value of the forest. Intensive management 
practices, such as site preparation, fertilising, weed control, pest and disease control, 
and other operations can be carried out but must be consistent with the specified 
principles of environmental care (Commonwealth of Australia 1992, pp. 43-6). It is 
difficult to comprehend how these intensification practices do not violate the AFC's 
first principle of environmental care, namely to maintain the floristic and faunal 
diversity of public native forests including their successional stages. Although the 
National Forest Policy Statement is set in an ESD framework where ecological 
processes and biodiversity within forests are ecological constraints and other 'uses' are 
optimised within this constraint, the operating guidelines for wood production allow 
practices that are potential threats to ESD. 
Industry Commission Report on Adding Further Value to Australia's Forest 
Products - 1993 
The Industry Commission recognised the attraction of a plantation resource for cost 
competitiveness in commodity production and also that plantations should reduce the 
wood supply pressure on native forests (Industry Commission 1993, pp. 12, 74, 131). 
Its terms of reference required it to investigate the industry's potential within the 
principles of ESD. This meant that the Commission's recommendations to improve 
efficiency in wood production, most notably through corporatising public (native) 
forest agencies, did not trigger a discussion on the implications for native forest 
ecological integrity. The Commission did not ask the question: what is the need for 
native forest agencies when, as the Commission indicated, plantations are a superior 
resource option for a commodity industry? The same contradiction was made in the 
Commission's first recommendation, namely to improve native forest resource security 
by accelerating the process identified in the National Forest Policy Statement. 
67 The document (including the glossary) does not define 'forest' but it does define 'native forest' and 
'plantation'. In most cases the two resources are referred to separately. 
139 
Wood and Paper Industry Strategy - 1995 
This strategy formed the industry policy component of the new arrangements 
announced by Prime Minister Keating in November 1995. The Strategy aimed to 
increase the level of domestic wood processing with a particular emphasis on pulp and 
paper given the size of the trade deficit for these products. The strategy encouraged 
processing both plantation and native forest wood. 
The National Forest Policy Statement's ESD framework and definitions provided the 
umbrella for the strategy. It noted that the Australian public expects that where logging 
of native forests is permitted (i.e. has a signed RF A in place) it will be ecologically 
sustainable. The Strategy reported that the RF A process would clarify the native forest 
(mostly regrowth) wood availability, and its use would maximise financial returns from 
native forests (Commonwealth of Australia 1995c, p. 18). There was no discussion on 
how conflicts between ESD principles for native forests and maximisation of financial 
returns would be reconciled. An earlier draft of the Strategy allowed for the application 
of intensive management practices to increase wood production in regrowth forests 
(Commonwealth of Australia 1995b, p. 8) but this initiative was removed in the final 
document. The Strategy did recognise that plantations would reduce the dependence on 
native forest resources but did not elaborate on when and to what extent. 
The 2020 Plantation Vision - 1997 
In 1996, the Ministerial Council on Forestry (previously the AFC), Fisheries and 
Aquaculture endorsed an industry-developed target of trebling Australia's plantation 
estate by the year 2020 and asked its standing committee to report on how this might be 
achieved (Ministerial Council on Forestry, Fisheries and Aquaculture et al. 1997, p. 1). 
The Centre for International Economics (CIE) was commissioned to prepare a plan to 
achieve the vision (Centre for International Economics 1997). The Minister for Primary 
Industries and Energy launched this reference document, together with a framework for 
action as government policy, in October 1997 (Anderson 1997). The policy's resource 
implications were briefly discussed in chapter 3. 
The 2020 Vision and the CIE identified the need to strengthen the commercial 
incentive to invest in plantations by making them more profitable and less risky. 
Neither the 2020 Vision nor the CIE identified the competing native forest resource as 
undermining plantation profitability. By defining the industry exclusively to the 
plantation sector (Ministerial Council on Forestry, Fisheries and Aquaculture et al. 
1997, p. 1), the 2020 Vision virtually ignored the native forest industry. None of the 28 
actions and 11 goals listed in the 2020 Vision refers to competition from native forests 
including the supply implications of native forest intensification. 
Action 27 encouraged native forest commodity wood production by recommending the 
removal of quotas on exports of woodchips from private native forests (Ministerial 
Council on Forestry, Fisheries and Aquaculture et al. 1997, p. 23). This was to enable a 
major expansion of the Tasmanian plantation estate using 'badly degraded' private 
native forest land and using the chip export revenue to provide the cash flow to fund 
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plantation establishment (Centre for International Economics 1997, p. 31 ). The 
commercial implications for plantation investors in other states of this Tasmania-only 
arrangement were not discussed. 
Regional Forest Agreement (RFA) - ecologically sustainable forest 
management (ESFM) 
The principal ecological objectives of the National Forest Policy Statement were to 
protect native forest communities, wilderness and old-growth forests in comprehensive, 
adequate and representative reserves and to use ecologically sustainable forest 
management (ESFM) approaches to wood production outside this reserve system. The 
RF As incorporate guidelines and practices for ESFM agreed to by the Federal and State 
Governments. Advisory groups were established in each state to lay the foundations for 
ESFM - developing the methodology for assessment, frameworks and values. The 
process generated the indicators for sustainable forest management, thereby fulfilling 
Australia's obligations under the Montreal Process (Raison 2000).68 
Maintaining 'forest' ecosystem health and vitality was identified in the Montreal 
Process as one of the values society seeks to maintain ( criteria). The key indicator 
(measure of change in the criteria over time) developed by Australia is the area and per 
cent of forest (there being no distinction between native forests and plantations) 
affected by processes or agents that may change ecosystem health or vitality. The cost-
price squeeze of commodity production and the associated pressure for intensification 
was not identified as a threatening process or agent. Processes and agents that were 
identified included fire; climatic events; river regulation; salinisation; grazing; and 
introduction of exotic biota, insects and diseases (Commonwealth of Australia 1998, 
pp. 27-8). 
The processes and reports the Federal Government had commissioned from the public 
service failed to provide a policy framework that tackled the core of the problem, 
namely the multiple-use approach to native forest commodity wood production. In so 
doing, all reports failed to present to Government the policy option of distinguishing 
plantations from native forests and aligning environment and industry objectives to the 
most appropriate land base. Each report made its own judgement about the centrality of 
multiple use in the policy approach ( or took it as a given) thereby limiting the range of 
policy options for government consideration and public debate. Without a policy 
approach that could resolve the conflict, exiting the native forest environment policy 
arena became an attractive option for the Federal Government. 
68 The Montreal Process followed the development of international criteria (values society seeks to 
maintain) and indicators (measures of change in criteria over time) for forest management at the Rio 
Earth Summit in 1992. 
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Table 6.1 The multiple use framework and treatment of intensification technologies in reports to the 
Federal Government and major policy documents generated by Government on forest and wood 
industry policy 1n the 1990s. 
Document Does the 
ESD Forest Use 
Working Group 1991 
National Plantations 
Advisory Committee 
1991 
Resource Assessment 
Commission 1992a 
Commonwealth of 
Australia 1992 
(National Forest 
Policy Statement) 
Industry Commission 
1993 (Adding Further 
Value to Australia's 
Forest Products) 
Commonwealth of 
Australia 1995c 
(Wood and Paper 
Industry Strategy) 
Ministerial Council 
on Forestry, Fisheries 
and Aquaculture et 
al. 1997, and Centre 
for International 
Economics 1997 
(The 2020 Plantation 
Vision) 
Commonwealth of 
Australia 199 8 
(ESFM indicators for 
the Montreal Process) 
document use a 
multiple use 
framework for 
public native 
forest policy? 
Yes 
Not applicable 
Yes 
Yes 
Not discussed. 
Terms of 
Reference 
required 
recommendations 
consistent with 
the principles of 
ESD 
Yes 
Not applicable 
Yes 
Does the document 
recogmse 
intensification 
practices in native 
forests? 
Yes 
No - despite 
intensification 
increasing native 
forest wood supply 
and therefore the 
competitive 
pressure on the 
plantation industry. 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
No - draft 
document approved 
intensification 
practices in 
regrowth native 
forests. 
No - despite 
intensification 
increasing native 
forest wood supply 
and therefore the 
competitive 
pressure on the 
plantation industry. 
Not identified as a 
threatening process 
to ecosystem health 
and vitality. 
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Does the document present 
recommendations to ensure 
intensification does not 
undermine the ecological integrity 
of native forests? 
The main body of the report 
advises that intensification 
practices be thoroughly tested and 
monitored before being widely 
adopted. The Executive Summary 
takes intensification as a given 
and remains silent on a 
precautionary approach. No 
funding for research 
recommended. 
No 
Intensification not identified as a 
key concern and not exposed to 
critical examination. 
Contradictions in principles for 
wood production and the ESD 
framework. 
No 
No 
No 
Identification of threatening 
processes to ecosystem health and 
vitality recognised as requiring 
further research. 
6.5 Plantation expansion - 2020 Plantation Vision 
Introduction 
More tree planting, primarily to supply wood, is widely understood in Australia to be 
necessary and desirable. Perceptions of a looming global wood shortage create a 
healthy price outlook for investors (Clark 2001a, p. 62); the wood presents an 
alternative to native forest logging (Cameron & Penna 1988); tree planting provides 
opportunities to address land and water degradation through integration with traditional 
farming (National Plantations Advisory Committee 1991 ); and carbon sequestration by 
trees helps alleviate climate change (Centre for International Economics 1997, p. 19). 
Because tree planting appears to meet such diverse interests (leaving aside the rigour of 
the individual arguments), the existing plantation resource tends to be ignored and so 
the spotlight on processing issues is dimmed. As briefly discussed in chapter 3, a 
plethora of assistance measures emerged following the cessation of Federal 
Government financial assistance to the states for softwood planting. The 2020 Vision 
was launched in 1997 to drive a greatly increased planting effort. Together with the 
RF A process, it dominated Australia's native forest and wood industry policy in the 
1990s. The background to the 2020 Vision and its implementation are discussed below. 
The 2020 Vision 
The National Forest Policy Statement supported an increased plantation estate and 
announced measures to encourage private sector investment (Commonwealth of 
Australia 1992, pp. 28-30). Like the regional forest assessment process, this initiative 
lay dormant until 1995. In that year Plantations Australia
69 
met with Federal Ministers 
and presented a vision of trebling Australia's plantation estate (National Association of 
Forest Industries 1995c). 
In April 1996, the Standing Committee of Forestry (the same Committee that Jacobs 
had chaired in the 1960s) agreed that a national vision for the plantation industry should 
be developed to encourage private investment in plantations. The Ministerial Council 
on Forestry, Fisheries and Aquaculture (the forestry arm being the AFC) was asked at 
its meeting on 27 July 1996 to endorse the trebling of Australia's plantation estate to 
three million hectares by 2020 (Ministerial Council on Forestry, Fisheries and 
Aquaculture 1996, p. 27). It was an almost exact repeat of three decades earlier when 
the AFC was presented with a proposal from its Standing Committee to expand 
Australia's plantation estate to three million acres (chapter 3). The Council endorsed 
the national goal and requested the Standing Committee on Forestry to develop an 
implementation plan and presentation on the opportunities for, and obstacles to, 
plantation development (Ministerial Council on Forestry, Fisheries and Aquaculture 
69 Plantations Australia was formed in 1994/95 to represent the interests of the plantation industry and in 
particular the processing arm of the industry. It was effectively shackled by the National Association of 
Forest Industries (NAFI) and in 2001 its role was subsumed by the newly formed Plantation Timber 
Association Australia. 
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1996, p. 27-8). John Anderson, Federal Minister for Primary Industries and Chair of the 
Ministerial Council (Forestry), announced the target on 29 July 1996 (Anderson 1996). 
The plantation policy was launched as the 2020 Vision (Ministerial Council on 
Forestry, Fisheries and Aquaculture et al. 1997) by th.e Minister for Primary Industries 
and Energy in October 1997. It was prepared by the Ministerial Council, its Standing 
Committee, Plantations Australia, Australian Forest Growers and the National 
Association of Forest Industries (NAFI) and, as discussed earlier, included a reference 
document prepared by the CIE. The document presents a strategy for government and 
industry collaboration to attract private investment to realise the planting target. The 
benefits of the program are listed as increased plantation investment, increased farm 
income, conversion of Australia's wood deficit into a surplus and rural employment 
growth (Ministerial Council on Forestry, Fisheries and Aquaculture et al. 1997, p. 3). 
The planting target shifted the market focus to the global arena because the existing 
estate could largely meet Australia's wood requirement ( chapter 4). The reference 
document to the 2020 Vision (Centre for International Economics 1997) presented a 
superficial two-page analysis of the global market prospects. Its conclusion, that global 
market conditions appeared favourable, was referenced to one paper prepared by the 
Manager - Group Development of Australian Paper (previously APM and now 
PaperlinX). That paper (Cameron 1996), using the global wood supply projections 
presented in Apsey & Reed ( 1994) and wood demand projections prepared by Simons 
Consulting Group (1994), concluded that by 2010 there would be a significant global 
wood shortage and that Australian plantations would become more attractive 
investments. Cameron (1996) did not consider alternative projections. The significant 
qualifications that Apsey & Reed (1994) made on most of their country-based wood-
supply projections were ignored. 
In investigating Australia's trade balance in wood and wood products, the CIE did not 
include Australia's significant export woodchip industry (appendix D). This meant that 
the CIE incorrectly reported Australia as having a large trade deficit (in wood volume 
terms) when it actually had, and still has, a slight wood surplus (Australian Bureau of 
Agricultural and Resource Economics 2001 b, pp. 62-3). With this significant omission, 
the CIE misrepresented the commercial outlook for prospective plantation investors. 
The CIE's superficial analysis of the market prospects for Australian plantation wood 
led it to conclude that: 
'Because of the healthy long term price outlook finding markets for wood 
before planting should not be a priority.' (Centre for International 
Economics 1997, p. 11 ). 
This outlook contradicts the findings of other reports ( e.g. Food and Agricultural 
Organisation of the United Nations 1997; Sedjo & Lyon 1990) based on research 
showing that native forests, plantations and other fibre sources are likely to be 
sufficient to meet demand in the near future at least. A later examination of the global 
wood market by Clark (2001 a) found no evidence of a looming global wood shortage 
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and argued that wood prices are likely to continue their downward trend over the long 
term. 
The CIE 's superficial treatment of the market prospects for plantation investment is as 
challenging as Hanson's (1962a) consumption projections that underpinned the 1960s 
softwood plantation program (chapters 3 and 4). The CIE's undisputed understanding 
of the importance of realistic market analysis stimulates investigation of other (non-
wood market) factors driving the planting target. One possible explanation is that, if 
tree planting were regarded as a carbon-sink in international negotiations over climate 
change, a significantly increased plantation estate could reduce the compliance cost 
burden on industries contributing most to Australia's greenhouse gas emissions. 
In 1994, the United Nations ratified its Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC) that aimed to stabilise atmospheric greenhouse gas concentrations to 
prevent human induced climate change. The Australian Mining Industry Council 
(AMIC) commissioned research into the economic implications of implementing such a 
policy. The research (McKibbin et al. 1994)70 provided estimates of the cost burden, in 
terms of reduced Australian GDP, if a carbon tax were used to restrain CO2 emissions. 
The CIE argued that some of the GDP loss would be avoidable through the CO2 
sequestration benefits of the 2020 Vision (Centre for International Economics 1997, p. 
19). Although not reported in this way, the CIE' s assumptions and calculations show 
that realising the 2020 Vision for plantations would enable Australia to increase its CO2 
emissions by 2 per cent on 1990 levels without generating a net increase in CO2 into the 
atmosphere. The effect is significant because the 1997 Kyoto Protocol requires 
countries to tackle just the increase in CO2 emissions since 1990. It is difficult to 
imagine that Australia's three million hectare plantation target was conceived 
independently of a wider strategy to address the cost impost, particularly to the mining 
industry, of climate change. 71 In launching the 2020 Vision, the Minister for Primary 
Industries and Energy presented figures showing that the Government expected a larger 
sequestration benefit: 
'Achievement of the Vision of trebling the plantation estate will result in 
annual greenhouse gas sequestration equal to between 5 and 10 per cent of 
Australia's current annual emissions.' (Anderson 1997, p. 4). 
The 2020 Vision has been argued in the public mainly on traditional wood industry 
grounds. However, the discussion above suggests that the mining industry, as relatively 
large generators of Australia's greenhouse gas emissions, may have influenced the 
policy. 
70 Andy Stoeckel, one of the report's authors, is the Executive Director of the CIE. 
71 As a postscript, the 1997 Kyoto Protocol allowed for Australia's CO2 emissions to increase to 108 per 
cent of 1990 emissions. Article 3 of the Protocol allowed for the removal of greenhouse gases by sinks 
resulting from human-induced land use change and specified forestry activity since 1990 to offset a 
Party's emissions from sources to meet its commitments. The sequestration capacity of plantations has 
been questioned on scientific grounds (Turner & Lambert, in press) . 
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Implementing the 2020 Vision 
The Federal Government saw its role primarily as providing clear and consistent 
policies supporting plantation development with the private sector undertaking the 
investment. Prospectus-based investment became the dominant vehicle for plantation 
development. Prospectus investment was available prior to the 2020 Vision (see for 
example SEAS Sapfor Investment Services Ltd. 1991; Timbercorp Eucalypts Ltd. 
1993), but the number and size of plantation prospectus companies expanded 
significantly after 1997, riding on the wave of loosely regulated, mass-marketed tax 
effective schemes (Senate Economics Reference Committee 2001 ). 
Most plantation prospectus companies marketed hardwood plantations for paper, seeing 
a bright market outlook for hardwood pulp and paper and attracted by the shorter 
rotations for hardwood chiplogs and hence earlier financial returns. Australia's 
purported trade deficit in wood and wood products, expectations of a global wood 
shortage and solid government support for plantation development were powerful 
marketing messages used in the plantation prospectuses to distinguish their product 
from other tax effective investment products. Australia's hardwood planting increased 
from an average 12 000 hectares per annum in the first half of the 1990s (National 
Plantation Inventory 1997, p. 10) to 146 000 hectares in 2000 (Wood et al. 2001, p. 14; 
figure 4.1). 
The prospectus-based plantation boom turned to bust in 2001. By mid 2000, the share-
price declines in the prospectus companies listed on the Australian Stock Exchange 
signaled a declining investor confidence in the industry. 72 As the financial year ending 
June 2001 drew to a close, the plantation prospectus companies, despite most having 
Product Rulings guaranteeing their tax deductibility status, were further damaged by 
the negative publicity over mass-marketed tax effective schemes in general. All 
plantation prospectus companies bar one failed to meet projected sales, and the largest 
promoters reported significant declines relative to projected sales for 2001 
(Agribusiness Research as reported in Fenton-Jones 2001). Share prices continued to 
decline (Kormendy 2001) and by end-July/early August 2001 the financial plight of 
prospectus companies became clear. Australian Plantation Timber Ltd. appointed an 
administrator after the Commonwealth Bank ( owed $40 million) refused it further 
funding (Bolt 2001) and Forest Enterprise Australia's position was described in the 
financial press as 'terminal' (Pierpont 2001 ). At the time of writing, the saga continues 
with the finance sector tuned out of the industry and the Federal Government exploring 
measures to prevent a precipitous fall in annual planting. 
The 2020 Vision has received substantial public funding in the form of reduced 
taxation liabilities to private prospectus-based investors. The first-year tax benefit for 
individuals on the top marginal tax rate (48.5%) averaged $2 459 per hectare in 2001 
for eight hardwood ( eucalypt) chiplog projects investigated and $4 500 per hectare over 
72 Share-price data from the Australian Stock Exchange for Australian Plantation Timber Ltd. , Forest 
Enterprises Australia, Great Southern Managers Australia Ltd. , Timbercorp Eucalypts Ltd. , and Willmott 
Forests Ltd. Rights issues do not alter the underlying assessment of a declining market value among 
these companies. 
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the full rotation of 10-13 years (Lonsdale Securities Limited Alternative Research 
Group 2001). Over the period 1998-2000, an estimated 200 000 hectares of prospectus 
based plantations were established in Australia (based on Cum.mine 2000). These 
figures suggest income taxation deductions in the order of $0.5 billion over 1998-2000. 
Plantation prospectus investments do not undermine the overall public revenue base to 
the extent that other mechanisms for reducing tax liability are used in their absence. As 
a marketing tool, however, the 2020 Vision policy can influence where Australia's tax 
minimising investment is focussed. The main groups to benefit from. the 2020 Vision 
are wood buyers, particularly if the planting generates a wood over-supply and reduces 
wood prices further, and Australia's major energy producers - as the largest 
contributors to Australia's greenhouse gas emissions - if plantations are recognised as a 
carbon sink. 
Export regulations on unprocessed plantation wood 
The 1992 National Forest Policy statement announced the Federal Government' s 
intention to remove controls on exporting unprocessed public and private plantation 
wood ( chips and logs), subject to the application of codes of practice to protect 
environmental values (Commonwealth of Australia 1992, p. 19). In 1995, the Keating 
Labor Government announced its intention to remove export controls on plantation 
wood as soon as practicable after 1 January 1996 and the newly elected Howard 
Liberal-National Coalition Government expedited the legislative changes (Forest 
Taskforce 1995b; Ministerial Council on Forestry, Fisheries and Aquaculture 1996, p. 
36). 
Removing the export regulations on unprocessed plantation wood was a key 2020 
Vision implementation strategy. When the Federal Government first imposed the 
export controls in 1968 they used generic terminology, there being no need to 
distinguish between growing regimes because at the time there were no proposals to 
export unprocessed plantation wood. Export markets were sought in the 1980s for 
surplus ( to domestic processing capacity) wood from plantation thinnings and sawmill 
residues. These exports were subject to the Export Control (Unprocessed Wood) 
Regulations. Although rubber-stamping was the practice for applications to export 
unprocessed plantation wood, the controls were perceived as an inhibitor to further 
investment in plantations. The Centre for International Economics (1997, pp. 43 , 51, 
65) argued that the regulations put downward pressure on wood prices because of the 
uncertainty they created for wood buyers. Their removal would signal to the finance 
market the Federal Government's com.m.itment to plantation expansion and would 
therefore add another level of confidence for potential investors. 
If Australia's comparative advantage lies more in growing wood (agriculture) than 
processing wood into wood products (manufacturing), a policy focussed on 
deregulation of wood growing will deliver optimal resource allocation and maximise 
Australia's economic wealth. The evidence suggests, however, that Australia's 
comparative advantage may lie m.ore in manufacturing some wood products than in 
wood growing. Margules Groome Poyry (1995, pp. 76-9), in a plantation benchmarking 
study com.missioned by the Federal Government, found that Australia's plantation 
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wood growing cost competitiveness is less attractive than all competing countries other 
than New Zealand. The Industry Commission (1993 , pp. 96, 102) found that Australia 
was globally competitive in packaging and industrial papers; potentially globally 
competitive in hardwood kraft pulp and had a slight disadvantage in particleboard, 
medium density fibreboard, softwood plywood and softwood sawn timb~r on export 
markets. Given that exports of unprocessed wood are growing more strongly than the 
processing arm of the industry ( chapter 5), these studies imply that barriers to 
plantation processing investment should be investigated. 
Australia's plantation processing industry argued against the removal of export controls 
on unprocessed plantation wood. Auspine Ltd., a large private softwood grower, 
Australia's biggest exporter of softwood plantation chips, and an owner of sawmills in 
South Australia and Tasmania, wrote to Prime Minister Keating stating that it was not 
opposed to the removal of export licences per se but sought the Government's 
assurance that a mechanism would be retained to ensure that domestic preference 
remain an active part of government policy (Bankes 1995). Auspine Ltd. was opposed 
to the export of unprocessed logs if there were domestic opportunities to add value 
through processing without disadvantaging the plantation grower. It argued for the 
retention of the domestic preference clauses in the export licencing arrangements for 
plantation logs and woodchips and recommended some streamlining of the current 
system. Auspine advised the Prime Minister that its views were not isolated and that 
other major plantation companies maintained a similar position (Bankes 1995). 
Australian Newsprint Mills, with pulp and newsprint mills in Tasmania and New South 
Wales using softwood plantation and native forest wood and recycled paper, expressed 
to the Prime Minister its position strongly favouring a domestic processing preference 
(C. Humphries pers. comm. 1995). CSR Timber, then Australia's largest sawmiller and 
wood panels producer, supported a domestic preference policy, arguing that exports of 
unprocessed wood should occur when the domestic processing industry did not have a 
wood requirement. The company recognised that checks and balances were needed on 
wood prices with exporters being required to declare the export pricing arrangements 
(H. Pens pers. comm. 1995). The native forest environment movement aligned with 
these companies on the issue, concerned that lifting the export controls would see a 
firesale of plantation wood and deny Australia the opportunity to realise 15 000 to 
20 000 new jobs in processing Australia's increasing plantation resource (National 
Forest Campaign 1995). 
In December 1996, The Minister for Primary Industries and Energy introduced to 
Parliament amendments to remove export controls on unprocessed plantation wood in 
states where codes of practice had been assessed as protecting environmental values. 
Senator Brown's (Australian Greens Party) move to disallow the amendment triggered 
a long and intense Senate debate (Parliament of Australia 1997, pp. 1738-53). The 
Liberal-National Party Coalition Government and Labor opposition voted against the 
disallowance, thereby clearing the regulatory path for exporting unprocessed plantation 
wood subject to verification of environmental practices and controls by the CSIRO. 
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6.6 Evaluation of the Federal Government's 1990s forest and 
wood industry policy 
Introduction 
The Federal Government's exit from the native forest environment policy arena and the 
new national plantation target drove Australia's native forest and wood industry policy 
during the second half of the 1990s. The mechanisms, namely the RF A process and the 
2020 Vision, were initiated under the Keating Labor Government and continued, with 
ALP opposition support, under the Howard Liberal-National Party Coalition 
Government. 
The following section evaluates 1990s policy against the indicators established in 
chapter 5. The key questions are: 
• What effect did the RF A and 2020 Vision have on shifting the Australian wood and 
wood products industry from native forests to plantations? 
• What effect did the RF A and 2020 Vision have on the level of domestic integration 
in the Australian plantation industry? 
The policy implementation period started in 1997. The first RF A was signed, for East 
Gippsland, on 3 February 1997. This was followed by Tasmania (8 November 1997), 
Central Highlands Victoria (27 March 1998), South West Western Australia ( 4 May 
1999), North East Victoria (23 August 1999), Eden New South Wales (26 August 
1999), North East New South Wales (31 March 2000), Gippsland Victoria (31 March 
2000), West Victoria (31 March 2000) (Commonwealth Forests Taskforce 2000, p. 2). 
The Southern New South Wales RF A was signed in April 2001. As discussed at the end 
of this chapter, south east Queensland does not have a RF A. The 2020 Vision was also 
launched in 1997. Amendments to the regulations controlling the export of unprocessed 
plantation wood were voted through the Senate in March 1997 and the regulations were 
progressively abolished as each state's procedures for environmental protection were 
checked-off by the CSIRO. 
Industry performance during the policy implementation period (1996/97 to 1999/00) is 
compared with the trends prior to policy implementation (1989/90 to 1995/96). 
Deviations from the trend are examined for a causal relationship with policy 
implementation. 
Indicator 1: Shift from a native forest to a plantation based wood and wood 
products industry 
Australia's native forest wood production increased by an average 3.4 per cent per 
annum in the policy implementation period 1996/97 to 1999/00. Virtually all the 
growth was realised during the end of this period as the full resource effects of the 
policy began to flow through. There was virtually no growth in native forest wood 
production during the pre-implementation period. The increase in native forest wood 
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supply occurred despite continuing strong growth in plantation supplies (table 6.2, 
figure 6.1 ). Indicator 1 therefore identifies deterioration during the policy 
implementation period in Australia's performance in shifting from a native forest to a 
plantation based wood and wood products industry. 
Table 6.2 Average annual change in Australian production of wood and wood products 1989/90-1995/96 
and 1996/97-1999/00 (% per annum). Growth rates calculated using regression analysis incorporating all 
annual data. Source: Australian Bureau of Agricultural and Resource Economics (2001 b) and earlier 
editions; Australian Bureau of Statistics international trade statistics; Pulp & Paper Manufacturers 
Federation of Australia (2001). 
Product3 
Native forest based production 
Total wood 
W oodchip exports 
Whole log exports 
Sawn timber, plywood and wood based panels 
Wood for domestic pulp production 
Othe{ 
Plantation based production 
Total wood 
W oodchip exports 
Whole log exports 
Sawn timber, plywood and wood based panels 
Wood for domestic pulp production 
Other 
Pre-policy period -
1989/90 to 1995/96 
0.1 
0.6 
na 
-0.8 
-6.1 
-9.6 
6.2 
44.6 
118.0e 
8.5 
-2.4 
6.7 
Policy implementation 
period - 1996/97 to 
1999/00 
3.4 
4.7 
na 
-1.8 
-4.7 
2.9 
7.3 
9.2 
25.5 
7.8 
5.9 
5.3 
a. Source data adjusted to be consistent with product descriptions using assumptions and information in 
Appendix D, with the exception of native forest hardwood wood panels production where ABARE 
round wood removals for wood based panels production was used assuming a 5 5 per cent product 
recovery. 
b. In 1999/00, 80 000 m3 of hardwood logs were exported. Export volumes are small but growing and 
are not disaggregated into plantation and native forest sources. 
c. Railway sleepers, fencing and mining timbers, poles and posts, etc. 
d. Assuming all softwood log exports are plantation derived. Excludes hardwood logs - see note b. 
e. Growth rate is high because of the low export volume at the start of the period. 
Increased woodchip exports account for virtually all the additional native forest wood 
production (table 6.2). The volume of native forest woodchips exported during the pre-
policy period increased by less than 1 per cent per annum on average. The removal of 
export licence regulations commenced with East Gippsland and then Tasmania -
Australia's largest chip export state - in 1997. By the end of March 2000, the export 
regulations had been abolished in all RF A regions, with the exception of Southern New 
South Wales. Australia's exports of native forest woodchips increased by an average 
4. 7 per cent per annum during the policy implementation period (table 6.2, figure 6.1 ). 
The strong volume growth in Australia's native forest chip exports, particularly during 
1999/00 (19 per cent from 1998/99 to 1999/00), was realised despite the significant 
increase in resource productivity in the global paper industry and stagnating paper 
consumption during the second half of the 1990s (Clark 2001 a, pp. 54-5). Real, 
inflation adjusted, prices for Australian eucalypt woodchips in the global market were 
relatively stable over the period 1994/95 to 1998/99 and then declined by 9 .2 per cent 
150 
in 1999/00 (table 6.3), and volume exports grew strongly. This suggests price-cutting 
by the Australian native forest based industry to gain increased export volumes. 
The financial statements of Harris Daishowa (Australia) Pty. Ltd. - the only company 
operating in Australia that solely exports native forest chips, and therefore whose 
financial statements relate specifically to this activity - indicate that exporting native 
forest woodchips from Australia continued to generate extra-ordinary returns on equity 
despite deteriorating woodchip prices for the Australian industry (table 6.3). It is 
difficult to establish whether state forest agencies have facilitated this outcome by 
lowering native forest stumpages (price of logs excluding logging and cartage) because, 
with the exception of Western Australia, their prices are either confidential, not 
available, or published as averages (Commonwealth Competitive Neutrality 
Complaints Office 2001, p. 32). There is solid evidence of very low stumpages on 
native forest chip logs in Tasmania and Victoria (Miller 1999; Paine 2001 ). These are 
Australia's main exporting states. Export woodchip companies have also worked to 
reduce costs in other areas of their operations. 
On the evidence available it is likely that, during the deregulation implementation 
period, reductions in native forest log stumpages have facilitated the significant growth 
in Australia's exports of native forest woodchips. This development has undermined 
Australia's capacity to shift commodity wood production from native forests to 
plantations. 
Table 6.3 Operating profit, return on equity and chip export volume, Harris Daishowa (Australia) Pty. 
Ltd. and real price for Australian exports of hardwood chips. Source: Harris Daishowa (Australia) Pty. 
Ltd. (2001) and earlier statements: Australian Bureau of Agricultural and Resource Economics (2001 b) 
and earlier editions; Reserve Bank of Australiafor GDP deflator. 
Year ending 31 Return on Unit costs of Chip exports 
December equity8 productionb 
(0/o) ($A/ green tonne) (million green 
tonnes) 
1995 46 71.24 0.94 
1996 35 73.74 0.78 
1997 27 74.28 0.70 
1998 35 70.09 0.67 
1999 17 72.30 0.70 
2000 26 70.46 0.71 
a. Operating profit after income tax as a per cent of shareholder's equity. 
Real price for 
Australian exports of 
hardwood chipsc 
(A$ fob/bone dry 
tonne) 
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151 
150 
151 
152 
138 
b. Payments to suppliers and employees deflated by GDP deflator (1998/99 = 100). Excludes income 
tax, GST and interest charges. 
c. Prices for financial year ending June deflated by Australian GDP deflator (1998/99 = 100). 
In contrast to increased native forest chip exports, domestically processed production 
using native forest wood declined during the policy implementation period. Plantation 
products increased their Australian production share in all products ( figure 6 .2 and 
table 6.2). This favourable performance is a continuation of past trends and, as 
discussed below, is occurring despite policy during the 1990s. 
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Figure 6.1 Australian production of plantation and native forest wood and exports of 
native forest woodchips 1990-2000. Wood production was disaggregated into 
plantation and native forest sources using the methods presented in Appendix D. 
Plantation eucalypt exports have been netted out using the methods presented in 
Appendix D and assuming 150 000 m3 were exported in 1999 and 100 000 m3 in 1998. 
Sources are as detailed in Appendix D. 
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Figure 6.2 Australian production of plantation and native forest wood products 1995/96 
and 1999/00. Production has been disaggregated into plantation and native forest sources 
using the methods presented in Appendix D. The data do not include adjustments for the 
over-reporting of native forest sawn timber production in Victoria. *Railway sleepers, 
mining and fencing timbers, poles and posts. Source: Australian Bureau of Agricultural and 
Resource Economics, Forest Products Statistics and Australian Commodity Statistics; Pulp 
and Paper Manufacturers Federation of Australia (2001) and earlier editions. 
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Plantation 
other* 
Indicator 2: Plantation industry domestic integration 
As outlined in chapter 5, Australia's plantation industry has become less integrated as 
more plantation wood, principally from maturing softwood plantations, has come on 
stream. Virtually all Australia's plantation wood was processed domestically at the start 
of the 1990s. By the end of the pre-policy period (1995/96), 30 per cent was exported 
unprocessed and this share has continued to increase during the policy implementation 
period (table 6.4). Increased plantation woodchip exports account for most of the 
growth in unprocessed wood exports in the pre-implementation period. Chip exports 
continued to grow during the policy implementation period, particularly with the 
resource from eucalypt plantations coming on stream. Of significance is the growth in 
exports of unprocessed plantation logs in 1999 and 2000 (table 6.4). 
Table 6.4 Australian production of plantation wood and exports of unprocessed plantation wood 1991-
2000. Source: Australian Bureau of Agricultural and Resource Economics (2001b) and earlier editions; 
Australian Bureau of Statistics international trade statistics. 
Year ending Wood Chip exports Log exportsc 
June production a 
Unprocessed wood 
exports as per cent 
of total wood 
production 
(million m3 per (million m3 per (million m3 per (%) 
annum) annum)b annum) 
1991 6.3 0.4 0.1 8 
1992 6.9 0.9 0.1 14 
1993 7.6 1.1 0.2 17 
1994 8.7 1.4 0.4 21 
1995 8.4 2.5 0.3 33 
1996 9.0 2.4 0.3 30 
1997 10.3 2.5 0.6 30 
1998 10.8 2.9 0.4 29 
1999 10.7 2.9 0.7 34 
2000 13.0 3.3 1.0 33 
a. See appendix D for methodology used to separate wood production into plantation and native forest 
sources. Excludes relatively small volumes of eucalypt plantation wood supply prior to 1999/00. 
b. Softwood chip exports reported in bone dry tonnes converted to m3 by multiplying by 2.47. Data for 
2000 include an estimated 483 000 m3 of eucalypt plantation chips (appendix D) and assumes 150 
000 m3 were exported in 1999 and 100 000 m3 in 1998. A 6.5% allowance for chip losses and fines 
(Australian Forest Growers 1996) is included. 
c. Assumes all softwood log exports are plantation sourced. Excludes logs not specified as softwood. 
Eucalypt plantation log exports, currently relatively minor, are not reported separately from native 
forest logs and are excluded from the table. 
The decades-long failure - largely of state forest agencies who in 1990 managed 70 per 
cent of Australia's softwood estate (Australian Bureau of Agricultural and Resource 
Economics 1992, p. 3) - to sell the available plantation resource (Jaakko Poyry 
Consulting 2000, p. 16; Victorian Wood Products Working Party 1993, pp. 21-5) 
underpins the introduction of softwood plantation chip exporting. The resource 
oversupply was initially manifested in unthinned plantations, and action was finally 
triggered by concerns about deteriorating sawlog growth and quality combined with the 
income that could be generated from clearing the backlog of unthinned plantations via 
the woodchip export market. As discussed above, for softwood plantation woodchip 
exporters, the export controls that were in place in the first half of the 1990s merely 
involved rubber-stamping applications. 
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In contrast, the export of whole plantation sawlogs arouses significant concerns about 
lost opportunities for domestic sawn timber production, employment and native forest 
conservation. This was demonstrated in the 1997 Senate debate (Parliament of 
Australia 1997) over the proposed amendment to the Export Control (Unprocessed 
Wood) Regulations. 
By the policy implementation period (commencing in the mid 1990s), Australia's 
softwood plantations contained a stockpile of sawlogs that, through corporatisation and 
privatisation of the public estate, exposed them to the pressures of cash flow. Abolition 
of the export controls on unprocessed plantation wood removed a Federal Government 
regulation that had the potential to constrain the surge in plantation log exports during 
the policy implementation period (table 6.4). This is not an argument against abolishing 
export controls, rather it is an argument for ensuring that any disincentives to investing 
in plantation processing are identified and removed and given sufficient time to work 
before deregulation. This approach was not pursued because, as argued earlier in this 
chapter, policy in the 1990s was not about facilitating plantation processing. 
The increase in Australia's unprocessed plantation wood exports indicates an 
insufficient domestic plantation processing capacity, which in tum signals a 
manufacturing investment failure. Investment in plantation processing over the longer 
term has been affected to the extent that the collapse in Australian manufacturing 
industry policy generally has undermined manufacturing in Australia and to the extent 
that native forest wood production is subsidised. The question for this evaluation is 
whether 1990s forest and wood industry policy further inhibited investment in 
Australian plantation processing. 
Evidence that the RF A has undermined plantation processing is found in the increased 
investment risk for the plantation industry. The RF A policy incorporated financial 
assistance (Forest Industry Structural Adjustment Packages) from the Federal and State 
Governments to individual companies, the industry generally, and employees 
negatively affec!ed by native forest land use decisions. At this stage there is no analysis 
of changes in land use to demonstrate how RFA-generated conservation gains have 
affected native forest wood supply on a regional basis. With grants still occurring, it is 
too early for comprehensive evaluation of the compensation measures. State 
Government announcements show that a flexible approach has been taken in utilising 
the funds. Tasmania allocated much of their financial package to constructing and 
maintaining roads. In New South Wales, Government grants have financed a significant 
proportion of new investment in the native forest sawn timber industry. For example, 
75 per cent ($6 million) of the cost of reopening a native forest sawmill in the Eden 
region was financed through the RF A structural adjustment package (Phillips 1999, p. 
73) and, in northern New South Wales, 50 per cent ($22.5 million) of the expenditure 
by Boral Ltd. on native forest sawmill upgrades was funded through the RF A structural 
adjustment package (Boral Ltd. statement to Australian Stock Exchange, 17 October 
2001 ). The Victorian Government has announced grants to individual companies in the 
native forest industry for purchasing new logging equipment, sawmill retooling and 
drying kilns (Minister for Environment and Conservation 2001 ). The compensation 
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provisions have also been used to encourage native forest sawmillers, for example in 
Western Australia and northern New South Wales, to exit the industry. Bearing in mind 
the qualifications made above about the absence of evaluation, much of the 
compensation funding appears to be a subsidy to native forest logging and commodity 
sawn timber production. Because plantation products can and are substituting for most 
of Australia's native forest sawn timber (appendix F), subsidies to the native forest 
industry undermine investment in plantation sawn timber and wood-based panels 
processing. 
Federal Government subsidies, separate from the RF A process, have encouraged 
investment in plantation processing. The amount of assistance appears to be 
significantly less than that provided to the native forest industry. The main example 
was the $40 million grant made by the Federal Government through its Investing for 
Growth program to Visy Industries to encourage its $450 million investment in a 
softwood plantation pulpmill in Tumut, New South Wales. The decision was criticised 
within the Liberal Party as 'picking winners' (Ries 1998). If governments cannot resist 
providing corporate welfare, then it is in the public interest that the assistance is aligned 
with 'picking winners' (i.e. plantation based processing) rather than continuing the 
'picking losers' approach. Removing subsidies to the native forest part of the industry 
will encourage investment in plantation processing without the need to pick anything. 
Before closing this analysis, reference should be made to the significant change in 
ownership of Australia's plantation processing assets during the second half of the 
1990s. Stafford et al. (2000, p. ii) report recent Australian plantation processing asset 
sales valued at nearly $2 billion, covering sawmills, wood panels plants, timber 
treatment plants and pulp and paper mills. They report that the purchasers are mainly 
international wood product specialists seeking to achieve global competitiveness and 
that international investors have been active in Australia's more recent processing 
capacity expansion. This changing ownership occurred in a Federal Government policy 
environment that largely ignored plantation processing industry interests, and it is 
arguable that this policy environment contributed to some asset sales. International 
investment has invigorated Australia's plantation processing industry and offers 
potential new markets for Australian growers. The key question, however, is whether 
some new investors view their Australian assets as primarily focussed on the domestic 
market rather than as a launch pad for global markets. The globalisation of the 
Australian plantation processing industry may also inhibit the transition of Australia's 
commodity-based industries out of native forests and into exporting plantation wood 
products. Investors are less likely to embark on marketing Australian wood products in 
the global arena as 'native forest free' if they have assets utilising native forest 
resources in other parts of the world. These issues are now being identified for debate. 
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6.7 Omission of plantations from RFA public consultation options 
Public consultation was a central component of the RF A process and it is here that the 
1990s policy incoherence becomes clearly visible. The National Forest Policy 
Statement included the provision of effective public participation in decision making as 
one of its goals (Commonwealth of Australia 1992, p. 6). Forest and wood industry 
policy can claim an extra interest in public consultation and participation because most 
of the native forest and plantation resource is publicly owned. The consultative effort 
surrounding the RF A process appears to have been driven by the Federal Government's 
understanding that public consultation was critical for public acceptance of the RF A 
outcome, and therefore a smoother exit from the native forest environment policy 
arena. Keys Young Pty. Ltd., consultants engaged in 1996 to assist in the Federal 
Government's RF A public relations strategy, reinforced this view. They advised that: 
'The basic elements of the RF A approach (substantial research, community 
consultation, and an effort to reach a defensible balance among competing 
interests) will make sense to many members of the general public. In 
particular, the concept of a 'balanced' outcome, accommodating as many 
legitimate interests as possible, will strike a chord with many people - but 
probably not those who are most strongly committed to environment 
protection. There is likely to be some resistance to the notion of a 
State/Commonwealth agreement that is ultimately reached behind closed 
doors'. (Keys Young Pty. Ltd. 1996). 
Regional forest forums of government officials and key stakeholders were held to 
debate and obtain views, and various information and consultation sessions were held 
with the public. These processes provided a legitimising mechanism that raised 
stakeholder and public expectations that their views and submissions would influence 
the decisions (Dargavel et al. 2000). Dargavel et al. (2000) argue that Commonwealth-
State steering committees of government officials oversaw the RF A process and 
negotiated the eventual agreements in private - just as Keys Young warned against. 
Dargavel et al. (2000) doubt that the RF A process will diffuse the conflict because it 
was not directed towards mediating or resolving the source of the conflict. 
The main public consultation for the RF A centered on a report for each region that 
presented information and options and invited written submissions. Various options 
were presented for native forests, and their effects on the environment, industry 
production and employment were calculated. Plantation based opportunities were 
excluded from every option presented for public consultation (Clark 1999c; table 6.5). 
The RF A process focussed on native forests, yet it specifically defined forests to 
include both plantations and native forests and specifically stated that the RF A process 
was not limited to native forests (see for example Commonwealth and Western 
Australian Regional Forest Agreement Steering Committee 1998b, p. 16). The key 
goals of the RF A were to develop internationally competitive forest-based industries 
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that maximise value-adding opportunities as well as protect native forest ecological 
integrity. A role for plantations was clear. 
At the time of the RF A negotiations, plantation wood accounted for approximately 45 
per cent of the wood supply in the RFA areas and a higher proportion of the wood used 
in domestic processing. The RF As have a 20 year duration, yet Australia's continuing 
strong growth in plantation wood supply is expected to see it double the native forest 
log supply within ten years (table 6.5, figure 6.3). 
The RF A process denied the public the policy option of substituting native forest 
commodity wood with plantation supplies and thereby enhancing the persistence 
capacity of Australia's native forests, wood production systems and rural socio-
economies. As Australia's softwood plantations matured and sawlog supply increased 
significantly, Australia chose to maintain native forest wood production through 
increased exports of woodchips. The key public policy issue for Australia's native 
forests and wood based industries over the next decade is the role to be played by 
Australia's significant hardwood plantation resource (figure 6.3). 
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Table 6.5 Treatment of the plantation resource in the RF A optionsa presented for public consultation. 
Sources: Commonwealth and Victorian Regional Forest Agreement Steering Committee (1996a, 1996b, 
1997, 1998 , 1999a, 1999b, 2000a, 2000b); Tasmania-Commonwealth Joint Steering Committee (1997); 
Margules Groome Poyry (1997) ; Banks & Clark (1997); Clark (1995a, 1998a); Duggie (2000) ; Gooday 
et al. (1998); Commonwealth and Western Australian Regional Forest Agreement Steering Committee (1998a, 1998b); New South Wales Government and Commonwealth Government (1998, 1999a, 1999b, 
1999c); Department of Conservation and Natural Resources (1993) ; Bull et al. (1998). 
Region and date Were plantations Estimated Estimated Projected growth 
of signing included in the plantation plantation in plantation 
East Gippsland, 
Vic 
3 February 1997 
Tasmania 
8 November 1997 
Central 
Highlands Vic 
27 March 1998, 
Gippsland Vic 
31 March 2000d 
South West WA 
4 May 1999 
North East Vic 
23 August 1999 
Eden, NSW 
26 August 1999 
North East NSW 
31 March 2000 
West Vic 
31 March 2000 
SouthemNSW 
24 April 2001 
South East Qld 
unsigned 
Total RFA 
regions 
Australia£ 
options? share of share of wood supply from 
No plantations 
of significance 
. . 
m region 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
Yes. 
RF A practice of 
excluding the 
plantation resource 
discarded in the 
stakeholder/ 
State Government 
agreement. 
wood domestic actual use in mid 
supply in processmg m l 990sb to 2010 
mid l 990sb mid l 990sb 
(%) (0/o) 
0 0 
20 45 
40 40 
35 55 
90 * 
17 75 
25 * 
75 * 
85 * 
80 70 
45 
47 67 
0 
225% to 3.4 
million m3 pa 
135% to 2.0 
million m3 pa 
675% to 6.3 
million m3 pa 
45% to 1.2 million 
m
3 pa 
665% to 0.7 
million m3 pa 
160% to 0.8 
million m3 pa 
150 to 2.4 million 
m
3 pa 
210 to 2.9 million 
m3 pae 
45% to 2.2 million 
m
3pa 
200% to 21.9 
million m3 pa 
180% to 27 million 
m3 pa 
a. 
b. 
Options were variously described as scenarios, approaches and opportunities. 
Slight variations in years due to sourcing from different reports. 
Native forest 
log supply 
in mid 
1990sb 
(million m3 pa) 
0.9 
4.0 
1.3 
1.4 
0.1 
0.4 
0.9 
0.3 
0.2 
0.3 
9.8 
10.2 
C. Current softwood plantation sawn timber production excluded. Projected growth in softwood 
plantation saw and veneer log supply excluded. Current use of softwood plantation chiplog and 
sawmill residues included with native forest supply and not differentiated. Eucalypt plantation 
resource included, but neither quantified nor differentiated from native forest resource. 
d. 
e. 
f. 
The RF A regions have been combined to be consistent with the plantation area used in the supply 
projections. 
Includes resources in Bathurst and Oberon plantations. 
Includes wood supply from outside RFA regions , notably South Australia's plantation resource. 
* Data on exports of unprocessed wood from the region not readily available. 
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Figure 6.3 Australian native forest and plantation wood production and native forest 
woodchip exports 1936 to 2000, and projected softwood and hardwood plantation wood 
supply 2000 to 2010. Source: Forestry and Timber Bureau (1969); Clark (1995a) ; Duggie 
(2000); Australian Bureau of Agricultural and Resource Economics (1999a and 2001 b and 
earlier editions). Note: fuelwood excluded. 
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The Queensland and Western Australian approach 
Queensland 
Queensland adopted a different approach to all other states on the RF A. Queensland's 
wood and wood products industry is similar to the plantation-dominant South 
Australian industry (which was excluded from the RFA process) in that it involves no 
native forest export woodchipping73 and the plantation r·esource overwhelmingly 
dominates wood supply. Approximately 80 per cent of Queensland's wood was sourced 
from (softwood) plantations when the RFA process commenced (Bull et al. 1998). The 
conservation of native forests was especially urgent in Queensland, where only 9 per 
cent of the state's public native forests were protected in conservation reserves in the 
mid 1990s - by far the lowest of all Australian states (National Forest Inventory 1998, 
p. 6). 
The sawn timber industry faced immediate growth opportunities ( as did all other states) 
with plantations established under the softwood forestry loans agreement (for 
projections of plantation sawlog supply see Clark 1995a; National Plantation Inventory 
1997; BIS Shrapnel Forestry Group Pty. Ltd. 2000). The build-up of exotic and native 
hoop pine plantations past their clearfell harvest age presented an immediate growth 
opportunity (see Wood et al. 2001 for age profile data). 74 The sawn timber industry 
(particularly Hyne and Sons, the state's largest sawmiller) had previous experience in 
negotiating and benefiting from a swap in native forest for softwood plantation resource 
as part of the machinations surrounding the Fraser Island World Heritage Listing. 
The south east Queensland process was exceptional in achieving an agreement to 
initiate a complete transition to plantation processing and to protect immediately a large 
area of public native forest. This stakeholder agreement between the Queensland wood 
and wood products industry (represented by the Queensland Timber Board), the 
environment movement (represented by the Australian Rainforest Conservation 
Society, Queensland Conservation Council and the Wilderness Society) and the 
Queensland Government was signed on 16 September 1999 (Queensland Government 
1999). 
The main elements of the agreement were: 
• the immediate reservation of a defined 425 000 hectares of native forests, 
• the cessation of the use of public native forests for wood production by 2024 at the 
latest, 
• a specified reduction in public native forest sawlog supply whilst maintaining 
existing Crown log allocations to specified mills to 2024, 
73 Industry has proposed export woodchip schemes in the past and more recently a licence was granted to 
Queensland Hardwood Resources to export 140 000 tonnes of native forest wood in 1996, but the project 
did not proceed. 
74 To sustain the wood supply, the stockpile needs to be drawn down and the rest of the plantation estate 
managed such that the annual wood supply does not decline. 
161 
• continued logging of 184 000 hectares of native forests on a transitional basis 
before they are progressively added to reserves, 
• 80 000 hectares of native forest to be temporarily quarantined from wood supply, 
for possible addition to reserves depending on the pace at which the transition to 
plantation resources is realised, 
• implementation of a strategy to develop native hardwood plantations, 
• exemption of Crown native forest sawlog holders from national competition policy 
requirements, and 
• the Government's first right of refusal in terms of any mill seeking to sell their 
wood allocation or business (Queensland Government 1999; Brown 2001). 
Critical to successful negotiation of the agreement was an agreement between Boral 
Ltd. and the Queensland Government with the company agreeing to transfer ownership 
of its native forest mills to the Queensland Government by July 2002 (Boral Ltd. 1999) 
for an undisclosed sum. The buy-out enabled a reduction in the overall sawlog cut from 
public native forests while maintaining log allocations to the remaining sawmills. With 
over 90 per cent of the region's native forest sawn timber sold unseasoned - primarily 
for house building, fencing and rough sawn boards, and produced in many small mills 
with relatively high unit costs (Bull et al. 1998) - market forces are likely to 
complement the Government's plantation transition strategy. Included in the strategy 
was an increased sawlog allocation from exotic species plantations to Hyne and Sons 
and, from indigenous hoop plantations, to Finlayson Timber. These allocations will 
help to draw down Queensland's plantation sawlog stockpile. The $18 million State 
Government funded plantation program (Brown 2001) should realise around 6 000 
hectares of native hardwood plantations to complement the 186 000 hectare softwood 
plantation estate and provide for continued hardwood sawn timber production over the 
long term. 
The Federal Liberal-National Coalition Government argued that the Queensland 
agreement was not a valid solution under the National Forest Policy Statement and 
suspended formal RFA negotiations with the Queensland Government on 21 February 
2000 (Brown 2001). The Federal Government Minister for Conservation and Forests, 
Wilson Tuckey, argued that the south east Queensland RF A would not be endorsed 
because it failed to meet: 
'a set of conditions set out in the NFPS to set up a comprehensive and 
adequate reserve system that also allows for . . . a continuation of a hardwood 
forest industry. The Queensland Labor Government is being asked to follow 
the same rules as other states and the Commonwealth who have signed on 
for a consistent national approach to forest policy. ' (Tuckey, as quoted in 
Brown 2001). 
Brown, on the basis of the Minister's earlier press releases, interprets Tuckey' s 
understanding of a continuing hardwood industry to mean a native forest hardwood 
industry in perpetuity. The Minister's view was that native forests should be used for 
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wood production irrespective of the existence of alternative resources. 75 The Minister's 
argument led Brown to examine whether the National Forest Policy Statement actually 
entrenched native forests for wood production. He concluded: 
'While the NFPS may be based on an assumption that native forests can be 
logged in the long-term, nowhere does it say they must be logged. ' (Brown 
2001). 
Because the Queensland stakeholder agreement did not satisfy the Federal Government, 
it received no compensation funding through the RF A process. Instead the $80 million 
structural adjustment package was funded entirely from the Queensland public purse 
(Brown 2001 ). Against this loss is the enhanced persistence capacity of south east 
Queensland's native forest ecosystems, wood production system and socio-economic 
systems. 
Western Australia 
In contrast to the process of stakeholder negotiation in south east Queensland, Western 
Australia's environment movement continued its campaign for native forest protection 
mainly through public engagement. Western Australia's RFA process identified that 
only 8.2 per cent of its estimated pre-1750 forests were in conservation reserves 
(Commonwealth and Western Australian Regional Forest Agreement Steering 
Committee 1998b, appendix 6). The RFA, signed in May 1999, endorsed old-growth 
forest logging and galvanised wide public support for better conservation outcomes. 
With a state election imminent and the public losing confidence in its Environment 
Minister (who was also responsible for the forest agency), the Premier, Richard Court, 
was forced to directly engage in the issue.76 The outcome was a breaking of the RFA 
agreement signed with the Prime Minister only a few months earlier. In July 1999, the 
Premier announced that old-growth karri forest logging would be phased out by 2003 
and the annual karri sawlog cut reduced to 50 000 m3 per annum by 2003 (Western 
Australian Liberal Party 2001). Under the RFA, the karri sawlog cut would fall to 
178 000 m3 per annum by 2003. The RFA-set jarrah sawlog cut would remain 
unchanged. The environment movement argued that the changes were not sufficient -
nearly one-quarter of the remaining old-growth forests were still available for logging 
(B. Schultz pers. comm. 2001) - and supported the ALP's policy (Australian Labor 
Party - Western Australia 2001) of immediately ending logging in nearly 99 per cent of 
Western Australia's old-growth forests. 
Western Australia's old-growth forests were estimated to provide only 13 per cent of 
the state's native forest sawlogs and 17 per cent of its chiplogs in the early 1990s 
(Resource Assessment Commission 1992a, p. 151 ). A policy limited to old-growth 
forest conservation requires supplementation for the system-enhancing strategies 
75 The Federal Labor opposition expressed in the Senate the same view as the Minister when it voted in 
August 2001 against a Senate motion that wherever there is an existing plantation alternative, old-growth 
forests and high conservation forests should not be logged (Parliament of Australia 2001). 
76 As part of that process, I by invitation, briefed the Premier on the state's plantation resource and 
industry policy on 16 July 1999. 
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presented in chapter 5 to be implemented. In particular, policy must directly address 
native forest export woodchipping. Chip exports accounted for slightly over half the 
state's native forest log cut, and Sotico Pty. Ltd. (a subsidiary of Wesfarmers Ltd.) is 
the monopoly operator. As part of the Premier's July 1999 strategy, a process was 
initiated to help the company meet its Japanese chip contract with eucalypt plantation 
wood rather than native forest wood. On 13 March 2000, Wesfarmers Ltd. announced 
its transition to a plantation-based woodchip industry in Western Australia (Wesfarmers 
Ltd. 2000). The company announced that its native forest chip exports would decline 
from 630 000 tonnes per annum in 1999 to 270 000 tonnes per annum by 2002. 
Concurrently, eucalypt plantation chip exports would increase from 50 000 tonnes per 
annum in 1999 to 7 50 000 tonnes per annum in 2002 and about one million tonnes per 
annum by 2004 (Wesfarmers Ltd. 2000). This initiative, combined with the protection 
of all old-growth forests in Western Australia (the ALP won the state election), means 
that the state is now undergoing a substantial transition to a plantation-based industry. 
The Queensland and Western Australian experiences demonstrate the political 
feasibility of a plantation transition for Australia. The premiers of both State 
Governments were motivated to look further than the RF A process as a basis for their 
native forest and wood industry policy. They needed, amongst other things, information 
on the plantation resource and its processing potential and a coherent policy framework 
that could meet conflicting objectives. With this information, they could negotiate with 
the players, particularly industry, pragmatic and immediate plantation transition 
outcomes. The RF A process undermined this approach, denying government and the 
public information about the potential for a plantation transition in every RF A region, 
except East Gippsland where there are virtually no plantations. Examination of 
Australia's knowledge about its plantation wood supply potential (chapter 7) provides 
some insight as to why plantation processing was virtually ignored in Australia's 1990s 
policy. 
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Chapter 7 
Impediments to information flow 
7 .1 Introduction 
Product substitution is fundamental to the strategic choice land use framework 
presented in chapter 5. Product substitution embodying increased resource productivity 
has been proposed for the energy, transport, communication, agriculture, construction, 
packaging, consumer good and home building sectors ( von W eizsacker et al. 1997; 
Hawken et al. 1999). Chapters 5 and 6 established that with large volumes of available 
plantation wood ( chapters 3 and 4) market-based competition provides an important 
mechanism for product substitution. These chapters also found that government 
policies can undermine product substitution even though substitution may be desirable 
from a wider perspective. 
Schattshneider's (1960) analysis of the mobilisation of bias in political organisation 
offers a potential theoretical explanation for government policy resistance to product 
substitution. In his analysis of democracy in America, Schattshneider argued that, by its 
very nature, politics ensures that some issues are organised into politics and others are 
organised out: 
'All forms of political organization have a bias in favor of the 
exploitation of some kinds of conflict and the suppression of others 
because organization is the mobiliation of bias.' (Schattschneider 
1960, p. 71). 
Those with power are able to focus decision making on the issues and information that 
advantage them and away from issues that would disadvantage them. 
Bachrach & Baratz (1970) in their study of poverty, race and politics in Baltimore, 
USA, linked the mobilisation of bias to 'nondecision-making' . By keeping issues and 
information out of the public arena, conflict could be suppressed and the status quo 
maintained. Bachrach and Baratz extended the definition of power to explicitly include 
situations where: 
'A devotes his energies to creating or reinforcing social and political 
values and institutional practices that limit the scope of the political 
process to public consideration of only those issues which are 
comparatively innocuous to A. To the extent that A succeeds in doing this, 
B is prevented, for all practical purposes, from bringing to the fore any 
issues that might in their resolution be seriously detrimental to A 's set of 
preferences.' (Bachrach & Baratz 1970, p. 7). 
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They perceived a diversity of mechanisms for achieving 'nondecision-making', 
including co-opting with the enticement of potential rewards, branding individuals and 
groups in negative ways and intimidation. The motivation for 'nondecision-making' , 
argue Bachrach and Baratz, is to prevent change in the existing allocation of benefits: 
'To be more nearly explicit, nondecision-making is a means by which 
demands for change in the existing allocation of benefits and privileges in 
the community can be suffocated before they are even voiced; or kept 
covert; or killed before they gain access to the relevant decision making 
arena; or, failing all these things, maimed or destroyed in the decision-
implementation stage of the policy process.' (Bachrach & Baratz 1970, p. 
44). 
Australia's 1990s native forest and wood industry policy was as much a nondecision 
about plantation processing as it was a decision to facilitate increased wood supply 
from native forests and plantations. The mobilisation of bias and nondecision making 
are the pegs used in this chapter's examination of the reaction of interested players -
including the public service and government - to new information that could threaten 
the status quo agenda. The information, namely Australia's plantation wood supply 
potential, could be regarded as old information because the plantation wood coming on 
stream in the 1990s and soon thereafter was largely the legacy of the 1960s softwood 
plantation program . . It was new information in the sense that, by the time these 
plantations matured, they appeared to have been largely forgotten or dismissed by 
policy makers in the three decades of conflict over native forest allocation and resource 
use. 
I examine the RAC's performance in providing reliable information on Australia' s 
plantation wood supply potential. This is to establish the nature of the information the 
Federal Government had at the time of its 1995 policy to exit the native forest 
environment arena. The chapter then investigates the reaction to a significant initiative 
of the environment movement to identify Australia's plantation wood processing 
potential and the subsequent behaviour of interested players to the public release of that 
information. The project, funded by the Federal Government, incorporated the 
production of the 1995 report Australia's Plantations: Industry, Employment, 
Environment that was written by me in my capacity at the time as a consultant. 
7.2 Government information on Australia's plantation wood supply 
at January 1995 
The wood supply potential of Australia's existing plantation estate is critical 
information for policy. A relatively large, unused resource meant that government 
could consider a bolder conservation agenda combined with a policy to encourage 
investment in processing. The opposite would support a policy of continued use of the 
native forest resource and additional plantation establishment. 
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At that time of the Federal Government's decision in 1995 to exit the native forest 
environment policy arena, the most up-to-date information on Australia's plantation 
wood supply potential was that generated by the AFC in 1989 and the RAC in 1992. 
The AFC presented projections of Australia's softwood plantation wood supply 
potential to 2030, disaggregated by region and log grade (Australian Forestry Council 
1989). Inadequate documentation prevents peer review. Information explaining the 
projections is limited to reporting the plantation area by species and state, and 
plantation productivity (MAI) for Australia as a whole. The AFC reports an average 
MAI for the Australian softwood plantations of 18 m3 per hectare per annum - the 
upper end of the range of projections (table 4.5). The projections present a relatively 
low sawlog supply particularly for the period 2000-19 (see Appendix E for a 
comparison with other projections). The absence of documentation, particularly on 
plantation management assumptions, meant the reason for the relatively low sawlog 
supply projection could not be identified. 
The RAC argued that the wood and wood products industry must remain dependent for 
some time on the native forest resource, suggesting that Australia had not then planted 
sufficient trees (Resource Assessment Commission 1992a, pp. 34-5). The RAC 
remained silent about the importance of the plantation resource in its 14 pages of 
principal conclusions and recommendations. In its overview chapter, the RAC 
presented qualitative information vaguely indicating the wood supply role of 
plantations. Quantitative information on wood and wood products industry production 
and trade was aggregated by sector irrespective of wood source (Resource Assessment 
Commission 1992a, p. 6, 19). The RAC did not report on Australia's future plantation 
wood supply in its conclusions, recommendations and overview chapter. This 
information was presented in appendix L. The appendix reported the RAC 's projections 
of plantation wood supply graphically, not numerically. This, combined with the 
omission of key information and assumptions underpinning the projections, frustrated 
peer review. The RAC created confusion over the softwood plantation resource by 
presenting (numerically expressed) projections of softwood sawn timber production 
(Resource Assessment Commission 1992a, table L.5). They are effectively 
consumption projections - quite different to projections of resource supply potential. As 
discussed below, the sawn timber production projections were developed using vaguely 
specified, contestable assumptions about the industry's competitiveness against native 
forest and imported sawn timber. 
Numerical projections of the RAC's graphically presented projections of Australia' s 
softwood plantation sawlog supply potential were derived using ANU software77 and 
are presented in table 7.1 together with the RAC's projections of softwood plantation 
sawn timber production. Appendix E presents the RAC's projections of softwood 
plantation wood supply together with other projections prepared in the late 1980s and 
1990s. 
77 The Data Grabber program was developed by Steve Roxburgh of the Ecosystem Dynamics Group of 
the Research School of Biological Sciences at the Australian National University. 
167 
Table 7.1 Resource Assessment Commission projected softwooda sawlog supply and softwooda sawn 
timber production and potential softwood sawn timber production. Source: Resource Assessment 
Commission (1992a); Australian Bureau of Agricultural and Resource Economics (2001b) . 
Year RAC projected RAC projected Potential sawn Per cent of 
2000 actual 
sawlog supplyb sawn timber timber productiond projected 
(000 m3 log per 
annum) 
production sawlog supply 
assumed to be 
(000 m3 sawn 
timber per annum) 
2 388 
(000 m3 sawn 
timber per annum) 
used for sawn 
timbe{ 
(%) 
1990 projected 3 760 1 549 1 504 103 
2000projected 7810 2048 3124 66 
2010 projected 8 750 2 036 3 500 58 
2020 projected 8 730 2 074 3 492 59 
2030 projected 6 850 2 136 2 740 78 
a. Softwood is assumed to be all plantation based. Softwood sawlogs include veneer logs. 
b. Projections presented graphically converted to numerical data using ANU Data Grabber software. 
c. Data for 1999/00. This figure is likely to under-report availability because of the stockpile situation 
and debate about grading plantation log exports. 
d. Assuming a 40 per cent sawn timber recovery. 
e. RAC projected sawn timber production as a percentage of potential production. 
The analysis presented in table 7 .1 clarifies a key assumption RAC made about the use 
of softwood plantation sawlogs. Prior to 2000, the RAC assumed - presumably on the 
basis of actual production data - that virtually all Australia's softwood plantation 
sawlog resource would be used ror sawn timber production. However, for the year 2000 
and onwards it was assumed that between 35 and 40 per cent of Australia's softwood 
saw log supply would not be used for sawn timber production (table 7 .1 ). This could not 
be identified in the RAC' s report because one set of information was presented 
graphically and the other numerically. 
The RAC did explain its assumed under-use of the plantation sawlog supply. It 
identified a surplus softwood plantation sawlog resource that had been diverted to chip 
production. The surplus was generated by constraints the RAC had imposed on the 
share of the Australian market assumed to be supplied by Australian softwood 
plantation sawn timber. It constrained softwood sawn timber (imported and 
domestically produced) to 65 per cent of the Australian market and maintained the 
market share of Australia's softwood plantation sawn timber industry within that, 
arguing that the industry was uncompetitive against imported softwood (Resource 
Assessment Commission 1992a, L50-5 l ). In 2000, softwoods accounted for 71 per cent 
of the Australian sawn timber market and the market share of Australian softwood 
plantation sawn timber increased from 36 per cent in 1992 to 51 per cent in 2000 
(Australian Bureau of Agricultural and Resource Economics 2001 b and previous 
editions). The RAC had assumed that native forest hardwood sawn timber would 
supply 30 per cent of the Australian sawn timber market in 2000. In 1999/00 it supplied 
25 per cent ( calculated using appendix D and Australian Bureau of Agricultural and 
Resource Economics (2001 b )). The RAC, based on poor market analysis, has presented 
unrealistic projections of Australia's softwood plantation sawn timber production 
(consumption). The RAC's projection of 'no growth' in Australian softwood plantation 
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sawn timber production over the next three decades has already been defied with 
production in 2000 being 17 per cent higher than projected (table 7.1). 
The second component of the RA C's constraint on the softwood plantation sawn timber 
market share was its view that Australia faced a softwood chip shortage. It argued that, 
because current softwood plantation management aims to maximise sawlog yields, 
there was insufficient chip resource to meet Australia's projected future needs 
(Resource Assessment Commission 1992a, L47). No evidence or argument was 
provided to support the softwood chip shortage view. Subsequent reports identified a 
serious problem of insufficient markets for thinning material for most Australian 
softwood plantation regions (Victorian Wood Products Working Party 1993, p. 22; 
Jaakko Poyry Consulting 2000, p. 16). This problem was well-known within the · 
industry by the mid 1980s. 
The RAC reported that in its modeling work it modified the softwood plantation 
harvesting regime to more than double chiplog yields, having the effect that sawlog 
availability declined by about 20 per cent (Resource Assessment Commission 1992a, 
L47). It is not clear whether the RAC's graphical projections of softwood plantation 
saw log supply (reported numerically in table 7 .1) include this 20 per cent reduction. 
In summary, the RAC provided the Federal Government with an inadequate account of 
the then significance of Australia's plantations for wood products manufacturing and 
employment and presented a confused and unrealistic account of Australia's plantation 
wood supply potential, particularly that of softwood sawlogs. 
7.3 New information that challenged the policy agenda 
This section examines, through a case study focussed on the report, Australia 's 
Plantations: Industry, Employment, Environment report (hereafter called the Report), 
how stakeholders and government react to information and processes that are perceived 
to threaten the status quo agenda. The Report was an initiative of the Australian State 
and Territory Conservation Councils who, in June 1993, sought funding from the 
Federal Minister for Environment, Ros Kelly, for a process to improve the 
understanding of the environment movement, industry, government policy makers and 
the public of the output and employment growth potential of the plantation industry and 
to identify the implications for industry and environment policy at the national level 
(State Conservation Councils 1994a). 
The project had two components. The first was to undertake research and gather 
information to develop a nation-wide picture of Australia's plantation base as well as 
identifying, for each state, industry development and employment opportunities that 
could be supported by both industry and the environment movement. This work was 
presented in the Report. The second component of the project was to build on this 
information to develop a deeper understanding within the environment movement of 
the critical issues surrounding the shift to plantation processing (State Conservation 
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Councils 1994b; Clark 1995a, appendix 1 ). This work was undertaken by eight project 
officers who, under my supervision, carried out data collection and information tasks 
and researched identified issues; visited plantations and processing facilities and 
engaged with industry players; and communicated information and discussed issues 
with the wider environment movement. A high degree of co-operation was required 
from the plantation industry to develop an accurate picture of the wood-supply potential 
of the existing plantation estate, the role of the plantation processing industry at the 
time and its growth potential over the following decade. All large and medium-sized 
plantation processors and major plantation growers were consulted and contributed 
information to the project (Clark 1995a, appendix 3). 
The key findings of the Report were that: 
• plantation wood was the dominant resource for the Australian wood products 
industry with more than two-thirds of the wood and fibre processed domestically 
already coming from plantations and recycling and less than one-third from native 
forests, 
• plantation processors were poised to invest . large sums in processing capacity to 
take advantage of rapidly expanding supplies of plantation wood, 
• with the large volumes of plantation wood available for processing, the public could 
choose the future for Australia's native forests, and 
• to reap the benefits that Australia's plantation processing industry could deliver in 
the 1990s, all stakeholders had to escape from past attitudes (Clark 1995a, pp. ix-
x). 
The project was not an isolated piece of work. Its origins lay in an earlier research 
paper (Clark & Blakers 1989) stimulated by an interest in reworking the figures in 
Cameron & Penna (1988) to clarify the wood resource implications of Australia 's 
existing plantations. A later study commissioned by Environment Victoria confirmed 
the growth potential of plantation processing and associated employment at a Victorian 
state level (Clark 1992b ). The Victorian Government, aware of the potential for 
substantial agreement between industry and the environment movement, established the 
Victorian Wood Products Working Party in 1993 to identify these opportunities and 
develop a strategic plan. The Working Party included members from the plantation and 
native forest industry, unions and the environment movement. 78 The Working Party 
confirmed substantial growth opportunities in plantation processing and substantial 
agreement between the plantation industry members and the environment movement 
(Victorian Wood Products Working Party 1993). This outcome encouraged other State 
Conservation Councils to revisit plantations. The process they settled on was embedded 
in the funding proposal submitted to the Federal Minister for the Environment in 1993 
by Environment Victoria acting on behalf of the State Conservation Councils. 
The Minister for the Environment, John Faulkner, approved funding for the project in 
August 1994 (Cook 1994). The 14-month delay to what was a 12-month project, meant 
78 Phillip Sutton, Director of Green Innovations Inc. , and myself were also on the Working Party. 
Notably public servants were used as support staff and professional facilitation ensured that the Working 
Party controlled the agenda. 
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that its contribution to the policy process in the critical period of early 1995 was 
limited. The reactions to the project and Report can be divided into four phases - the 
pre-study phase, the study phase, the Report release phase and the post-Report release 
phase. 
Pre-study phase 
The results of the Victorian studies (Clark 1992b; Victorian Wood Products Working 
Party 1993) provided a reasonable indication of the situation and outlook for other 
states and Australia as a whole because the softwood planting program was common to 
all states ( chapters 3 and 4). Most players could broadly envisage the project's potential 
before work commenced. 
A number of factors contributed to the relatively long 14-month period waiting for 
Federal Government funding approval. The first delay resulted from the Environment 
Minister inviting the Minister for Resources, Michael Lee, and his Department to 
participate. The offer was effectively refused in October 1993 (Lee 1993). The 
Resources Minister argued that it was premature to commit funds to the project and that 
consideration of industry development and employment opportunities should wait until 
other government studies were finalised and considered. These included the Industry 
Commission's 1993 report, Adding Further Value to Australia 's Forest Resources, the 
Australian Taxation Office's comprehensive public ruling on private plantation taxation 
and the Bureau of Rural Science's (BRS) National Plantation Inventory (Lee 1993). 
The Industry Commission's report was released in September 1993 and, whilst it 
advanced our understanding of industry structural change, substantial work remained to 
be done on establishing the potential for the plantation resource to generate even more 
industry efficiency gains. The tax ruling related to future plantings - the Report was 
focussed on opportunities surrounding the existing plantation resource. The BRS' work 
was in a very early stage, and the BRS presented the National Plantation Inventory four 
years later. The State Conservation Councils submitted a revised proposal in February 
1994 that Minister Kelly verbally approved but did not sign before her resignation on 
1 March 1994 (State Conservation Councils 1994a; L. Parlane79 pers. comm. 2001). 
The incoming Environment Minister, John Faulkner, did not act on the Department' s 
recommendation to fund the project until questions about Environment Victoria ' s 
finances were settled on receipt of their audited financial statements (Faulkner 1994b ). 
The questions were raised by Barry Cunningham, ALP Member for McMillan. The 
McMillan electorate was the home of Amcor's Maryvale pulp and paper mill 
complex,80 which relied on native forests for about half of its wood supply, and the 
Central Highlands native forest sawrnillers, the state ' s largest sawmilling region 
(Jaakko Poyry Consulting 2001 , p. 16). In the late 1980s, Amcor and the CFMEU 
formed what they called the Maryvale 'A' Team to tackle public opposition to the 
construction of an ocean outfall. The alliance was maintained after the outfall was 
completed and used as a powerful weapon in the company' s fight against other 
79 Linda Par lane was Director of Environment Victoria and initiated the project. 
80 Amcor later divested its subsidiary, the Australian Papers Group , through a public vehicle called 
PaperlinX Ltd . . 
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conservation threats (McCallum 1997). Cunningham's concern was focussed on the 
native forest resource, although plantations then supplied slightly more than half the 
region's wood resource and plantation processing growth opportunities were significant 
(Department of Conservation and Natural Resources 1993; Stewart & Clark 1995, pp. 
167, 174).81 Environment Victoria provided the necessary documents, thereby 
addressing Cunningham's concerns. 
Study phase 
Minister Faulkner announced the Government's approval and funding for the project in 
his speech at the ALP National Conference on 29 September 1994. As part of his green 
jobs theme, Faulkner said: 
'Plantation forestry can also be described as a 'green' industry. I'm 
looking at how plantations can play a role in relieving pressure on native 
forests, while at the same time offering significant expansion of the 
industry's resource base. To this end, I have recently agreed to fund a 
National Plantation Study involving State and Territory based 
Conservation Councils. The Study will provide an information base on 
Australia's plantation resource and encourage a greater understanding of 
the critical issues surrounding the shift to plantation processing.' 
(Faulkner 1994a, p. 4 ). 
The Minister's announcement triggered Bob Richardson, Industrial Officer for the 
ACTU, to issue the press release, ACTU and industry slams green funding, on 
IO October (Australian Council of Trade Unions 1994). The release reported that a 
coalition from Timber Towns, the ACTU and the CFMEU 'were furious over the 
Minister's decision' and called on Industry Minister Peter Cook and Resources 
Minister David Beddall to intervene. Jon Faine from Melbourne's radio station 3LO 
interviewed Bob Richardson and clarified the union's concerns. Richardson explained 
that: 
[the Report] 'will say that the forest products industry should get out of 
native forests and into plantations. What I do is object, and the unions and 
the community groups object to them [the Federal Government] funding 
groups in specific circumstances where the reports are unscientific, 
they 're going to be used as propaganda tools. In fact some of them are 
already being used by Lindsay Tanner [ALP Member for Melbourne] to 
substantiate a particular political position. That's what we 're objecting 
to.' (Richardson [BJ 1994). 
81 Amcor's Maryvale operations relied on native forests for 47 per cent of its wood supply in 1999/00 -
53 per cent being sourced from plantations, predominantly softwood (Stafford et al. 2000, p. 371). In 
1999/00 the softwood plantation sawmills in the region processed 411 000 m3 of sawlogs (Stafford et al. 
2000, pp. 336, 371). Public native forest sawlog supply from the Central, Central Gippsland and 
Dandenong regions totalled 366 100 m3 in 1999/00 (Department ofNatural Resources and Environment 
2000). 
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The ACTU and CFMEU were attempting to stifle research into manufacturing and 
employment growth in Australia's already dominant plantation industry as part of the 
native forest and wood industry policy process. 
Minister Faulkner responded to the union's criticisms in the Senate the next day (11 
October 1994) arguing: 
'they [ the criticisms] are groundless. I think they are mischievous 
statements. They are certainly statements that, I believe are out of step 
with many of his union colleagues.' (Faulkner 1994b ). 
Faulkner used the rest of his question time differentiating the project from previous 
studies that focussed on plantation wood growing, rather than processing, and 
concluded: 
'I believe this study will provide a basis for greater dialogue on plantation 
issues between industry, union and conservation interests. I think this is 
very important to the environment debate in this country. ' (Faulkner 
1994b). 
The Minister's enthusiasm disappeared when the Government decided to exit from the 
native forest environment policy arena. This was demonstrated during his one-day tour 
of plantation operations in the Mount Gambier region in May 1995. 82 The Minister was 
uninterested and communicated minimally with industry. At lunch he delivered a strong 
attack on Australian Greens Party Senator Brown and the Wilderness Society -
destroying, in the plantation industry's mind, any notion of harmony between the 
industry, environment movement and the Government. At his press conference, the 
Minister expressed support for the industry and displayed none of the earlier disinterest. 
Given the Government's policy redirection following the January 1995 Parliament 
House blockade, the Minister could have elected to cancel the tour. My interpretation is 
that the Minister was on a mission to deliver the message that a harmonious 
relationship between the plantation processing industry, the Federal Government and 
the environment movement was not a political reality. The Labor Government was 
facing a federal election and not antagonising the unions was essential for keeping 
native forest issues out of the media. 
The project required information from the plantation industry to fill information gaps 
and develop regional industry profiles. With the exception of small processors, every 
plantation processing company and all the major growers contributed information to the 
project. A list of the companies and government business operations and individuals 
providing information is presented in the Report (Clark 1995a, appendix 3). My 
interpretation of this high degree of cooperation is that the plantation processors were 
frustrated by the lack of government recognition of their part of the industry and saw 
82 The tour incorporated Kimberly-Clark Australia's pulp and paper mill, CSR Timber Product' s wood 
panels operations and Auspine's sawmill and plantation growing operations. Company heads, senior 
managers and I were in attendance. 
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that a report presenting a national picture could help redress the imbalance. Of 
significance was the support from Henry Pens, Chief Executive of CSR Timber 
Products, whose operations dominated Australia's sawn timber and wood panels 
industry at the time, and Adrian de Bruin, Managing Director of Auspine Ltd., which 
owns large plantation sawmills in Tasmania and South Australia and was Australia's 
largest softwood plantation woodchip exporter. This support made it easier for other 
companies to engage in the project. Surprisingly, for those companies using both 
plantation and native forest wood, the decision about participating did not appear to be 
a challenge. This can be explained by the project's focus on factual information about 
the plantation part of the industry, the industry's obvious understanding of the 
importance of plantations both now and in the future, the participation of major 
industry players, and the project team's interest in the industry and its information 
sources. With the exception of pulp and paper producers, most companies that process 
both native forest and plantation wood do so in separate establishments. Because the 
project focussed on establishments operating in the regions, it was able to communicate 
directly with mill managers who had responsibility for a plantation business and could 
therefore speak with clarity about the situation and the outlook for the plantation sector. 
Amcor's behaviour contrasted to that of other plantation-processing companies. The 
company was represented by Angus Pollock, General Manager of Forest Resources at 
Amcor and a member of the above mentioned Victorian Wood Products Working 
Party. He considered that the Working Party had presented some good proposals but 
objected to the message from Environment Victoria that there was enough wood in 
plantations to substitute for native forest logging. His concern about the national project 
was that the environment movement would 'misuse' the information presented in the 
Report and that the study should be done by an industry department as part of an 
industry policy process. Pollock advised that he was reluctant to be involved but that 
Minister Faulkner had visited Amcor and his Ministerial Advisor was keen to broker a 
meeting (A. Pollock pers. comm. 8 March 1995). 
It appears likely that somewhere between March 1995 and May 1995 (when Faulkner 
delivered his pointed message to the South Australian plantation processors) the Labor 
Federal Government ruled out a native forest and wood industry policy approach that 
embraced a transition to plantation processing. 
Amcor was left as the last company to be consulted - it could choose whether or not to 
participate. Its decision was irrelevant from an information perspective because the 
company had provided the necessary information for a previous report (Clark 1992b). 
The interest was more for industry consultation completeness. Pollock and members of 
the project team met on 10 April 1995 with George Masri, Advisor to the Federal 
Minister for the Environment, facilitating the meeting. The main aim of the meeting 
from the Report's perspective was to clarify Amcor's eucalypt plantation wood supply 
and processing outlook. Pollock presented Amcor' s projections of wood supply from 
the company's eucalypt plantations in the Maryvale region of Victoria. The figures 
were significantly lower than calculations using area, productivity and management 
regime information previously provided by Pollock and presented in Clark (1992b, pp. 
82-3). Information, or confirmation of existing information, was sought from and 
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provided by Pollock at the meeting to enable a later recalculation of the projections. 
This comprised plantation productivity by species, plantation age profile, rotatio
n 
length by species and clarification on the extent to which the plantations would be use
d 
for sawlog supply. Information from the meeting (Clark 1995c) was forwarded to 
Pollock who verified the accuracy of the eucalypt plantation assumptions and data
. 
There was a significant discrepancy between the projections of eucalypt plantation 
chiplog supply presented by Pollock at the meeting and those reworked using hi
s 
assumptions (table 7 .2). 
Table 7.2 Projections of eucalypt chiplog supply from Am.car's plantations. Source: Clark (1995c); 
Stewart & Clark (1995). 
Eucalypt plantation 
wood available by: 
Available in 199 5 from 
plantings >30 years in 
age 
1995-99 
2000-04 
2005-09 
2010-14 
2015-19 
Eucalypt plantation 
chiplog supply 
presented by Pollock on 
10 April 1995 
(000 m3 per annum) 
350 
100 
150 
150 
150 
175 
Eucalypt plantation 
chiplog supply 
calculated by Clark 
using data provided by 
Pollock on 10 April 
199 5 and later verified 
by Pollock 
(000 m3 per annum) 
119 
223 
234 
392 
not calculated 
* Not calculated because it requires an assumption about future first rotation planting.
 
Difference 
(%) 
19.2 
48.8 
55.9 
161.1 
Barry Cunningham in Federal Parliament again attacked the project on 1 June 1995. He 
reported that Amcor had approached him, as the local member, about the project. 
Cunningham (incorrectly) argued that, because Amcor was not prepared to respond to 
the project, information had been denied to it, and therefore the project could not meet 
its objectives. Cunningham argued: 
'It [the not yet released Report] is flawed: it should not be allowed to be 
used as a catalyst for a fraudulent campaign: it should not be allowed to 
be used in the way these people intend to use it, in order to convince city 
people on an issue where they do not have a lot of knowledge. It is an 
emotional issue and the information being provided to them is emotional: 
the planning to use this is emotional; and it is causing tremendous 
problems in an industry in Australia .. .I call on the government to get some 
alternative reports which have substance and are done by proper people.' 
(Cunningham 1995). 
Cunningham's calls went unheeded, but his parliamentary speech added to earlie
r 
actions to publicly tarnish the Report. 
Cunningham was one of an important group of Federal ALP Members of Parliamen
t 
whose rural seats were vulnerable in the forthcoming early 1996 election. The ALP was
 
sensitive to criticism that it had abandoned the rural worker. A policy that enhance
d 
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native forest conservation and promoted plantation processing was perceived as an 
attack on 'forest' industry jobs and would further add to the ALP 's image of 
abandoning the rural worker. The Prime Minister's office was pressured on native 
forest and wood industry policy because of these concerns (M. O'Neill pers. comm. 
1995). 0 'Neill reported nine rural seats that the party had identified as close contests at 
the forthcoming election - seven were held by the ALP. At the March 1996 election, six 
of the seven seats held by the ALP were lost and the Liberal Party retained their two 
previously held seats. 83 Ironically, electorates with a significant native forest industry 
that were held by the ALP (namely, Page, McMillan and Bass) also had significant 
plantation resources. This correlation is explained by the clearing of native forests for 
plantation establishment. 
The Report was finished in May 1995 and the Department of the Environment, Sport 
and Territories decided that it should be peer reviewed. Although this process was not 
included in the Conditions of Grant agreed to by the Department and Environment 
Victoria, Environment Victoria advised that they would be happy for the department to 
initiate a peer review to assist in preparing a briefing for their Minister (Parlane 
1995).84 An explanation of the motivation for the peer review was provided by Dr 
Robert Bain, Executive Director of NAFI. In a memo written to an ACTU officer in 
August (the purpose of which is discussed below), Bain advised that: 
'Senator Faulkner's department is currently distancing themselves from 
the report because they are aware of its potentially political 
embarrassment for their minister and are trying to insist that it is purely 
an Environment Victoria report ... Senator Faulkner is acutely aware that 
if the report is significantly flawed he will be closely questioned by the 
Opposition and is likely to be significantly embarrassed. ' ( as quoted in 
Nicholson 1995). 
On 5 June 1995, the Department sent out invitations and a consultancy brief to peer 
review the Report (Griffiths 1995). The peer review did not proceed because the 
forestry consultants invited to tender declined. 
Environment Victoria sent the Report to Graham Ogilvie, General Manager of ANM 
Ltd., 85 Henry Pens and Adrian de Bruin for review and comment. Between them, they 
managed significant businesses in all sectors of the Australian wood and wood products 
industry. Environment Victoria's intention was to satisfy itself of the accuracy of the 
Report's findings and to test the waters for industry participation in jointly releasing the 
Report. All three spoke positively about the Report and two, in events discussed below, 
put their opinions on the Report into the public domain. Ogilvie wrote: 
83 The seats lost by the ALP in the 1996 election were Page (Harry Woods) , Richmond (Neville Newell), 
McMillan (Barry Cunningham), Bass (Silvia Smith), Patterson (Robert Home), Capricornia (Marjorie 
Henzell). Lyons (Dick Adams) was the only seat identified by O'Neill that the ALP retained. 
84 Environment Victoria's concern was limited to the Department first confirming that the Report 
fulfilled the terms of the Conditions of the Grant (Par lane 199 5) enabling the final grant payment. 
85 ANM Ltd. produced pulp and newsprint in Tasmania and New South Wales using softwood 
plantations, native forests and recycled paper. 
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'I am impressed with the comprehensiveness of the report and support the 
author's call for government, industry and conservation groups to work 
together to expand the processing of existing plantations and to increase 
Australia's plantation estate ... As the report notes, plantations already 
make a significant contribution, however the major public focus in the past 
has been on native forest wood and recycling. This report addresses the 
often forgotten area of plantations and urges industry, government and the 
conservation movement to work together to maximise the potential of this 
resource . . . I would hope that this report will have a similar impact [ to the 
RF A process then just underway] in terms of focussing attention on the 
importance of plantations to achieving a wood and wood fibre balance 
which meets both industry and conservation objectives.' (Ogilvie, as 
quoted in Australian Newsprint Mills Ltd. 1995). 
de Bruin, when questioned by the media about the Report, said: 
'Well for the first time we've got a study that has got some credibility, 
some real credibility, whereas the previous assessments I think were 
lacking and didn't involve enough private industry players.' ( de Bruin, as 
quoted in ABC TV 1995). 
Pens said of the Report: 
'It surprised me not in a negative sense but a positive sense. Nothing 
directly concerns me. Most messages are positive in relation to the 
plantation industry. So from your perspective there is no problem with me 
in association with the report. It's a good balance and recognises my 
direct input.' (H. Pens pers. comm. 9 August 1995). 
Release phase 
By July 1995, Environment Victoria commenced serious planning for the release of the 
Report. The key player was Ogilvie because he was highly respected in both the native 
forest and plantation parts of the industry and understood that any approaches that 
could genuinely reduce conflict were good for the industry. Ogilvie consulted the 
industry before making his decision about participating in a public launch of the Report 
- three-quarters were supportive and one-quarter was emphatically opposed (L. Parlane 
pers. comm. 1995). With this support, Ogilvie formally agreed on 3 August 1995 to 
participate in the Report's release on the condition that, although he believed the Report 
was constructive and made an important contribution to the overall debate, he would 
make it clear that he did not endorse it completely. In particular, he would state in his 
address that he believed that, with the RF A process allocating native forest areas for 
preservation, the remaining areas could be used for production forestry and/or clearing 
for plantations (Ogilvie 1995a). This did not imply any endorsement at the launch of 
the view by other parties, including the environment movement - it was a statement of 
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view. Parlane and Ogilvie proceeded with a Joint industry/environment movement 
public launch on the basis of this understanding (L. Parlane pers. comm. 1995). 
Shortly thereafter, Ogilvie reluctantly withdrew his acceptance because he did not want 
to leave his successor with an ANM-precipitated legacy of industry divisiveness 
(Ogilvie 1995b ). 86 At the time, Ogilvie was unaware of the above-mentioned memo 
from Dr Bain to the ACTU officer. In that memo Bain also wrote: 
'Industry has expressed concern to Mr Ogilvie that his participation and 
even partial endorsement of the report will be used as a major propaganda 
tool by the extreme elements of the environmental movement against the 
industry ... I would be grateful if Mr Ogilvie can be contacted by the union 
movement indicating that his endorsement of the report may have 
significant adverse consequences for industry development and 
employment.' (as quoted in Nicholson 1995). 
When Ogilvie became aware of the memo he wrote to the NAFI board, sending copies 
to others, advising them that, before he made the decision to withdraw, Robert Bain had 
written to the union movement asking them to pressure him to reject the invitation. 
Ogilvie's message to the NAFI Board expressed his anger over Bain's action: 
'I think it is outrageous that the head of an industry organisation would do 
such a thing. It has deeply concerned me. The Greens are aware of the 
Bain request and will no doubt pick their time to use it. An ABC Radio 
journalist has already raised it with me. Again, for industry solidarity 
reasons, I believe I successfully batted it away. Perhaps the next media 
bowler may not allow that to happen.' (Ogilvie 1995b ). 
Ogilvie reported that the union movement did not act on the request. What was 
remarkable about Bain's actions was that, as the head of an industry association, he was 
prepared to engage worker unions against the expressed interests of industry. 
With a public release of the Report scuttled, Environment Victoria, on behalf of the 
State Conservation Councils, successfully approached ABC TV's Lateline Program87 to 
cover the Report. The story ran on 24 August 1995. After introducing the Report and 
the issues, the program moved to a debate between Linda Parlane and Robert Bain with 
Kerry O'Brien presenting. From a policy perspective, the most important issue was the 
accuracy of the Report's findings. Kerry O'Brien worked to establish whether the 
Report was credible in the eyes ofNAFI, the organisation representing the native forest 
and plantation industry nationally. O'Brien asked: 
'Robert Bain - this is an extraordinarily optimistic report on the capacity 
of plantation forest to supply all Australia 's timber needs in the future. Do 
86 Ogilvie was soon to take up an appointment with a pulp and paper company in south east Asia. 
87 Lateline ran at 10.00 p.m. and targeted politicians and the interested public on current political issues . 
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you find any fault with the factual base?' (O'Brien, as quoted in ABC TV 
1995). 
Bain replied: 
'No, I don't Kerry, in the sense that what it is focussed on is the existing 
plantations - the plantations that we have in the ground now and it 
highlights the potential of those plantations. And I think that is very 
important. And I think that has got lost in the debate. It has been 
understated and it highlights it.' (Bain, as quoted in ABC TV 1995). 
Bain did not 'quibble' about the Report's finding that plantation wood supply would 
double in the following ten years and acknowledged that plantation wood already 
dominated the Australian markets for wood products (ABC TV 1995). 
From a policy perspective, Bain's public agreement over the wood supply potential of 
Australia's existing plantations should have been a significant development. That it was 
not can be explained by the nature of entrenched conflict and the actions of players in 
the Report's post-release phase. 
Post-release phase 
Plantations Report Not Credible was the heading for one of the two NAFI media 
releases issued the day after the Lateline program (National Association of Forest 
Industries 1995a). The media release remained silent about the Report's plantation 
wood supply projections. Instead it argued that the Report only dealt with existing 
plantations; conflicted with the National Forest Policy Statement; ignored the 
worsening trade deficit; and ignored the increase in global demand for wood products. 
It argued that withdrawing Australia's native forests from wood supply would therefore 
put more pressure on overseas forests and result in substitution by less environmentally 
friendly products. These contestable arguments worked to establish the Report as 
controversial and therefore undermine the capacity for its key information to be taken 
up in the policy process. 
NAFI's second media release for the day, New Study Shows Major Growth in Forest 
Industries (National Association of Forest Industries 1995b ), appeared aimed at 
creating confusion. The study ( Centre for International Economics 1995) mixed 
together the plantation and native forest resource. NAFI presented the CIE's projections 
of the output, employment and net trade that could be achieved by 2030 given 
appropriate policy changes. These changes were aimed at promoting greater use of 
native forest wood and substantial new plantation establishment - the policy the Federal 
Government implemented in the second half of the 1990s. NAFI argued for a greater 
use of native forest residues (then 'wasted' as a consequence of the woodchip export 
controls); more investment in pulp and paper production (not specifying the resource); 
creation of substantial new plantations; and increased processing of native forest 
hardwoods. Securing increased investment in plantation processing was not mentioned. 
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The CFMEU responded to the Report with a press release titled Forest Reports (sic) -
Waste of Taxpayers' Money. It correlated with the NAFI view arguing that the Report 
was: 
' .. . clearly pushing a position which is ideologically driven not driven by 
the facts. The Commonwealth Government has distanced itself from the 
report, demonstrating it lacks real substance.' (Construction, Forestry, 
Mining, and Energy Union 1995). 
The reason the Federal Government distanced itself from the Report was largely 
because of the CFMEU's earlier actions, not for the reasons the CFMEU claimed. It is 
not clear that the CFMEU had seen the Report when it wrote its response. 
In contrast to the CFMEU and NAFI reaction, ANM' s media release welcomed the 
Report and said the company, being a major user of plantation wood, would examine 
the Report's findings with an open mind (Australian Newsprint Mills Ltd. 1995). 
Ogilvie's views on the Report were quoted earlier. 
In September 1995, NAFI released a 19-page, two-part response to the Report 
(National Association of Forest Industries 1995d). Part A was the native forest88 and 
plantation member's combined response and Part B was the NAFI native forest 
industry response. It is worth quoting in full the first half of the Executive Summary to 
Part A. 
'The release of the "Australia's Plantations" report has been 
accompanied by claims from the conservation councils that the report is 
the first comprehensive study of the plantation industry and serves to focus 
attention on plantations rather than natural forests. These claims are 
extremely misleading. 
While industry welcomes the acknowledgement of success in the plantation 
industry and agrees that the growth of the plantation wood supply and 
associated industry has been of benefit to Australia, there are some serious 
discrepancies in both the analysis and conclusions of the report. 
Furthermore, the continued growth of the industry, an objective that all 
Australians should be able to agree on, is ignored in the report. 
Future predictions of wood supply are difficult and are greatly influenced 
by the assumptions made. The predictions of plantation wood supply in the 
"Australia's Plantations" report, while based on some accurate data 
contain a number of misinterpretations and inappropriate assumptions. 
The claim that the report has been prepared in consultation with industry 
is misleading. Many companies provided raw data on plantation areas, 
88 The wording 'natural' forest was used instead of 'native' forest. Plantations were not referred to as 
'unnatural' forests. 
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growth rates and processing capacity, but this information has been 
misused, distorted and exaggerated in the analysis. Industry was not 
consulted at any stage beyond the provision of raw data. 
Disagreement with the actual figures and method of analysis aside, 
industry agrees that a future increase in the volume of wood from 
plantation forests presents an exciting opportunity for growth in the 
plantation processing sector.' (National Association of Forest Industries 
1995d, p. i). 
The summary proceeded with a listing of the requirements for the industry to reach its 
full potential, namely additional planting, a globally competitive industry and 
plantation policy not impeded by the native forest conflict. Part B argued that the 
Report set out to prove that 'harvesting of natural forests must cease' and identified 
what it claimed to be serious deficiencies in the Report, namely: 
• simplistic assumptions about substitution of plantation for native forest wood, 
• the predetermined objective of proving that . existing plantations are sufficient to 
replace native forests and ignoring the global market, 
• repetition of claimed previous mistakes based on Clark's work in Victoria,89 
• incompatibility with current and future forest policy, and 
• a focus only on processing existing plantations - ignoring future plantings and 
criticising 'value-adding' in the native forest industry (National Association of 
Forest Industries 1995d, p. ii). 
Up to August 1995, NAFI had largely been able to avoid confronting intra-industry 
competition publicly. However, with the media coverage generated by the Report, 
NAFI was forced to confront the issue and seek the views of its diverse membership in 
developing its (unique two-part) response. On the one hand, NAFI welcomed and 
acknowledged the Report's findings on the plantation industry's growth, but on the 
other it aggressively attacked the plantation wood supply projections, thereby 
undermining the public choice option for native forests. NAFI's response contains no 
substantiation of the claims made in the Executive Summary about the Report's serious 
discrepancies; misinterpretation of data and inappropriate assumptions; and misuse, 
distortion and exaggeration of data provided by the industry. 
89 NAFI was referring to a projection made in Clark (1992) that native forest sawn timber production 
would continue to decline as plantation production displaced it in the market. ABARE data shows 
Victorian native forest sawn timber production trending up during the 1990s although the Australian 
industry was trending down. The Victorian Department of Natural Resources and Environment generates 
the data for ABARE to include in their national quarterly publication, Australian Forest Products 
Statistics. As a cost cutting measure the department ceased its sawmill survey and presented estimates of 
Victoria's native forest sawn timber production using its sawlog sales data and a sawn timber conversion 
that appears to be based on the assumptions used to calculate stumpage prices. These factors assume that 
around 50 per cent of the sawlog is converted to sawn timber. This is significantly higher than generally 
accepted in the industry and contradicts the average 3 7 per cent the Timber Promotion Council reported 
for the industry in 2001 (Jaakko Poyry 2001, p. 18). The discrepancy suggests that the official figures for 
Victoria's native forest sawn timber production over-stated actual production in calendar year 2000 by 
approximately 30 per cent. A letter has been sent informing the Director of ABARE of the discrepancy 
and, if verified, seeking revision to establish the integrity of national time series data (Clark 2001 b ). 
ABARE is aware of the discrepancy and is working to resolve it. 
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The Plantations Australia Group also considered the Report. It circulated a draft 
response stating that the predictions of plantation wood supply in the Report, while 
based on data available, were overly optimistic (Plantations Australia 1995). The 
claims were also not documented and appear to have been farmed by Miles Prosser 
(Clark 1995d), Secretary for Plantations Australia and Assistant Director of Economic 
and Resource Policy, NAFI. At a meeting with Plantations Australia in November 
1995, the Group undertook to reconsider the appropriateness of the description of the 
Report's projections of plantation wood supply as 'overly optimistic'. If the wording 
was considered inappropriate, a revised statement would be issued. If the wording was 
considered appropriate, Plantations Australia undertook to document who considered 
the projections overly optimistic and why (Clark 1995d). When no response was 
received from Plantations Australia, a follow up letter was sent to Angus Pollock as 
Chairperson of Plantations Australia in early February 1996 (Clark 1996b). Plantations 
Australia responded advising that opinion on the Report varied amongst its members 
but that it stood by its statement that the Report's plantation wood supply projections 
were overly optimistic (Prosser 1996). No documentation was provided and the letter 
advised that a report by lecturers from the Australian National University's Forestry 
Department, Forest Plantations of Australia, presented a more realistic view of future 
plantation wood supply. This report is discussed below. 
Identifying the source of the claims 1nade by NAFI and Plantations Australia about the 
Report's plantation wood supply projections is difficult, although two documents may 
have contributed. The first was prepared by the Western Australian Department of 
Conservation and Land Management (CALM) in September 1995 and comments 
specifically on the Report (Department of Conservation and Land Management 1995). 
This document remained unknown to me until it was tabled in the Western Australian 
Parliament on the 23 of December 1998 following a question in Parliament (Edwards 
1998) seeking the tabling of all CALM responses to Clark's work. Every paragraph of 
this five-page document, with the exception of the introductory paragraph, contained 
some misrepresentation of argument, error, contestable point, illogicality or other 
objection (Clark 1999a). 
Amcor was the second possible source for the claims made by NAFI and Plantations 
Australia. At a meeting in Canberra on 5 December 1995, between Pollock and myself, 
Pollock advised that he wrote a memorandum on the Report dated 25 September 1995 
to Amcor's public relations officer Kerrie Milburn Clark. The contents of the 
memorandum were discussed, but my request to retain a copy was refused. The 
memorandum implicitly assumed that Amcor would remain Australia's sole 
manufacturer of printing and writing paper (the main domestic market for eucalypt 
plantation wood) and therefore was Australia's printing and writing paper industry. The 
memorandum argued that there was insufficient eucalypt plantation wood for Amcor to 
meet Australia's printing and paper consumption without calling on native forests . This 
'Amcor-centric' view of the industry meant that eucalypt plantations in regions without 
Amcor processing capacity, namely Western Australia, were excluded from the 
memorandum's consideration. Amcor may not be able to meet Australia's printing and 
writing paper consumption using eucalypt plantations located in the Maryvale region of 
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Victoria, but that does not imply that the industry (including competing, new entrants 
located in other states) can not. Pollock acknowledged this point. 
The key question is were the projections of chiplog supply from Amcor' s eucalypt 
plantations presented in the Report accurate? Pollock and Karl Kny, General Manager -
Corporate Development of APM ( an Amcor subsidiary) with whom I met shortly later, 
both agreed with the projections. Amcor, however, would not correct for any 
misperception created by the September memorandum that might have flowed through 
to the NAFI and Plantations Australia response to the Report. 
By the end of-September 1995, no specific error in the Report's plantation wood supply 
projections had been identified. Shortly later, Senator Nick Sherry (ALP, Tasmania) 
released a report (James et al. 1995) by four staff from the ANU's Department of 
Forestry on the potential for Australia's plantations to meet Australia's wood needs. 
The report was commissioned by the Standing Committee on Forestry of the 
Ministerial Council on Forestry, Fisheries and Aquaculture. 90 The report's main 
conclusion was that: 
'in terms of quantity, the current plantation resource cannot meet the 
anticipated demand for wood products in Australia. If the supply of wood 
from native forest was to be reduced to a 'minimum' level, supplying the 
shortfall from Australian sources would require substantial additional 
investment in plantations.' (James et al. 1995, p. 4). 
The authors claim to have provided an independent assessment of the potential for 
Australia's existing plantations to meet Australia's wood needs (James et al. 1995, p. 
5), however the projections were a collation of those presented by state forest agencies 
(James et al. 1995, p. 9). The authors omitted critical data and methodology that could 
enable peer review (Clark 1996a). James et al. (1995) presented lower softwood 
plantation wood supply projections than the Report, but the two sets of projections 
came into reasonably close alignment for the sawlog resource up to 2005 (see appendix 
E, figure E2). James et al. 's (1995) conclusion that Australia's existing plantations 
cannot meet Australia's anticipated wood demand rests largely on their high wood 
consumption projections. They used old projections of sawn timber consumption that, 
based on actual data already published by ABARE at the time of their work, indicated a 
significant over-estimation of the long-term trend growth in Australia's sawn timber 
consumption and under-estimated the role of paper recycling in constraining the growth 
in Australia's wood consumption (Clark 1996a, pp. 6-8). Having been released by a 
Senator, the report enjoyed high political exposure and was promoted as being more 
accurate in its projections of Australia's plantation wood supply than those presented in 
the Report (for examples, see Prosser 1996; Shea, as quoted in Department of 
Conservation and Land Management 1996). 
90 The forestry component being the former Standing Committee to the Australian Forestry Council 
formed in the mid 1960s to facilitate the softwood planting program (chapter 3). 
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Peer review was essential for resolving the differences between James et al. (1995) and 
the Report and therefore their fundamentally different policy implications. However, 
peer review was virtually impossible. The Report's plantation wood supply projections 
were documented to enable peer review, but peer review-invitees declined and those 
sections of the industry and its industry associations who criticised the projections 
would not detail their concerns. The plantation wood supply projections presented in 
James et al. (1995) were accompanied by no documentation, effectively ruling out peer 
review. This meant that a critical piece of information for policy was left to a public 
battering devoid of scientific appraisal. 
7.4 The National Plantation Inventory (NPI) 
In 1997, the BRS published an inventory of Australia's plantations established up to 
1994 (National Plantation Inventory 1997). It provided quantitative information on 
Australia's softwood and hardwood plantation estate - age-profile, area, species-
composition and location. After some debate, the BRS inventory team, on the advice of 
its reference committee, included projections of Australia's plantation wood supply 
(Anon. pers. comm. 1997).91 Drs Brian Turner and Ryde James, two of the authors of 
James et al. (1995), were engaged as consultants to assist in the preparation of the 
projections. The projections were a combination of grower estimates and, in their 
absence, projections using indicative yield tables prepared by the consultants (Turner & 
James 1997a). The projections, particularly for sawlogs coming on stream over 
1995-04, are significantly lower than those presented in James et al. ( 1995) ( appendix 
E, figure E2). Peer review was again frustrated because the projections are 
undocumented with the BRS maintaining confidentiality on all individual grower 
information (National Plantation Inventory 1997, p. 2). Nearly 70 per cent of the 
plantations included in the NPI were publicly owned. Documentation of the projected 
wood supply from public plantations in the NPI could have made a substantial 
contribution to resolving the debate over Australia's plantation wood supply. 
The projections for Australia's largest softwood plantation wood supply region - the 
Green Triangle comprising western Victoria and south east South Australia - presented 
a 20-year declining sawlog supply outlook, contradicting recent processing industry 
investment. The projections were reviewed by identifying the productivity and 
management regime assumptions required to replicate the results given the age profile 
data contained in the NPI (Clark 1997b). The review was forwarded to the Federal 
Minister for Primary Industries and Energy (Clark 1997c), the Executive Officer of the 
Greater Green Triangle Farm Forestry and Plantation Committee (Clark 1997d) and the 
head of the Department of Forestry, ANU (Clark 1997e). Neither the Minister nor his 
91 The informant wishes to remain anonymous. The National Plantation Inventory Reference Committee 
comprised Rod Channon of the Federal Department of Primary Industry and Energy, Alan Cum.mine of 
Australian Forest Growers, Ken Eldridge from the Association of Consulting Foresters of Australia, Ross 
Hills of the National Association of Forest Industries, Roger Hnatiuk of the National Forest Industry 
Secretariat, David Jamieson from the National Forest Inventory Steering Committee, Graham McKenzie 
Smith and Ian Millard of the Standing Committee on Forestry, Miles Prosser from Plantations Australia, 
Leng Sar (observer) from ABARE (National Plantation Inventory 1997, p. 4). 
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department responded. Peter Kanowski, Professor and Head of the Department of 
Forestry, at the ANU, spoke to the NPI team and brokered meetings between Brian 
Turner and myself. There was no resolution over the differences in the projections. 
Andrew Moore, a member of the Greater Green Triangle Farm Forestry and Plantation 
Committee, undertook some broad-brush indicative projections of the softwood 
plantation resource in the region and compared them with the projections presented in 
the NPI (Moore 1997). Moore's projections of average annual softwood plantation 
sawlog supply for 2000-09 exceeded those presented in the NPI by 33 per cent, and for 
the period 2010-19 by 7 5 per cent. The analysis led Moore to comment that the Turner 
and James projections presented in the NPI appear to be very conservative and that 
knowing the basis for their assumptions would be desirable (Moore 1997). 
An analysis of the debate over the Western Australian plantation resource provides 
further insight into the actions that frustrate government and public understanding of 
Australia's plantation resource potential. The debate, described in essence below and in 
detail in appendix G, circled around the projections presented in the NPI. 
Western Australia's softwood plantation sawlog supply potential was a key piece of 
policy information because it determined the capacity for Western Australia to cease 
logging old-growth forests. The cessation of logging in old-growth native forests was 
strongly supported by the Western Australian public (AMR: Quantum Harris 1998). 
Neither the Government, the opposition nor the public had clarity over the plantation 
supply potential. 92 The need for clarity required the Western Australian Government, 
through CALM, to prepare projections of the state's public and private softwood 
plantation sawlog supply and release them publicly with documentation to enable 
critical review. The RF A process did not generate this information despite its extensive 
public funding and stated consideration of the 'industry as a whole and not just the 
native forest sector' ( Commonwealth and Western Australian Regional Forest 
Agreement Steering Committee 1998b, p. 16). This meant that the NPI became the key 
source of information on Western Australia's plantation wood supply potential. 
The NPI's projections for Western Australia were actually prepared by CALM, but this 
appears to have been denied by the Western Australian Government (see appendix G). 
At the very least, one can argue that neither CALM nor the Government worked to 
correct any misunderstanding about the authorship of the projections. The wall of 
confidentiality surrounding the NPI made it difficult to clarify the source of the 
projections (appendix G). 
The NPI projections of sawlog supply from Western Australia's softwood plantations 
differed substantially from those of Clark (1998a), particularly for the immediate 
future. Clark (1998a) projected an annual softwood plantation sawlog supply for 
2000-04, 70 per cent higher those published in the NPI (table 7 .3). The difference in the 
projections was equivalent to 60 per cent of the state's native forest sawn timber 
production in 1999/00 ( converted to roundwood equivalent units). 
92 My comments regarding the Government are based on my briefing the Premier Richard Court, at his 
invitation, on the plantation resource potential and policy implications on 16 June 1999. 
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The Western Australian Government used the NPI projections (incorrectly perceived to 
be the work of the ANU's Forestry Department and the BRS) to criticise the projections 
in Clark (1998a). Undermining Clark's projections worked to invalidate a plantation 
transition policy. 
The media's coverage of the plantation resource debate (see for example Capp 1998; 
Pownall 1999); the pressure from politicians to have the uncertainty over the plantation 
resource clarified (Sharp 1999; Edwards 1999); and possibly Clark's meeting with the 
Premier on 16 July 1999 and Keynote address, Can Plantation Forests Solve the Old 
Growth Forest Debate?, to the Western Australian Business Forum on 7 October 
199993 put considerable pressure on CALM to clarify the softwood plantation saw log 
supply potential. 
On 13 October 1999, Dr Shea, Executive Director of CALM, wrote to Clark enclosing 
the document, An analysis of Judy Clark's softwood saw log y ield predictions for 
Western Australia (Shea 1999a; Department of Conservation and Land Management 
1999). The Minister did not approve the release of the document because she perceived 
it to be too personal, wanting the emotion taken out and a factual report on the 
projections (Edwardes pers. comm. 12 November 1999).94 Despite the critique's style, 
it was an important document containing new (and publicly available) information. 
Specifically, CALM presented new projections of sawlog supply from Western 
Australia's public softwood plantations. 
These projections can be used to estimate the state-wide softwood plantation sawlog 
supply potential by adding them to projections of private plantation supply. CALM's 
projections of sawlog supply, prepared for the NPI, were disaggregated by plantation 
ownership, namely private and public, but this disaggregated information remains 
confidential (B. Turner pers. comm. 2001).95 Appendix G presents projections of 
sawlog supply from Western Australia's privately owned softwood plantations 
generated by assuming a saw log MAI of 10.0 m3 per hectare per annum applied to age 
profile data collected by CALM's National Forest Inventory Project Team (Appendix 
G, table G2). Dr Turner confirmed the MAI assumption as being consistent with 
CALM's view (B. Turner pers. comm. 2001). The projections of annual sawlog supply 
over the period 1995-14 are presented in appendix G, table G3 . These projections can 
93 The Wes tern Australian Business F arum - Breakfast Briefing is hosted by the Institute for Research 
into International Competitiveness, Curtin University of Technology. Representatives from major 
resources companies, finance sector, media, government departments (including the Office of Public 
Accountability) , academia and political parties attended the Briefing. 
94 CALM's document was responded to by Clark (1999£) and the Director and immediate past Director 
of the Centre for Resource and Environmental Studies at the Australian National University (CRES). 
Shea took exception, claiming that Clark was accusing CALM staff of being dishonest (Shea 1999b, p. 
4). Further correspondence from Shea (1999c, 1999d) informed the ANU of his intention to vigorously 
defend himself and CALM officers. This appeared to be a threat of legal challenge. The matter ended 
when Shea ceased to be the Executive Director of CALM and a Western Australian public servant. 
95 Consultants were engaged in 1999 to review CALM' s plantation business activities and clarify the 
private resource situation (Western Australian Legislative Assembly 1999, p. 23 89). The report (Forestry 
Pacific Pty. Ltd. 1999) did not add substantially to knowledge of the private softwood plantation supply 
potential. 
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be compared with those presented in the NPI by aggregating to the time periods used in 
the NPI projections. 
Combining CALM's 1999 projections for the public estate with the projections for the 
private estate (using CALM age profile data and average productivity assumption) 
resulted in the state's projected softwood sawlog supply in 2000-04 being 81 per cent 
higher than the projections CALM provided to the NPI. CALM's 1999 projections 
combined with those for the private plantations were not significantly different to Clark 
(1998a) (table 7.3, appendix G, figure Gl). 
Table 7.3 Projections of sawlog supply from Western Australian softwood plantations presented in the 
NPI (prepared by CALM); CALM (1999) and private plantation projections; and Clark (1998a) (000 m3 
per annum). 
1995-99 
2000-04 
2005-09 
2010-14 
CALM projections for CALM 1999 and 
NPI 1997 projections for private 
313 
436 
1 005 
677 
plantations using CALM 
data and productivity 
assumptions 
791 
867 
733 
Clark 1998 
412 
747 
971 
670 
The difference in the projections CALM sent to the NPI and its later projections for the 
public estate combined with the private estate projections has substantial implications 
for Western Australia's native forest policy and its wood products industry policy. The 
BRS' confidentiality policy and the actions of CALM frustrated critical review that 
could have saved four years of debate over critically important policy information. 
In October 2001, the BRS released the NPI for 2001 (Wood et al. 2001). The Inventory 
does not include projections of plantation wood supply although projections have been 
generated. The BRS advises that a cross-validation exercise reveals that the projections 
are comparable with those presented in the 1997 NPI (Wood et al. 2001 , p. 9). The 
University of Melbourne undertook the work, and the BRS reported that it was 
available as a companion report (Wood et al. 2001, p. 9), but it was not released at the 
time of writing. Considerable operational change is required if Federal Government 
agencies wish to establish a reputation for providing reliable information on Australia 's 
plantation wood supply potential. 
7.5 Summary 
The wood supply potential of Australia's existing plantation estate is key information 
for native forest and wood industry policy. A relatively large, unutilised resource means 
that government can consider a bolder native forest conservation agenda combined with 
a policy to encourage investment in plantation processing. The opposite supports a 
policy of continued use of native forests and additional plantation establishment. 
The establishment of the RAC in the late l 980s provided an important opportunity to 
fill large gaps in our knowledge about the plantation industry's then current production, 
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employment and international trade and its growth potential based on future plantation 
supply. This did not happen. The RAC remained silent about the plantation wood 
supply potential in its principal conclusions, recommendations and overview chapter. 
This information was presented in appendix L. Peer review of the projections is 
frustrated because they were presented graphically, not numerically, and were 
inadequately documented. Confusion about the plantation wood supply potential was 
created by the RAC's focus on projected plantation sawn timber production. An 
analysis of their report shows that about 40 per cent of the RAC's projected Australian 
softwood plantation sawlog resource was diverted from sawn timber production to chip 
production using conservative assumptions about the Australian plantation sawn timber 
industry's domestic market share. 
The failure of the Federal Government public service to report adequately, in my view, 
on Australia's plantation wood supply potential stimulated the State and Territory 
Conservation Councils to fill the information gap and resulted in the Australia 's 
Plantations Report. 
An analysis of the responses to the Report identified strong linkages between the 
unions, major corporations and industry associations in their actions aimed at keeping 
plantation resource information off the agenda. These actions defy commonly held 
perceptions of the relationship between capital and labour; union desire for safe, secure 
and employment-generating manufacturing industries; private companies as profit 
maximisers; public servants acting with disinterest providing information and advice to 
government for policy making in the public interest; academics providing peer 
reviewable information; and the environment movement as opponents of economically 
rational industry development. 
The actions of major players in the Australian plantation processing industry 
demonstrated that they were not happy with government and public perceptions of their 
industry and that the wood supply potential of the existing plantation estate was 
important information. However, without an industry association representing their 
interests as plantation processors, they, as individual people and individual companies, 
were more vulnerable to retaliatory action if they articulated to the public the 
competitive relationship between themselves and the native forest-based industry. 
The public debate that followed the Report's release has alerted policy makers and the 
public to the importance of the wood supply potential of Australia's existing plantation 
estate. While the BRS has allocated resources to generate this information, it has failed 
to provide plantation wood supply projections that government and the public can be 
confident in using. The practice of using commercial-in-confidence provisions to hide 
data is a major concern. Government information for public policy remains inadequate, 
and unnecessary conflict over Australia's native forests and wood industries continues. 
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Chapter 8 
What can Australia learn from its native forest and wood 
industry policy experience? 
8.1 Introduction 
Australia can enhance its capacity to develop problem solving polices by learning - and 
committing it to public memory - from its native forest and wood industry experience. 
Australia's forest problem is essentially about product substitution. What is learned 
from Australia's forest experience may therefore provide insights for other environment 
and industry-enhancing substitution challenges. 
This thesis argues that over the 1990s Australia's native forest and wood industry 
policy failed to exploit the ecological, industrial and socio-economic benefits that its 
maturing plantation estate offered. There is, therefore, a great deal to learn. This 
learning can benefit from Australia's more recent achievements, in south east 
Queensland and Western Australia. 
This chapter, based on the information and analysis presented in this thesis, discusses 
the fundamental reasons for Australia's native forest and wood industry policy failures 
and successes in the 1990s. It then presents some suggestions about what can be done, 
acknowledging that governments are fundamental to the outcome. 
8.2 Why the policy failure and policy success? 
Government in Australia today is a play between what I view as the largely competing 
interests of capitalism and democracy. Politicians are actors juggling with the 
complexity of these tensions as they drive their chariots (to use the analogy of Snooks 
(1996)) somewhere or other. The path travelled largely reflects the agendas set, refined 
and reset as new and existing players struggle for power or retention of their 
dominance. Historically, Australia's native forest and wood industry policy has largely 
aligned with native forest wood production and plantation establishment agendas. Less 
powerful players have formed alliances with the more powerful and over many decades 
this process has woven a compacted complexity of relationships. 
The strategic significance of the 1990s for Australia's native forests and wood industry 
was that the plantation resource began to unravel stakeholder alliances. It takes time for 
stakeholders to separate and rejoin into alliances that better suit their core interests. In 
this time, the pendulum swung closer to the plantation processing industry that was able 
to promote its specific interests to government and the public without fear of the 
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consequences of breaking relationships with the native forest part of the industry and its 
service providers. As this happened, alliances with the environment movement - the 
first stakeholders to recognise the strategic opportunity for agenda realignment -
became possible. The Victorian Wood Products Working Group's 1995 report 
demonstrated the potential for alliance. The south east Queensland 1999 stakeholder 
agreement with the Queensland Government is Australia's first formal alliance between 
the environment movement and the plantation processing industry. The unions may one 
day accept that an industry policy favouring the native forest sector will no longer 
generate the best employment outcome because it undermines investment in more 
competitive plantation processing. 
The failure of Australia's 1990s native forest and wood industry policy was in not using 
Australia's maturing plantations and the inevitable reassessment of stakeholder agenda 
alliances to develop and implement policy in the public interest; that is, to facilitate in a 
constructive way a transition to plantation processing and cessation of native forest 
based commodity wood production. Instead, policy was presented with the implicit 
assumption that the 'fore st' industry was competing against environment interests. The 
inevitable conflict created the misunderstanding that the only way forward was to seek 
a balanced outcome of the incorrectly perceived competing interests. Not presenting the 
industry in its two parts - plantation based and native forest based - prevented a 
fundamentally different approach to native forest and wood industry policy that has 
quite different implications for industry competitiveness, employment and the 
environment. 
This policy 'blind spot' resulted from a failure to define the problem first and then to 
collect and present critical information before proceeding with the development of 
policy options. Chapter 6 identified a failure in all government reports over the 1990s 
to examine critically the appropriateness of the multiple use approach to native forests 
to supply an industry focussed on commodity production. They all assumed the 
continuation of a multiple use ( or ESD) approach to native forests for wood production 
and, therefore, failed to present an analysis that went to the core of Australia's native 
forest conflict. 
The second failure was to not clarify the current importance of the plantation resource 
and to provide reliable projections of Australia's plantation wood supply. Confusion 
over the meaning of 'forest' remains, and no government report separates Australia's 
wood and wood products production, employment and trade into its plantation and 
native forest components. This means that neither the government nor the public has 
the proper base on which to build the policy options surrounding Australia's increasing 
plantation wood supply. 
All projections show increasing wood supply from Australia's softwood plantations 
(appendix E, figure E2) and there is agreement that eucalypt plantations will add to this 
resource. However, the timing and size of the softwood plantation wood supply 
increase (particularly saw logs) remains contested and shrouded in confusing conflict. 
Despite the importance of clarifying the plantation supply potential for policy, all 
government projections of Australia's plantation wood supply remain virtually 
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impossible to peer review because they are inadequately documented (chapter 7 and 
appendix G). 
These are simple failures, but they have serious policy implications and their reasons 
are complex. 
In my view, public servants, by their nature, will tend to align to the dominant agendas 
and be cautious about upsetting agenda alliances. Their role is to provide information 
and advice to a government that holds office because its platform suits dominant 
agendas. Despite the hallmark of a professional public service providing advice without 
fear or favour, it takes deliberate effort to provide government with advice in the public 
interest that challenges the interests of powerful stakeholders. This bias to the status 
quo is reinforced by Federal Government policy to formally engage stakeholders in 
Australia's native forest and wood industry policy process (chapter 6). No government 
report with direct stakeholder involvement presented a policy approach that shifted the 
dominant agenda from native forest logging and plantation growing to plantation 
processing. This was despite the obvious maturing of Australia's plantation estate and 
increasing importance of plantations in Australian's production of wood products. 
Compacted agenda alliances and the absence of a powerful industry association 
representing the interests of Australia's plantation processors underpinned this 
outcome. 
The casting of the environment movement as anti-industry/anti-capitalist non-
compromisers reinforced the perception that the forest problem was insoluble. 
Therefore, the policy approach must be one of seeking a balanced compromise over the 
use of native forests. Because the issue is really about substituting an old product with a 
new product, compromise entrenches already high levels of production from the old 
system (i.e. native forests), and frustrates the substitution process. The environment 
movement was painted as being extreme in their calls for native forests to be protected. 
The shifting of commodity wood production from native forests to plantations is no 
more extreme than shifting report production from type-writers to word-processors and 
personal transport from horse and buggy to motor vehicles. Presenting the conflict as 
industry versus environment, in my view an incorrect portrayal, is a problem common 
to product substitution opportunities where environmental benefits threaten existing 
corporate interests - energy production and climate change being another notable 
example. 
The RAC's failure to present a problem-solving approach to government (chapters 6 
and 7) calls for investigation. The RAC was adequately funded, it appointed staff from 
the key disciplines, it investigated new approaches to conflict resolution, it consulted 
stakeholders whilst retaining its public service autonomy, yet its inquiry over slightly 
more than three years failed to deal with all the options available. The three 
Commissioners to the RAC were short-term external appointments, an arrangement that 
should be included in any examination of the RAC model as a public service institution 
for natural resource analysis and policy advice. The RAC tried to find and present 
solutions too early. The RAC received its terms of reference for the forest and wood 
industry inquiry in late November 1989; by July 1991 , it presented a two volume draft 
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report of around 1 300 pages, including options for forests and the wood based 
industries, and in March 1992 it released a slightly smaller three volume final report. 
Political hopes ran high that the RAC would find a solution, and the RAC itself thought 
the task possible with considered analysis. The analysis presented in chapters 6 and 7 
indicate that the RAC remained lost in what Schattshneider (1960) called 'the fog of 
war' - the inevitable confusion, even over what the debate is about, as players struggle 
to capture the agenda. The RAC did not need more time - a point acknowledged by 
Justice Stewart its Chairperson (Resource Assessment Commission 1992a, p. viii) - it 
needed critical thinking skills and discipline to complete the tasks of problem 
identification and information collection before proceeding with the development of 
options. Critical thinking skills were absent; the RAC failed to identify the 
interrelationships of commodity production, intensification technologies and multiple 
use of native forests as the triad to be solved. Because the problem was not correctly 
defined, critical information was either not collected ( e.g. the ecological effect of 
intensification technologies on native forests) or poorly accounted for (e.g. presenting 
the plantation supply potential in appendix L). By rushing to formulate the options 
(some of which were set by stakeholders that the Federal Government wished be 
evaluated), how could any option address the fundamental problem or even its rationale 
be understood? Lack of problem definition and incomplete collection of key 
information also meant that the RAC ruled out options that it thought were politically 
unfeasible, notably the cessation of wood production from native forests ( chapter 6). 
Yet slightly less than a decade later the Queensland Government adopted just such a 
policy. 
The RAC assumed that the balanced compromise between industry and environment 
should be in the regrowth native forests. This preference may explain why critical 
investigation of the ecological effects of intensification technologies in native forests 
was not undertaken and why the RAC did not challenge the multiple use (ESD) 
approach to native forests for wood production. The preference for (regrowth) native 
forest use for wood production, common to other reports, meant that the Federal 
Government was presented with options that either reflected the author's value 
judgements or second guessed what the Government wanted. The Federal Government 
was not presented with a clear account of the native forest and wood industry problem 
or the full range of options and their implications. Whether the Federal Government 
wanted this clarity is not for public servants to determine. 
The RAC did not unravel the stakeholder interests by seeking a balanced outcome over 
native forests , instead it joined the group. The clear commercial beneficiary of such a 
policy is the native forest export woodchip industry. The RF A options, by ignoring the 
plantation resource, also displayed the same preference for a native forest-based 
compromise. Perhaps the failure to expose these preferences and key information ( e.g. 
the plantation wood supply potential) to critical review was motivated by a fear of 
rocking the boat - of angering powerful interests and undermining what was perceived 
as the only way forward for the supposedly intractable forest conflict. 
Why did the Queensland and, to a slightly lesser extent, the Western Australian 
Governments move in another direction and adopt a plantation transition strategy? 
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These states are distinguished in that, on the native forest issue, their governments rose 
above their public services. The Queensland environment movement, under the 
leadership of Dr Aila Keto, formed a strategic alliance with an industry association 
dominated by plantation processing, the Queensland Timber Board. After intense 
debate and negotiation, the two stakeholders presented an approach that met their core 
interests to the State Government, who became a party to the final agreement. The 
Queensland Government actively protected the process of negotiation and the 
implementation of the agreement from Federal and State Government public service 
disruption (A. Keto pers. comm. 2001). Victoria's 1995 Wood Products Working Party 
also showed that substantial agreement can be reached between the industry, 
represented by plantation processors, and an informed environment movement if the 
public service is constrained from dominating or interfering with the process. 
A similar theme emerges from Western Australia although the experience was 
markedly different. The Western Australian environment movement successfully built 
on a long history of public campaigning for forest protection. By the late 1990s, with 
the help of the RF A finding that less than 10 per cent of its old-growth forests 
remained, the movement deepened its support base to include a majority of the 
population across a broad spectrum of society. With an election looming, the Premier, 
who only months earlier had signed the RF A with the Federal Government, was forced 
to engage directly in the issue. His approach was to invite people with relevant 
information and analysis to brief him, his Chief of Staff and one senior public servant. 
The approximately two-week long process produced a strategy of increased old-growth 
forest protection (later added to by the opposition on their winning office) and a 
transition to the plantation resource. Public service involvement in the strategy was 
notably constrained and resulted in the resignation of the Executive Director of the 
responsible public service department. 
8.3 Enhancing capacity for policy making in the public interest 
It is reasonable to assume that over the medium term Australia's native forest and wood 
industry policy environment will be characterised by an increasing plantation wood 
supply; agenda-aligning efforts between the plantation industry and environment 
movement; and continuing conflict over native forest land use. 
The challenge is to break the government-public service nexus that has trapped policy 
in the past. One approach is to privatise Australia's wood resource as suggested by the 
Industry Commission (now Productivity Commission) in its 1993 report. Privatisation 
of the plantation resource is already a well-established trend. The framework developed 
in this thesis suggests that its continuation should be preceded by an industry policy 
that encourages domestic grower-processor integration. Leasing public plantations to 
processors under appropriate terms and conditions could form part of the industry 
policy. The strategic choice land use approach presented in chapter 5 indicates that 
privatising native forest land is counter-productive and unnecessary from industry and 
ecological perspectives. With native forests allocated substantially to conservation, and 
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plantations owned or managed by the private sector, the public service role on wood 
industry matters should be to facilitate investment in plantation processing and the 
ecological sustainability of plantation wood growing. 
Observation of recent State Government success in native forest and wood industry 
policy reveals that the environment movement can be a strategically important player in 
motivating government to engage directly in the issue. We can also expect the 
plantation industry to build on the pressure for government to rise above the public 
service, where it has become entrenched in conservative patterns, and directly engage 
in tackling Australia's native forest and wood industry problem. If we understand the 
policy process as Snooks describes with his chariot analogy, the question is how do we 
increase the probability that the charioteer picks up native forest and wood industry 
policies in the public interest? 
The first challenge is to generate such policies. The public service has this capability 
but, as argued in this thesis, it has failed to perform in the native forest and wood 
industry policy arena. A public service with an open mind and critical thinking skills 
could develop a plantation transition policy. 
Universities, think tanks and other research organisations may claim a capacity for 
policy making in the public interest. However, the analysis presented in this thesis 
shows that these organisations are not immune from the same weaknesses besetting the 
public service in its approach to native forest and wood industry policy. To establish 
their policy making legitimacy, in a competitive environment, these organisations need 
to demonstrate their capacity to avoid bias towards status quo agendas; to apply critical 
thinking skills to their in-depth knowledge of the problem from different perspectives; 
to participate in disciplined processes that articulate assumptions and preferences; and 
to provide information and advice without fear or favour. That society has many 
organisations, including the public service, competing for policy legitimacy through 
public debate can only enhance our capacity to generate policy in the public interest. 
How then can we increase the probability that the policy that best meets the public 
interest is adopted? Status quo interests appear to have the upper hand in government 
policy processes addressing substitution issues. The challenge is to take the issue to the 
public for debate and, by continuous public engagement, build up the public's capacity 
to understand the issues and arguments and demand better policy. Institutions engaged 
in public policy making are obvious candidates for this task, but their repertoire of 
skills and knowledge will need supplementing, particularly in terms of understanding 
how the public perceives issues and how to communicate information. By engaging 
with the public and stakeholders that have the capacity to change the chariot' s 
direction, public policy institutions can contribute to good governance and challenge 
actions that undermine it. 
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Appendix A 
Wood consumption projections underpinning Australia's 
1960s softwood plantation program 
A 1 Introduction 
Chapter two established that the Federal Government's three million acre softwood 
plantation target originated from Jacobs' 1963 address to the Australian Timber 
Congress (Jacobs 1963c). Jacobs used the consumption projections presented in 
Hanson (1962a) and assumed that native forests would supply approximately half of 
Australia's projected consumption in 2000. Using a mean annual increment (MAI) of 
200 cubic feet per acre per year (14 m3 per hectare per year) and 40 year rotations, 
Jacobs calculated that Australia needed three million acres ( 1.2 million hectares) of 
softwood plantations to supply the other half of Australia's projected wood 
requirements in 2000. The planting target was achieved if hardwood plantings that 
substituted for some softwood planting are included. In 2000 Australia had 1.5 million 
hectares of plantations, comprising 1.0 million hectares of softwood and 0.5 million 
hectares of hardwood (Wood et al. 2001, p. 14). The average productivity of Australia's 
softwood plantations is widely considered to exceed that assumed in Jacobs (1963c) 
( chapter 4, table 4.5). Australia's hardwood plantations are expected to generate 
significantly higher yields than the 14 m3 MAI assumed in Jacobs (1963c) (Duggie 
2000; Turner & James 1997). With the plantation area and productivity exceeding 
Jacobs' target and expectations, Australia's plantation wood supply must also exceed 
Jacobs' aim that it meet half Hanson's wood consumption projection. 
Data are now available to estimate Australia's actual consumption of wood and wood 
products over the year ending 31 December 2000. In 2000, Australia required an 
estimated 18.6 million m3 of wood to make the wood products ( excluding fuel wood) it 
consumed in 2000 (table Al). This compares with Hanson's projection of Australia's 
wood needs ( excluding fuel wood) in 2000 of 32.6 million m3. 
The aim of this appendix is to identify the sources of the over-projection. It is important 
to understand this because it provides critical background to the debate over the wood 
supply capacity of Australia's existing softwood plantations (chapter 7). Hanson' s 
consumption projections set the planting target. With actual consumption being slightly 
more than half that projected in Hanson (1963a) and the planting target and 
productivity exceeding expectations, Australia's plantations should therefore be able to 
meet not half Australia's consumption as planned, but virtually the entire consumption 
in wood volume terms. 
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A2 Methods 
Hanson prepared separate consumption projections for each major wood product - sawn 
timber (including sleepers), plywood and veneer, particleboard, newsprint, printing and 
writing paper, paperboard, other paper, hardboard, softboard, poles, piles and posts and 
fuel wood. Fuel wood is excluded from this analysis to be consistent with the 
definitions and focus of this thesis on industrial wood for wood products. Hanson 
assumed an Australian population of 22.4 million people in 2000 and per capita 
consumption of each project as specified. The projected consumption of each wood 
product was converted to its log equivalent and aggregated. 
This appendix quantifies the error sources by reworking Hanson's projections with 
each assumption, or implied assumption (per capita consumption, population, paper 
recycling, conversion to log equivalent) replaced with the actual or estimated figure for 
2000, all else held constant. This enables us to answer the question, for example, if 
Hanson's assumption about Australia's per capita consumption of sawn timber in 2000 
was correct, all other assumptions held constant, how would the consumption 
projection change? 
Hanson reports in imperial units. In this appendix all data have been converted to 
metric units, namely: 
• 
• 
• 
100 super feet= 0.235973 m3 
1 cubic foot= 0.0283168 m3 
1 ton= 1.01605 tonnes 
• Products reported in square feet were converted to cubic feet using the product 
thickness reported in Forestry and Timber Bureau (1969). 
The year 2000 is taken as the year ending 31 December 2000. 
ABARE, in their publication Australian Bureau of Agricultural and Resource 
Economics (2001 b ), presented estimates of Australia's actual wood consumption - the 
latest year being 1999/00. The same publication reported calendar year 2000 data for all 
wood products except paper and railway sleepers. Table Al uses these data, together 
with the specified wood conversion factors, to obtain a wood consumption estimate for 
calendar year 2000 (Hanson's projection period) using the maximum amount of 
available data for 2000. The use of financial 1999/00 data for paper consumption will 
reduce the estimated wood consumption in 2000. Offsetting this factor is the sawn 
timber figure for calendar 2000 that is affected by the one-off pre goods and services 
tax implementation building boom. It is estimated that Australia consumed 18.6 million 
m
3 of wood in 2000 (table Al). 
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Table Al Estimated Australian consumption of wood in 2000.a Source: Australian Bureau of 
Agricultural and Resource Economics (200 I b ); Beca Simons Australia Pty. Ltd. et al. (1997) ; Clark (1995a); Forestry and Timber Bureau (1969) ; Hanson (1962a) . 
Sawn timber 
Railway sleepers 
Plywood 
Particleboard 
Medium 
fibreboard 
Hardboard 
Softboard 
Paper 
density 
Newsprint 
Printing & writing 
Household & 
sanitary 
Packaging 
Poles, piles, posts, 
Deduction for saw and 
plywood mill residues 
(30% of log) used to 
make panels and paperf 
Total wood required to 
meet Australian wood 
products consumption 
in 2000 
Hanson 1962 wood 
consumption 
projectiong 
Wood product Wood conversion Wood consumption 
consumption facto? 
(000 m3 for all products 
except paper that is 
reported in 000 tonnes) 
4 704 
296 
966 
464 
100 
34 
3 841 C 
755 
1 277 
262 
1 547 
0.40 
0.40 
0.50 
0.55 
0.55 
0.55 
0.55 
e 
1.00 
(000 m3 roundwood 
equivalent) 
11 760 
58 
592 
1 756 
844 
182 
62 
5 822 C 
(3 150) 
18 588 
32 600 
a. Year ending 31 December. Where data are not yet available for the full calendar year 2000, year 
ending 3 0 June data are used as noted. 
b. This figure is divided into the finished wood product volume to estimate the volume of wood (in 
roundwood form) required to make the finished product. Conversion factors are sourced from Beca 
Simons Australia Pty. Ltd. et al. (1997). The sawn timber figure (also used for railway sleepers) was 
reduced from 0.45 to 0.40, in line with the author's knowledge of Australia 's softwood sawn timber 
industry (Clark 1995a). Conversion factors for softboard and hardboard were set to that assumed for 
other wood based panels. 
c. Year ending 30 June 2000. 
d. Author estimate - hardboard data are not reported because of commercial confidentiality. 
e. Wood volume figure is sourced directly from Australian Bureau of Agricultural and Resource 
Economics (2001b). 
f. Assuming 15 per cent of residues were not used. Full residue use would mean that Australia's wood 
consumption would be 0.6 million m3 less than reported in the table. 
g. Excluding fuel wood and assuming all the allowance for sawmill residues was used for pulp 
production and not fuel wood. 
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A3 Projected saw and veneer log requirements 
A3.1 Per capita consumption of sawn timber (including railway sleepers) 
Hanson argued that widely fluctuating movements with irregular periodicity in 
Australia's per capita consumption of sawn timber meant that its forecasting required a 
subjective judgement. Hanson assumed that by 2000 Australia's per capita 
consumption of sawn timber and railway sleepers would be 0.4 7 m3 per person -
equivalent to the lower figure used in forecasting work by the USA Forest Service 
(Hanson 1962a). Hanson argued that this figure was not ' unduly optimistic' given 
productivity improvements in wood growing and processing and technology 
developments that would enhance the competitiveness of sawn timber against substitute 
non-wood products. An examination of the statistics available to Hanson at the time 
(published by the Forestry and Timber Bureau in its annual reports) shows that during 
the 1950s Australia's per capita consumption of sawn timber was trending down. 
Although Hanson did not ref er to this decade long trend, his view was that an increased 
domestic softwood resource would enable industry to better satisfy the market and also 
enhance its competitiveness through realising scale economies (Hanson 1959). 
Australia's population of 19.28 million people in 2000 (Australian Bureau of Statistics 
2001a) consumed 4.73 million m3 of sawn timber and railway sleepers (table Al). 
Australia's per capita consumption of sawn timber and sleepers in 2000 was 0.2452 m3 
per person - about half the figure Hanson assumed. 
The assumptions made by Hanson, in hindsight, significantly over-stated Australia's 
wood requirements to meet its sawn timber consumption in 2000. Based on projected 
population size and per capita consumption, the projected sawn timber and railway 
sleeper consumption was 10.57 million m3 (0.4719 m3 x 22.4 million). Using Hanson's 
0.5 log to sawn timber conversion factor means that 21.14 million m3 of sawlogs would 
be required to meet projected consumption in 2000. 
Furthermore, had Hanson used a per capita sawn timber and sleeper consumption of 
0.2452 m3 per person (i.e. actual for 2000) all else held constant, projected sawn timber 
and sleeper consumption would have been 5.49 million m3 in 2000 requiring 10.99 
million m3 of logs. 
This means that Hanson's per capita consumption assumption for sawn timber and 
railway sleepers over-estimate Australia's wood requirements for 2000 by 10.16 
million m3 per annum or by 92 per cent. 
A3.2 Sawn timber recovery factor 
Hanson used a log to sawn timber (including railway sleepers) conversion of 0.50. The 
actual for softwood plantation sawn timber is around 0.40 (Clark 1995a). Using a 
higher conversion factor works to lower estimated log requirements. Hanson projected 
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that by 2000 Australia would consume 10.57 million m3 of sawn timber and railway 
sleepers requiring: 
• 21.14 million m3 per annum of logs using a recovery factor of 0.50. 
• 26.43 million m3 per annum of logs using a recovery factor of 0.40. 
Therefore Hanson's sawn timber recovery assumption under-estimated Australia' s 
wood requirements for 2000 by 5.29 million m3 per annum or by 20 per cent. 
A3.3 Sawn timber and railway sleeper consumption in log equivalent 
(combining A4.1 and A4.2) 
The net effect of over-estimating per capita consumption and sawn timber recovery, 
whilst leaving the population assumption unchanged, can be calculated by deducting 
from Hanson's projected sawn timber and railway consumption in log equivalent 
(21.14 million m3 per annum), the reworked figure using today's per capita 
consumption and sawn timber recovery. That is: 
21.14 million m3 - ((22.4 million x 0.2452 m3)/0.4) = 7._41 million m3 per annum. This 
figure represents the over-estimation of Australia's wood requirements in 2000 holding 
Hanson's population assumption constant. For 2000 the over-estimation is 54 per cent. 
A3.4 Per capita plywood and veneer consumption 
Hanson noted the modest upward trend in Australia's plywood and veneer 
consumption, but considered that growth would be constrained by log availability and 
competition from other wood products. He assumed that Australia's per capita 
consumption of plywood and veneer would increase from its then level of 0.0133 m3 
per person to 0.0177 m3 per person by 2000. Actual per capita plywood consumption in 
2000 was 0.0154 m3 per person (calculated from table Al and Australia's population). 
Based on projected population size and per capita consumption, the projected plywood 
and veneer consumption was 0.397 million m3 (0.0177 m3 x 22.4 million). Using 
Hanson's 0.4667 log to plywood conversion factor means that 0.85 million m3 of 
veneer logs would be required to meet projected consumption in 2000. 
If Hanson had used the actual per capita plywood consumption of 0.0154 m3 per person 
for 2000, all else held constant, projected plywood consumption would have been 0.345 
million m3 in 2000 requiring 0.739 million m3 of logs. 
This means that Hanson's per capita consumption assumption for plywood worked to 
slightly over-estimate Australia's wood requirements for 2000 by 0.11 million m3 per 
annum, or by 15 per cent. 
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A3.5 Projected saw, sleeper and veneer log requirements by 2000 (combining 
A3.3 and A3.4) 
The net effect of over-estimating per capita consumption and using a high sawn timber 
recovery factor was to over-estimate Australia's saw, sleeper and veneer log 
requirements in 2000 by 7 .52 million m3 per annum (figure Al). This projection was 52 
per cent above that required for 2000 if Australia's population was as Hanson assumed. 
A4 Projected wood requirements for wood-based panels 
A4.1 Particleboard and medium density fibreboard (MDF) 
The wood requirements for particleboard were not included in Hanson's projections. At 
the time, particleboard was a new product and Hanson considered its wood 
requirements could be met from sawmill residues without drawing on the resource used 
for pulp production. MDF is a product that appeared on the market since the projections 
were undertaken. Australia consumed 1.4300 million m3 of particleboard and MDF in 
2000 requiring 2.6000 million m3 of wood (table Al). Hanson's omission of these 
products works to dampen his projection of Australia's wood requirements in 2000 by 
2.6000 million m3 per annum. 
A4.2 Hardboard 
Hanson considered that growth in hardboard consumption would be constrained by 
competition from plywood. He assumed that per capita consumption would increase to 
0.0265 m3 per person by 2000.96 Hardboard production in Australia is no longer 
recorded for confidentiality reasons, being produced by only one company in 2000. 
Imports are minor. It is estimated (based on Stafford et al. 2000) that Australia 
consumed about 0.1 million m3 of hardboard per annum with per capita consumption of 
0.005 m3 per person in 2000. 
Based on projected population size and per capita consumption, the projected 
hardboard consumption was 0.59 million m3 (0.0265 m3 x 22.4 million). Using 
Hanson's 0.5385 wood to finished product conversion factor means that 1.1023 million 
m3 of wood would be required to meet projected consumption in 2000. 
If Hanson used a per capita hardboard consumption assumption of 0.0050 m3 per 
person (i.e. actual for 2000) all else held constant, projected hardboard consumption 
would have been 0.1120 million m3 in 2000 requiring 0.2080 million m3 of logs. 
This means that Hanson's per capita consumption assumption for hardboard over-
estimated Australia's wood requirements for 2000 by 0.89 million m3 per annum, or by 
430 per cent. 
96 In converting to metric units it was assumed that hardboard was 3/16 inch thick (Forestry and Timber 
Bureau 1969, p. 108). 
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A4.3 Softboard 
Hanson considered that the volume of wood used to produce softboard would revert to 
its mid 1940s levels due to a substitution for some of the raw material market captured 
by bagasse. In 2000 Australia recorded no softboard production and imports97 of only 
0.0337 million m3 requiring an estimated 0.0613 million m3 of wood (table Al) for 
production. 
Hanson assumed that 0.113 million m3 of wood would be required to meet Australia's 
softboard requirements by 2000. This assumption resulted in an over-stating of wood 
requirements by about 0.0520 million m3 per annum as at the end of 2000. 
A4.4 Projected wood requirements for wood-based panels 
(Combining A4.1 to 4.3) 
The effect of Hanson's per capita consumption assumptions and omission of wood 
requirements for particleboard and MDF on Australia's projected wood requirements in 
2000 is as follows: 
• Particleboard/MDF - under-estimated by 2.60 million m3 per annum 
• Hardboard - over- estimated by 0.894 million m3 per annum 
• Softboard - over- estimated by 0.052 million m3 per annum 
• Total wood based panels - under- estimated by 1.654 m3 per annum (figure Al). 
AS Projected wood requirements for paper 
Hanson argued that incomplete pre-war data made it difficult to establish long-term 
paper consumption trends. He noted the F AO warning about establishing a long-term 
growth trend on the relatively short post-war period with its readjustment to more 
liberalised trading. Hanson observed that Australia's per capita consumption of the 
main paper grades followed closely that of the USA, but with a 15 to 20 year lag. 
Assuming that this relationship would remain, Hanson considered that the USA 
forecasts could be used to guide Australian consumption projections. 
A5.1 Newsprint 
Hanson expected that growth in advertising and Australia's population in the 
newspaper-buying age group would increase per capita consumption. F AO projections 
undertaken in 1960 of per capita newsprint consumption in the USA in 1975 ranged 
from 0.0399 tonnes to 0.0445 tonnes (Hanson 1962a). Allowing for the Australian 
15-year lag and a saturation effect, Hanson assumed Australia's per capita consumption 
of newsprint in 2000 to be 0.0454 tonnes per person. In 1999/00 Australia's population 
97 Imports of other fibreboard are included in this figure. 
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of 19.1570 million people (Australian Bureau of Statistics 2001a) consumed 0.755 
million tonnes of newsprint (table Al) - 0.0394 tonnes per person. 
Based on projected population size and per capita consumption, the projected newsprint 
consumption was 1.02 million tonnes (0.0454 tonnes x 22.4 million). Using Hanson's 
finished product to raw material conversion of 1 tonne of newsprint requiring 3.01 m3 
of wood and assumed paper recycling levels, means that 3.06 million m3 of wood 
would be required to meet projected consumption in 2000. 
If Hanson used a per capita newsprint consumption assumption of 0.0394 tonnes per 
person (i.e. actual for 1999/00) all else held constant, projected newsprint consumption 
would have been 0.883 million tonnes in 2000 requiring 2.66 million m3 of wood. 
This means that Hanson's per capita newsprint consumption assumption over-estimated 
Australia's projected wood requirements in 2000 by 0.405 million m3 of wood per 
annum, or by 15 per cent. 
A5.2 Printing and writing paper 
Hanson considered that Australia's per capita consumption of printing and writing 
papers would increase as the industry grew domestically, through import replacement, 
and with increasing consumption of magazines and quality paper for advertising. 
Hanson adopted the then per capita consumption of printing and writing papers in the 
USA of 0.0295 tonnes per person per year as the figure for Australian per capita 
consumption in 2000. In 1999/00 Australia's 19.1570 million people consumed 1.277 
million tonnes of printing and writing paper. Per capita consumption in 1999/00 was 
0.0667 tonnes per person - more than double Hanson's assumption. 
Based on projected population size and per capita consumption, the projected printing 
and writing paper consumption was 0.661 million tonnes (0.0295 tonnes x 22.4 
million). Using Hanson's finished product to raw material conversion of 1 tonne of 
printing and writing paper requiring 3.6445 m3 of wood and assumed paper recycling 
levels, means that 2.41 million m3 of wood was required to meet projected consumption 
in 2000. 
If Hanson had used a per capita printing and writing paper consumption figure of 
0.0667 tonnes per person (i.e. actual for 1999/00) all else held constant, projected 
printing and writing paper consumption would have been 1.49 million tonnes in 2000 
requiring 5.45 million m3 of wood. 
This means that Hanson's per capita printing and wntlng paper consumption 
assumption under-estimated Australia's projected wood requirements in 2000 by 3.037 
million m3 of wood per annum, or by 56 per cent. 
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A5.3 Other paper - paperboard and other paper 
My analysis combines Hanson's projections of the then two paper categories 
'paperboard' and 'other paper' to rule out discrepancies caused by subsequent product 
classification changes of these papers to 'packaging and industrial' and 'household and 
sanitary' papers. Here, 'other paper' refers to the combined grades - i.e. all other papers 
excluding newsprint and printing and writing papers. Packaging and industrial papers 
accounted for 86 percent of Australia's consumption of other papers in 1999/00 
(Australian Bureau of Agricultural and Resource Economics 2001 b ). 
Hanson considered that Australia's per capita consumption of other paper would 
continue its steady increase through to the end of the 20th century. The per capita 
consumption assumption used by Hanson of 0.1383 tonnes per person by 2000 was 
based on a combination of the then USA rate and F AO projections for the USA. 
Australia's 19 .157 million people consumed 1. 809 million tonnes of other papers in 
1999/00 (table Al) - 0.0944 tonnes per person. 
Based on projected population size and per capita consumption, the projected 
consumption of other papers was 3.10 million tonnes (0.1383 tonnes x 22.4 million). 
Using Hanson's finished product to raw material conversion of 1 tonne of other paper 
requiring 2.2570 m 3 of wood and assumed paper recycling levels, means that 6.99 
million m3 of wood would be required to meet projected consumption in 2000. 
If Hanson had used a per capita other paper consumption of 0.0944 tonnes per person 
(i.e. actual for 1999/00) all else held constant, projected consumption of other papers 
would have been 2.11 million tonnes in 2000 requiring 4. 77 million m 3 of wood per 
annum. 
This means that Hanson's per capita other paper consumption assumption over-
estimated Australia's projected wood requirements in 2000 by 2.22 million m3 of wood 
per annum, or by 47 per cent. 
A5.4 Aggregated effect of per capita paper consumption assumptions on 
projected wood requirements (combining A6.1 to A6.3) 
The combined effect of Hanson's per capita consumption assumptions for the various 
paper grades on projected wood requirements are as follows: 
• Newsprint 
• Printing and writing 
• Other paper 
• Total paper 
Al). 
- over- estimated by 0.405 million m3 per annum 
- under- estimated by 3.037 million m3 per annum 
- over- estimated by 2.219 million m3 per annum 
- under- estimated by 0.413 million m3 per annum (figure 
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A5.5 Changes in pulp and paper industry resource productivity 
Hanson made no allowance for wood saving technologies in the pulp and paper 
industry. Over the near four-decade period wood saving technologies such as recycling, 
use of fillers and increased pulping efficiency have significantly reduced the amount of 
wood required to produce a unit of paper (Sedjo & Lyon 1990; Clark 2001a). Here, I 
examine the extent to which wood saving technologies have reduced wood 
requirements to meet Australia's paper consumption. Limitations of the published data 
prevent the calculation of resource productivity for each major paper grade, so the 
analysis is conducted at the aggregate industry level. 
Hanson's projections imply that on average each tonne of paper consumed in Australia 
in 2000 would require 2.6093 m3 of wood. In 1999/00 Australia consumed 3.84 million 
tonnes of paper requiring an estimated 5.82 million m3 of wood to produce (Australian 
Bureau of Agricultural and Resource Economics 2001 b ). On average each tonne of 
paper consumed in Australia in 1999/00 required 1.5158 m3 of wood. By not forseeing 
wood-saving technology, Hanson over-estimated the wood required to meet Australia's 
projected paper consumption in 2000 by 5 .22 million m3, 
i.e. (4.7757 million x 2.6093 )- (4.7757 million x 1.5158) (figure Al). 
A5.6 Use of sawmill residues in pulp production 
Hanson made an allowance for 4.0493 million m3 of sawmill residues to be used for 
pulp production and fuel wood. The figure was not disaggregated and also contains an 
unspecified rounding-off factor. Excluding particleboard consumption on the 
assumption that sawmill residues would meet its wood requirements is a further 
complication. It is · difficult to evaluate the assumption, because of continuing 
limitations with data. Hanson's estimate appears to be reasonable given that an 
estimated 3. 7 million m3 of saw and plywood mill residues was generated in meeting 
Australia's consumption of sawn timber and plywood in 2000 (see table Al and 
allowing 30 per cent for mill residues). Hanson probably assumed that significant 
volumes of residues were not within economic distance of a market, thereby off-setting 
the effect of his high sawn timber consumption projection on residue supply. 
A6 Poles, piles and posts 
Hanson after weighing up new product development, competing products and market 
trends assumed that the total consumption of poles, piles and posts would remain 
relatively unchanged at 0.85 million m3 per annum by 2000. In 1999/00 Australia 
consumed 0.662 million m3 of logs comprising fencing and mining timbers, poles and 
piles (Australian Bureau of Agricultural and Resource Economics 2001 b ). Hanson 
over- estimated Australia' s wood requirements in 2000 by 0.188 million m3 per annum. 
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A7 Population 
Projections of Australia's population extended to 1975 at the time when Hanson was 
preparing his wood projections. Hanson projected Australia's population to 2000 by 
assuming a per annum growth of 1.87 per cent - the lower of the two officially 
estimated population growth rates in 1975 (Hanson 1962a). Hanson considered that 
Australia's population in 2000 would be in the range of 20.1 million to 23.1 million. 
His preferred figure used in the projections was 22.4 million. Australia's population at 
31 December 2000 was estimated to be 19 .28 million people (Australian Bureau of 
Statistics 2001a). Reworking the projections with a population of 19.28 million people 
shows that Hanson's population assumption, all else held constant, over- estimated 
Australia's projected consumption of wood in 2000 by 5.06 million m3 (table A2, 
figure Al). 
Table A2 The effect of the population assumption on Hanson's wood consumption projections 
Product Hanson's projected wood Wood requirements in 
Sawn timber and railway sleepers 
Plywood 
Hardboard 
Softboard 
Newsprint 
Printing and writing papers 
Other papers 
Poles, piles and posts 
Deduction for sawmill residues 
Total wood 
A8 Summary 
requirements in 2000 with 2000 assuming a 
a population of22.4 population of 19.28 
million million. 
( million m3) 
21.24 
0.85 
1.10 
0.11 
3.06 
2.41 
6.99 
0.85 
4.05 
32.56 
(million m3) 
18.20 
0.73 
0.95 
0.10 
2.63 
2.07 
6.02 
0.85 
4.05 
27.50 
Hanson projected that Australia would require 32.6 million m3 per annum of wood by 
2000 ( excluding fuel wood). In 2000, Australia's consumption of wood products 
required an estimated 18.6 million m3 of wood (table Al). Table A3 presents the 
sources of error. 
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Table A3 Sources of error in Hanson 1962 projected Australian wood consumption in 2000 
Error source Effect on projected wood consumption in 2000. 
+ means over-estimate: - means under-estimate 
(million m3 per annum of wood) 
Per capita consumption assumption + 7 .11 
Sawn timber, plywood and sleepersa 
Paper - total 
• Newsprint 
• Printing and writing papers 
• Other paper 
Wood saving technology in the paper industry (mainly 
recycling) 
Wood-based panels consumption 
• Particleboard/MDF 
• Hardboard 
• Softboard 
Consumption of poles, piles and posts 
Australia's population assumption 
Total all sources6 
+7.52 
-0.41 
+5.22 
-1.65 
+0.19 
+5.06 
+14.0 
a. After allowing for Hanson's high sawn timber recovery assumption. 
+0.40 
-3.04 
+2.22 
-2 .60 
+0.89 
+0.05 
b. Error sources cannot be aggregated because the error with the population assumption will be double 
counted. This figure is sourced from table Al. 
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Figure A1 Error source in Hanson (1962a) projected Australian wood requirements in 
2000. 
Wood consumption in 2000 
Hanson 1962 wood consumption projection 
for 2000 
Hanson 1962 overestimation of Australia's 
wood requirements in 2000 
Source of error* 
High assumed per capita consumption of 
sawn timber, plywood and sleepers 
High assumed Australian population 
Not allowing for wood saving technology in 
the paper industry (mainly recycling) 
Understating consumption of wood-based 
panels 
Low assumed per capita paper 
consumption 
Overstating consumption of poles , piles and 
posts 
-5 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 
Million m3 per annum of roundwood 
* Error source calculated by substituting 2000 data for each of Hanson's assumptions whilst 
holding all else constant. The total overestimation cannot be derived by aggregating the 
error sources because the error with the population assumption would be double counted. 
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Appendix B 
Commodity production in the Australian wood and wood 
products industry 
B1 Introduction 
Commodities are homogeneous products that usually meet established standards. This 
means that commodity producers compete largely on price to distinguish their 
company's product from others in the industry. The significance of commodity 
production in the Australian wood and wood products industry is critical information. It 
enhances our understanding of the nature of the industry and its strategies for success, 
thereby assisting in the development of coherent policy. Clark (1995a, p. 19) 
considered that commodity production accounted for between 80 to 90 per cent of the 
Australian wood and wood products industry. The estimate has not been contested and 
is similar to estimates of the share of commodity production in the industry, globally 
(A.J. Leslie pers. comm. 1992). There appears to be no other quantification of 
commodity production in the Australian .industry. 
This appendix presents estimates of the commodity share of Australian production of 
wood and wood products. The approach is based on the product classifications and 
production data from Australian Bureau of Agricultural and Resource Economics 
(2001a). The data are adjusted using the assumptions and information as detailed in 
table B 1 to estimate the volume of commodity based production. The estimation relies 
heavily on the author's industry knowledge to establish commodity production shares 
for each major product. The analysis sets the last stage of domestic processing as the 
point for determining whether the product is a commodity or otherwise. For example, 
all woodchip exports are commodities from an Australian industry perspective, 
although some may be used in the overseas manufacture of specialty papers. 
B2 Finding 
It is estimated that commodity production accounted for around 95 per cent of the 
volume of Australian-made wood and wood products in 1999/00 (table B2). 
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Table Bl Estimated Australian production of commodity wood and wood products 1999/00 (000 m3) 
Product 
Sawn 
timber 
Plywood 
Wood-
based 
panels 
Paper 
Woodchip 
exports 
Log 
exports 
Sleepers 
Other 
(poles, 
posts etc.) 
Actual Estimated Log equivalent Log Assumptions and 
commodity commodity volume focussed equivalent information used 
and non production to commodity volume of to estimate 
commodity production in last commodity commodity 
production stage of domestic and non production 
3 928 3 535 
192 154 
1 599 1 519 
3 080 
8 602 
1 150 1 150 
40 40 
662 662 
production commodity 
production 
8 838 3 9 820 3 
385 a 480 a 
2 3376 2 4606 
9 200g 
1 150 1 150 
54 54 
563 662 
Assuming 10% of 
native forest and 
plantation 
production goes 
into specialty 
markets. Guided 
by Regional 
Forest Agreement 
data ( e.g. Gooday 
et al. 1998). 
Assuming 80% is 
commodity 
production. 
Assuming 5% 
goes into specialty 
mouldings. 
Assuming 
commodity 
production 
accounts for: 
• 100°/o of 
newsprint 
• 80% printing 
and writing 
• 60% 
household & 
sanitary 
• 90% 
packaging 
All chips are sold 
on commodity 
markets 
All commodities 
All commodities 
Assuming 85% 
commodities. 
a. Assuming a 40% sawn timber and veneer recovery factor. ABARE data on saw and veneer log 
removals could not be used because ABARE does not report the volume exported in log form. 
b. Assuming a 65% recovery factor. ABARE provides data on log input for wood based panel 
production, but not sawmill residues. 
c. Assuming 1 m3 of paper on average weighs 0.75 tonnes (Clark 2001a) . 
d. Assuming the ratio of commodity to total paper production applies to wood input. 
e. Wood input data reported in Pulp and Paper Manufacturers Federation of Australia (2001) converted 
from green tonnes to m3 by multiplying hardwood by 0.9 and softwood by 1.0. 
f. Hardwood chips reported in bone dry tonnes converted to m3 by multiplying by 1.68 and softwood 
chips reported in bone dry tonnes converted to m3 by multiplying by 2.47 (Neilson & Flynn 1998, p. 
xiv). 
g. Allowing for 6.5% loss in chip handling and fines. 
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Table B2 aggregates the data across products and removes the double counting of 
sawmill residues utilised in domestic production of wood panels and paper and as chip 
exports to generate an industry wide estimate of commodity production. 
Table B2 Summary table of Australian production of commodity wood and wood products 1999/00 
Product Log equivalent volume Log equivalent Commodity 
focussed to commodity volume of total production 
production in last stage of commodity and non share of total 
domestic production commodity production production 
(000 m3) (000 m3) (0/o) 
Sawn timber & plywood 9 223 10 300 90 
Sleepers 54 54 100 
Other 563 662 85 
Paper, wood based panels, 13 883 14 357 97 
chip exports 
Log exports 1 150 1 150 100 
Total above 24 873 26 523 
Less estimated saw and (2 767) (3 090) 
veneer log residues used in 
domestic production of wood 
panels and paper and chip 
exports.a 
Total 22 106 23 433 94 
a. Assuming that utilised sawmill residues are 30% of the saw and veneer log production. 
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Appendix C 
Value added and employment per unit of wood used in the 
Australian wood and wood products industry 
C1 Introduction 
This appendix presents the methods, data sources and assumptions used to generate 
figure 5 .2 in the main body of this thesis. The ratios of value added and employment 
per unit of wood input were calculated for 1998/99 using Australian Bureau of 
Statistics (ABS) value added and employment data for each of the main industry groups 
in Australia. Wood and wood products volume data were sourced from the Australian 
Bureau of Agricultural and Resource Economics (ABARE) and the Pulp and Paper 
Manufacturers Federation of Australia (PPMF A). The information and assumptions 
used to calculate the ratios are presented in table C 1. 
The ratios could not be calculated separately for the plantation and native forest based 
sectors because the ABS does not disaggregate industry data by wood-growing regime. 
Using ABS value added and employment data for South Australia - virtually all 
plantation based - is not a viable alternative because of the high aggregation across 
products to satisfy confidentiality requirements. Incorporating native forest based 
production in the exercise will not distort the ratios significantly except for the sawn 
timber employment to wood input ratio. This ratio is expected to decline as sawn 
timber produced in more capital intensive plantation mills continues to displace native 
forest sawn timber. 
Employment is that generated inside the mill gate or port; i.e. it excludes employment 
that is general to all sectors of the industry, namely wood growing, logging and 
haulage. 
C2 Finding 
The ratios of value added and employment per unit of wood used in the Australian 
wood and wood products industry are presented in table Cl with methods detailed in 
the notes. 
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Table Cl Value added and employment to wood input ratios for the Australian wood and wood products 
industry 1998/99. Source: Australian Forest Growers (19960; Australian Bureau of Agricultural and 
Resource Economics (200 la); Australian Bureau of Statistics (2000); Dart Radiata Services (1997); New 
Zealand Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry (2001a); Pulp and Paper Manufacturers Federation of 
Australia (1999); Ian Sedger pers. comm. 2001. 
ANZSIC Product Value Roundwood Value added Employment 
product added equivalent 
number 
($ million) (000 m3) 
Softwood plantation 
A grade sawlog 
exports 
Softwood plantation 
chiplog exports 
2312 Wood chip exports0 168.2 7 896e 
2311 Sawn timber, 914.8 9 859 
2313 plywood and veneer 
2321 
2322 Wood-based panels 278.9 2 6951 
2323 Further processing I 008.8 2 200h 
2329 sawn timber and 
panelsg 
2331 PaEer 711.0 3 783J 
2332 Processing paper 1 212.8 ni 
2333 into containers, 
2334 bags, sacks, etc 
2339 
per unit of 
wood 
($ per m3 
roundwood 
equivalent) 
13.743 
0.96c 
21.30 
92.79 
103.49 
275.001 
187.95 
nak 
(persons) 
737 
13 309 
3 522 
25 857 
4 382 
12 912 
Employment 
per unit of 
wood 
(persons per 
000 m3 
roundwood 
equivalent) 
0.08 
0.08 
0.09 
1.35 
1.31 
7.00 1 
1.16 
ni 
a. ABS does not report on value added for log exports. Value added was estimated for A grade 
softwood sawlogs by deducting from the New Zealand fob A grade sawlog price per m3 (New 
Zealand Ministry of Forestry and Agriculture, 200 la) in 1996 converted to $A ($Al00.89), costs of 
$A35.25 for stevedoring, wharfage, loading, storage, wharf holding, cartage over 100 km and 
harvesting (using Australian Forest Growers (1996) for unit cost data) and stumpage of $A5 l.90 
(NSW Government rates reported by DART Radiata Services, 1997) to give an estimated value 
added per m3 of $Al3.74. Nominal log prices have remained stable between 1996 and 1999. 
b. Employment in log handling, weighing and storage, quality assurance and administration per unit of 
wood (Ian Sedger pers. comm. 2001). 
c. Value added calculated using same data sources and methodology as for A grade saw logs (note a) · 
but with fob log price of $A48 .2 l/m3 and costs including stumpage of $A4 7 .25/m3 . 
d. Includes native forest and plantation chip exports to be consistent with ABS value added and 
employment data. 
e. ABARE reported exports of 1 033 200 bone dry tonnes (bdt) of softwood chips converted to m3 by 
multiplying by 2.47 and allowing for 7% loss from chipping and chip handling = 2 744 000 m3 
roundwood equivalent. ABARE reported exports of 2 851800 bdt of hardwood chips converted to 
m
3 by multiplying by 1.68 and allowing for 7% loss from chipping and chip handling= 5 152 000 
m3. These conversion figures are averages - whole log chipping has lower conversions than residue 
chips from sawmills. 
f. To the ABARE estimate of particleboard and medium density fibreboard production in Australia of 
I 397 000 m3 was added an estimated I 00 000 m3 of hardboard production. This combined estimate 
was then converted to roundwood equivalent by multiplying by 1.8. 
g. Processing into wooden structural components (e.g. trusses and door-window units) and other wood 
products (e.g. pallets and containers). Also includes articles manufactured from cork and bamboo 
and further processing of imported products. 
h. In the absence of data on Australian wood processed past sawn timber, plywood and wood-based 
panels, a roundwood equivalent figure was estimated assuming that 60 per cent of wood input for 
panels production was sourced from sawmill residues and 20% of Australian production of sawn 
timber, plywood and wood based panels was further processed. Severe information gaps mean that 
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these assumptions should be treated cautiously. The reason for persisting with the calculation was to 
reinforce the point that the further processing of commodity wood products may lead to significant 
value-adding and employment, a point often lost because of data limitations. 
1. Deducting an assumed 40 per cent of value added and employment to allow for imported products. 
Severe information gaps mean that this assumption should be treated cautiously. Figure 5.2 excludes 
these ratios because the data are not considered to be sufficiently robust. The reason for persisting 
with the calculation was to reinforce the point that the further processing of commodity wood 
products may lead to significant value-adding and employment, a point often lost because of data 
limitations. 
J. Pulp and Paper Manufacturers Federation of Australia reported wood usage of 1 780 000 tonnes of 
softwood (assuming 1: 1 for tonne: m3 conversion) and 1 007 000 tonnes of hardwood converted to 
m
3 by multiplying by 0.85 and adding 310 000 tonnes of imported pulp (90% chemical) converted to 
roundwood equivalent by multiplying by 3.7. 
k. Value added and employment to wood input ratios are high, but difficult to calculate because of data 
limitations. 
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Appendix D 
Australian production of wood and wood products in 
1999/00 and 1989/90 disaggregated by wood source 
D1 Introduction 
Neither the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) nor the Australian Bureau of 
Agricultural and Resource Economics (ABARE) use a wood source (native forest and 
plantation) disaggregation as the basis for statistical reporting. ABARE reports some 
production data by wood source, but not consistently across all wood and wood 
products. This appendix fills in the gaps to provide estimates of Australia's production 
of wood and wood products ( excluding fuel wood) and exports of unprocessed wood in 
1999/00 disaggregated into plantation and native forest sources. Data sources and 
assumptions are provided in the discussion and tables. The method was also used to 
disaggregate production data by wood source for 1989/90 (table D6) to facilitate the 
evaluation of industry performance over the 1990s ( chapter 5). 
D2 Australian wood supply in 1999/00 
ABARE reports annual roundwood removals with hardwood disaggregated into native 
forest and plantation sources and softwood (mostly plantation) not disaggregated 
(Australian Bureau of Agriculture and Resource Economics 2001 b, p. 63). These data 
exclude logs sold for fuel wood. 
D2.1 Plantation log cut 
The plantation log cut can be estimated by deducting from softwood round wood 
removals (12.475 million m3 in 1999/00) the estimated volume of native forest 
softwood removals (mostly for sawn timber) and adding the volume of hardwood 
plantation removals (0.839 million m3 in 1999/00). ABARE reported that in 1999/00, 
Australia's native forest softwood sawn timber production was 108 800 m3 (Australian 
Bureau of Agriculture and Resource Economics 2001b, p. 13) processed from an 
estimated 272 000 m3 of logs (assuming a 40% sawn timber recovery). It is estimated 
that log removals from Australia's plantations totalled 13.0 million m3 in 1999/00. 
D2.2 Native forest log cut 
Australia's native forest hardwood log removals totalled 10.695 million m3 in 1999/00 
(Australian Bureau of Agriculture and Resource Economics 2001 b, p. 63). The native 
forest log cut can be estimated by adding the native forest softwood log volume (272 
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000 m3). With this adjustment, it is estimated that log removals from Australia's native 
forests totalled 11.0 million m3 in 1999/00. 
D3 Australian production of sawn timber and wood panels in 
1999/00 
It is estimated that 4.2 million m3 of sawn timber and wood panels were made from 
plantation grown wood in 1999/00 accounting for 73 per cent of Australian production 
(table Dl). 
Table Dl Australian production of sawn timber and wood panels 1999/00 (000 m3 finished product) 
Product Made from Made from native Source 
Sawn timber 
Softwood 
Hardwood 
Total 
Particleboard 
Medium density 
fibreboard (MDF) 
Hardboard 
Plywood 
Total sawn timber and 
wood panels 
plantation wood 
2 484.3 
60.0 
2 544.3 
978.1 
621.4 
0.0 
163.0 
4 306.8 
forest wood 
105.7 
1 163.3 
1 269.0 
0.0 
0.06 
100.0 
28.8 
1 397.8 
ABARE 2001b, pp. 13, 63. 
Assuming a 40% sawn timber 
recovery for hardwood 
plantation sawlogs. Native forest 
hardwood sawn timber 
production has been corrected 
for an anomaly in the Victorian 
data.a 
ABARE 2001b, p. 17. 
ABARE 2001b, p. 18. 
Estimated Amatek production in 
Queensland and NSW. 
ABARE 2001 b, p.17 and 
assuming 85% of production is 
plantation based (National 
Association of Forest Industries 
1990, p. 82). 
a. ABARE data overstate Australia's native forest hardwood sawn timber production in calendar year 
2000 by an estimated 9 per cent (Clark 2001 b ). Possible explanations currently being investigated by 
ABARE are the inclusion in the Victorian data of some chiplogs in the sawlog category that were 
not used for sawn timber and a high sawn timber recovery assumption in the calculation of Victorian 
sawn timber production. ABARE' s reported native forest hardwood sawn timber production for 
Victoria in 1999/00 was recalculated using sawlog supply data and the sawn timber recovery 
assumption presented in Jaakko Poyry Consulting (2001, pp. 11, 18). The sawlog supply data were 
adjusted to include 10 per cent of the residual log sales based on Victorian Department of 
Conservation and Natural Resources unpublished data on residual log licence allocations and the 
products manufactured from them. Data reported in tonnes were converted to m3 by multiplying by 
0.8. 
b. Starwood's medium density fibreboard (MDF) plant in Tasmania has been operating at well below 
capacity and whilst the plant was designed to use 50 per cent eucalypt and 50 per cent plantation 
softwood, since start up the majority of the intake has been plantation softwood (Stafford et al. 2000, 
p. 153). 
D4 Australian production of pulp and paper in 1999/00 
Australia uses recycled paper, imported and domestically manufactured pulp, fillers and 
cotton linters as the material inputs for its paper production. Recycled paper accounted 
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for 52 per cent of Australia's paper production in 1999/00 (Pulp and Paper 
Manufacturers Federation of Australia 2001). The importance of recycled paper and 
other non-wood inputs in Australia's paper production means that disaggregating the 
industry's output into plantation and native forest sources is not appropriate. The 
disaggregation is therefore reported as wood input for Australian paper production. 
The Pulp and Paper Manufacturers Federation of Australia (2001) reported softwood 
and hardwood input for Australian pulp and paper production. All softwood is 
plantation based. The hardwood component has not been disaggregated by wood 
source. In 1999/00, PaperlinX used 0.2 million m3 of plantation hardwood in its 
Victorian operations (Stafford et al. 2000). The company's Maryvale, Victorian pulp 
and paper complex is Australia's main user of hardwood chips (Clark 1995a). I 
understand that virtually all other hardwood chips processed in Australia in 1999/00 
were sourced from native forests. 
Wood input reported in tonnes by the Pulp and Paper Manufacturers Federation was 
converted to m3 assuming 1 tonne of native forest (virtually all regrowth) wood used in 
Australian pulp production= 0.9 m3 and 1 tonne of softwood plantation wood= 1 m3. 
Table D2 Wood used for Australian pulp and paper production in 1999/00 (000 m3 wood) 
Plantation Native forest 
Softwood 1 77 6 0 
Hardwood 200 720 
Total 1 976 720 
D5 Australian production of other wood products in 1999/00 
Other wood products comprise railway sleepers, fencing and mining timbers, poles and 
piles. Fuel wood is excluded from this exercise. 
Table D3 Wood used for other products - Australia 1999/00 (000 m3 finished product) 
Railway sleepers 
Fencing, mining , poles 
piles and other 
Total 
Plantation Native forest Source 
0 40 ABARE 2001b, p . 16. 
484 178 ABARE 2001b, p. 63 and 
assuming that all softwood 
production is plantation 
based. 
484 218 
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D6 Australian production of unprocessed wood exports (logs and 
chips) in 1999/00 
Table D4 Australian exports of unprocessed logs and chips 1999/00 (000 m3 roundwood equivalent) 
Plantation Native forest Source 
Hardwood chips 483 5 953 Assuming all ABARE (2001b, p. 63) 
reported plantation hardwood 
production less the wood used for 
PaperlinX's domestic production (see 
above and assuming 1 tonne plantation 
hardwood = 1 m3) is exported as chips. 
Hardwood chip exports (ABARE 
2001 b, p. 56) reported in bone dry 
tonnes multiplied by 1.68 to convert to 
m
3 (Neilson & Flynn 1998, p. xiv). An 
allowance of 6.5% for chip losses and 
fines (Australian Forest Growers 1996) 
was made. The native forest component 
was calculated by netting out 
plantation-based exports. 
Softwood chips 2 764 0 ABARE 2001 b, p. 57 with bone dry 
metric tonnes multiplied by 2.47 to 
convert to m3 (Neilson & Flynn 1998, 
p. xiv) and allowing 6.5% for chip 
losses and fines (Australian Forest 
Growers 1996). 
Softwood logs 1 032 ABARE 2001b, p. 47 and assuming 
half of unspecified logs were plantation 
sourced. 
Hardwood logs 118 ABARE 2001b, p. 47 and assuming all 
hardwood logs are native forest sourced 
and half of unspecified logs are native 
fore st sourced. 
Total unprocessed 
wood 
D7 Summary 
4 279 6 071 
Table D5 Australian production of wood and wood products and unprocessed wood exports by wood 
source 1999/00 
Unit Plantation Native forest 0/o plantation 
Wood production 000 m roundwood 13 000 11 000 54 
Sawn timber & 000 m finished 4 307 1 398 75 
wood panels product 
Wood for 000 m roundwood 1 976 720 73 
domestic pulp 
production 
Other wood 000 m finished 484 218 69 
products product 
Unprocessed 000 m-' roundwood 4 279 6 071 41 
wood - chips & 
logs 
% of wood exported 33 55 
unprocessed 
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D8 Disaggregation of 1989/90 production 
Production data for 1989/90 were disaggregated by wood source using the above 
methods. ABARE data were sourced from Quarterly Forest Products Statistics March 
Quarter 1992 & 1995. The calculations are simplified by the absence of hardwood 
plantation wood production. MDF production not reported by ABARE in 1989/90 was 
sourced from National Association of Forest Industries (1990, p. 78). Log export data 
were sourced from the Australian Bureau of Statistics international trade data. The 
results are presented in table D6. 
Table D6 Australian production of wood and wood products and unprocessed wood exports by wood 
source 1989/90 
Wood production 
Sawn timber & 
wood panels 
Wood for 
domestic pulp 
production 
Other wood 
products 
Unprocessed 
wood - chips and 
logs 
¾of wood 
exported 
unprocessed 
Unit 
000 m3 roundwood 
000 m finished 
product 
000 m roundwood 
000 m3 finished 
product 
000 m3 roundwood 
Plantation 
6 704 
2 304 
2 080 
334 
283 
4 
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Native forest % plantation 
10 861 38 
1 874 55 
1 133 65 
461 42 
4 475 6 
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Appendix E 
Projections of Australia's softwood plantation wood supply 
E 1 Introduction 
This appendix presents the main published projections of Australia's softwood 
plantation wood supply prepared since the late 1980s. Each, in time order, is briefly 
described and presented in tables and figures for comparison. 
E2 Projections of softwood plantation wood supply 
Cameron & Penna (1998) presented projections of softwood plantation wood supply to 
2030 in the Australian Conservation Foundation (ACF) report The Wood and the Trees 
report. They projected wood supply by applying five different management regimes 
(selected and weighted to provide a coverage of the range likely to be implemented 
across Australia) to age profile data for the Australian estate. Details are presented in 
appendix 4 of their report. 
The Australian Forestry Council (1989) presented projections of Australia's softwood 
plantation wood supply potential to 2030 disaggregated by region and log grade. 
Information explaining the projections is limited to reporting the plantation area by 
species and state and plantation productivity (MAI) for Australia as a whole. The 
projections present a relatively low sawlog supply particularly for the period 2000 to 
2019. The absence of documentation, particularly on plantation management 
assumptions, accompanying the projections means the reason for the relatively low 
sawlog supply projection cannot be identified. 
The Resource Assessment Commission (1992a) projected sawlog and chiplog supply 
from Australia's softwood plantations to 2090. Area and productivity data for each 
plantation region were collected in their forest resources survey completed by all state 
and territory forest agencies (Resource Assessment Commission 1992b). Projections of 
sawlog and chiplog supply for the Australian estate are presented graphically not 
numerically. The data presented in the tables and graphs below were generated using 
ANU Data Grabber software.98 The RAC did not document their projection method and 
key information and assumptions are not reported. In preparing projected softwood 
sawlog availability, the RAC reduced their softwood sawlog supply projections by 
about 20 per cent because they considered that Australia faced a softwood chip 
shortage (Resource Assessment Commission 1992a, Ll 1). No evidence or argument 
98 Steve Roxburgh of the Ecosystem Dynamics Group at the Research School of Biological Sciences, 
Australian National University developed the program. 
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was provided to support the chip shortage view despite it contradicting the serious 
problem facing most Australian softwood plantation regions of insufficient markets for 
thinning material (Victorian Wood Products Working Party 1993, p. 22 ; Jaakko Poyry 
2000, p. 16). It is not clear whether the 20 per cent adjustment was made before or after 
the sawlog projections were presented. 
The RAC projected Australia's softwood plantation sawn timber production by 
bringing demand into the analysis. The projections are consumption projections and 
were generated by superimposing assumptions of the Australian softwood plantation 
sawn timber industry's future market share. A model with price as the mechanism for 
aligning supply and demand was not used. Softwood sawn timber (imported and 
domestically produced) was constrained to 65 per cent of the Australian market and 
Australia's softwood plantation sawn timber production was constrained to not exceed 
55 per cent of the total market (Resource Assessment Commission 1992a, L 23). In 
2000, softwoods accounted for 71 per cent of the Australian sawn timber market and 
the market share of Australian softwood plantation sawn timber increased from 36 per 
cent in 1992 to 51 per cent in 2000 (Australian Bureau of Agricultural and Resource 
Economics 2001b and previous editions). In this appendix (table E2 and figure E2) the 
RAC's projections of sawn timber production have been converted to a sawlog 
equivalent unit ( assuming a 40 per cent sawn timber recovery) to enable comparison 
with projections of sawlog supply. The RAC's sawlog supply projections are presented 
as RAC 1 and the sawn timber production projections presented in log equivalent form 
are shown as RAC 2. 
Clark's (1995a) projections of Australia's softwood plantation sawlog and chiplog 
supply are an aggregation of projections prepared for each plantation region. The report 
included state-based working papers presenting each region's plantation area and age 
profile and the productivity and management regime assumptions used to generate the 
projections. The method was described in appendix 1 to the report and a list of the 
names of people and their organisations consulted was presented in appendix 3. The 
national projections focus on wood supply becoming available at 2000 and 2005 when 
Australia's softwood plantation estate will be fully on stream. Short-term surges that 
raised wood supply in 2000 to 2005 above what the plantations could sustainably 
supply ( assuming no increase in plantation productivity) were removed to ensure that 
processing opportunities could be maintained with a sustainable wood resource. 
Reliable data across the estate on likely plantation productivity improvements are not 
available, and so the projections were constrained to the period 2000 to 2010. 
The projections of James et al. (1995) of softwood plantation wood supply to 2015 are 
presented in tables 3 and 8 of their report. Projected total wood supply is an aggregation 
of projections presented by various (unstated) state organisations and sawlog supply is 
assumed to be 70 per cent of this total (James et al. 1995, p. 9 & 12). The report 
provided no further details on data sources, assumptions or methods. 
The National Plantation Inventory (1997) presented regional projections of softwood 
plantation chiplog, sawlog and veneer log supply to 2039. The projections are an 
aggregation of grower-based information and, where not available, projections using 
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indicative yield tables prepared by consultants (Turner & James 1997 a, 1997b ). The 
projections are not documented, an action rationalised by the NPI on the grounds of 
maintaining data confidentiality to secure grower information. At the time 70 per cent 
of Australia's plantation resource was publicly-owned. 
BIS Shrapnel Forestry Group Pty. Ltd. (2000) presented sawlog supply projections for 
Australia disaggregated by state to 2030. The projections are a combination of those 
presented in Australian Forestry Council (1989) and National Plantation Inventory 
(1997) with undocumented adjustments made following discussions with State 
Governments. 
The projections of total softwood plantation wood supply are presented in table El and 
figures El and the sawlog projections are presented in table E2 and figure E2. 
Table El Projections of Australia's softwood plantation wood3 supply 1990-2029 (000 m3 per annum). 
Source: Cameron & Penna (1988); Australian Forestry Council (1989); Resource Assessment 
Commission (1992a); Clark (1995a); James et al. (1995); National Plantation Inventory (1997). 
Cameron & AFC 1989 RAC Clark James et al. NPI 1997 
Penna 1988 1992 b 1995 1995c 
1990-94 8 800 8 712 6 930 
1995-99 10960 8712 6930 11 800 10 462 
2000-04 14 0(50 11 547 13 970 14 400 12 500 11 916 
2005-09 18 270 11 547 13 970 15 550 12 200 12 550 
2010-14 18 670 13 442 13 960 d 12 200 12 085 
2015-19 19 630 13 442 13 960 12 163 
2020-24 19 030 14 746 14 720 12 688 
2025-29 19 280 14 746 14 720 13 199 
a. Includes chiplogs, sawlogs and veneer logs. 
b. Projections presented graphically converted to numbers using ANU Data Grabber software. 
c. Projection period set back one year to align with other projection periods. 
d. Plantation supply expected to continue increasing as productivity improvements are realised. 
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Table E2 Projections of Australia's softwood plantation sawloga supply 1990-2029 (000 m3 per annum) . 
Source: Cameron & Penna (1988); Australian Forestry Council (1989); Resource Assessment 
Commission (1992a); Clark (1995a); James et al. (1995); National Plantation Inventory (1997) ; BIS 
Shrapnel Forestry Group Pty. Ltd (2000). 
Cameron & AFC RAC I 
Penna 1988 1989 1992b 
1990-94 3 930 3 759 3 760 
1995-99 5 240 3 759 3 760 
2000-04 8 530 6 472 7 810 
2005-09 12 380 6 472 7 810 
2010-14 13 540 8 284 8 750 
2015-19 14 630 8 284 8 750 
2020-24 14 340 9 394 8 740 
2025-29 14 090 9 394 8 740 
a. Includes veneer logs . 
RAC2 
1992c 
3 873 
3 873 
5 120 
5 120 
5 090 
5 090 
5 185 
5 185 
Clark 
1995 
9 500 
10 600 
e 
James et 
al. 1995d 
8 300 
8 800 
8 500 
8 500 
NPI 
1997 
5 705 
7 124 
8 585 
8 181 
8 470 
8 914 
9 312 
b. Projections presented graphically converted to numbers using ANU Data Grabber software. 
BIS 
Shrapnel 
2000 
7 746 
10 015 
10 110 
10 110 
10 610 
10 610 
c. Projections of sawn timber production converted to sawlog equivalent assuming 40 per cent sawn 
timber recovery. Note this projection is effectively a consumption projection generated by 
assumptions about the market share for plantation sawn timber. 
d. Projection period set back one year to align with other projection periods. 
e. Supply expected to continue increasing as productivity improvements are realised. 
222 
Figure E1 Projections of wood supply from Australia's softwood plantations 1990-2029. 
Source: Appendix E, table E1. 
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Figure E2 Projections of saw and veneer log supply from Australia's softwood 
plantations 1990-2029. Source: Appendix E, table E2. 
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Appendix F 
Plantation and native forest wood and wood products 
substitutability 
F1 Introduction 
This appendix establishes the technical capacity of Australia's plantation resource to 
substitute for its current use of native forest wood. Firewood, from native forests and 
woodlands, and charcoal are included in the analysis. Technical substitution is based on 
technologies in commercial use. Whether substitution is realised depends on price 
competitiveness, non-price competition factors ( e.g. customer service, quality 
assurance, product attributes), building regulations, buyer behaviour and wood 
availability in volumes to support scale economies in new processing facilities. 
Substitution is examined for Australia as a whole. The smaller regional outcome ( e.g. 
south west Western Australia, south east Queensland, south east NSW) will depend 
largely on how successful each region is in securing additional plantation processing 
investment because the location of Australia's plantations is highly correlated to the 
areas where native forest wood production occurs, the main exception being East 
Gippsland (for a mapping of Australia's native forest types and plantations see National 
Forest Inventory 1998; for a more detailed plantation location see Wood et al. 2001). 
In chapter 5, I argued that a plantation processing industry policy should accompany 
substitution of plantation wood for native forest wood. The structural change in 
Australia's wood and wood products industry (if domestic integration in the plantation 
industry increases together with substitution) will significantly affect the value of 
industry production and employment in some regions. For example, Tasmania's 
eucalypt plantation resource could supply a world competitive pulp and paper making 
complex, which contrasts with its existing largely native forest based export woodchip 
industry. 
Each of the main uses for Australia's current native forest wood resource is examined 
for technical substitution. The investigation is accompanied by a brief discussion on 
plantation resource availability and location. Industrial wood uses are examined in 
order of the volume of native forest wood logged, followed by a brief examination of 
native forest ( and woodland) use for firewood and charcoal. 
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F2 Plantation substitution of native forest industrial wood 
F2.1 Native forest hardwood chips for export and domestic pulp and paper 
production 
Approximately 60 per cent of the 11 million m3 of wood sourced from Australia's 
native forests in 1999/00 was exported as chips or u_sed for domestic pulp and paper 
production (appendix D). Eucalypts account for all the resource. There is consensus 
that Australia's eucalypt plantations present a perfectly substitutable resource. Some 
eucalypt plantation growers argue that their resource is superior to native forest wood 
on quality grounds (see for example Pacific Forest Corporation Ltd. 1999). 
The chiplog supply potential of Australia's existing eucalypt plantations in 2000 was 
estimated to be 2.1 million m3 per annum, with supply increasing to 6.6 million m3 per 
annum by 2005 and 9.8 milliion m3 per annum by 2010 (Duggie 2000, table 4). The 
resource presents a significant substitution opportunity, although the domestic 
processing issue should not be discarded. In 1999/00, Australia's eucalypt plantations 
provided 0.7 million m3 of wood for domestic and overseas paper production 
(Australian Bureau of Agricultural and Resource Economics 2001b, p. 63) - a possible 
warning of plantation resource stockpiling. The eucalypt plantation resource in Western 
Australia is sufficient to supply a greenfield pulp and paper facility within the five 
years of mill planning, approval and construction (based on projections presented in 
Duggie 2000, table 4). The Tasmanian eucalypt plantations can also supply such a 
processing complex by 2010, i.e. shortly after the five year planning, approval and 
construction period (based on projections presented in Duggie 2000, table 4). 
Alternative, but significantly lower resource intensive, uses of the eucalypt plantation 
supply include wood-based panels and sawn timber. 
Despite structural and chemical differences between hardwood and softwood, their 
degree of interchangeability in pulp and paper is high, as shown by the varying 
dependence on one or the other resource in different countries depending on resource 
availability (Higgins 1991 ). Higgins reported that in general hardwoods and softwoods 
are largely interchangeable in pulping, but not completely so - hardwoods are not 
suitable for mechanical pulping without chemicals. In paper making the two resources 
are highly interchangeable with the main limitations being where papers require a high 
tearing strength (a considerable part of the furnish should be long fibred softwood 
pulp), and papers that require printing surfaces for good image reproduction ( a high 
proportion of hardwood fibre is normally required, although softwood can be processed 
to generate the qualities) (Higgins 1991, p. 31 ). If hardwood fibre becomes 
significantly more important in the pulp and paper raw material mix, it could affect 
Australia's softwood sawn timber industry to the extent that markets for softwood 
plantation thinnings become more competitive. 
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F2.2 Native forest sawn timber 
Australia produced 1.3 million m3 of native forest sawn timber (92 per cent hardwood) 
in 1999/00 (appendix D), the second main use of Australia's native forest wood. BIS 
Shrapnel's research into the Australian sawn timber market shows that housing 
accounted for approximately 70 per cent of the hardwood sawn timber consumed in 
Australia in 1999 and the inclusion of non-dwelling building means that building 
accounted for nearly 80 per cent of Australia's hardwood sawn timber consumption in 
1999 (table Fl). These market shares (i.e. including imports) give a reasonable 
approximation of the markets for Australian native forest hardwood sawn timber 
because imports accounted for only 9 per cent of Australian hardwood sawn timber 
consumption and exports of Australian hardwood sawn timber accounted for only 3 per 
cent of Australian hardwood sawn timber production in 1999 (Australian Bureau of 
Agricultural and Resource Economics 2001 b ). 
Table Fl Australian consumption of hardwood and softwood sawn timber 1999. Consumption includes 
domestically produced production and imports. Imported hardwoods accounted for 9 per cent of 
Australia's hardwood sawn timber consumption. Source: BIS Shrapnel Forestry Group Pty. Ltd. (2000, 
table 7.4). 
Application 
Housing including 
alterations and 
additions 
Non dwelling building 
Furniture 
Other 
Total 
Hardwood 
984 
137 
63 
247 
1 431 
Softwood 
2 349 
270 
313 
158 
3 090 
Softwood as per cent 
of total 
(%) 
70.5 
66.3 
83.2 
39.0 
68.3 
An array of non-wood ( e.g. steel, aluminum, plastic composites, bricks, concrete) and 
wood products compete in the market to meet the various building needs (Sedjo & 
Lyon 1990; Lippke 1994; Clark 1995a; BIS Shrapnel Forestry Group Pty. Ltd. 2000). 
The Australian competition within the sawn timber component is largely between 
hardwood and softwood. With most hardwood consumed in Australia being sourced 
from Australian native forests and most softwood from plantations (Australian and 
New Zealand), the competition is effectively between native forests and plantations. 
BIS Shrapnel research indicates that the two resources are substitutable in all 
applications in the Australian housing market (table F2) with differences in market 
share reflecting price, availability, quality, building regulations, buyer behaviour etc. 
The Tasmanian Wilderness Society (TWS) One Stop Timber Shop provides an online 
advisory service to buyers seeking plantation alternatives to native forest products 
including product guides, product sourcing information and professional guidance on 
specifying environmentally preferred products (The Wilderness Society One Stop Timber 
Shop). 
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Table F2 Australian consumption of sawn timber for building houses and multi-dwellings and alterations 
and additions 1999. Source: BIS Shrapnel Forestry Group Pty. Ltd. (2000). 
Application Total consumption Australian Imported Radiata pine Other 
native forest hardwood softwood 
hardwood 
(000 m3) (%) (%) (%) (%) 
Floor bearers & 291.1 69.2 0.3 14.3 16.2 
joists 
Floor boards 106.9 63.4 8.0 12.0 16.6 
Ceiling frames 375.2 6.6 1.8 86.0 5.6 
Wall frames 736.4 7.7 0.5 86.0 5.8 
Roof frames & 710.2 14.4 0.1 78.0 7.5 
trusses 
Architraves & 91.4 17.7 31.5 37.5 13.3 
skirtings 
Facia boards 49.3 17.3 0.6 50.8 31.3 
Window frames 69.8 20.5 32.8 9.9 36.9 
Decks 50.6 26.0 34.7 35.1 4.2 
Pergolas 36.2 17.2 0.5 49 .0 33.2 
Fencing 414.9 50.5 1.2 45.0 3.3 
Doors 43.2 19.5 54.1 8.4 18.1 
Other 357.0 18.5 50.5 14.7 16.4 
Total 0/o 23.8 9.0 57.3 9.9 
Total m3 3 332.2 794.6 299.4 1 908.3 329.9 
High substitutability between native forest and plantation sawn timber is also evident in 
the non-residential building market, which is supplied mainly by non-wood products 
(BIS Shrapnel Forestry Group Pty. Ltd. 2000, pp. 109-17). 
Plantation softwood has a wide market application because it can be processed into a 
diverse range of products. Sawn to specification engineered products made from 
laminated veneers provide strong beams spanning large distances; preservative 
treatment enhances durability; and wood-based panels made from reconstituted 
particles of wood are made for a plethora of applications traditionally met by sawn 
timber and non-wood products (von Weizsacker et al. 1997; Gray & Hall 1999). 
The furniture market absorbs a relatively small proportion of Australia's native forest 
sawn timber (as indicated in table Fl but, note that the figure includes imports) and 
draws on about 1 per cent of Australia's native forest wood cut. Softwood accounts for 
most (83 per cent) of the sawn timber used in Australian furniture production in 1999 
(table Fl) and this share increases markedly with the inclusion of softwood wood-based 
panels, notably medium density fiberboard (MDF). The requirement for native forest 
hardwoods and softwoods for high appearance uses such as furniture, joinery and 
paneling is based primarily on customer preference and represents a relatively low-
volume specialist niche (Resource Assessment Commission 1992a, R14). Consumer 
tastes change (notable examples being the declining consumption of whale products 
and fashion furs) and hardwood and softwood plantations can present an alternative raw 
material to satisfy high appearance quality requirements. For example, Finlayson 
Timber & Hardware Pty. Ltd. processes hoop pine plantations in Queensland into high 
appearance joinery products and its business is expected to grow following the south 
east Queensland Forests Stakeholder/Government Agreement (chapter 6). 
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Other uses for Australian native forest sawn timber include pallets and cases; pickets; 
bridge, wharf and jetty construction; and a plethora of minor products such as ladders, 
tool handles, signs etc. Pallet and case production and repair requires approximately 
200 000 m3 of sawn timber per annum and hardwood and softwood is used in roughly 
equal amounts (BIS Shrapnel Forestry Group Pty. Ltd. 2000, p. 132). Substitution also 
exists in the production of ladders, tools (softwood application can be broadened with 
wood densification treatment), signs, pickets etc. This leaves sawn timber for bridge, 
wharf and jetty construction. BIS Shrapnel Forestry Group Pty. Ltd. (2000, pp. 132-3) 
reported that native forest hardwood ( sawn) timber accounts for half the raw materials 
in wharf and jetty construction and is used to repair bridges. Volume data are not 
provided. The RAC considered that softwood cannot substitute for hardwood in bridge 
construction (Resource Assessment Commission 1992a, Rl 4), although preservative-
treated softwood sawn timber has been used in jetty and pier construction and repair 
(A.Walker-Morrison pers. comm. 2001). 
In summary, softwood plantation sawn timber (and wood-based panels) can substitute 
for nearly all current uses of Australian native forest sawn timber. Whether there is 
sufficient resource in Australia's existing plantations for such a substitution is a key 
piece of information for policy. This information remains shrouded in confusion 
( chapter 7), but time is appearing to bring some clarity (see for example appendix G). 
Australia's consumption of sawn timber, from all domestically produced sources and 
imports, has remained static averaging around 4.2 million m3 per annum over the past 
three decades (figure 5.4). Projections of Australia's softwood plantation sawlog supply 
separate into two groups, those that project Australia's potential to meet its 
consumption virtually immediately (namely Clark 1995a and BIS Shrapnel Forestry 
Group Pty. Ltd. 2000) and all government based projections that identify a significant 
shortfall. The projections, in m3 of sawlog units, are presented in appendix E and in the 
following discussion have been converted to sawn timber equivalent units using a 
standard 0.4 per cent sawn timber conversion factor. Clark (1995a) projected that 
Australia's softwood plantations can produce 3.8 million m3 per annum of sawn timber 
by 2000, increasing to 4.2 million m3 per annum by 2005. BIS Shrapnel Forestry Group 
Pty. Ltd. (2000) projected a softwood plantation sawn timber supply potential of 4.0 
million m3 per annum by 2005 ( appendix E, table E2 with log volumes converted to 
sawn timber units). As noted above, all government-generated projections indicate a 
continuing softwood plantation sawlog supply shortfall although supply is projected to 
increase ( appendix E, table E2 with log volumes converted to sawn timber units) . 
Wood-based panels made from softwood and hardwood plantations add to the capacity 
for plantation products to substitute for native forest sawn timber. It is unlikely that 
sawn timber imports will be completely eliminated. Export markets will be essential if 
the Australian sawn timber industry is to process all the available plantation resource. 
The location for the softwood processing expansion is and will continue to be widely 
distributed throughout Australia because all states participated in the 1960s softwood 
plantation program ( and the ACT through a separate Cabinet decision) and continued 
their planting programs through to the early 1990s ( chapters 2 & 3). A profile of the 
processing potential in each of the plantation regions is presented in Clark ( 1995a). 
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F2.3 Native forest use for wood panels 
Small volumes of native forest hardwood are used to make wood-based panels. 
Plantation hardwood can readily substitute for this resource. Smaller volumes of native 
forest wood are used to make veneer for plywood (appendix D, table Dl). Most 
Australian plywood production is softwood plantation based (appendix D, table Dl). 
The strength attribute of hardwoods means that plywood manufacturers require a 
hardwood resource for some applications (Resource Assessment Commission 1992a, 
R12) although the volumes will be small and the capacity for plantation product 
development to fill the niche remains to be explored. Decorative applications for native 
forest veneer and plywood face the same consumer choice issues as high appearance 
sawn timber discussed above. 
F2.4 Native forest use for other products 
The main products in the other category are sleepers, poles, and posts. Australia's use 
of native forests for railway sleepers has declined markedly over the last three decades 
as railway lines have been progressively converted to concrete sleepering. Australia 
produced 40 000 m3 of railway sleepers in 1999/00 - a 40 per cent decline on the 
previous year (Australian Bureau of Agricultural and Resource Economics 2001 b, p. 
16). Railway authorities are expected to reduce their demand for native forest 
hardwood railway sleepers, favouring concrete and steel with their significantly longer 
track life (BIS Shrapnel Forestry Group Pty. Ltd. 2000, p. 13). Softwood and eucalypt 
plantations will add to the supply of poles and posts. Preservation treatment enhances 
their durability, particularly for in-ground applications, and extends their substitution 
potential. 
F3 Plantation substitution of native forest wood used for firewood 
and charcoal 
F3.1 Firewood 
It is estimated that Australia consumes around 6 million tonnes of firewood per annum 
(Resource Assessment Commission 1992a, p. 248), similar in volume to native forest 
chip exports. Hanson (1962a, p. 14) reported that data on fuel wood consumption were 
the most incomplete of all the wood statistics, but Forestry and Timber Bureau 
estimates suggest that in the early 1960s Australia consumed approximately 4 million 
tonnes of firewood per annum. Traill (2000) argued that most firewood is sourced from 
woodlands and that high extraction rates are further threatening woodland ecosystems. 
Pears (2000) argued that changes in building energy requirements, tightening 
environmental constraints and technology have the potential for enhancing the firewood 
and wood burning heater industry's environmental soundness and also significantly 
reduce domestic firewood demand. He reported on the potential for increased use of 
biomass for commercial and industrial heat, cogeneration, electricity generation and 
transport fuel. Native forest and plantation wood is substitutable in these applications. 
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Auspine Ltd. is proposing to develop a biomass fueled power station at Tarpeena South 
Australia using softwood plantation wood and sawmill residues (Auspine Ltd. 2001). 
Maxwell (2000) reported on government and environment movement initiatives aimed 
at addressing the environmental impacts of the firewood industry and firewood 
consumption in Canberra. Substituting cleaner energy systems for wood burning 
heaters forms a major part of the approach combined with measures to supply wood 
from more environmentally friendly sources. Maxwell reported that a small quantity of 
softwood plantation wood is currently used for firewood in Canberra and increased use 
could be facilitated if the Australian Standards for wood heaters are amended so that 
wood heaters are tested using both hardwoods and softwoods. Parlane & Clark (2000) 
presented preliminary estimates of the potential plantation firewood supply suggesting 
that, after allowing for full use of the resource for industrial products, logging residues 
from Australia's existing softwood plantations could supply between 1.3 to 1.7 times 
Australia's current firewood consumption. This estimate excludes the eucalypt 
plantation resource, does not include plantations in the warmer regions (northern NSW, 
Qld and NT), and assumes all firewood currently consumed is high density forest red 
gum - therefore requiring a greater amount of softwood to generate the equivalent heat. 
F3.2 Charcoal 
Approximately 150 000 tonnes of jarrah was used for charcoal production in Western 
Australia in 1999/00 (Department of Conservation and Land Management 2000, p. 20). 
A similar project, using native forest hardwoods, is proposed for south east NSW with 
the charcoal also used in silicon production (Australian Silicon Pty. Ltd. 2001 ). In its 
public consultation, the developer advised that the charcoal plant will shift to hardwood 
plantations to be established in the Murray Darling Basin (Australian Silicon Pty. Ltd. 
2001, p. 4 ). Further research is required to verify the technical feasibility of charcoal 
production based on Australia's existing hardwood plantations particularly those 
planted to species other than the high ash producing Eucalyptus globulus. Charcoal can 
also be produced from other raw materials, notable coal. 
F4 Summary 
The above product analysis indicates that Australia's softwood and hardwood 
plantation wood and wood products can technically substitute for virtually all current 
Australian native forest wood uses. The exceptions are unknown, but may include very 
small amounts of native forest hardwood used for wharf and bridge building and very 
small amounts of high-appearance native forest sawn timber and veneer reflecting 
consumer preference for such products. 
Projections of Australia's plantation wood supply indicate a sufficiency of resource to 
enable a total substitution of native forest wood supply and imported products with 
potential for additional exports of plantation wood products. Whether these 
opportunities are realised depends largely on the level of investment in plantation 
processing in Australia. 
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Appendix G 
Resolving the difference between CALM and Clark over 
Western Australia's softwood plantation sawlog supply 
G1 Background 
The Western Australian Department of Conservation and Land Management (CALM) 
presented softwood plantation wood supply projections in their 1987 wood and wood 
products industry strategy (Department of Conservation and Land Management 1987). 
The projections show a 3.5 times increase in annual sawlog supply from public 
softwood plantations over the period 1987 to 2002+ to 410 000 m3 per annum 
(Department of Conservation and Land Management 1987, p. 52). The projections 
excluded the private resource (20 per cent of the then softwood estate) and did not 
extend past 2002-2005.99 The ending point made the projections particularly sensitive 
to the rotation assumptions. Radiata pine (the dominant species) plantings reached their 
peak around 1970, which meant that a rotation assumption of 35 plus years would 
result in a large increase in sawlog supply not depicted in the projections. 
The AFC in 1989 (Australian Forestry Council 1989, pp. 65-7) published projections of 
Western Australia's softwood plantation sawlog supply including the private resource. 
Significant volumes of softwood plantation sawlogs were projected to come on stream 
by 2020 however the projected supplies for 2000-2010 were relatively small (ranging 
between 488 000 to 580 000 m3 per annum). The projections are unfortunately 
inadequately documented. 
In 1993 the Western Australian Forest Alliance invited Clark to investigate the role of 
plantations for Western Australia's wood products industry. The paper (Clark 1993), 
using CALM data and allowing for the private resource, identified significant 
opportunities for growth based on processing increasing supplies of softwood and 
eucalypt plantation wood into sawn timber, wood panels and pulp and paper. With the 
support of Federal Government funding for the national plantation study (Clark 1995a, 
see chapter 7 for background discussion), Morris & Clark (1995) undertook a more 
detailed examination of the state's plantation resource and processing opportunities. 
They identified a plantation sawlog supply by 2000 ranging between 680 000 to 790 
000 m3 per annum increasing to 780 000 to 960 000 m3 per annum by 2005 (Morris & 
Clark 1995, p. 232). These projections showed a considerably larger plantation sawlog 
supply available by 2000 than previous work. 
99 The last projection period was defined as 2000+ for two of the three regions. Whilst the projections 
presented numerically ended in the early 2000s, graphical presentations extended the projections in a 
horizontal line to 2040 (Department of Conservation and Land Management 1987, p. 54). 
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In 1997 the BRS presented projections of Western Australia's softwood plantation 
sawlog supply in its National Plantation Inventory (NPI). They projected relatively 
small volumes of sawlogs coming on stream by 2000 ( 436 000 m3 per annum) and a 
significant peak in supply (to 1 005 000 m3 per annum) over the period 2005-2009 
(National Plantation Inventory 1997, p. 81) . 
. • 
Insufficient documentation of the NPI projections significantly constrains peer review. 
An interactive process identified an average productivity for the state's softwood 
plantations of 11 m3 per hectare per annum (Clark 1997±). This was significantly lower 
than the MAI' s reported by the Resource Assessment Commission (RAC) for Western 
Australian softwood plantations: 13.5 to 20 m3 per hectare per annum for public radiata 
pine plantations; 17 to 20 m3 per hectare per annum for private radiata pine plantations; 
and 13 m3 per hectare per annum for pinaster pine plantations (Resource Assessment 
Commission 1992b, chapter 4 p. 7). The plantation productivities implied in the NPI 
projections also contradicted those prepared by Turner and James from the ANU 
Department of Forestry engaged as consultants to the NPI team. The indicative yield 
tables they prepared for Western Australia's plantations used a MAI of 20.7 m3 per 
hectare per annum for radiata pine plantations managed over 3 0 years and 10. 7 m 3 per 
hectare per annum for pinaster pine managed over 45 years (Turner & James 1997a, p. 
8).100 
At a symposium organised by the National Trust of Australia (WA) on the RF A, Clark 
presented a paper aimed at clarifying the plantation supply potential and its 
implications for industry policy and public choice about native forests (Clark 1998a). 
The paper included projections of the softwood plantation resource using projection 
periods that were compatible with the NPI. 
G2 Establishing the difference between CALM and Clark 
Whilst CALM publicly criticised my projections (see for example Department of 
Conservation and Land Management 1996; Coatney 1996), establishing the difference 
between CALM and Clark on the state's softwood plantation sawlog supply potential 
was difficult. This was largely due to the shield CALM created by first using the 
projections in James et al. ( 199 5) and later the National Plantation Inventory ( 1997) to 
criticise Clark's projections rather than releasing their own up-to-date projections. 
CALM also distanced itself from the NPI projections arguing, through its Minister, that 
the ANU consultants prepared the NPI projections (Edwardes 1997). This contradicted 
the NPI that advised that CALM had provided the resource information and that that 
information was accepted as up-to-date and correct and used instead of resource 
information separately provided by individual private growers (National Plantation 
Inventory 1997, p. 17). 
100 Radiata pine accounts for 70 per cent of the softwood plantation estate and pinaster pine 30 per cent 
(National Plantation Inventory 1997, p. 18). 
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To clarify the plantation resource situation Dr Edwards, ALP shadow Minister for the 
Environment, asked the Minister for the Environment in the Western Australian 
Parliament whether CALM was satisfied with the data underpinning the NPI and the 
conclusions of the NPI about plantation wood supply, and asked for the Minister's 
explanation for the substantial discrepancies between the NPI and Clark (Edwards 
1999). The Minister answered as follows: 
Answer: 
1. 'CALM does not have access to all of the data underpinning the 
National Plantation Inventory, so it is unable to provide comment. 
2. The National Plantation Inventory of Australia, as published by the Bureau 
of Resource Sciences in 1997, does not contain or draw any conclusions 
about the availability of plantation timber for the local market. It does 
contain "approximate and broadly average woodflows for each region" 
with Western Australia comprising one region. These estimates were based 
on wood flow forecasts by growers, and where these were not available, 
predictions provided by the Department of Forestry at the Australian 
National University. The wood flow estimates provided in the NPI report 
''present only one scenario. Other scenarios based on a number of defined 
management strategies are also possible. " It is therefore not appropriate 
for CALM to be either satisfied or dissatisfied with their projections. 
3. CALM does not have responsibility for the data or analysis prepared 
in the NPI. Detailed inquiries should therefore be directed to the 
Bureau of Resource Sciences. However, CALM understands that the 
differences probably arise from the differences in the resolution and 
quality of the data used. For example, Judy Clark's analysis applied a 
single yield regime to all plantations by species irrespective of their 
condition, stocking or site quality. Such analyses can only provide, at 
best, a very broad, imprecise indication of future resource 
availability. ' (Edwardes 1999). 
The Minister's answer created the perception that CALM did not prepare the Western 
Australian projections presented in the NPI and therefore had no responsibility in 
resolving the differences with Clark. IOI 
Dr Brian Turner, one of the consultants engaged by the NPI to assist in compiling 
national plantation wood supply projections, confirmed that the Western Australian 
wood supply projections for the period 1995 to 2014 were prepared by CALM. 
CALM's projections were disaggregated into private and public plantation wood 
supplies, but this disaggregated information remains confidential (B. Turner pers. 
comm. 2001 ). All data provided by growers to the NPI are protected under data transfer 
arrangements (National Plantation Inventory 1997, p. 2). 
101 For the record, CALM misrepresented Clark' s methodology as described in Clark (1997f, 1998a). 
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With this clarification of the authorship of the NPI projections for Western Australia, 
the differences between CALM and Clark can now be established. The difference 
narrows down largely to the supply projections for 2000-04 where Clark projects a 
softwood plantation saw log supply 70 per cent higher than CALM (table G 1 ). The large 
difference in the volumes projected for the immediate future has significant 
implications for both native forest conservation and industry policy. 
Table Gl Projections of sawlog supply from Western Australian softwood plantations presented in the 
NPI (prepared by CALM) and prepared by Clark. Source: National Plantation Inventory (1997); Clark 
(1998a) . 
CALM projections for Clark 1998 Difference 
NPI 1997 
(000 m3 per annum) (000 m3 per annum) (%) 
1995-99 313 412 31.6 
2000-04 436 747 71.3 
2005-09 1 005 971 -3.4 
2010-14 677 670 -1.0 
G3 Resolving the difference between CALM and Clark 
The difference between CALM and Clark started to break down in October 1999 when 
Dr Shea Executive Director CALM wrote to Clark enclosing the document An analysis 
of Judy Clark 's softwood saw log yield predictions for Western Australia (Shea 1999a; 
Department of Conservation and Land Management 1999). The Minister did not 
approve the release of the document because she perceived it to be too personal, 
wanting the emotion taken out and a factual report on the projections (Edwardes pers. 
comm. 12 November 1999). 102 It was an important document containing important new 
(and publicly available) information. Specifically, CALM presented new projections of 
softwood sawlog supply from public plantations (Department of Conservation and 
Land Management 1999, pp. 11-2). 103 The projections were presented graphically, with 
the exception of the years 2000 and 2005. Numerical estimates of the projections were 
derived using the ANU' s Data Grabber software104 and are presented in table G3 . 
The next task is to clarify the private softwood plantation sawlog supply potential -
virtually all planted with radiata pine. The NPI did not distinguish between different 
plantation ownership classes and, as mentioned earlier, wood supply projections 
disaggregated by ownership class remain confidential. In this exercise, the sawlog 
supply potential from Western Australia's privately owned softwood plantations was 
estimated using a sawlog MAI of 10.0 m3 per hectare per annum applied to age profile 
data collected by CALM's National Forest Inventory Project Team and presented in 
102 The release of the document could have been triggered by my meeting with the Premier Richard Court 
on 16 July 1999 who wished to be briefed on the state ' s plantation resource supply and my Keynote 
address Can Plantation Forests Solve the Old Growth Forest Debate? to the Western Australian 
Business Forum on 7 October 1999. Representatives from major resources companies, finance sector, 
media, government departments (including the Office of Public Accountability), academia and political 
parties attended. 
103 The projections relate to CALM managed plantations and include sharefarm plantings managed by 
CALM. 
104 Developed by Steve Roxburgh Ecosystem Dynamics Group of the Research School of Biological 
Sciences, ANU. 
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table G2. Dr Turner confirmed the MAI assumption as being consistent with CALM's 
view (B. Turner pers. comm. 2001). 
The sawlog yield table for the private estate was developed as : 
Thinning at age 18 
Thinning at age 24 
Clearfell at age 30 
Sawlog yield (m3 per hectare) 
30 
45 
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The projections are presented in table G3. 
Table G2 Wes tern Australia's private 
Inventory Project Team 1993. 
softwood plantation age profile.a Source: National Forest 
Net area planted in: Hectares 
<1962 116.6 
1962 15.2 
1963 40.3 
1964 50 
1965 57.6 
1966 77.9 
1967 49.1 
1968 63.4 
1969 353.8 
1970 894.2 
1971 1 236.7 
1972 861.0 
1973 978.0 
1974 651.9 
1975 1 275.7 
1976 1 716.3 
1977 843.6 
1978 628.5 
1979 358.1 
1980 209 .2 
1981 290.9 
1982 231.9 
1983 214.8 
1984 215.3 
1985 839.6 
1986 803.8 
1987 727.6 
1988 816.7 
1989 777.4 
1990 448.2 
1991 208 .1 
1992 201.1 
1993 47.9 
Total 16 300 
a. Plantings undertaken in the early 1990s are not fully recorded. 
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Table G3 CALM's projections of sawlog supply from Western Australian public softwood plantations 
and projected sawlog supply from private softwood plantations (000 m3 per annum). Source: Department 
of Conservation and Land Management (1999 , figure 4) for public resource; projections of private 
resource supply based on CALM information as detailed in the discussion. 
Public plantations a Private Plantations Total 
<1995 380 
1995 94 
1996 75 
1997 66 
1998 50 
1999 306 146 452 
2000 366 285 651 
2001 514 323 837 
2002 567 228 795 
2003 616 261 877 
2004 616 180 796 
2005 616 322 938 
2006 616 421 I 037 
2007 616 223 839 
2008 616 165 781 
2009 616 125 741 
2010 616 89 705 
2011 648 100 748 
2012 648 90 738 
2013 652 85 737 
2014 666 71 737 
Average annual supply 581 195 776 
1999 to 2014 
a. Projections presented graphically converted to numerical data using ANU's Data Grabber software. 
The three sets of projections, namely those prepared by CALM for the NPI; CALM's 
revised projections for the public plantations combined with the private resource 
supply; and Clark (1998a), are presented in table G4 and figure Gl. 
Table G4 Projections of sawlog supply from Western Australian softwood plantations presented in the 
NPI (prepared by CALM); CALM (1999) and private plantation projections; and Clark (1998a) (000 m3 
per annum). 
1995-99 
2000-04 
2005-09 
2010-14 
CALM projections for 
NPI 1997 
313 
436 
1 005 
677 
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CALM 1999 and 
projections for private 
plantations using CALM 
data and productivity 
assumptions 
791 
867 
733 
Clark 1998 
412 
747 
971 
670 
Figure G1 Projections of sawlog supply from Western Australian softwood 
plantations presented in the NPI (prepared by CALM) ; CALM (1999) and private 
plantation projections; and Clark (1998a). Source: Table G4. 
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The upwards revisions in CALM's projections of sawlog supply from public softwood 
plantations and incorporation of the private resource brings CALM's projections into 
agreement with those prepared by Clark (table G4, figure Gl). CALM's explanation, 
presented to Parliament, of the differences between its projections and those prepared 
by Clark was spurious because there actually was little difference (figure G 1 ). The 
Clark projections were based on CALM age profile data and productivity assumptions 
and management regimes drawing on CALM information. 
CALM's 1999 projections for the public estate combined with the projections for the 
private estate have important and immediate policy implications with plantation sawlog 
supply over 2000-04 being nearly double what CALM had projected for the NPI. The 
three years of debate between CALM and Clark over the wood supply potential of 
Western Australia's plantations could have been avoided if the BRS had a policy of 
fully documenting the projections it publishes in the NPI to enable critical review. 
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ABARE 
ABC 
ABS 
ac 
ACCC 
ACF 
ACT 
ACTU 
AFC 
AHC 
ALP 
AMIC 
ANM 
ANU 
ANZAAS 
ANZSIC 
APM 
APPITA 
APPM 
ASX 
AUSTIS 
AWU 
BAE 
bdt 
bdu 
BRS 
CALM 
CFMEU 
CIE 
CO2 
cm 
CRES 
CSIR 
CSIRO 
CSR 
DUB 
ESD 
ESFM 
ESTIS 
FAFPIC 
FAO 
Abbreviations 
Australian Bureau of Agricultural and Resource Economics 
Australian Broadcasting Commission 
Australian Bureau of Statistics 
calculated by the author of this thesis 
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission 
Australian Conservation Foundation 
Australian Capital Territory 
Australian Council of Trade Unions 
Australian Forestry Council 
Australian Heritage Commission 
Australian Labor Party 
Australian Mining Industry Council 
Australian Newsprint Mills Ltd. 
Australian National University 
Australian and New Zealand Association for the Advancement of 
Science 
Australian and New Zealand Standard Industrial Classification 
Australian Paper Manufacturers Ltd. 
Technical Association of the Australian and New Zealand Pulp and 
Paper Industry 
Associated Pulp and Paper Mills Ltd. 
Australian Stock Exchange 
Australian Timber Industry Stabilisation Conference 
Australian Workers Union 
Bureau of Agricultural Economics 
bone dry tonne 
bone dry unit 
Bureau of Rural Sciences (previously Bureau of Resource Sciences) 
Department of Conservation and Land Management, Western Australia 
Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union 
Center for International Economics 
carbon dioxide 
centimetre 
Centre for Resource and Environmental Studies, ANU 
Council for Scientific and Industrial Research 
Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation 
Colonial Sugar Refiners Ltd. 
diameter under bark 
ecologically sustainable development 
ecologically sustainable forest management 
Eastern States Timber Industry Stabilisation Conference 
Forestry and Forest Products Industry Council 
Food and Agricultural Organisation of the United Nations 
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FICA 
fob 
FORUM 
FORWOOD 
FPS 
FTB 
GATT 
GDP 
ha 
IFA 
INFORM 
MAI 
mm 
m3 
MDF 
na 
NAFI 
NFF 
NFI 
NFPS 
NPI 
nr 
NSW 
NT 
NZ 
pa 
PPMFA 
PTAA 
Qld 
RAC 
RFA 
RMIT 
SA 
SAPFOR 
Tas 
TWS 
UNESCO 
UNFCCC 
USA 
Vic 
VPC 
WA 
Forest Industries Campaign Association 
free on board 
forest resource use model 
Forestry and Wood-Based Industries Development Conference 
Forest Protection Society 
Commonwealth Forestry and Timber Bureau 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
gross domestic product 
hectare 
Institute of Foresters of Australia 
integrated for est model 
mean annual increment 
millimetres 
cubic metre 
medium density fibreboard 
not available 
National Association of Forest Industries 
National Farmers Federation 
National Forest Inventory 
National Forest Policy Statement 
National Plantation Inventory 
not reported 
New South Wales 
Northern Territory 
New Zealand 
per annum 
Pulp and Paper Manufacturers Federation of Australia 
Plantation Timber Association of Australia 
Queensland 
Resource Assessment Commission 
Regional Forest Agreement 
Royal Melbourne Institute of Technology (now RMIT University) 
South Australia 
South Australia Perpetual Forest (now Auspine Ltd) 
Tasmania 
The Wilderness Society 
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
United States of America 
Victoria 
Victorian Plantation Corporation 
W estem Australia 
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Afforestation 
Agriculture 
Bone dry tonne 
Bone dry unit 
Chiplog 
Commodity 
Ecological integrity 
Forest 
Forest agency 
Free on board 
Green tonne 
Glossary 
planting trees on unforested land - in Australia often 
incorrectly used to mean clearing native forests to plant 
tree crops. 
cultivating land and rearing crops and livestock -
farming. 
(for woodchips) a standard measure of the weight of oven 
dry woodchips. 
(for woodchips) equals 2 400 pounds or 1.0886 bone dry 
tonnes. 
logs that are below sawlog quality but can be chipped 
usually for pulp or wood-based panels. Sometimes 
referred to as pulplogs or pulpwood. 
reasonably standardised product competing primarily on 
pnce. 
of an ecosystem is reliant on the maintenance of 
ecological and evolutionary processes that underpin 
ecosystem function and support biological diversity. 
Threats to the biological composition and structure and 
function of an ecosystem threatens its ecological 
integrity. 
wooded area with a thick growth of trees - includes 
plantations and native forests. 
that part of the State Government agency with specific 
responsibility for managing public native forests or 
plantations for wood production. 
the price of exported product excluding customs, 
insurance and freight costs. 
(for wood and woodchips) a standard measure of the 
weight before drying. 
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Hardwood 
Industrial wood 
Kraft pulp 
Log equivalent 
Mean annual increment 
Multiple use 
National Estate 
Native forest 
0 Id-growth native forest 
Particleboard 
Plantation 
Plywood 
Public interest 
wood from flowering trees (angiosperms) includes 
eucalypts, wattles, poplar, most rainforest species, oaks, 
birches, etc. Also referred to as broadleaves. Many 
hardwoods can be physically soft. 
wood used to make the industrial wood products sawn 
timber, sleepers, veneer, plywood, wood-based panels, 
pulp, poles and posts. Includes sawlogs, veneer logs and 
chiplogs but excludes wood used for fuel and charcoal. 
wood-based pulp made using a chemical (principally 
sodium hydoxide and sodium sulphide) pulping process. 
see roundwood equivalent. 
the average annual increase in wood volume for a 
specified growing period (usually a crop rotation) 
recorded as m 3 per hectare per annum. 
(of native forests) means the management of native 
forests for a variety of uses. In Australia, multiple use 
native forest areas allow wood production. 
those parts of Australia's natural and cultural 
environment listed on the Register of the National Estate 
for their aesthetic, historic, scientific or social 
significance or other special value. 
forests with trees predominantly native to the locality and 
where natural regenerative processes operate either fully 
or in part for the recovery of canopy structure following 
natural or artificial disturbance. 
native forest that is ecologically mature where the effect 
of any human land use activity is now negligible. 
reconstituted wood-based panel made by compressing 
wood particles (such as shavings, sawdust and chips) and 
resin at high temperature. 
trees planted and managed in an agricultural context 
primarily for wood production. 
wood panel made by gluing and compressing veneer. 
as in policy making for the public good, taking a 
disinterested, long term and wide perspective. The tools 
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of deliberative democracy can assist in establishing the 
public interest on specific issues. 
Pulplog see chiplog. 
Regional forest agreement an agreement between the Commonwealth and State 
Government about the long-term use and management of 
forests in a defined region. 
Regrowth native forest native forest dominated by early stages of succession 
following natural or artificial disturbance. 
Rotation length time taken from planting until the final crop (sawlog or 
chiplog) is harvested. 
Roundwood equivalent volume of wood in log form required to produce the 
wood product. 
Sawlogs logs suitable for processing into sawn timber and veneer. 
Can be used for other products including sleepers and 
chips depending usually on market conditions. 
Sawmill residues residues from the manufacturing of sawn timber from 
sawlogs. Includes slabs and edges, sawdust, fines and 
shavings. In this thesis sawmill residues refer to slabs and 
edges used for chip production. 
Sawn timber construction and other material produced by sawing 
wood. 
Silviculture the growing and tending of trees. 
Sawlog stockpile volume of sawlogs in plantations past their commercial 
clearfell harvest age. 
Softwood wood from trees with exposed seeds (gymnosperms) 
includes pines, cypresses and other conifers. The wood is 
usually softer than hardwoods but there are many 
exceptions. 
Stakeholder groups or individuals whose participation in the policy 
processes is governed by a self-interested stake in the 
outcome or who through participation define themselves 
as an interest group. 
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Stumpage 
Timber 
Unprocessed wood 
Value added 
Veneer 
Wood 
Wood-based panels 
Wood panels 
Wood products 
price paid for logs still standing - excludes cost of 
logging and transporting to mill or port. 
variously refers to wood and sawn timber and for clarity 
is best avoided. 
logs, woodchips and other wood particles. 
the net $ value of economic production by a firm - i.e. the 
difference between a firm's total value of production and 
the cost of all material inputs and purchased services that 
it uses. The extent of kiln drying is sometimes used as a 
proxy for value adding in Australia' s native forest sawn 
timber industry, although value added declines if the 
additional costs of processing past the green sawn timber 
stage are not offset by increased revenue. 
thin layer of wood obtained by peeling or slicing logs. 
fibre under the bark of trees. 
products made by compressing and gluing particles or 
pieces of wood, e.g. medium density fibreboard, 
particleboard, hardboard and oriented strand board. 
veneer sheets, plywood and wood-based panels. 
products manufactured from wood - consistent with the 
United Nations FAO definition of industrial wood 
products. Includes sawn timber, plywood, wood-based 
panels, pulp and paper. Excludes fuel wood and charcoal. 
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